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This thesis is an intellectual history of the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada (EFC) and its public 
policy activity from 1983 to 2006. The EFC represents many of the major evangelical Protestant 
denominations and organizations in Canada. Although some commentators interpret its work in light 
of the American Religious Right, the EFC is non-partisan and strives to be more politically moderate. 
This stance reflects the historical political moderation of Canadian evangelicalism. EFC leaders give 
direction to the evangelical community by contributing to the development of an evangelical identity 
that assumes political engagement, ecumenism, persuasion, and a high view of the state. Their model 
of engagement is politically pragmatic and emphasizes the imago Dei principle and the common 
good. 
The two concerns that contributed to evangelical political mobilization in the early 1980s were the 
increasing secularization of Canadian society and the privatization of religion. The EFC responded to 
these concerns in two ways. First, it defined secularism as intent on limiting religion in the public 
sphere. This interpretation enabled EFC leaders to mobilize their constituency, argue that public 
policy can never be religiously neutral, and insist that liberalism is not a neutral philosophy. 
However, it also meant that they did not critique the most secular of all spheres, the economy, or 
recognize the degree to which Christianity continues to enjoy cultural privileges as compared to other 
religions. The struggle against secularism took the EFC to Parliament Hill and into the courts.  
Second, the EFC called for religious groups to be at the policy making “table.” This “table” is a 
liberal-democratic one that often requires participants to engage in discussions in a secular liberal 
manner. The impact of these requirements was evident in the EFC’s participation in the public 
debates surrounding the definition of marriage. Many of its arguments employed liberal reasoning 
and de-emphasized religious convictions. Over time the EFC moved toward the social consensus 
about the need to protect same-sex relationships. This movement, however, did not indicate 
secularization on the part of the EFC. Rather, its leaders desired to develop publicly accessible 




I gratefully acknowledge the support of many people in the production of this thesis. As my 
supervisor, Dr. Scott Kline provided valuable feedback at each and every step, reading many drafts of 
each chapter. Dr. David Seljak shared his knowledge of religion in Canada and did a marvellous job 
of editing the penultimate drafts of the chapters. My husband Mike spent countless hours talking 
through the ideas presented here. In addition, I am grateful for the support of the Social Science and 











Table of Contents 
Author’s Declaration ..............................................................................................................................ii 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................iii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... iv 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................... v 
List of Abbreviations...........................................................................................................................viii 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
Themes ............................................................................................................................................... 7 
Who are Evangelicals? ....................................................................................................................... 8 
Outline of Study ............................................................................................................................... 12 
Chapter 1 Evangelicals and Canadian public life................................................................................. 14 
1.1 Pre-confederation British Toryism............................................................................................. 19 
1.2 Nineteenth century evangelicalism: A Protestant consensus (1760-1880s) ............................... 23 
1.3 Social Gospel: A partial rupture of the Protestant consensus (1880s-1920s)............................. 26 
1.4 Fundamentalism: A further rupture (1920s-1940s) .................................................................... 28 
1.5 Post World War II changes: The decline of Christian cultural domination (1945-1980s) ......... 32 
1.6 Public unease about evangelical political engagement (1990s-2000s)....................................... 37 
1.7 Themes from Canadian history and the EFC.............................................................................. 43 
1.8 Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 46 
Chapter 2 The history of the EFC: Contributing to a Canadian evangelical identity........................... 48 
2.1 Creating the EFC........................................................................................................................ 50 
2.2 Brian Stiller: 1983-1997............................................................................................................. 53 
2.2.1 John Redekop ...................................................................................................................... 63 
2.2.2 Paul Marshall....................................................................................................................... 66 
2.2.3 Redekop’s response to the Kuyperian view of the state ...................................................... 72 
2.3 Gary Walsh: 1997-2002 ............................................................................................................. 75 
2.4 Bruce Clemenger: 2003-present ................................................................................................. 81 
2.5 A return to the Stackhouse/Redekop debate............................................................................... 86 
2.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 89 
Chapter 3 Defining the secular public sphere....................................................................................... 91 
3.1 Developing a definition of secularism........................................................................................ 92 
 
 vi 
3.1.1 Stiller’s identification of secularism as a threat .................................................................. 95 
3.1.2 Developing a discourse of resistance to mobilize evangelical political action ................... 99 
3.1.3 Stiller’s turn toward pluralism .......................................................................................... 104 
3.1.4 Walsh and Clemenger ....................................................................................................... 106 
3.2 Contextualizing the EFC’s definition of secularism ................................................................ 111 
3.2.1 The emergence of secularisms in the West ....................................................................... 111 
3.2.2 Analyzing the EFC’s interactions with secularism ........................................................... 116 
3.3 Political implications of being “at the table” in a secular liberal state..................................... 119 
3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 124 
Chapter 4 Developing a model for political engagement................................................................... 126 
4.1 Abortion ................................................................................................................................... 127 
4.2 Euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide .................................................................................... 137 
4.3 Reproductive technologies....................................................................................................... 144 
4.4 EFC contributions to the public sphere.................................................................................... 149 
4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 153 
Chapter 5 Protecting religious freedom ............................................................................................. 155 
5.1 The legal protection of religious freedom in Canada............................................................... 156 
5.2 The EFC’s involvement in issues of religious freedom ........................................................... 158 
5.2.1 The CRTC and religious broadcasting.............................................................................. 159 
5.2.2 Religious education in public schools............................................................................... 162 
5.2.3 Sexual orientation and educational institutions................................................................. 167 
5.2.4 Protecting the religious freedom of minority groups ........................................................ 170 
5.3 Challenges associated with the EFC’s legal work ................................................................... 173 
5.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 180 
Chapter 6 Advocating for the traditional family and heterosexual marriage..................................... 181 
6.1 Opposing the expansion of gay and lesbian equality rights..................................................... 184 
6.2 The same-sex marriage debate................................................................................................. 193 
6.2.1 Marriage as a social policy issue....................................................................................... 194 
6.2.2 The pluralism argument .................................................................................................... 196 
6.2.3 Same-sex marriage as a threat to religious freedom ......................................................... 197 
6.2.4 Social issues arising from the redefinition of marriage..................................................... 201 
6.3 The impact of liberalism on the EFC’s religious-political subject........................................... 204 
 
 vii 
6.4 Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 209 
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................... 210 
Revisiting the chapters ................................................................................................................... 211 
The EFC as a public religion and the challenges associated with political engagement................ 216 
Future Areas of Study..................................................................................................................... 220 
Appendix A A list of the EFC affiliates ............................................................................................. 223 
Appendix B Statement of Faith of the World Evangelical Alliance .................................................. 226 




List of Abbreviations 
 
AMF  Alliance for Marriage and Family 
BCCT BC College of Teachers 
CCC  Canadian Council of Churches 
CCCB Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops 
CLF  Christian Legal Fellowship 
CMDS Christian Medical and Dental Society 
CPJ  Citizens for Public Justice 
CRTC Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission 
EFC  Evangelical Fellowship of Canada 
ICMF Interfaith Coalition for Marriage and Family 
IFCM Interfaith Coalition for Marriage 
IVCF Inter Varsity Christian Fellowship 
NAE  National Association of Evangelicals 




Despite predictions that religion would become increasingly irrelevant in modern societies (Berger 
1990; Bruce 2002), religion continues to motivate Canadians to engage in public life and claim public 
space to practice their beliefs. People of faith volunteer for organizations that provide social services 
to the poor, donate money to charities, write letters to their Members of Parliament, participate in 
marches and rallies, and create organizations to influence public policy. In addition, religion 
continues to be a social and legal issue in Canada. For example, Canadian Sikhs successfully lobbied 
for changes to the RCMP uniform that allowed Sikh officers to wear their turban and they secured the 
right of Sikh students to wear the ceremonial dagger, or kirpan, in schools. Elsewhere the Islamic 
Institute of Civil Justice asked the Ontario government in 2004 to permit Islamic family law to 
operate under the province’s Arbitration Act. Meanwhile, a number of evangelical organizations 
continue to argue for the right to require their employees to sign lifestyle statements that prohibit, 
among other things, engagement in same-sex relationships.  
In this thesis I trace the political engagement of one evangelical organization, the Evangelical 
Fellowship of Canada (EFC), from 1983 to 2006. More specifically, I examine the development of 
the organization, identify some of the theological and political influences that informed its leaders, 
and study how those leaders responded to secularism. I outline the political and legal interventions 
undertaken by EFC leaders and then analyze those interventions by assessing the degree to which the 
organization operated as a modern public religion and naming some of the challenges that it faced as 
it participated in the public sphere. By “public sphere” I mean the public space in which citizens and 
organizations gather to discuss and help shape government and public policy. At times I use the term 
“public square” to refer to the same space. The EFC enters into political debates by mobilizing 
evangelicals to participate in public life, presenting briefs to Parliamentary committees, building 
relationships with individual Members of Parliament (MP) and at times being involved in closed-door 
planning meetings with these individual Members, intervening in legal cases, and engaging with the 
media. These types of participation are both public and political. I pay particular attention to how the 
EFC communicates with its base and actors in the political and legal spheres.1   
                                                     
1 The term “public sphere” has been theorized by many social, political, and critical theorists. The concept 
emerged during the Enlightenment and developed more fully by Jürgen Habermas in the 1960s. Theorists focus 
on the importance of non-coercive and inclusive deliberation for democracy, the creation of rational public 
opinion, and the potential for participatory deliberation to challenge hegemonic power and the status quo. 
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Created in 1964 to support Christian pastors who felt alienated in what they perceived to be an 
increasingly secular society and to overcome denominational barriers between mainline and 
evangelical churches, the EFC became more intentionally engaged in politics in 1983 when it hired 
Reverend Brian Stiller as its first executive director. A Pentecostal pastor and former director of the 
evangelical ministry Youth for Christ, Stiller had oratory and leadership skills that contributed to the 
growth of the organization. Stiller’s arrival at the EFC serves as the starting point for this study since 
it was during Stiller’s tenure that the EFC developed a model of political engagement and cultivated 
relationships with a number of MPs, including some Cabinet ministers and others in high levels of 
government. The conclusion of the same-sex marriage debate in 2006 marks the end of my study.  
The EFC had invested significant resources into the campaign against gay marriage and the end of 
that debate prompted EFC leaders to pursue new directions that are the subject of on-going debate. 
The EFC is a worthy subject of investigation because it represents the majority of large evangelical 
denominations in Canada, a host of evangelical institutions, just over 1,000 individual congregations, 
and thousands of individuals. Appendix 1 is a list of the EFC’s denominational, institutional, and 
organizational members. Many countries around the world have a national evangelical organization, 
of which the EFC is the second largest, after the National Association of Evangelicals in the US 
(Fieguth 2004). These national organizations are members of the World Evangelical Alliance,2 an 
organization to which the EFC provides significant leadership.3  
The mission statement of the EFC is to gather “evangelicals together for impact, influence and 
identity in ministry and public witness.”4 Although a significant aspect of the EFC’s work is its 
support of churches and their ministries, such as evangelism, in this thesis I focus only on the 
organization’s political and legal engagement in the Canadian public sphere. Within months of hiring 
                                                     
2 Originally created in 1846 in the UK, the organization became the World Evangelical Fellowship in 1951. In 
1982 it changed its name to the World Evangelical Alliance. In 1983 Faith Alive reported that the Alliance had 
28 members (EFC: Together we can. Faith Alive 1 [1]: 20). In 2010, its members included 128 national 
associations and 7 regional organizations. For more about the history and structure of the Alliance, see 
http://www.worldevangelicals.org/members/ (accessed January 2, 2011). 
3 The International Director of the World Evangelical Alliance is Geoff Tunnicliffe, who began his term of 
office in 2005. Prior to and throughout this appointment Tunnicliffe was employed by the EFC. Tunnicliffe is a 
member of the WEA’s International Executive Council and Bruce Clemenger, the EFC’s current president, is 
the secretary of the Council. The EFC houses and supports the WEA’s administration and financial offices. 
4 This mission statement is found on the EFC’s website at http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/ 
NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=178 (accessed March 11, 2011). According to the website, the EFC fulfils its 
mission by drawing together ministry leaders in order to establish or deepen networks, communication, and 
partnerships; facilitating the development of evangelical leaders; representing evangelicals in the public square; 
and publishing a variety of materials that inform, resource, and encourage ministry organizations and leaders.  
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Stiller in 1983, the EFC’s General Council, the governing body of the organization at the time, 
signalled to the membership its intention to be a major, long-term evangelical voice in Canadian 
public life. Faith Alive reported that at the Council’s fall meeting Dr. Frank Peters stated, “It’s one 
thing to play marbles in the back alley ‘for funs,’ but it’s another thing to play ‘for keeps’” (Faith 
Alive 1983a, 40). The statement aptly captured the desire of EFC leaders to become a voice in public 
debates and help shape social policy. Also captured in this statement was the confidence that the 
General Council had in Stiller’s ability to lead evangelicals and address issues pertaining to public 
affairs and social policy. Stiller worked closely with the General Council, which had representation 
from the member denominations and organizations, and together they developed positions and 
strategies. 
Stiller left the organization in 1997. The two presidents who succeeded him, Gary Walsh and Bruce 
Clemenger, continued to engage in the public sphere by developing positions that were based on 
biblical principles that they and other EFC leaders believed would best protect human life and 
promote human flourishing. The number of legal interventions increased, especially in cases 
involving religious freedom and same sex marriage. In addition to their political and legal 
interventions Walsh created an online clearinghouse for articles by and about evangelicals 
(christianity.ca) and Clemenger founded a research centre to study Canadian evangelicalism. 
Methodology 
I study the EFC as an exercise in intellectual history. As the editor of Modern Intellectual History 
noted in the journal’s first issue in 2004, the aim of intellectual history is to illuminate “the 
interactions between texts and context and thereby [recover] contextually the meaning of texts, their 
significance, and the processes of their reception” (2004, 1). According to historian Peter Gordon, 
intellectual history tends “to regard ideas as historically conditioned features of the world which are 
best understood within some larger context” (n.d. 2). For intellectual historians, “context” is a broad 
category that includes social struggles, institutional changes, cultural dispositions, linguistics, and 
intellectual biography (2). As Gordon argues, intellectual historians are committed to understanding 
rather than evaluating ideas and are often interdisciplinary in their scope, drawing from works in 
philosophy, cultural history, political theory, and sociology, including the sociology of knowledge.  
The most relevant aspect of intellectual history that I apply to the EFC is David Hollinger’s 
assertion that one of the operating assumptions of the discipline is “that social action necessarily takes 
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place within a framework of meanings that serve to enable and to restrict what people do” (1982, 
309). Put another way, people’s actions can be understood, at least in part, by the common ideas held 
by the publics of which they are a part (309). This thesis, then, studies the leadership of the EFC and 
how they made meaning of their faith in the context of Canadian secularization. EFC leaders took 
seriously the biblical command to be in the world but not of it. As a result, they refused to privatize 
religion. Instead, they insisted that faith has both private and public aspects and therefore must have a 
voice in the public sphere. 
My position is that the EFC becomes more intelligible when we uncover the manner in which its 
leaders created meaning and discern the religious, social, philosophical, and political influences upon 
them. I hope to enter into the mindset, or worldview, of the EFC and examine how and why its 
leaders participate in Canadian public life as they do. This task requires that I study the context in 
which the EFC operated and how its leaders interpreted and responded to that context. 
In order to delve into the mindset of the organization and its leaders, I examined EFC documents 
and publications, in particular, the legal and political documents it developed as it engaged with 
various social and religious issues. Since 1983 the organization has written many briefs to various 
parliamentary committees and participated in approximately 40 legal cases as an intervener, often in 
coalition with other evangelical, Christian, and religious groups. Most of these documents are 
available on the EFC’s website. In addition, I read every issue of the organization’s magazine, called 
Faith Today (originally published as Faith Alive), from 1983 through 2010. I paid particular attention 
to the regular columns written by the EFC presidents, the EFC updates in each issue, and any 
additional articles written by the presidents or other noteworthy evangelical leaders. I also read the 
three books written by Stiller during his time as EFC president and one published after his tenure at 
the EFC. 
While there is a paucity of in-depth historical writing about the EFC, there are some shorter works 
that provide readers with a solid introduction to the nature of the EFC. These include a brief history of 
the organization written by freelance reporter Debra Fieguth in 2004 to celebrate the organization’s 
40th anniversary, an article written by Stackhouse comparing the EFC with its American counterpart, 
the National Association of Evangelicals (1995), and a chapter in Stackhouse’s Canadian 
Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century (1993). In addition, there are many scholarly and media 
articles written about evangelical political engagement. These articles often include quotes from EFC 
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presidents or other leading evangelical leaders about the EFC. In many of these articles the EFC is 
referred to as a politically moderate organization. 
I augmented this written history by interviewing Brian Stiller and the EFC’s current president, 
Bruce Clemenger. I also interviewed a number of people who knew the EFC well, including 
Stackhouse, John Redekop, a political scientist who volunteered with the EFC in a number of 
capacities from the late 1960s until the 1990s, John Reimer, a Progressive Conservative Member of 
Parliament in the 1980s and early 1990s who worked closely with Stiller during the abortion debate, 
and Gerald Vandezande, co-founder of Citizens for Public Justice and involved with the EFC almost 
since its inception. In order to gain a “thick” understanding of evangelical participation in the public 
square, I interviewed other evangelical leaders such as David Mainse of 100 Huntley Street and Dave 
Quist of the Institute of Marriage and Family Canada and sought the views of such politicians and 
academics as Bill Blaikie, Stockwell Day, Tom Flanagan, John MacKay, and Preston Manning. 
In order to interpret the texts written by the EFC, I drew on the insights of a number of sociologists 
of religion, especially José Casanova, who contests the assumption of many secularization theories 
that religion inevitably declines and is privatized as societies modernize. I argue that the manner in 
which the EFC operated in the public sphere was similar to the national churches studied by 
Casanova in his book Public Religions in the Modern World (1994). Just as Casanova found the 
political engagement of the Roman Catholic Church in various countries and evangelicalism in the 
US to be viable, and even desirable, public religions in modern secular liberal democracies, I find that 
the EFC contributes to Canadian public life. In addition, Casanova’s work helps explain the 
resurgence of evangelical political involvement in Canada that began in the late 1960s. He suggests 
that religious groups and institutions tend to deprivatize when the state intervenes in the private 
sphere or seeks to colonize a religious life-world (227).5 For many Canadian evangelicals, this 
process of deprivatization began when Pierre Trudeau, first as Minister of Justice and then as Prime 
Minister, began liberalizing social policy in the late 1960s and later introduced the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. The latter brought legal rulings on matters of religious conscience 
                                                     
5 Building on the work of Jürgen Habermas, Simone Chambers defines lifeworld as “the background against 
which all social interaction takes place. It is a repository and contains the accumulated interpretations of past 
generations: how the people who went before us understood their world, themselves, and each other, their 
duties, commitments and allegiances, their art and literature … As social actors, we draw upon these 
understandings when trying to make sense of the things that go on around us (or even inside of us).” Chambers, 
“A critical theory of civil society” in Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, eds. Simone Chambers and Will 
Kymlicka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 92. 
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and impacted the ability of religious adherents to practice their faith publicly. Many evangelicals 
interpreted these political and legal changes as state intrusions into their personal lives. 
According to Casanova, religious groups are motivated to enter the public sphere for a variety of 
reasons: a) to defend the traditional lifeworld, for example, by protecting the traditional family; b) to 
challenge the autonomy of the secular spheres such as the state, markets, and science to operate 
without recognition of external moral norms; and/or c) to call for the retention of the concept of the 
common good and remind “modern societies that morality can only exist as an intersubjective 
normative structure” (1994, 228-29). According to Casanova, all three motivations may contribute to 
public dialogue about a society’s normative structures. As the following chapters reveal, all three 
motivations prompted EFC leaders to participate in the public sphere.   
Another theorist who influenced my interpretation of the EFC and its political engagement is Talal 
Asad, a scholar who is more critical of a liberal appreciation of public religion than Casanova. More 
specifically, Asad argues that the ability of religious groups to influence the public sphere is limited 
by modern secular states as they create national identities or “personalities” (2003, 205) and then 
require loyalty to that identity. If necessary, Asad claims, states are willing to employ force to ensure 
obedience and loyalty. He is particularly concerned about the power of the state to form certain types 
of subjects who must adopt, or at least parrot, assumptions about the nature of knowledge, religion, 
desire, and social life if they wish to participate in public discourse. I appeal to Asad’s insight that 
public religions may be compelled to use the same means of political engagement as secular 
politicians and his concern about the modern secular state’s tremendous power (1993, 306) in my 
analysis of the EFC’s participation in the public sphere. 
It is important to note that relying on written documents to the degree that I do in this thesis is 
limiting as documents cannot capture the internal debates and processes involved in arriving at a 
position. For example, if an EFC document reveals a particular theological or political orientation, the 
theological points involved could have been hotly contested during internal discussions. The outsider 
who later reads the documents does not have access to these discussions and therefore assumes the 
dominance of the theology that eventually found its way into the document. Being cognizant of this 
limitation, I made only those theological inferences that can be supported by a variety of documents. 
However, in my search to make the EFC’s positions and methods of engagement intelligible, at times 
I had to comment on the philosophical commitments that were evident in the document without a 
thorough understanding of the background behind the production of the document.   
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As the EFC intervened in public discourse, it encountered a number of challenges. It needed to 
present its positions in a language that could be understood by a religiously diverse population and it 
had to contend with the popular conception that it was a northern extension of the American 
Religious Right. These challenges form two themes developed in this thesis.   
Themes 
The first theme is that the EFC both impacted social policy and was influenced by its engagement 
with politics, the legal system, and public discourse. On the one hand, for example, the EFC 
contributed to the ruling of the Supreme Court to protect the sanctity of life in the Rodriguez case that 
addressed the issue of doctor-assisted suicide in 1993. On the other hand, its participation in the 
public sphere required its leaders to employ secular liberal reasoning and language. While this type of 
participation did not indicate an increasing secularization within the EFC or make it any less 
committed to its evangelical faith, it revealed how the EFC adjusted to and accommodated “the 
world.” Its leaders developed a pragmatic conception of politics and used such liberal ideas as 
equality and rights in some of their arguments. The political and social contexts, then, influenced the 
organization and its leaders.   
The second theme is that the EFC is not a northern version of the American Religious Right. While 
there is a great deal of communication between evangelicals on both sides of the 49th parallel and 
evangelicals in both countries share similar views on such social issues as abortion, euthanasia, and 
same-sex marriage, there are significant political differences between Canadian and American 
evangelicals. This is in part due to the different political and social contexts that exist in the two 
countries. Any religious organization participating in the public sphere in either country must interact 
with that country’s particular history, political system, and cultural milieu. EFC leaders understood 
their own milieu and sought Canadian responses to the issues. They appreciated political “Red 
Toryism,” although with the departure of Stiller and Paul Marshall, a political theorist who influenced 
Stiller’s political thinking, there were virtually no more references to such Red Tories such as George 
Grant in the EFC’s literature and documents.  
Despite the appropriation by EFC leaders of many aspects of Canadian political culture, a number 
of scholars and media reporters interpreted the EFC, and the political mobilization of Canadian 
evangelicals in general, as indicative of the American culture wars moving north. Commentators 
quickly focused on the role of evangelicals in the creation of the Reform Party in 1987 and equated 
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evangelicals with politically conservative, if not reactionary, views. As the Reform Party morphed 
into the Canadian Alliance in 2000 and then the Conservative Party of Canada in 2003, various 
members of the media raised concerns about the evangelical beliefs of the various Party leaders 
(Preston Manning, Stockwell Day, and Stephen Harper) and characterized their supporters as bigoted, 
narrow-minded, intolerant, and un-Canadian (Hoover 2000; McDonald 2006). Some of the fear 
stemmed from evangelical conceptions of their role in public life, which Jonathan Malloy, a political 
scientist who has examined the political engagement of evangelicals in the 2000s, describes in the 
following manner:  
The cognitive centre of evangelical identity assumes not only that 
their interpretation of the Christian faith is superior to all other 
interpretations and faiths, but that it is their duty to share these 
beliefs in order to convert others. Furthermore, evangelical spiritual 
beliefs are closely linked to particular lifestyles and social 
behaviours. A dense evangelical subculture of churches, educational 
institutions, businesses, media and other organizations reinforce their 
identity and contrasts it with the outside world. (2004, 5) 
As Malloy’s words suggest, some of the public unease about evangelical political engagement 
stemmed from the fear that evangelicals would use the law and any political influence they could 
garner to impose their theology, moral code, and lifestyle on others. Indeed, given the desire of many 
evangelicals and a number of their organizations to retain the cultural dominance of Christianity, 
there is a Canadian Christian Right in Canada despite the fact that it looks differently than it does in 
the US.    
Who are Evangelicals? 
Part of the difficulty of distinguishing Canadian evangelicals from their American counterparts is the 
lack of common definitions for the terms “evangelical” and “fundamentalism.” The two terms are 
frequently confused in public discourse. The word “evangelical” comes from the Greek root word 
“euangelion,” which means “Good News.” First used to describe the teachings of John Wycliffe in 
1360, the term came to be associated with the Protestant Reformation and subsequent Protestant 
revivalist movements of the 16th century in Britain and North America, including those of Henry 
Alline in Maritime Canada during the eighteenth century (Browne 2001, 45). Indeed, evangelicalism 
had significant influence in early Canadian history, evidenced in the dominance of Baptists and 
Methodists in the Maritimes, particularly in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Throughout much of 
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the nineteenth century an evangelical “creed” influenced many Anglophone Canadians in what is 
today Ontario (Gauvreau 1991), bringing together what are today known as evangelical and mainline 
churches. The advent of the Social Gospel movement shattered this Protestant consensus and 
Protestants in both Canada and the US divided into mainline and evangelical denominations. The 
fundamentalists were an evangelical sub-group that withdrew into sectarian communities in order to 
protect themselves from modern, or liberal, theology and evolutionary biology.  
While fundamentalists in the US comprised a sizeable segment of American evangelicalism,6 in 
Canada they were a proportionally much smaller group with very little status (Stackhouse 1993a, 12, 
21). These demographic differences meant that Canadians did not experience the same “culture wars” 
that occurred in the US after fundamentalists there broke from their self-imposed isolation in the late 
1970s in order to take back the nation for God. These fundamentalists, and the evangelicals who 
joined them, comprised the majority constituency of the “Religious Right.” Their subsequent 
alignment with the Republican Party made them a political force as they fought to keep the Lord’s 
Prayer and teaching of creationism in public schools, repeal the legal protections of gays and lesbians 
against discrimination, and lobby for socially conservative policies. The resulting political divide 
between this Religious Right and American liberals spawned the culture wars.  
Although this brief history differentiates between evangelicalism and fundamentalism, the term 
“evangelical” remains difficult to define. Many contemporary scholars rely on the definition 
developed by British historian David W. Bebbington, who identified four elements of evangelical 
belief. According to Bebbington, evangelicals elevate the Bible as the ultimate religious authority, 
posit Jesus’ salvation work on the cross as central to their faith, focus on the importance of a change 
of heart within each believer (or New Birth), and promote “an energetic, individualistic approach to 
religious duties and social involvement” (Noll, Bebbington, and Rawlyk 1994, 6). While the degree to 
                                                     
6 George Marsden defines fundamentalism as a “militantly anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism.” American 
fundamentalists desire a national revival and tend to be dispensational premillennialistsm referring to the 
practice of dividing history into eras, known as dispensations. The final dispensation is when Christ returns to 
earth to rule for 1,000 years (2006, 4-5, 232-33).  According to some premillenialists, in the “last days” prior to 
Christ’s return, the world will experience great tribulation and the rise of an Antichrist. See Stanley Grenz, 
David Guretzki, and Cherith Fee Nordling, Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 1999) 39-40, 93-94, and Wilcox 2000, 26-27). 
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which each of these elements is held varies among evangelicals, most scholars adopt these four 
elements as central to evangelical faith and life (Lear 1995, 18).7  
In 1987 Reginald Bibby, a Canadian sociologist who tracks the growth and decline of religion in 
Canada, began referring to evangelicals as “conservative Protestants,” defining them as members of 
particular denominations, such as the Christian and Missionary Alliance, Baptists, Mennonites, 
Nazarenes, Pentecostals, and the Salvation Army. Bibby claimed that these groups share a focus on 
“born again” experiences, stress a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, and emphasize the 
authority of scripture (1987; 1995, 125). However, Stackhouse disagreed with the term “conservative 
Protestant,” arguing that evangelicals tend to be “only selectively conservative.” For Stackhouse, 
evangelicals are innovative in their worship styles and missions and are no longer divided over such 
doctrinal controversies as how to practice baptism or the Lord’s Supper (1995a, 29, italics in 
original). 
In any discussion about how to define terms, it is important to discover how the subjects involved 
define themselves. As Stackhouse observed, terminology is important because “words define us to 
ourselves and to others, and we can even begin to resemble those definitions, however mistaken they 
might be” (1995a, 29). He noted that in the late 1980s Stiller convinced some of the media to stop 
using the term “fundamentalist” when speaking about evangelicals. Stackhouse recalled how Stiller 
informed the media that calling an evangelical a fundamentalist was akin to calling a Black Canadian 
a “nigger” (28).8 The point for Stiller was that he wanted the media to call evangelicals what they 
called themselves. In 1984 he defined conservative Protestantism as:  
a religious faith which holds to the divinity of Jesus Christ; authority 
and trustworthiness of the Scriptures; the reality of sin and Satan; the 
need for each person to be “saved” and to be personally changed and 
indwelt by the Holy Spirit; the responsibility of the Church to preach 
the Gospel throughout the world; the coming again of Jesus Christ; 
and the eternal abode in either a literal heaven or a literal hell. 
(1984a, 19) 
                                                     
7 The 1993 Angus Reid/Rawlyk survey revealed that evangelicals placed a higher value on the Bible and Jesus’s 
work on the cross than on conversionism and activism (Rawlyk 1996, 118-19). 
8 While Stackhouse agreed that journalists must differentiate between evangelicals and fundamentalists, he 
found Stiller’s statement somewhat problematic. He noted that while some evangelicals refer to themselves as 
fundamentalists, African Canadians do not self-identify as “niggers” (Stackhouse 1995a, 28). 
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Stiller then claimed that Protestant churches, particularly Baptist ones, were moving in a more 
theologically conservative direction and predicted that many would come to desire “Bible-based 
ministry” in the coming decades.  
In 2003, the EFC co-sponsored a survey to help determine how many evangelicals were in Canada. 
Respondents had to meet all six of the following indicators in order to be classified as an evangelical: 
1.  Belief that in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, God 
provides the way for the forgiveness of sins 
2.  Belief that the Bible is the Word of God, and is reliable and 
trustworthy 
3.  Commitment of one’s life to Jesus Christ and self-identification 
as a ‘converted Christian’ 
4.  Disagreement with the statement that ‘the concept of God is an 
old superstition that is no longer needed to explain things in these 
modern times’ 
5.  Disagreement with the statement ‘Jesus Christ was not the divine 
son of God’ 
6.  Weekly church attendance.9 
The survey revealed that 19% of Canadians met all the indicators, of which 12% were Protestant and 
7% were Catholic. Given that the category of Protestant evangelicals included both Mormons and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and that some commentators objected to Catholics being labelled evangelical, 
the EFC decided that Canadians identified by the indicators would be considered “evangelically 
aligned” rather than evangelical (Hiemstra 2008, 1).10 
On behalf of, and together with, these ‘”evangelically aligned” Christians the EFC engages in 
public life by promoting pluralism, protecting religious freedom, and advancing what may be termed 
selective socially conservative mores based on its interpretations of the common good and the imago 
                                                     
9 These indicators may be found on the EFC’s website in a link intended to help the media understand the nature 
of evangelicals. For more, see http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=775 
(accessed January 29, 2011). 
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Dei principle, which states that human beings deserve dignity and respect because they are made in 
the image of God. These are the subjects of the following chapters. 
Before I outline the chapters, I need to locate myself in the discussion. I grew up in, and continue to 
hold membership in, the Christian Reformed Church, of which a sizeable contingency holds to the 
Kuyperian neo-Calvinist worldview that I argue in chapter 2 has informed a variety of EFC leaders. 
While some commentators identify the Reformed churches as evangelical, many within Reformed 
churches view themselves as bridging the evangelical and mainline denominations. Prior to this study 
I knew of the existence of the EFC but very little about its positions on specific social issues.  
Outline of Study 
In the first chapter I examine the history of evangelical political engagement in Canada from the 
eighteenth century until the election of Stephen Harper’s Conservatives in January, 2006. My aim in 
this chapter is to differentiate between Canadian and American evangelicals and to argue that most 
Canadian evangelicals were politically moderate throughout most of the twentieth century. In fact, the 
evidence suggests that throughout the twentieth century evangelical voting patterns reflected the same 
patterns evident in the general population. In this thesis the term “politically moderate” refers to those 
who seek the political centre, whether it be the centre-left or centre-right, do not use religion to 
polarize politics and public opinion, and are willing to engage in dialogue with those who hold 
different religious, political, and social views. Such dialogue does not preclude, however, that the 
participants may hold strong views on social or economic issues. 
The second chapter looks at the history and development of the EFC from its inception in 1964 to 
2006. During this time the EFC helped shape a particular Canadian identity that reflected the political 
moderation discussed in chapter 1. I spend considerable time tracing the religious and political 
influences on the three EFC presidents.  
Chapter 3 investigates how the EFC defined and interacted with Canadian secularism. Resisting 
what it defined as the forces of secularism was a central aspect of the EFC’s raison d’etre, although 
the manner in which its leaders conceptualized secularism changed over time, becoming more 
nuanced and less dualistic. This investigation is followed by an overview of some of the political 
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Stackhouse argues that the Catholic evangelicals found by the survey were simply “reasonably faithful 
Roman Catholics.” The problem with the questions, he suggests, is that they did not distinguish between the 
different views of tradition and the Bible held by Protestants and Catholics (2007, 1). 
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implications of a religious organization participating in the public sphere of a modern secular liberal 
state. 
In chapter 4 I study the political model of engagement developed by the EFC as it participated in 
the “life” issues of abortion, euthanasia, and reproductive technologies. The model was politically 
pragmatic in that it took into account the difficult process of creating legislation. To support their 
model of engagement EFC leaders grounded their positions on arguments of the common good and 
the imago Dei principle. 
Chapter 5 examines how the EFC protects religious freedom. The areas of religious freedom in 
which the EFC have been involved are religious broadcasting, religious education, sexual orientation 
and religious educational institutions, and the rights of religious minorities to practice their religion. 
Throughout their arguments EFC leaders emphasized that religion cannot be privatized because it 
impacts how one acts in all areas of life, including politics and education. In addition, they argued 
that there must be public space for religious adherents to live out their commitments, meaning that 
they should not be ordered to participate in public life as “a-religious” participants.  
During the early 2000s, the EFC became immersed in the issue of redefining marriage to include 
gay and lesbian relationships. The desire of EFC leaders to protect the traditional family is the subject 
of chapter 6. These leaders argued that the traditional family is the best institution in which to raise 
children and interpreted the issue within the frame of religious freedom. At the end of the chapter I 
examine the type of religious-political subject created by the EFC as it participated in the public 
debates about the nature of marriage.  
The EFC is a multi-faceted evangelical organization that seeks to influence public policy and 
public life. Its leaders not only recognize the distinct Canadian context in which they operate, but are 
aware that the context requires a particular type of participation. In this manner they are cognizant of 
the key elements of intellectual history: that ideas are important and that they are worked out in 
particular contexts. The first chapter sets the broad Canadian context by examining the role of 




Evangelicals and Canadian public life 
When the Reform Party gained 19 percent of the popular vote and 52 seats in the 1993 federal 
election, Canadian political scientist Alan C. Cairns warned of an impending “culture war” due to the 
fundamentalist streak of evangelicalism he saw in the Party. After noting the evangelical faith of 
Reform’s leader Preston Manning and other Reform candidates, Cairns noted that “the visceral 
antipathy to Reform from the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, from ethnic 
groups, and from French language minority organizations outside Quebec underlines the extent to 
which cultural conflict over contending life styles now has explicitly entered partisan federal politics, 
a decade after entering courtrooms via the Charter” (1994, 230).11 The term “culture war” is 
politically loaded. It conjures up images of conflicts in the US typically involving the issues of 
abortion, gay rights, feminism, pornography, the family, and law and order. In 1993, the culture war 
metaphor was in wide circulation as Bill Clinton, a Democrat, had won the 1992 US Presidential 
election running a campaign that embraced reproductive choice, gay rights, women’s rights, and 
public funding for the arts. Clinton’s policies met resistance from the American “Religious Right,”12 a 
social movement that, beginning in the late 1970s, mobilized American religious conservatives, 
particularly conservative Protestants, to become politically active in order to stop abortions and 
promote the teaching of creationism in public schools. Some of the Religious Right’s best-known 
leaders include Dr. James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family; Jerry Falwell, former leader of 
the Moral Majority; Ralph Reed, former leader of the Christian Coalition; and Pat Robertson, a 
televangelist and unsuccessful contender for the 1988 Republican Presidential nomination (Wilcox 
2000, 5-7).  
The term “culture war” is not only politically loaded; it also has a specific national context. In his 
book Culture Wars (1991), the American sociologist James D. Hunter defined the term as a clash 
between two moral visions, which he identified as orthodoxy and progressivism. Those who ascribe 
to orthodoxy derive their moral values from a transcendent authority while progressives locate moral 
                                                     
11 Cairns incorrectly conflated fundamentalism with evangelicalism.  
12 Although the Religious Right included Mormons and some conservative Jews, it is also known as the 




authority in the assumptions of the modern age, including rationalism and subjectivism (42-45). As 
suggested by the book’s subtitle, The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and 
Politics in America, Hunter’s definition was derived solely from the American context, that is, a 
context in which evangelicals comprise approximately 25 to 33 percent of the American population 
and fundamentalists in turn are a sizeable constituency of that community.   
In applying the term “culture war” to the Canadian context, Cairns was likely attempting to be 
rhetorically provocative. It would seem obvious that he was warning of an impending conflict 
between conservative religious figures associated with the Reform Party and the new Liberal 
government of Canada. Though somewhat less obvious, it is quite possible that Cairns was implying 
that the Reform Party was somehow acting un-Canadian by introducing an American-style politicized 
religious discourse to Canadian politics. All speculation aside, Cairns’ forecast of an impending 
culture war was indicative of a common theme in many criticisms of evangelical participation in 
Canadian politics; namely, that Canadian and American evangelicals are motivated by the same 
social, cultural, and political forces. The result is the conflation of American and Canadian 
evangelicalism. To be fair to Cairns, his vision of a looming Canadian culture war included additional 
conflicts over language policy, multiculturalism, and immigration. Still, to apply the term of culture 
war to events occurring in Canada ignored the fact that Canadian history and political culture are 
sufficiently different from the US and require distinct Canadian evangelical responses to social and 
political issues (Hoover et al. 2002). 
In this chapter I examine the history of evangelical participation in Canadian public life in order to 
establish the context for the emergence of the EFC. I trace evangelical political action from the early 
settlement of Canada prior to Confederation through to the election of Stephen Harper as Prime 
Minister in 2006. For each historical time period I look at the relationship between evangelicals and 
Canadian political culture. I then conclude the chapter by explaining how Canadian history helps 
explain 1) why Canadian evangelicals tend to be politically moderate; 2) the rapid secularization of 
Canadian society after World War II; and 3) the challenges that faced the EFC as it sought to lead 
evangelicals to participate in the public sphere. 
 The manner in which I use the term “evangelical” in this chapter requires some further 
commentary as its composition changed in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Beginning in 
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the 1760s, itinerant Methodist13 and Baptist preachers from the US introduced evangelical revivalism 
to the Maritime colonies and a few decades later to Upper Canada. Over time these evangelicals 
cooperated with members of the Church of England (the Anglican Church) and Presbyterian churches 
on the basis of their shared desire to “Christianize” the colonies in the Maritimes and central Canada. 
By the time of Confederation in 1867, evangelicalism dominated Canadian Protestantism. Therefore, 
in the nineteenth century the term “evangelical” referred to Methodists and Baptists as well as 
significant sectors within the Church of England and the Presbyterians. This Protestant consensus 
fractured at the turn of the twentieth century when the Methodists, Presbyterians, and Church of 
England adopted a more liberal, progressive theology. These denominations became known as 
“mainline” Protestants and represented the majority of Canadian Protestants. The minority group, 
consisting of largely Holiness and Pentecostal sects retained the name “evangelical.” They rejected 
progressive theology and continued to emphasize the need for evangelism and individual 
conversion.14 Given the different composition of evangelicals in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, it is problematic to denote both groups by the single term “evangelical.” In order to make 
the necessary distinctions I refer to the earlier group as “nineteenth century evangelicals” and the later 
group as either “conservative evangelicals” or simply “evangelicals.” In all subsequent chapters the 
term “evangelical” refers solely to the latter group as found in the twentieth century. This chapter 
traces how both nineteenth and twentieth century evangelicals interacted with the Canadian state and 
Canadian political culture.15  
Political scientist David Bell defined political culture as the ideas, beliefs, and values that inform 
political action and affect “the kinds of social problems we address and the solutions we attempt” 
(1992, 187). For Bell, political culture is expressed and preserved by symbols and slogans and is 
interrelated with social and cultural changes in that such changes result in shifts in political and public 
discourse. For example, the constitutional debates of the late 1980s and early 1990s introduced such 
concepts as “sovereignty association” and “distinct society” into Canadian political discourse and 
                                                     
13 Methodists are followers of British reformer John Wesley, who held a radical view of society evidenced in 
two of his beliefs: first, that social reform begins in the individual conscience; and second, that liberty is based 
on “individual free choice and conscience, thus allowing Methodists the freedom to withdraw from a 
government of which they did not approve” (Christie 1990, 26). 
14 Two significant evangelical groups were the Salvation Army and Christian and Missionary Alliance. The first 
Salvation Army British immigrants arrived in Canada in 1882. Five years later Canadian A.B. Simpson created 
the Christian and Missionary Alliance in New York City, which experienced significant growth in both the US 
and Canada in the 1920s. The Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada came into existence in 1919. 
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common vocabulary (14-15).16 Bell argued that prior to the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982, 
Canada had a distinct political culture. This was a proposal first developed by American political 
scientist Louis Hartz, who differentiated Canada and the US by what he termed their “political 
ideology” (or political philosophy). Hartz theorized that colonies retain political fragments of the 
mother country that are frozen at the time of colonial independence and do not develop according to 
the “natural” progression of political ideology found in Europe. For Hartz, the first stage involved a 
move from feudalism (or Toryism) to bourgeois liberalism (or Whiggery), which is a non-democratic 
and elitist tradition. Capitalism and the industrialization it engenders encourages democratic 
liberalism, the third stage of development. Socialism is the final stage. Each stage develops out of the 
previous one, meaning that the absence of, say, the feudal/Tory tradition stops the development of 
socialism because “socialism re-creates the feudal community” (1964, 46). Hartz believed that the 
future shrinks when the past is left behind, as “it is the continuing pressure of these older forces which 
renews the doctrinaire passion of European radicalism, renews it utopias” (42). When Hartz applied 
his theory to Canada, he contended that New France (later re-named Lower Canada and then Quebec) 
inherited a feudal/Tory ideology that viewed society organically and ensured social stability by 
distinguishing the rights and responsibilities of social classes. In contrast, the primary ideological 
component of the English-speaking colonies in British North America was the liberal individualism 
of “bourgeois fragments” (34). Hartz thought the presence of the feudal fragment in Quebec and some 
remnants of Toryism in what became Ontario and the Maritime Provinces impeded development of 
responsible government and liberal democracy in Canada (40).  
Gad Horowitz, a student of Hartz, built upon Hartz’s notion that the arrival of British Loyalists 
from the US during the American War of Independence (1775-1783) moderated the liberal bourgeois 
fragment in Canada. Horowitz argued that the presence of the Loyalists and their “Tory touch” 
explains why socialism continues to be an element of Canadian political culture but is virtually absent 
in the US. Horowitz identified the brand of socialism introduced to the US as Marxist and originating 
in Germany. In contrast, Canadian socialism has British roots, is Protestant, labourist, non-Marxist, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
15 Marsden traces a similar shift in the US from a Protestant consensus in the nineteenth century to the division 
between liberals and fundamentalists early in the twentieth century (2006, 232-35). 
16 Bell wrote his book during the constitutional crisis that emerged after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, 
designed to persuade Quebec to agree to the Constitution.  While Bell referred to the “rich tradition” of 
Canada’s political culture, he lamented the loss of this tradition as Canadians become less aware of their 
history. The inability of the different political ideologies (conservatism, liberalism, and socialism) to provide 
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and combines the corporate and organic ideas of Toryism with the rationalist and egalitarian elements 
of liberalism (1995, 23, 33). At the heart of Horowitz’s argument was a desire to explain the 
distinctiveness of Canadian political culture, and, perhaps above all, to explain why Canada is 
different from the US. For Horowitz, Canada differs from the US because it has: a) a Tory touch; b) a 
tradition of right-wing liberalism rather than Jeffersonian liberal democracy; c) a centrist-left wing 
liberalism; d) a socialist movement; and e) greater ideological diversity that contributes to greater 
tolerance (24-29). While Horowitz believed the Tory touch was located in the Progressive 
Conservative (PC) Party,17 he nevertheless identified the Party’s primary political philosophy as 
liberalism (30-33). Canadian philosopher George Grant concurred, claiming that the PC Party 
combined business liberalism with a strong central government, evidenced in its creation of many 
crown corporations such as the CBC, the Bank of Canada, and the CNR (1989, 14).18  
However, a number of historians and political scientists disagree with Horowitz’s thesis that 
Toryism is a distinct element of Canadian political culture. In contrast to Horowitz’s argument that 
Toryism tempered liberalism in Canada, political scientists Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith argued 
that Canadian political culture was not dependent on the opposition of Toryism and liberalism, but on 
the opposition between nineteenth century liberalism and civic republicanism, with the latter found on 
the political left and derived from the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Civic republicans critiqued 
nineteenth century liberalism for its individualism, its bias toward economic development, and its 
focus on rights and freedoms. In contrast, they emphasized community, democracy originating from 
that community, and citizen virtues. Ajzenstat de-emphasized Canadian distinctiveness by pointing to 
the liberal commitments of many early political leaders in British North America (Ajzenstat and 
Smith 1995; Ajzenstat 1995a; 1995b). 
Other commentators focused on different elements of Canadian culture. Political theorist Paul 
Marshall argued that it was the traditions of accommodation and compromise that made Canadian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
solutions to the issues of national unity, regionalism, aboriginal rights, and ethnic tension alarmed him (Bell 
1992, 15-18, 187).  
17 Originally named the Liberal-Conservative Party by Macdonald, the party underwent several name changes 
before 1942, when it became the Progressive Conservative Party. 
18 For an overview of theorists who question the accreditation of these institutions solely to the Conservatives, 
see Bell (1992, 163). The larger point is that regardless of which political party is in power, the Canadian state 
continues to spend more than the US government on the public sector. In 2003 the Canadian government spent 
40 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product on the public sector, compared to approximately 30 per cent spent by 
the American government. On this point Canada is closer to the governments of Western Europe (Adams, 
Langstaff, and Jamieson 2003, 58). 
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political culture unique. According to Marshall, the founders of the Canadian Confederation 
established cultural diversity “as the foundation for public life.” They preferred compromise over 
majoritarian rule and sought to balance individual and communal rights and responsibilities (1992, 
9).19 Indeed, as Marshall pointed out, compromise between the French Catholics and English 
Protestants was critical to the formation of Canada in 1867. Bell identified regionalism as another 
aspect of Canadian culture (1992, 128), which was a result of the sheer size of the country and the 
cultural diversity that resulted from various immigrant groups settling in different parts of the 
country.20 As ethicist Roger Hutchinson observed: “Where we come from in Canada shapes our 
consciousness, our self-images, and our understanding of what we mean by Canada” (1982, 249). It is 
also a reason why a number of political parties in Canada have represented regional interests, such as 
the Social Credit in Alberta and BC, the Bloc Québécois in Quebec, and the Reform Party in the 
West. The resulting fractured political culture often makes it difficult for Canadians to agree on key 
constitutional, economic, and political matters.   
For our purposes, I focus on Canada’s experience with British Toryism to explain one of the 
fundamental differences between US and Canadian evangelicals. In doing so, I find myself in a 
conversation with Gad Horowitz and others, such as Donald Creighton, William L. Morton, George 
Grant, and Eugene Forsey, all of whom argue that Toryism is a significant element that distinguishes 
Canada’s political culture from American political culture.21 Toryism also played an important role in 
the story of Canadian evangelicalism in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
1.1 Pre-confederation British Toryism 
British Toryism is a modern conservative political ideology that points to the Middle Ages as a 
golden age when people interpreted their existence within a divine order and a social hierarchy. Those 
                                                     
19 Marshall understands Confederation as a fundamentally conservative project, seeking to preserve traditional 
values rather than the emancipation of individuals (1992, 9). 
20 For example, many Mennonite immigrants settled in the Prairie Provinces.  Most of the early Sikh and 
Chinese immigrants immigrated to southern British Columbia, the latter to work on the railroad. Many Scots re-
located to Cape Breton Island and many of the Irish fleeing the potato famine (1845-1852) established 
themselves in Toronto and Montreal. 
21 Political scientists Ron Dart (1999; 2004) and William Christian (Christian and Campbell 1983; Campbell 
and Christian 1996) also view Toryism as a check against American-style liberalism. Political scientist Steve 
Patten acknowledges that while “the Canadian political culture has historically been liberal,” the traditions of 
social democracy and conservative Toryism are important counter ideologies and additional elements of 
Canada’s political culture (2001, 136). Patten suggests that many Conservative Party leaders blended Toryism 
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who contributed to Tory political philosophy include Anglican theologian Richard Hooker, Romantic 
poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and political theorist Edmund Burke. These Tories shared with other 
traditional conservatives a rejection of the individualism and social disruption brought about by 
industrialization, the French Revolution, Methodism, and philosophy, particularly utilitarianism and 
the liberal social contract theory. Instead, they valued the experiences of the past, traditional social 
order, and institutions such as the church, guild, and family that mediate between the individual and 
the state. In addition, they understood liberty as the right of a group to its autonomy (Nisbet 1986; G. 
Grant 1989).  
Tories translated these beliefs into anti-liberal political principles. Steve Patten, a political scientist, 
identified four characteristics of Toryism held by both the older elitist “High Tory” British 
colonialists and the more modern and democratic “Red Tories” that emerged in Canada during the 
mid-twentieth century. First, Tories valued established social structures, including the church, state, 
and family. Second, they viewed society as an organic whole rather than the aggregate of individuals. 
Their notion of community included the Canadian political community; consequently, they were not 
averse to using the state to develop and/or protect Canadian interests. Third, they believed order was 
more important than liberty and at times allowed the state to enforce moral conformity for the 
purposes of the public good. As Patten concludes, “this has meant a Tory willingness to violate the 
liberal commitment to the limited state, and disregard the liberal distinction between public and 
private.” Finally, Tories placed politics over economics, resulting in the belief that the state may 
intervene in the economy to assist the less fortunate and to promote national interests (2001, 137).22 
Horowitz elaborated this conception of the Tories when he posited that Tories believed the state was 
to protect and enhance the common good, intervening in the economy when necessary to provide for 
the equality of condition (as opposed to the liberal search for the equality of opportunity) (1995, 23). 
While some early British immigrants brought the Tory touch with them, Hartz recognized that the 
presence of Toryism in British North America was largely due to events in the US. During and after 
the American War of Independence, approximately 30,000 to 60,000 Americans loyal to the British 
government relocated to the Maritimes, Quebec, and what is today Ontario, many of them influenced 
                                                                                                                                                                    
with market liberalism, including Sir John A. Macdonald, Robert Borden, Arthur Meighen, R.B. Bennett, John 
Diefenbaker, Robert Stanfield, and, less consistently, Joe Clark (138).  
22 G. Grant argued that “at their best, Canadian conservatives never stood on an abstract appeal to free 
enterprise. They were willing to use the government to protect the common good. They were willing to restrain 
the individual’s freedom in the interests of the community” (1989, 65n22).  
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by the “Tory touch” (Horowitz 1995; Leuprecht 2003, 410; Bell 1992, 35). In addition to Tory 
collectivism, the Loyalists brought with them the ideas of British political philosopher John Locke.23 
Bell and Horowitz suggest that Locke’s fear of revolution and the lack of egalitarian dispositions in 
Toryism contributed to the counter-revolutionary nature of Canada (Bell 1992, 39; Horowitz 1995, 
26), and therefore responsible government did not appear in British North America until the 1830s 
(Bell 1992, 49). The American Loyalists benefited from the largesse of the British government. In 
exchange for their support of the British government during the American War of Independence, they 
received compensation for their war losses, free land grants, pensions, and tools (54-55).  
Prior to Confederation English-speaking Tories began to work with French-Canadian conservatives 
known as the Bleus. Both groups had a strong base in the dominant church of their respective colony 
and they shared the belief that government exists by divine ordinance. The Roman Catholic Church 
had become the unofficial established church in French Canada when it became the guardian of 
French culture after the British conquest of New France in 1760 (Bell 1992, 33) and especially after 
the 1837 and 1837 rebellions (Bramadat and Seljak 2008a, 34). In Upper Canada the Church of 
England became the established church in 1791 and over time became the home to so many English-
speaking Tories that it became known as “Tories at prayer” (Dart 1999, 88-96). Nancy Christie 
described the Church as promoting a Tory worldview of “hierarchical corporate bodies and social 
ranks” (1990, 11) and working with the state to construct a stable society. For its part, the state 
viewed the Church as a means by which to stem the revolutionary impulses (Katerberg 2000, 285) 
and supported it by establishing clergy reserves, land set aside for the exclusive use of the Church. As 
Michael Gauvreau has noted, in this political environment where the Church legitimated the state and 
the state supported the Church, “political loyalty was endowed with a divine sanction and was thus 
merely the obverse of religious orthodoxy; any criticism or dissent from the church establishment 
carried with it the stigma of political radicalism” (1990, 49). The result was a dearth of public 
theological and political critique. 
However, Toryism was by no means the preferred political ideology of all religious colonists. 
According to Christie, itinerant evangelical Methodist preachers and Baptists from the US brought 
with them a rival worldview that emphasized “the dynamic role of the free individual in transforming 
society based on a more inclusive and egalitarian concept of human relations” (Christie 1990, 11). 
                                                     
23 For a partial debunking of loyalist myths, see Bell, who argues that the Loyalists helped delay the 
development of a specifically Canadian identity and antagonized French Canada (1992, 38-40, 66-75). 
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These values were to have dramatic political effects as the Methodists and Baptists first challenged 
both the Church of England and political Toryism and then adopted the latter. (By the dawn of the 
twentieth century the Methodists had moved away from Tory conservatism.)   
Christie’s narrative reflects the common assumption that the early Canadian Methodists and 
Baptists contributed to liberal thought by opposing established churches and supporting political 
radicalism. This interpretation focuses on the cultural implications of evangelicalism. In contrast, S.D. 
Clark emphasized that evangelical political attitudes could be explained by its structural position in 
society rather than a supposedly inherent political radicalism within evangelicalism. He contended 
that eighteenth and early nineteenth century evangelicals operated as “sects,” sociologically defined 
as religious groups that stress voluntary association, tend to be in high tension with their surrounding 
culture, and entail extensive commitment from their members (Stark and Finke 2000, 142-46). 
According to Clark, the Nova Scotian Baptists in the late eighteenth century and Methodists living in 
Upper Canada in the early nineteenth century organized themselves as sects. Comprised of the rural 
downtrodden and urban working classes, they sought religious, political, and economic autonomy 
from the control exerted by the metropolis, which in turn led many of them to support radical politics. 
However, Clark noted that many evangelical leaders were largely indifferent to politics and their 
followers exhibited “political illiteracy.” From his perspective, the political contribution of the 
evangelical sects was not in their activities but in their separation of religion and politics and their 
decentralization of organization. Clark declared that the role evangelical sects played in helping to 
end the alliance between the church and the state contributed to liberal politics (1945).24 
Christie’s identification of evangelicalism as an element of cultural change is supported by 
Gauvreau, who argued that the strength of the evangelical awakening in British North America 
combined with the religious focus on history rather than philosophy or the natural sciences and the 
relative absence of the divisive aspects of the Enlightenment contributed to a Protestant consensus in 
the nineteenth century that emphasized the relationships between God, the individual, and human 
                                                     
24 As some sects grew more prosperous and migrated to the cities, they underwent a process of 
institutionalization, became denominations, and acquired some privileges which then needed protection. As a 
result, they became more dependent on the state. The change in their structural position led them to resist new 
theological ideas and shift to political conservatism. Clark argued that they entered politics to protect their new 
institutional interests and social position, participating in such campaigns as educational reform and the 
temperance movement. Given the evangelical history of political illiteracy, Clark maintained that their political 




society (1991, 16, 19, 70, 127). In fact, he labelled the nineteenth century as “the evangelical 
century.” While Gauvreau’s assessment is somewhat overstated, it is nevertheless the case that most 
English-speaking Protestants shared the goal of “Christianizing” the country and together they 
constituted a strong, though not always united, political force. 
1.2 Nineteenth century evangelicalism: A Protestant consensus (1760-1880s) 
The Methodists and Baptists of the Maritime colonies and Upper Canada believed that individuals 
rather than the state transformed society. According to Christie, they replaced the Tory predilection 
for institutions with a focus on the individual, freedom, and liberty (1990, 34). However, Christie’s 
claim is an exaggeration since the desire for liberty typically did not extend to the Catholics (Noll 
2006, 270).  
In addition to preaching the language of freedom and liberty, Christie argued that the Methodists 
and Baptists redefined social unity. While the Tories and the Church of England believed that social 
unity was achieved through social distinctions and class responsibilities, the Methodists and Baptists 
conceptualized social unity as occurring in community, defined as the “voluntary association between 
individuals who shared a common intimacy with God” (Christie 1990, 34). So defined, community 
separated the converted from the unconverted (38). This voluntary nature of community incensed the 
Tory hierarchy, which interpreted it as evidence of the evangelical commitment to republicanism 
(Adamson 1994, 436). The Tories attempted to limit the political impact of the Methodists and 
Baptists by suppressing their religious expression (Christie 1990, 14-15). In 1810 they used the power 
of the state to do so, with the House of Assembly in Upper Canada expelling two Methodist preachers 
by invoking a clause from the 1791 Constitution Act that disallowed clergymen from participating in 
the House. Some early Methodist preachers experienced stoning and other physical assaults 
(Adamson 1994, 434). For example, in Halifax, Nova Scotia, the Church of England and the 
governmental elite used the British army and urban mobs to limit the influence of preachers Henry 
Alline (Congregationalist/Baptist) and William Black (Methodist) (Rawlyk 1994, 138). Alline 
endured numerous physical assaults and threats on his life (Clark 1948, 188) 
Despite the challenge Methodists and Baptists posed for Toryism and the Church of England, the 
evangelical conception of community, along with the vision of social change it entailed, a Protestant 
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consensus endured.25 Most nineteenth century Protestants believed that converted individuals would 
voluntarily gather together in civil associations and work for social change. The Christian values and 
conduct of these individuals would permeate society and change it from the inside (Gauvreau 1990, 
61), thereby helping to create a Christian nation. Methodists and Baptists shared these aspirations. In 
other words, although evangelical theology focused on the individual conversion experience before 
God, it also directed individuals to actively participate in society. For example, while the Baptists in 
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia contributed to a conservative political culture, they also worked to 
transform society and make “it more Christlike” by caring for the less fortunate (Rawlyk 1991, 114-
16). Later in the nineteenth century evangelicals joined other Protestants in support of temperance (a 
debate that extended from the 1870s to the 1920s), the Lord’s Day Act (achieved in 1906), and 
missionary societies. With the exception of high-church supporters in the Church of England and 
some Lutherans, Protestants broadly supported these moral projects (Airhart 1990, 101). However, 
religious studies scholar N.K. Clifford argued that this missionary zeal had its dark side, as the 
Confederation vision of “God’s Dominion,” taken from Psalm 72, created ethnic prejudices among 
Protestants, leading them to assimilate non-Western immigrants by Christianizing them. For example, 
some Protestants voiced their fear of the “yellow peril” of Chinese immigration. Others worried that 
Slavic immigrants from southern and eastern Europe would “overrun” the country and one day 
govern those of Anglo-Saxon descent. Additional “undesirable groups” included the Jews, 
Mennonites, Mormons, and Doukhobours (1977, 24-32).26 Missions to the aboriginal peoples 
included residential schools, which had long-lasting effects upon aboriginal communities due to the 
abuse aboriginal children suffered while attending these schools. Bramadat and Seljak summarized 
the context by claiming that at times the Christianizing project amounted to persecution of those who 
held non-conformist beliefs (2008a, 10-11).  
Given that nineteenth century Canadian evangelicals did not separate the church and the state as 
thoroughly as their American counterparts, they were able to seek a middle road between Toryism 
and republicanism. Like the Church of England, they sought financial aid from the British 
                                                     
25 Rawlyk suggested that the consensus was the result of the “genuine evangelical churches” across the country 
becoming “more like the evangelical Anglicans and Presbyterians” during the mid to late 1800s. As a result, 
they replaced their “religion of the heart” with “the religion of the head” (1994, 208). 




government and religious organizations supported by the British state.27 By the mid 1830s, half a 
century after the US ratified a non-establishment clause in their constitution,28 many of the large 
Canadian religious groups (with the exception of the Baptists) received some financial assistance 
from Britain. This was in contrast to American evangelical leaders, who raised money in their own 
communities or from successful merchants and professionals. Canadian evangelical leaders also spent 
more time than their American counterparts lobbying the government, focusing on such issues as 
education and the clergy reserves. Leaders of both the Church of England and the nineteenth century 
evangelicals believed that they required state assistance for their project of promoting Christian 
discipline in the colonies. For example, Egerton Ryerson, a Methodist leader in the movement to end 
the establishment of the Church of England, rejected the American Methodist understanding of 
society as comprised of autonomous individuals (Adamson 1994, 443-46). In his campaign for a 
public education system free from denominational control, Ryerson did not envision public schools as 
religiously neutral. Rather, he understood public education as developing a Christian conscience in 
students and teaching Christian values (Gauvreau 1990, 91).  
Ultimately the Church of England and political Tories could not stem the tide of individualism, 
capitalism, and social democracy supported by evangelicalism (Gauvreau 1990, 50). Due to strong 
pressure from the Methodists, Baptists, and Presbyterians, in 1841 the government allowed other 
denominations to benefit from the clergy reserves, effectively disestablishing the Church of England. 
By 1854 the government eliminated the reserves altogether. However, in contrast to the American 
experience of disestablishment, Canadians did not create many new denominations or sects.29 As 
Gauvreau pointed out, Canadians “converged towards the centre,” with almost all Protestants 
involved in either a Church of England, Baptist, Methodist, or Presbyterian church (1990, 65).30 
Gauvreau also noted that this convergence coincided with the politics of accommodation required to 
achieve Confederation. Building upon the work of others, Gauvreau suggested that the nineteenth 
                                                     
27 Clark attributed this phenomenon to the political consequences of the War of 1812. The anti-American 
sentiments unleashed by the War pushed Methodists in the Maritimes and Upper Canada to break with the 
American Methodists and create an alliance with the English Wesleyan Conference. Similarly, the Newlight 
Baptists came to depend on English leadership. For Clark, these alliances “signified the shift to a position of 
accommodation to conservative political forces” (1962, 179-80). See also Adamson (1994, 437-38). 
28 In the popular American mind disestablishment is synonymous with the separation of church and state. The 
latter concept originated from a private letter written by Thomas Jefferson in which he advocated for “a wall of 
separation” between the church and the state. 
29 For a theory about the continual creation of sects in the US, see Stark and Finke (2000). 
30 This pattern remained the same at the end of the twentieth century, leading sociologist David Martin to 
identify Canada as having a “shadow establishment” (2000).  
 
 26 
century Canadian evangelical antipathy for polarization and its political moderation contributed to the 
political ethos of accommodation (90).31  
The Protestant consensus as described by Christie and Gauvreau may be summarized as a project 
by which both churches and sects engaged in nation-building and establishing Canada as a Christian 
nation. As a result of their engagement with the project of establishing the Canadian nation-state, 
nineteenth century evangelicals did not develop a critique of the governing structures, including the 
state, economy, military, and legal system. Rather, they became part of the “informal Protestant 
cultural establishment,” a legitimating force for the state, progress, morality, and modern order that 
historian William H. Katerberg sees operating in early Canadian history (2000, 285). For Katerberg, 
Protestants in North America understood education as advancing the modern virtues of progress, 
individualism, capitalism, good citizenship, consensus Protestantism, and progress (286). 
However, progress and capitalism spawned industrialization and significant social change brought 
about by the relocation of many Canadians from the countryside to the cities. Many of the new 
urbanites suffered poor working and living conditions. New avenues of transportation enabled the 
prosperous to move out to the suburbs, leaving the inner cities to the less affluent. These events 
renewed Protestant efforts to ban alcohol and establish a day of rest on Sunday to combat the 
brutalizing nature of constant work. At the same time, the Protestant consensus began to fracture as 
some groups called for more extensive social reform and adopted the “progressive theology” of 
higher criticism (Airhart 1990, 114-23). Out of this cauldron of change emerged the Social Gospel 
movement. 
1.3 Social Gospel: A partial rupture of the Protestant consensus (1880s-1920s) 
While the early proponents of the Social Gospel continued to be concerned about alcohol and the 
effects of industrialization, they differed from the more theologically conservative element within 
Protestantism in their adoption of a scientific evangelicalism that combined evangelistic work with 
social reform and progressive theology. These Social Gospellers placed less emphasis on the dramatic 
conversion experience and paid more attention to service. They approached religious life as an aspect 
of everyday life, drew inspiration from the social sciences, and believed science offered unlimited 
future possibilities. They also professionalised many of the evangelical universities (Airhart 1990, 
                                                     
31 J.W. Grant argued that the political act of Confederation prompted Presbyterians, Methodists, and Anglicans 
to consolidate their various groups into denominational structures (1969, 332). 
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123-26). The Methodists embraced the message of the Social Gospel most thoroughly, followed by 
the Presbyterians and members of the Church of England. According to J.W. Grant, the individualism 
of the Baptists limited their involvement in the movement (1988, 102).32 
The Social Gospel’s adoption of scientific evangelicalism marked the end of the Protestant 
consensus and resulted in divisions within and between denominations. Protestants split into two 
broad groups, the more theologically liberal “mainline” Protestant denominations and the 
theologically conservative ones who retained the name of “evangelical.” The division between the 
two groups was not always clear as the mainline denominations contained minority groups that did 
not adopt social progressivism. Many evangelicals and these minority groups continued to embrace 
social activism (Airhart 1990, 125).33  
In addition, the mainline and evangelical churches continued to share a desire to evangelize new 
immigrants. Fearful of the Roman Catholicism that accompanied many of the new immigrants, 
Protestants of all doctrinal persuasions joined together to “Canadianize” the new immigrants by 
assimilating them into the Protestant faith. While both groups participated in foreign missions, the 
motivation for each group was different. Where the premillenialism of evangelicals led them to 
engage in evangelism in anticipation of the return of Christ, progressive groups engaged in 
evangelism in the name of service (Airhart 1990, 126-31). Where cooperation between the 
evangelicals and mainline churches was not an option, they developed parallel directions and 
institutions. For instance, in response to the professionalization of the progressive religious 
universities, evangelicals established Bible institutes and colleges to prepare their laity for evangelism 
and missionary work.  
As Canadians experienced the horrors of World War I, they began to question the belief in progress 
espoused by the Social Gospel, with its hope in science and technology, liberalism, and progressive 
revelation. Still, socialist ideas remained in some circles, with the Methodist Committee on Social 
Service and Evangelism calling for a planned economy in 1918 (Wright 1990, 144-45). University 
students founded the Student Christian Movement (SCM) in 1921, the most theologically liberal 
organization to that time. In response, conservative evangelicals established a Canadian arm of Inter-
Varsity Christian Fellowship (IVCF) in 1928 to evangelize university and high school students. IVCF 
                                                     
32 J.W. Grant located the Methodist zeal for the social gospel “in Wesley’s doctrine of Christian perfection” 
(1988, 103).  
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emphasized the traditional evangelical focus on a personal relationship with God and evangelism 
(165). Even so, points of contact remained between many mainline and evangelical leaders as they 
shared an aversion for communism (147-48).34 By 1925, the Social Gospel came to be associated 
most closely with the United Church of Canada, created by the Methodists, Congregationalists, most 
Presbyterians, and a number of independent churches (154). 
Despite the retrenchment of the Social Gospel movement, the creation of the United Church and 
the cultural dominance of the liberal mainstream Protestant churches meant that conservative 
evangelicals became cultural “outsiders.” In response, many turned their attention to creating 
institutions to further evangelism, missions, and personal holiness (Guenther 2008, 370). A minority, 
however, turned to fundamentalism, a movement that originated in the US and is one of three 
subcultures in American evangelicalism. The other two are the type of evangelicalism elucidated by 
Billy Graham and Pentecostalism (Nash 1990, 82).35 While the fundamentalists exerted significant 
influence in the American evangelical subculture, the same did not occur in Canada (Stackhouse 
1993, 12-13). 
1.4 Fundamentalism: A further rupture (1920s-1940s) 
Fundamentalism is a variant of evangelicalism concerned about the loss of Biblical foundations for 
civilization and is identified by its literal interpretation of the Bible, which is considered inerrant, its 
opposition to modernity, and its separatism (Hiller 1978, 194). According to Gauvreau, 
fundamentalism did not achieve the same dominance in Canada as it did in the US because in the 
nineteenth century Canadian Methodists and Presbyterians developed a biblical and activist theology 
that engaged with history rather than philosophy or natural theology. Gauvreau claims that this focus 
on history helped Canadian evangelicals avoid the more extreme variants of the fundamentalist/ 
modernist rupture that occurred in the US and Britain in response to Darwinism, German higher 
                                                                                                                                                                    
33 According to Hoover et al., Mennonite groups are generally less hostile to liberal social teaching than other 
evangelical denominations (2002, 355). 
34 Wright contends that many Protestant religious leaders in Canada became bitter critics of Lenin’s 1917 
revolution and subsequent communist regime in Russia (1990, 147-48). 
35 (Neo)Pentecostal leaders include Pat Robertson (a charismatic Southern Baptist), Jimmy Swaggart (a pastor 
formerly in the Assemblies of God), and Oral Roberts (a neo-Pentecostal charismatic). Even in the heyday of 
these Pentecostal leaders, many American evangelicals did not perceive Pentecostals to be part of the 
evangelical mainstream (Nash 1990, 83). 
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criticism, and other modern challenges (1991).36 Harry Hiller, a sociologist, suggests a number of 
additional explanations. First, the presence of British immigrants and Canadian religious leaders 
trained in Britain provided a counter-influence to American religious leaders and traditions. Second, 
Canada did not experience the same rapid industrialization as the US, with its resultant social 
dislocation and growth of cities. (Social dislocation tends to encourage religious innovation.) Third, 
the composition of Canadian evangelicalism differed from the US, particularly the lack of a sizeable 
Baptist fundamentalist contingent (1978, 194). 
Canada’s best-known fundamentalists are Toronto Baptist pastor T.T. Shields and Baptist pastor 
turned politician, William “Bible Bill” Aberhart. In the 1920s Shields led a splinter group out of the 
Baptist Convention of Ontario and Quebec and resigned his position on the Board of Governors of the 
Baptist McMaster University to protest its liberal theology (Stackhouse 1993a, 23-34). Dissenters 
who left the Convention established the Union of Regular Baptist Churches and the Fellowship of 
Independent Baptist Churches. While Shields worked within the Baptist Church, Aberhart moved into 
politics, creating Alberta’s Social Credit Party, which won the 1935 provincial election and continued 
to lead the province until 1971. Aberhart was a fundamentalist who took many of his ideas from the 
British economist Clifford Hugh Douglas, particularly Douglas’ belief that the international financial 
system exploited the majority of people. In the case of Alberta, the plight of farmers concerned 
Aberhart. He denounced the financial institutions in central Canada and sought to provide Albertans 
with more purchasing power by distributing “social credit,” a stipend of $25 per month to each citizen 
(Stackhouse 1993a, 42). Aberhart incorporated labour reform and medicare into his political platform 
(Wright 1990, 172, 184),37 had a British socialist speak at his Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute, and 
cared for his parishioners as they faced the economic crisis (Stackhouse 1993a, 42, 44). As J.W. 
Grant reminds us, responses to the Depression from “those of the right, which were most often 
products of a sectarian environment, blamed most of the ills of society on the improper regulation of 
money and credit and sought financial remedies within the capitalist system” (1988, 141). Grant 
charged evangelicals with being politically right wing because they lacked a critique of capitalism. 
Indeed, while Aberhart wanted monetary reform, he did not re-vision capitalism; he simply sought to 
                                                     
36 Hutchinson added to Gauvreau’s analysis when he observed that the strong anti-German biases of Canadians 
due to their World War One experiences led them to reject all things German, including German Higher 
Criticism, thereby lessening the divisiveness of the modernist-fundamentalist split (1997, 25). 
37 Indeed, some scholars suggest that Aberhart shared a “common ideology” with Douglas and the CCF 
(Rawlyk 1991, 122-23). 
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make capitalism work better, in part by eliminating what he saw as economic parasites (Wright 1990, 
184).  
Both Aberhart and his successor Ernest Manning refused to privatize their faith and as premiers 
they continued to operate and host the Back to God Hour, a weekly radio broadcast first created by 
Aberhart in 1925. In addition to using the Bible to legitimate the Social Credit Party, Manning argued 
that God’s sovereignty was the best tool with which to combat communism. He believed dictatorship, 
the persecution of the Jews, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the rise of the Soviet Union 
heralded the impending return of Jesus Christ. However, according to David Marshall, Manning 
rejected requests to “Christianize” public schools because he did not believe Christians should use the 
state to bring about Christian reforms. He preferred to work for individual conversion. Although 
Manning followed Aberhart’s lead in establishing social programs, he believed the need for such 
programs indicated the decline of morality, the result of Christians abandoning their public 
responsibilities in favour of private religion (2001, 248-49). 
Social Credit also became a political party in British Columbia, electing its first members to the 
provincial Legislature in 1952. Conservative Protestants, including fundamentalists, strongly 
supported the Social Credit. Initially Party leaders portrayed the Party “as a religious movement,” 
complete with the song “O God our help in ages past” and a mischievous newspaper announcement 
that read: “Checking facilities for halos available” (Burkinshaw 1995, 196-97).  
There are many theories about why the Social Credit appealed to Albertans and British 
Columbians. Political scientist Nelson Wiseman points to the number of American immigrants in the 
provinces, especially Alberta. He views the Social Credit as promoting “a radical ‘populist’ liberalism 
that stressed the individual rather than the community or the state” and appealed to rural Protestants, 
especially fundamentalists (1991, 416, 427). John Moir also linked political individualism with 
religious individualism, arguing that the appeal of the Social Credit lay in the “religion-based political 
conservatism of early Victorian Canadian Methodism, when support for Christian measures and 
Christian men, in that order, was advocated to replace partisan politics. Revivalistic spirit and 
techniques had a prominent place in Social Credit gatherings” (2002, 37). Moir suggested that the 
Social Credit was a radical reform movement that appealed to the republican leanings of conservative 
evangelicals, re-awakening their vision for a Christian nation. However, Bruce Guenther, a church 
historian who focuses on Canadian evangelicalism, disputed the notion that evangelicals supported 
Aberhart, noting that already prior to becoming premier Aberhart alienated many evangelicals with 
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his broad ecumenism.38 Furthermore, Guenther argued, the Social Credit drew more members from 
the Church of England and the United Church than from evangelical churches (2000).  
Clark provided a different perspective by tracing the changes in structural location inhabited first 
by Aberhart’s Prophetic Bible Institute and then the party of Social Credit. For Clark, the Institute 
followed the development of a typical evangelical sect by seeking to isolate evangelicals from the 
worldly society, protesting large powerful churches, often with “creditor interests,” and appealing to 
those who were economically marginalized. He maintained that such religious separatism easily led 
to political separatism and antipathy towards federal authority. However, when Aberhart formed the 
Social Credit party which then became the government, he and the party underwent a process of 
institutionalization and became more conservative rather than radical. For instance, in the 1944 
provincial election, prominent business individuals and firms supported the party. Writing in 1945, 
Clark argued that whatever radicalism persisted in the party came from members who joined after its 
first election victory in 1935 and had little to do with the Prophetic Bible Institute (1945). 
Through this process of institutionalization the Social Credit became part of the establishment. In 
this sense the Institute and the political party followed in the footsteps of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Baptists in Nova Scotia and Methodists in Upper Canada who moved towards 
legitimating the state. However, as both J.W. Grant and Clark noted, evangelicals did not develop 
specific positions on poverty, the state, and the relationship between faith and politics. Although 
conservative evangelicals remained active in their communities during the Depression, they did not 
engage in philosophical and political deliberations to explain why they participated as they did. 
Instead, they emphasized personal conversion as a solution to the economic problems, leading some 
to criticize Aberhart’s lack of a specifically Christian approach to the Depression because he did not 
portray evangelism and conversion as answers to the economic crisis (Stackhouse 1993a, 43). The 
lack of political and economic deliberation suggests that evangelicals had reconciled themselves to 
some form of economic individualism. It also meant that they had few resources to help them respond 
to the decline of Christian cultural domination that followed World War II. 
                                                     
38 Stackhouse offers a similar analysis when he argues that Aberhart’s early adoption of a teaching by a Calgary 
Pentecostal pastor who baptized only in the name of Jesus – and not the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – sparked 
controversy among evangelicals. Aberhart’s self-identification as an apostle, his denunciation of other 
denominations, and his friendship with Catholics, Mormons, and those from the United Church further alienated 
him from other evangelicals (1993a, 39-44). 
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1.5 Post World War II changes: The decline of Christian cultural domination 
(1945-1980s) 
Although secularizing trends had been operating in society since the end of World War I, they 
became more apparent after World War II. Liberals and those involved in the market promoted the 
process of secularization as they chafed against religiously inspired restraints. The political and 
cultural elite became less religious and lobbied the various levels of government to curtail the 
privileges enjoyed by the Christian churches, including the removal of education from the domain of 
religious institutions (Bramadat and Seljak 2008a, 12-13; J.W. Grant 1988, 116). As a result, the state 
became more involved in people’s lives and churches began to retreat to the private sphere. 
J.W. Grant noted that initially evangelicals did not resist the state’s pre-emption of their traditional 
role of caring for society or even indicate much awareness of its significance (1988, 177-180). Their 
church attendance remained strong throughout the 1950s, although Stackhouse noted “that there was 
less of a revival of genuine and lasting spirituality in the post-war boom than of a revival of general 
cultural conservatism and consumerism of which church involvement was a component” (1990, 206). 
In other words, the Christian churches did not lead culture; rather, they followed the general cultural 
trends toward conservatism and consumerism. At the same time, however, social institutions and the 
dominant culture continued to be influenced by Christian values (Bramadat and Seljak 2008a, 10).  
Stackhouse cited the success of the evangelical pavilion at Expo ’67, held in Montreal, as a pivotal 
moment for evangelical self-understanding. Expo ’67 already had an ecumenical Christian pavilion 
planned and well in place. However, many evangelicals felt that it did not adequately reflect their 
Christian beliefs and insisted on constructing their own pavilion. Titled “Sermons from science,” the 
pavilion became a major attraction, drawing 840,000 people into its main theatre during the six month 
fair and a total of 2.5 million by the time it closed its doors in 1975 (Stackhouse 1993a, 114-120). The 
success of the pavilion reassured evangelicals, perhaps falsely, that their beliefs had broad public 
support.  
Yet such assurance was qualified by the social changes occurring at the time and embodied in new 
social policy drafted by the liberal elite. Although some of the Mennonite denominations were among 
the first of the evangelical denominations to become more intentionally engaged in politics in the 
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1950s (Bowen 2004, 189),39 most of the others declined to do so until the late 1960s in response to 
legislation that liberalized divorce and made access to abortion and birth control easier. While the 
mainline Protestant churches supported the Bill, both evangelicals from a variety of denominations 
and Roman Catholics worried about the separation of morality from law (Egerton 2000, 97). These 
latter groups opposed abortion (especially the Catholics) and lobbied for more conservative social 
policy.  
To bolster their position, evangelical denominations began to build the infrastructure needed to 
protect their orthodoxy and strengthen their ability to participate in the public square. They expanded 
their educational institutions,40 created relief and development agencies, food banks, and crisis 
pregnancy centres, launched religious broadcasters, and set up some interdenominational and 
transdenominational organizations. While InterVarsity and the EFC transcended the mainline-
evangelical divide, evangelical churches provided most of the leadership of the EFC from the 1970s 
on (Stackhouse 1993a, 184). In the 1960s and 1970s, InterVarsity leaders challenged evangelical 
students to expand their interpretation of Christian vocation beyond mission work to include all the 
jobs to which God called them. This shift indicated an expansion of evangelical interest from personal 
evangelism to the broader culture and society. Stackhouse suggested that in many cases the creation 
of these institutions was in response to the evangelical perception that society was increasingly 
secular and thus their creation was an example of how secularization and liberalism impacted 
evangelicalism (Stackhouse 1997, 56-59). In other words, it was the fear of secularism that drove 
evangelicals to become more intentionally involved in the public square. Guenther offers a slightly 
different interpretation, suggesting that the growth of evangelical churches in the 1960s gave 
evangelicals a sense of confidence and led them to act like cultural insiders. The creation of new 
institutions signified that evangelicals were ready to take on “a sense of responsibility for the 
character of Canadian society” (Guenther 2008, 373).  
                                                     
39 Not all Mennonites view themselves as evangelical. The Mennonite Brethren are more pietistically inclined 
and defined by some as evangelical and pacifist. The Mennonite Church Canada denomination is influenced by 
neo-Anabaptist thought and is more socially progressive on women’s issues (Loewen 2008; Guenther 2008, 
393). Walter Klassen argues that Anabaptists are “Neither Catholic nor Protestant” but represent both traditions 
(2001). 
40 By the late 1980s, two evangelical seminaries (Vancouver’s Regent College and the Ontario Theological 
Seminary in Toronto) surpassed the United Church’s seminary (Emmanuel College) to become the largest 
seminaries in Canada (Stackhouse 1991, 259). Guenther suggests that because the Bible institutes and colleges 
focus on trans-denominational evangelicalism, they acculturate new immigrants more effectively than the 
earlier attempts of homogenization by nineteenth century evangelicals at the turn of the century (2008, 371). 
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Both Stackhouse and Guenther offer insights into the events of the time. As with the evangelicals 
examined by Clark, evangelicals of the 1960s and 1970s were moving away from their sectarian roots 
and becoming denominations, and here I use the term “denomination” in a sociological manner. 
According to Casanova, denominations are modern forms of organization with voluntary membership 
that adapt to the structural differentiation of the social spheres, emphasize religious individualism, 
and recognize the fact of religious pluralism. Denominations engage the world around them and 
create the institutions to do so (1994, 52-55, 71). In addition, they make fewer doctrinal and social 
demands on their members than sects. The point here is that just as evangelicals oriented themselves 
to society, society became more secular and began the process of de-Christianizing some elements of 
public policy. Evangelicals then had to decide whether they would work to keep Christian values 
dominant in the legal and political spheres or view themselves as one of the many voices in a pluralist 
society seeking to influence culture.41 The tension between these two options continues to be reflected 
within the different elements of evangelicalism. 
The expansion of evangelical organizations had four implications for the broader evangelical 
community. First, they quickly encountered bureaucratic, legal, and cultural roadblocks. For example, 
in the area of religious broadcasting, the state controlled the air-waves and refused to grant religious 
broadcasting licenses until 1987. These roadblocks in turn led evangelicals to become more involved 
in the public sphere and to develop arguments based on religious freedom. Second, the establishment 
of evangelical transdenominational institutions contributed to what Stackhouse identifies as the lack 
of an “elaborate theological sophistication” because evangelicals tended to seek only minimal 
theological agreement among their members (1993a, 198-99). This lack of theological sophistication 
contributed to the historical trajectory that pulled evangelicals to the religious, and even political, 
centre. Third, the absence of large evangelical foundations and wealthy business persons required 
these organizations to raise their own revenue. To do so, they had to appeal to the “broad middle” 
(201-02). Raising funds from a limited constituency encouraged evangelical organizations to avoid 
the extreme left and right and focus on the political centre as well as the middle of the evangelical 
constituency. Finally, there is little evidence that these transdenominational organizations helped the 
broader evangelical community develop a distinctly evangelical understanding of politics, the state, or 
                                                     
41 An example of one organization that sought to protect “Christian Canada” and rebuild a Christian moderate 
majority was Renaissance Canada, founded by Ken Campbell. Another is the Christian Heritage Party, a federal 
political party that espouses a pro-life platform and obtains its guiding principles from the Bible. 
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the market. Thus as evangelicals became increasingly involved in politics, they lacked a political 
theology.  
All of this evangelical activity coincided with the rise of the American Religious Right. Although 
American fundamentalists abandoned the public sphere in the 1920s, the perceived moral decline of 
American culture and the teaching of evolution in public schools pushed them back to political 
engagement in the late 1970s and they quickly became the “backbone” of the Religious Right 
(Wilcox 2000, 30). Initially they, like many evangelicals, supported Jimmy Carter in the 1976 
presidential election (Marsden 2006, 242) but Carter’s support for gay rights and his refusal to contest 
Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court decision affirming the right to abortion, led them to consider other 
choices. Carter’s intention to penalize insufficiently desegregated private schools further angered 
evangelicals, and was perhaps the immediate issue that drove evangelicals back into the public sphere 
(Gilgoff 2007, 79). Southern Baptist fundamentalist preacher and televangelist Jerry Falwell 
mobilized other fundamentalist pastors and founded the Moral Majority (1979-1989), a political 
lobby organization. These pastors were generally intolerant of Pentecostals, Roman Catholics, 
evangelicals, and even other Baptist churches (Wilcox 2000, 36). Falwell led the fundamentalists into 
the Republican Party, resulting in the moniker “the Religious Right.” Ronald Reagan won the 1980 
presidential election with the support of “61 percent of ‘born again’ white Protestants” (Cizik 2005, 
51).42 In 1984 he gained an even greater majority of the white Protestant vote (52). During Reagan’s 
administration evangelical organizations become political insiders, with Reagan addressing the 
National Association of Evangelicals in 1983 and 1984.43 Protecting “an orthodox Christian vision” 
and the “natural family” became central issues to all Christian Right organizations (Buss and Herman 
2003, xviii), including the Moral Majority and Focus on the Family.44 For many Religious Right 
organizations, protecting the family required a public rejection of feminism, particularly its support 
for abortion. In addition, Religious Right organizations lobbied for prayer in public schools and the 
teaching of creationism in science classes while opposing the gay and lesbian campaign for civil 
rights (Wilcox 2000, 37). The re-election of Reagan in 1984 led some supporters of the Moral 
                                                     
42 Cizik does not provide the sources of these numbers. 
43 Reagan appointed Dr. James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, to the Commission on Pornography 
(Gilgoff 2007, 32). While leaders of the Religious Right used their status as insiders in the Republican Party to 
further their religious movements and cultural ideologies, professional politicians used the Religious Right to 
develop support for their conservative vision of the US (Marsden 2006, 247). 
44 Ten years after its inception in 1977, the budge of Focus on the Family was $34 million. By 1995 it was more 
than $100 million (Gilgoff 2007, 27). In 2005 Dobson resigned as the President of Focus on the Family. 
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Majority to become complacent and a series of widely publicized sex scandals of several high-profile 
televangelists in the late 1980s gradually made fundraising more difficult (37-38). In 1989 Falwell 
disbanded the Moral Majority. 
In the political vacuum left by Falwell’s departure Pat Robertson founded the Christian Coalition. 
Like the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition promoted “family values” and worked to eliminate 
abortion rights. Unlike the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition developed an ecumenical base of 
evangelicals as well as conservative Catholics, Jews, and African Americans. It mobilized the laity 
and professional activists rather than the preachers. During elections it distributed voter guides in 
churches, led voter mobilization campaigns, originally ran “stealth campaigns” in which those 
running for office hid their connection with the Religious Right, and adopted the “rights” language of 
liberalism. Rather than recalling a Christian America, the Christian Coalition talked of the rights of 
the unborn and the rights of the parents to educate their children in school systems that share their 
values (Wilcox 2000, 42-43). The Christian Coalition further differed from the Moral Majority in its 
broader mandate to include issues of taxes, government waste, crime, and health care, as well as 
abortion and homosexuality (Gilgoff 2007, 99). Yet it too ensconced itself in the Republican Party, 
and in 2000 evangelicals supported George W. Bush’s “faith-based and community initiatives,” his 
desire to protect heterosexual marriage, and his opposition to partial-birth abortions (Cizik 2005, 61-
63).  
In its effort to nominate sympathetic conservative politicians, the Moral Majority urged Religious 
Right organizations to form coalitions with such secular conservative groups as gun owners, English 
First groups, and anti-tax groups (Rozell 1997, 242). Elements within Christian Right organizations, 
like some within the Republican Party, combined their social conservatism with economic neo-
liberalism. Based on classical liberalism, neo-liberalism emerged in Western economic theory in the 
1980s and 1990s as an economic system based on Adam Smith’s maxim that nations maximize their 
well-being by ensuring that individual citizens are able to freely participate in the market 
(Hoksbergen and Madrid 1997, 39). This maxim often entailed less government intervention in the 
market, free trade, and economic privatization. According to Steve Patten, neo-liberal “governance 
rejects any extension of social rights and limits citizenship rights to the negative liberties associated 
with classical market liberal notions of civil and political rights” (2001, 144). Those who worked with 
the poor and disadvantaged became increasingly worried about the future of social programs and the 
health of their clients in an increasingly neo-liberal American state.    
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 Many Canadians who watched the politicization of abortion, the family, economics, and gay and 
lesbian rights that occurred in the US with the rise of the Religious Right became concerned that 
Canadian evangelicals were a northern version of the same political causes. This concern was 
heightened by the involvement of some high profile evangelicals in the formation of the Reform 
Party. But unlike the Republican Party in the US, which has received an overwhelming majority of 
evangelical votes since the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, the Reform Party received less than half 
of all evangelical votes throughout the 1990s. However, “Religious Right sympathizers” supported 
Reform at twice the national average (Hoover 1997).  
1.6 Public unease about evangelical political engagement (1990s-2000s) 
Preston Manning and others created the Reform Party in 1987 as a response to pent-up feelings of 
alienation in the Western provinces and to address constitutional and fiscal issues (Flanagan 2007).45 
Ten years later Reform became the official opposition with 60 members in its caucus. Like his father 
Ernest Manning, the long-serving Social Credit leader of Alberta, Preston Manning publicly, but 
perhaps more cautiously, expressed his faith. Unlike his father, Preston’s faith was more broadly 
evangelical rather than fundamentalist. He claimed to support the separation of church and state but 
not the separation of faith and politics. In a carefully worded chapter in The New Canada (1992), 
Manning described how the Christian understanding of reconciliation as expounded in Christ’s 
sacrifice on the cross impacts all areas of life, including one’s political commitments. While he 
insisted Reform was a secular party that did not have a hidden religious agenda, he also resolutely 
claimed, “there is a relationship between private and public morality, between what one believes and 
how one responds to public policy issues, between personal spiritual resources (or the lack of them) 
and how one copes with political stress. And these relationships should be openly explored” (103, 
italics in original). He believed that voters have a right to ask of those vying for the right to represent 
them in Parliament about their deepest held convictions. To assuage voters’ concern about the 
religious ethos of Reform, Manning argued that Reform’s dedication to following the majority view 
on social and moral issues protected the public against the imposition of minority values upon the 
Canadian society (105-09). 
                                                     
45 According to Flanagan, prior to the 1990s, Party leaders did not want to debate social issues and tried to 
“neutralize” them or bracket them out of the discussion (2007). 
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As Reform’s leader, Manning was not a Christian culture warrior. He refused to use religion as a 
political tool and did not view the Christian community as an interest group. He did not allow Reform 
Party memberships to be sold at church gatherings nor did he publish political material specifically 
aimed at the Christian, or more specifically the evangelical, community. Manning held that such a 
politicization of the church could destroy Party, or even national, unity and he pointed to the harm 
that could be done to Christianity if an MP who openly campaigned on a Christian agenda 
subsequently made an error in judgement or was caught lying. In addition, he argued that 
if a self-professed Christian leader takes political advantage of the 
trust of the Christian community, making promises and commitments 
to them which in the end he is unable to honour, he plants seeds of 
disillusionment and mistrust, not just among the public at large but in 
churches and faith organizations, which will yield acrimony and 
division for years to come. (2002, 150)  
Manning maintained this position in 1997 even when Party strategists reminded him that Reform did 
not capture a “fair share” of the Christian vote in 1993 (149).  
Manning’s interpretation of the role of religion in Reform was echoed by former Reform insider 
Tom Flanagan, who insisted that during his involvement with Reform in the early 1990s, “nothing, 
literally nothing was ever discussed in religious terms … everything was discussed in political terms.” 
Although many members directly loyal to Manning were evangelical and evangelicalism was often 
the “glue that held people together,” Flanagan argued that the evangelical faith did not influence party 
policies, evidenced in the Party’s “agnostic” position on the issue of abortion. The difference between 
Reform and the NDP, and at times Liberal Party, he contended, was that Reform was not hostile to 
religion (2007). 
Yet Reform did not receive the support of the majority of evangelicals across Canada (Hoover 
1997), perhaps because the Party was too closely associated with the western provinces. The 
evangelical tendency to hold politically centrist views on a number of issues was revealed in an 
Angus Reid/Rawlyk poll from 1993 that documented evangelicals held similar views about 
immigration, militarism, and politics as the general population. In an interview with the EFC’s Faith 
Today, George Rawlyk expressed his surprise at the results, saying, “up to now evangelicals were 
painted as a somewhat redneck group but obviously this isn’t the case” (Swift 1993, 23). 
In addition to this mixture of religion and politics, some political pundits feared what they 
perceived to be Reform’s commitment to neo-liberal economics, revealed in its desire for smaller 
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government. However, Reform was not the only Party to adopt neo-liberal policies. So did the 
Progressive Conservative Party (PC) under Prime Minister Mulroney (1984-1993). Mulroney’s 
Finance Minister, Michael Wilson, focused on deficit reduction, privatization, deregulation, free 
trade, and limiting the universality of some social programs, including Old Age Security (Patten 
2001, 139). Despite this move of the PCs to the economic right, Hugh Segal, a former Chief of Staff 
to Mulroney, distinguished Reform from the PC Party by labelling Reformers as “neoconservatives,” 
identified as those who take “their inspiration from the excessive classical exaltation of the 
‘individual’ in nineteenth-century liberalism” and who value “freedom as the core value ― far more 
than responsibility to each other or to the common good” (1997, 3).46 Segal’s assumption that the 
Reform Party had a sizeable strain of  Christian fundamentalism (Segal 2006, 171) and the allusion by 
others that Reform was “an ‘evangelical party’” (Hoover 1997, 201) suggest that some political 
commentators connected evangelicals with the neo-liberal views they saw within the Party. 
When Reformers could not attract significant electoral support outside of the western provinces, 
Manning initiated a campaign to “unite the right” in 2000. The campaign disbanded the Reform Party 
and formed a new party, the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance (Alliance Party). However, the 
Progressive Conservative Party under Joe Clark rebuffed Manning’s overture. According to Patten, 
Clark’s refusal stemmed from his roots in Red Toryism and his emphasis on social obligation and 
community (2001, 142-43). 
Party members also rebuffed Manning when they chose Stockwell Day to lead the Alliance Party. 
Day’s election caused even greater consternation among the political and social elites than Manning 
ever did. A former Pentecostal pastor and an MLA in Ralph Klein’s neo-liberal Progressive 
Conservative government in Alberta, Day was more open about his socially conservative views than 
Manning. While an MLA, he unsuccessfully attempted to end public funding of abortions in Alberta. 
During the 2000 election, the media and the Liberal Party attacked Day’s evangelical faith. They 
mocked his belief in creationism as portrayed in Genesis 1 and his decision not to campaign on 
Sundays. Maclean’s, Canada’s English-language weekly news magazine, published a picture of Day 
on its July 10, 2000 cover with the words “How scary” beside the picture. A Liberal Party strategist 
used a purple dinosaur doll named Barney to ridicule Day’s belief in a “young earth,” that is, earth as 
                                                     
46 Under Paul Martin, first as Finance Minister and then as Prime Minister, the Liberal Party also moved to the 
economic right. See Steve Patten, “Political ambition and corporate-friendly liberalism: three perspectives on 
Paul Martin,” Inroads: A Journal of Opinion Summer-Fall (2004). Available online at http://findarticles.com/p/ 
articles/mi_7074/is/ai_n28244969/pg_5/?tag=mantle/skin;content (accessed May 6, 2011). 
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6,000 years old. Hedy Fry, then Liberal minister for Multiculturalism and for the Status of Women, 
not only claimed that Day’s belief in Jesus as the God of the entire universe offended adherents of 
other religions but also suggested that Day would use political power to force Canadians to accept the 
belief. Hoover noted that during this time the media often used the term “fundamentalist” in stories 
covering the Alliance Party, thereby identifying Manning, Day, and other social conservatives as un-
Canadian. Many evangelicals, including evangelical constitutional lawyer Iain Benson, interpreted 
this backlash as part of a broader anti-Christian bias that Benson called a “velvet oppression.” In 
response to this perceived bias, the EFC and representatives of the Jewish, Catholic, and Muslim 
communities released a statement calling for the media to practice more toleration of religious beliefs 
(Heinrichs 2000; O’Leary 2001; Dawes 2000; Hoover 2000). 
The media’s unease with politically engaged evangelicalism continued to manifest itself after the 
2000 election. When the mayor of Regina proclaimed June 2, 2001 to be a Heterosexual Family Pride 
Day, Michelle Landsberg, a journalist at the Toronto Star, described evangelicals “as a group that 
‘breeds … toxic intolerance’ and ‘gives license to the kind of thugs who would beat a Matthew 
Shepard to death because he was gay.’” In response to a complaint by the EFC, the Ontario Press 
Council deemed the column to be unnecessarily hurtful (Faith Today 2002, 15). During the 2004 
election that pitted Stephen Harper’s Conservatives against Paul Martin’s Liberals, Liberal pollsters 
in Ontario asked voters if they would be more or less likely to vote for the Conservative Party if they 
knew it had been taken over by conservative Christians (Clemenger 2004a). In addition, the Liberals 
accused the Conservatives of holding a right-wing, if not fundamentalist, “secret agenda” (Hoover 
2006). As the Conservatives continued to organize after the election, the Globe and Mail ran two 
stories about a number of ridings in which conservative Christians, mostly evangelicals, won the 
Conservative riding nomination, thereby suggesting a link between a supposed Religious Right and 
the Conservatives (Galloway 2005; Simpson 2005).47 
The strongest media reaction against evangelicals occurred during the same-sex marriage debate 
that occurred between 2003 and 2005. While conservative Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, and Sikhs 
opposed the change, evangelicals formed the strongest and most vocal opposition. In response, 
                                                     
47 In response to such media coverage, Janet Epp Buckingham, the EFC’s former Director of Law and Public 
Policy, noted, “anyone who has ever been on a church committee knows how hard it is to conceive of an 
Evangelical conspiracy! We have trouble agreeing on the colour of floor tile for the foyer. And with 39 
denominations under the EFC’s umbrella, we know that while we have many core areas of agreement, we also 
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progressive elements within the media and academy again referred to evangelicals as fundamentalists, 
un-Canadian, and intolerant. For example, Maude Barlow wrote in her forum on the Maclean’s 
website that 
powerful far-right religious groups in the US, such as the Christian 
Coalition and Focus on the Family (whose leader James Dobson has 
backed politicians who called for the execution of abortion 
providers), have entered the political arena to impose their deeply 
conservative and narrowly moralistic views on the larger society. 
They want every breathing “liberal” removed from every level of 
office, from local school boards to the Supreme Court, and they are 
well on their way to success. (2006) 
Barlow listed the EFC as one of the “new” evangelical groups “with a political mission.” The EFC’s 
Janet Epp Buckingham responded by pointing out that the EFC was hardly a new organization and 
was definitely not American. She alerted Barlow to the latest poll at the time which revealed that 35 
percent of evangelicals supported the Conservatives, 30 percent the Liberals, and 20 percent the NDP. 
These polling numbers, Epp Buckingham noted, not only reflected the national numbers but revealed 
slightly more support for the NDP than the national average (2006).48 A quick glance at the letters 
sent by EFC staff members to various newspaper and magazine editors in response to media 
portrayals of evangelicals as intolerant and fundamentalist during the same-sex marriage debate 
reveal the extent to which such characterizations occurred.49 Clemenger worried that the enmity 
evangelicals felt from the mainstream media and “Ottawa” during the debate might push at least some 
of them away from political participation (Johnson 2005). 
In his study of how the CBC, CTV, and Global television networks covered stories involving 
evangelicals over a 25 year period, communications specialist David Haskell found that when 
evangelicals espoused a position on an issue that differed from the perspective typically held by 
journalists, the resulting coverage was more negative than positive. According to Haskell, this 
occurred during the same-sex marriage debate. Referring to research that indicated journalists 
strongly support homosexual rights, he claimed that the manner in which many journalists covered 
                                                                                                                                                                    
have many distinctives.” Available online at http://www.christianity.ca/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=3006 
(accessed January 30, 2011). 
48 However, the campaign against gay and lesbian marriage employed some tactics typically used in the US, 
such as direct mail campaigns and “American money flowed northward to support the fight” (Johnson 2005). 
49 For examples see http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=1410 and 
http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=1411 (accessed January 30, 2011). 
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evangelicals during the debate “evidenced the greatest signs of anti-evangelical bias” (Wilfrid Laurier 
Brantford 2007). 
When Stephen Harper won a minority government in January 2006 with significant support from 
those who regularly attend church, not only English-speaking Protestants but also Catholics in 
Quebec (Grenville 2006), some columnists worried about his connections to the evangelical 
community. For example, Marci McDonald reflected some of the public’s concern about Harper in an 
article she published in The Walrus magazine entitled “Stephen Harper and the Theo-cons: The rising 
clout of Canada’s religious right.” The title reflected McDonald’s concern that Harper was the 
harbinger of a culture war. She portrayed Canadian evangelicals as power seekers, members of an 
American-style Religious Right, and culture warriors. McDonald argued that Harper actively courted 
individuals and organizations of the Religious Right, such as the Institute of Marriage and Family 
Canada established by Focus on the Family (Canada) and the National House of Prayer. McDonald 
wondered whether these voices were influencing Harper’s views on day care, Israel, and the Kyoto 
Protocol. The issue for McDonald was not whether Harper himself ascribed to the views of the 
Religious Right, but whether he owed them political favours and therefore was their captive, just as 
she perceived George Bush to be the captive of the American Religious Right (McDonald 2006). Of 
course, not all commentators agreed with McDonald. For example, Robert Sibley, a senior journalist 
at the Ottawa Citizen, charged McDonald with “secular bigotry bordering on fear-mongering -- all 
with a view to delegitimizing religion as a source of or inspiration for political life and ensuring the 
suppression of any moral or spiritual concerns that don’t fit the liberal-progressive consensus.” He 
was particularly incensed with the lack of direct evidence provided by McDonald and her 
implications about conspiracies (2008).  
McDonald’s link between Harper and the Conservative Party with the American Religious Right 
was also disputed. According to Hoover, Harper “is not a natural culture-warrior” and under his 
leadership “the Conservative Party has consistently given social conservatives only a modest place at 
the table” (2006). At the Party’s annual general meeting in March 2005, members voted to retain the 
party’s support for traditional heterosexual marriage (although it allowed for the possibility of civil 
unions for homosexuals) but dropped its opposition to abortion “under Harper’s clear leadership” 
(Segal 2006, 197). As opposition leader, Harper supported the traditional definition of marriage50 but 
                                                     
50 For Harper’s speech in the House of Commons against Bill C-38, the same sex marriage Bill, in 2005, see 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2005/feb/050217b (accessed January 30, 2011).  
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as Prime Minister he demonstrated little commitment to address the issue. When Parliament defeated 
a motion to reopen the same-sex marriage debate on December 7, 2006, Harper indicated that he 
would not attempt to re-open it in the future (CTV 2006).  
Ultimately, both the political culture of Canada and the diversity of evangelical political opinion 
make the emergence of an American-style Religious Right in Canada highly unlikely. While many 
Canadian evangelicals tend to support socially conservative positions, the Canadian political culture 
and their desire to participate in public debates pushes them toward the political centre. For instance, 
in 2003 an Ipsos Reid poll found that evangelicals, like all Canadians, ranked “Supporting Canadian 
children living in poverty” as the most important priority for the Christian church. “Preventing the 
exploitation of children in pornography and the sex trade in Canada and the world” and “Hoping to 
reduce homelessness in Canada” were the next two concerns for all Canadians, including evangelicals 
(Van Ginkel 2003, 8). Despite their social conservatism on the moral issues of abortion and same-sex 
marriage, in 2003 evangelicals shared many of the same social concerns as other Canadians. 
1.7 Themes from Canadian history and the EFC 
As this overview of evangelicals in Canadian political history indicates, evangelicals have a long 
tradition of engagement in Canadian society, contributing to the identification and establishment of 
such Canadian values as accommodation and toleration. Indeed, Paul Marshall, writing on behalf of 
the EFC, suggested that evangelicalism is “near the heart of Canadian identity.” Hoping “to dispel the 
notion that evangelicalism in Canada is a stereotyped import of the worst of cultures from the 
American South” (1992, 1), Marshall traced how the Canadian balance of order and community with 
individual freedom reflects the evangelical balance of individual conversion and social activism. For 
example, he described how the religious revivals in the Maritimes during the eighteenth century 
balanced spiritual rebirth with social activity; how Methodists in Ontario balanced “personal and 
social transformation” by defending religious freedom and respecting authority; and how evangelicals 
in Western Canada helped establish the Social Credit Party and the socialist-oriented Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF). For Marshall, this evangelical inheritance cannot be ignored 
because it is a significant aspect of Canadian identity.  
Three themes emerge from the history presented in this chapter that are relevant to an examination 
of how the EFC participates in Canadian public life. First, Marshall and others within the EFC insist 
that Canadian evangelicalism is distinct from its American counterpart. This chapter suggests that 
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such differences are largely due to differences in demographics, history, and the political culture of 
the two countries. The presence of political Toryism in Canada prompted many evangelicals to accept 
and work with an interventionist state. As Hoover et al. note, the Canadian political tradition 
emphasizes “moderation and deferential appreciation for the state and its program” (2002, 353). They 
add that while twentieth century evangelicals on both sides of the border share the same antipathy 
toward abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage, Canadian evangelicals do not share the 
American disdain of (big) government. Rather, “Canadian evangelicals’ attitudes about redistribution 
are similar to Canadian non-evangelicals’ attitudes, and both are, on average, less opposed to big 
government than are U.S. non-evangelicals or Catholics. US evangelicals are even more sharply 
opposed” (363). In other words, Canada evangelicals in general do not adopt neo-liberalism. The 
difference may be attributed to the strength of fundamentalism in the US and the general anti-statist 
tone of American political culture (366-67).  
Several commentators follow Rawlyk in ascribing to Canadian evangelicals an “irenic” nature, 
defined by Sam Reimer “as attitudes towards other individuals or groups that are not sectarian, 
partisan, prejudiced, or patriarchal” (2003, 132). This irenic nature may contribute to evangelical 
political moderation in Canada. Environics pollster Michael Adams provides an example of Canadian 
irenicism when he notes that Canadians in the Prairie Provinces indicate the highest support for 
traditional gender identity, family structures, and social duty. However,  
whereas in the United States high levels of these traditional trends 
tend to go hand in hand with exclusionary and discriminatory values 
such as Sexism and Xenophobia, in Canada’s Prairie region we find 
no such intolerant underbelly to the belief in traditional categories of 
identity. Tradition without intolerance seems a rare combination in 
the world these days. (Adams, Langstaff, and Jamieson 2003, 85, 
italics in original)  
Given the strength of evangelicalism in the Prairie Provinces,51 there is no reason to think that 
evangelicals are not included in this description.  
Hoover provides four explanations for why Canadian evangelicals are more moderate than their 
American counterparts. First, Canadian Mennonite52 and Reformed churches, with their social justice 
                                                     
51 The Prairie Provinces are home to 27 per cent of all Canadian evangelicals who in turn comprise 20 percent 
of the Prairie population (Hoover et al. 2002, 360n7). 
52 The strong influence of Mennonites differentiates Canadian from American evangelicalism (Stackhouse 
1994, 383). The Brethren are also a sizeable contingent of British evangelicalism (Bebbginton 1997, 40). 
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traditions, are over-represented in Canadian evangelicalism. Second, Canadian fundamentalists make 
up a smaller proportion of evangelicalism. Third, the Canadian political system reinforces irenicism 
because “its rather elitist methods of dealing with interest groups and social movement organizations, 
allows for civil forums of communication, such as parliamentary committees and special 
commissions, but can and often does greet populist ‘outsider’ tactics with polite indifference.”53 To be 
accepted in the public square, then, one must be heard as a moderate voice. Fourth, the Canadian state 
regulates the content of evangelical radio and television programs, although the lack of aggressive 
radio personalities may be attributed to a generally more moderate Canadian political culture (1997, 
208-10). However, Hoover does not mention another important factor. Given the small size of their 
movement, Canadian evangelicals often work in coalitions, either across evangelical denominations 
or with other religious groups. For example, the EFC joined efforts with the Catholics on the abortion 
debate and with Hindus and Muslims in an effort to gain public funds for religious schools in Ontario. 
This collaboration diminishes both inter-denominational and inter-religious conflict.54  
The second important theme that emerges from this chapter is that the presence of Toryism may 
help explain the nature and speed of Canada’s secularization process. Combating secularism, or a 
variant thereof, is a raison d’être of the EFC. In the nineteenth century, more Canadians than 
Americans attended church. Until the 1950s Christian beliefs informed public policy, leading J.W. 
Grant to suggest that Canada emerged late out of the Victorian era (1988, 180). However, from the 
1960s on, fewer Canadians attended church and self-identified as Christian. As Bowen notes, 
“secularization in the form of disengagement from organized religion came relatively late to Canada, 
but it has swept through with a vengeance” (2004, 14). The American situation is the reverse: at the 
end of the twentieth century more Americans attended church and self-identified as Christian.55 Mark 
Noll suggests that Toryism, with its group-oriented and traditional views, and the proto-establishment 
privileges enjoyed by the Catholic, Anglican, and Presbyterian churches, are responsible for the rapid 
secularization of Canadian society. He believes that “the forces of modernity … have worked through 
                                                     
53 For more information on how the Canadian political system limits evangelical political activism, see Jonathan 
Malloy (2004). 
54 There are signs of moderation in the American religious right as well. For example, the National Association 
of Evangelicals is becoming more involved in environmental issues (Kirkpatrick 2007). 
55 However, as Noll cautions his readers, church attendance does not indicate religiosity and higher church 
attendance in the US does not necessarily indicate a more Christian country (1992, 549). In addition, given the 
continued dominance of Christian culture operative within American civil religion, levels of attendance may be 
exaggerated as Americans adjust their answers to poll questions in order to conform to expected religious 
behaviour (Reimer 1995). 
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the communal, top-down structures [in Canada], while they have worked alongside the more 
fragmented, populist structures of American churches” (1992, 549, italics in original). Noll 
summarizes the difference as the US having a form of secularization within the churches whereas 
Canada has a type that takes people out of the churches (550).56  
The third theme is that the political and theological diversity among evangelicals compels the EFC, 
which represents approximately one-third of Canada’s three million evangelicals (including most of 
the largest denominations), to generally develop centrist positions in response to issues. At the same 
time, the lack of twentieth century evangelical philosophical thought on poverty, capitalism, the 
nature of the state, and the relationship between church and state makes policy development more 
difficult for the EFC. As suggested earlier, the lack of such deliberations may indicate that 
evangelicals have reconciled themselves to some forms of economic individualism. The lack of 
philosophical reflection and the diversity of political views among contemporary evangelicals 
prompted EFC leaders to embark on an education campaign to help evangelicals interpret Canadian 
culture. Taken one step further, this interpretation and the subsequent policy recommendations 
contribute to a national Canadian evangelical identity, the subject of the next chapter. 
1.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined Canada’s history and political culture, which had a tendency to move 
individuals and organizations engaged in the public square to the political centre. I argued that 
evangelicals have been no exception, although the position they occupy is centre-right rather than 
centre-left. British Toryism, immigration patterns, and the British parliamentary system helped 
moderate the individualism preached by the itinerant evangelical preachers who came from the US in 
the nineteenth century. Indeed, nineteenth century evangelicalism contributed to the religious 
accommodation required for Confederation and helped establish a consensus among Protestants that 
lasted in some form until the 1920s. When the consensus collapsed, conservative evangelicals did not 
completely abandon the public square. Nor did they adopt en masse the fundamentalism of Shields 
and Aberhart or the neo-liberalism of the American Religious Right. Instead, Canadian evangelicals 
evidenced a variety of political commitments across the political spectrum and did not identify 
                                                     
56 In 2006 Noll expanded his analysis to include the new intellectual movements that swept particularly the 
Roman Catholic and United Churches in the 1960s, including the Second Vatican Council, as causes for 
Canada’s rapid secularization. 
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themselves with one political party. As the next chapter reveals, the EFC reflected the same 




The history of the EFC: Contributing to a Canadian evangelical 
identity 
As the EFC’s Executive Director, Brian Stiller did more than direct the operations of the organization. 
He helped Canadian evangelicals refine their understanding of the role of religion in the public square 
and interpret the secularizing trends they saw in the culture. The emphasis on these secularizing 
trends played a key role in persuading evangelicals to become politically engaged if they wanted 
public policy to reflect, at least to some degree, traditional Christian norms and values. 
This move towards political engagement did not go unchallenged. For example, John Stackhouse, 
in his study of the EFC and its American counterpart the National Association of Evangelicals 
(NAE), argued that both organizations assumed the necessity of engaging in politics despite the fact 
that not all evangelicals thought political involvement was a priority (1995b, 176, 178).57 In addition, 
he charged that at times the two organizations took positions on issues for which there was no 
complete consensus among evangelicals. As a result,  
rather than truly representing all those who could have agreed with 
their broadly inclusive statements of faith and purpose, they ended 
up representing a particular kind of evangelical Christianity, and in a 
kind of ironic and partially self-fulfilling prophecy were granted title 
to the term [evangelicalism] without gaining the much larger 
constituencies they had hoped for. (176)  
Specifically, Stackhouse pointed out that most of the members of the Canadian Baptist Federation and 
the Lutheran Church-Canada were not EFC members (172). Given the diversity of views within the 
evangelical community about the nature of evangelicalism and its role in society, Stackhouse 
questioned whether any organization could legitimately claim to represent the broad evangelical 
community on a variety of issues (173-77).  
John Redekop, a former president of the EFC’s General Council (its previous governing body), 
disagreed, claiming that Stackhouse’s view of representation was too limited. While granting that the 
                                                     
57 In his article Stackhouse noted a number of differences between the EFC and the NAE. First, Canadian 
Mennonites were more involved in the EFC than American Anabaptists were in the NAE (1995b, 162). Second, 
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EFC could never claim to represent the rank and file of individual congregations, he insisted that the 
organization nevertheless represented the common interests of denominational leaders, the decision-
makers who joined forces to further their common interests. According to Redekop, then, 
denominations maintained their individual identities and purposes while working together on certain 
issues. He claimed that just as in politics, “when you elect leaders you trust them to make decisions 
and that’s how EFC works” (2008).   
A key issue in the debate between Stackhouse and Redekop was the degree to which the EFC 
contributed to the creation of an evangelical identity. On the one hand, Stackhouse’s article from 
1995 suggested that the EFC’s conception of evangelicalism elevated a particular constituency within 
the broader evangelical community. On the other hand, Redekop argued that the EFC represented the 
common views of the evangelical leaders. In this chapter I trace the development of the EFC from its 
inception in 1964 to 2006 in an effort to determine the degree to which the EFC helped create a 
particular evangelical identity. The question necessitates that I look at the theological, political, and 
philosophical influences on the organization’s presidents. Given the lack of common evangelical 
conceptions of such issues as poverty, economics, and the nature of the state as discussed in Chapter 
1, the adoption by EFC leaders of a particular understanding of, for example, the state, would suggest 
that the EFC indeed interpreted evangelicalism in a specific manner. I limit my study to the EFC 
presidents, for as Doug Koop, the editor of Christian Week, observed:58 “The EFC is greatly shaped 
by the personality of its leader” (1998). While this statement applies more to Stiller than his two 
successors, the authority to make decisions and create policy has increasingly come to reside in the 
EFC’s staff, meaning that the presidents’ assumptions and beliefs are important indicators of the 
organization’s policies. I conclude the chapter by returning to the debate between Stackhouse and 
Redekop. 
This chapter is the second of two chapters that provide the historical background to the rest of this 
thesis. It acts as a bridge between a general Canadian evangelical history as outlined in chapter 1 and 
the examination of how EFC leaders interacted with secularism as studied in chapter 3. These 
interactions with secularism comprised the context from which EFC leaders developed a model of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the EFC did not portray itself in opposition to the Canadian Council of Churches as the NAE did against the 
National Council of Churches (170-71). 
58 Christian Week is an evangelical periodical published twice a month. Besides the denominational 
publications, it is the only Canadian alternative to the EFC’s Faith Today as a source for evangelical 
perspectives and news. 
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political engagement, protected religious freedom, and promoted human dignity and traditional 
marriage, the subjects of chapters 4 through 6. In short, this chapter describes the philosophical and 
theological assumptions of the EFC leaders as they interacted with Canadian public institutions and 
the complex issues that at times divided not only evangelicals but all Canadians. 
2.1 Creating the EFC 
Pentecostal pastor Harry Faught founded the EFC in 1964, with significant support from Oswald J. 
Smith, founder of The People’s Church, a missionary-oriented church in Toronto. Both Faught and 
Oswald had connections with the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) in the US.59 Faught 
encountered the American organization while studying at Dallas Theological Seminary in Texas and 
he wanted to develop a similar organization in Canada (Stackhouse 1995b, 161). In fact, one of the 
founders of the NAE travelled with Faught in 1967 on a national tour in an effort to increase the 
EFC’s membership (Kydd 1997, 298).60 Faught envisioned the primary purpose of the EFC as 
bringing evangelicals from the mainline and evangelical churches together for mutual support and 
worship, hence the inclusion of the term “fellowship” in the name of the organization.61 To encourage 
evangelicals from the mainline churches to join, Faught insisted that membership, in contrast to the 
NAE, be individual rather than congregational (this policy was later amended to allow individuals, 
denominations, and organizations to join).62 Consequently, three of the first six EFC presidents of the 
EFC’s General Council were leaders in the Presbyterian Church of Canada (Kydd 1997, 298), a 
mainline Protestant rather than an evangelical denomination. In the early years of the EFC a variety of 
groups provided limited administrative support, including the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada, 
                                                     
59 Fundamentalists created the NAE in 1942 to promote evangelism and counteract the public influence of the 
Federal Council of Churches (FCC). Within a decade its leaders referred to themselves as “evangelical” in order 
to distinguish themselves from the separatist fundamentalists. For an in-depth history of the NAE, see Cizik 
2005.  
60 Carl Henry helped found the NAE, Fuller Theological Seminary, and the magazine Christianity Today. 
During his Canadian trip he discussed the “God is dead” philosophy (Fieguth 2004, 31). 
61 Redekop attempted to have the term “fellowship” replaced with “alliance” but received little support (2008). 
62 At the EFC’s 1969 convention, 749 people attended, with 202 identifying themselves as Presbyterian, 63 as 
Anglican, and 47 as United Church (Minutes of the General Council, April 15, 1969 as quoted by Stackhouse in 
1993a, 284n5). Since the mid-1970s, however, the top leadership has come from the evangelical denominations 
(172). In an interview John Redekop recalled the active participation of a number of people in the early years 
who represented a variety of evangelical denominations, most notably Robert Thompson from the Evangelical 
Free Church who also served as leader of the federal Social Credit Party from 1960-1967; Gerald Vandezande, 
a member of the Christian Reformed Church; historian Charles Tipp of the Fellowship Baptists; and Reverend 
Merv Saunders of the Baptist Convention of Ontario and Quebec (2008).  
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Citizens for Public Justice, an organization with roots in the Reformed tradition, and the Mennonite 
Central Committee Canada (Redekop 2008).  
The EFC’s original constitution noted its opposition to theological liberalism, spiritual nihilism, 
and apostasy (likely referring to the then popular “God is dead” movement) while its statement of 
purpose outlined its commitment to furthering the gospel. It adopted the statement of faith of the 
World Evangelical Fellowship, which is a generic listing of the primary theological tenets of the 
evangelical faith but does not specifically refer to the Bible as inerrant (see Appendix B). To support 
the evangelical community and engage the culture, EFC leaders created commission to study such 
issues as theology, inter-church relations, Christian education, social action, public relations, and 
foreign missions (Stackhouse 1995b, 161-63). 
Over time three Protestant denominations came to influence the EFC in significant ways, of which 
two joined the organization in its early formative years. The Pentecostal Church of Canada63 and the 
Mennonite Brethren joined the EFC almost immediately upon its inception, with the latter being the 
first Mennonite group to do so (Guenther 1997, 233). In 1979 the Christian Reformed Church joined 
(Stackhouse 1993a, 187n31) after much internal debate in which the denomination’s leaders had to be 
convinced that the EFC was not promoting a fundamentalist agenda64 and was committed to cultural 
engagement and intellectual rigor (Tangelder 1968). According to Stackhouse, these three traditions 
continue to inform the “cultural outlooks” operative within the EFC: 1) the revivalist/ evangelistic 
culture that focuses on evangelism and wants a non-interfering state; 2) the Reformed tradition that 
understands Christianity as transformative and desires involvement with the state and other 
institutions; and 3) the Anabaptist position that Stackhouse characterised as desiring a non-interfering 
state but also wanting to be “a witness to the state on behalf of peace and justice issues” (2008). The 
Pentecostal influence was evident in the leadership of Faught, two other Pentecostal leaders who later 
served as presidents of the EFC,65 and Stiller, an ordained pastor in the Pentecostal Assembly of 
Canada. Mennonite Brethren influence can be seen in the contributions of John Redekop, an active 
                                                     
63 Some Pentecostals hesitated about joining the EFC given their at times turbulent relationship with 
evangelicals. For example, some evangelicals refused to attend meetings where Faught spoke. For their part, 
Pentecostal leaders feared that Faught would dilute the Pentecostal doctrine of baptism by the Holy Spirit (Kydd 
1997, 298-99). 
64 In 1951 the Christian Reformed Church of North America severed its ties with the NAE due to the 
fundamentalism the denomination perceived to be operative in the Association (See “The Evangelical 
Fellowship of Canada (II), available online at http://reformedreflections.ca/articles/re-evangel-fello-of-can-2.pdf 
(accessed March 15, 20211).  
65 The two are Reverend Charles Yates (1977-1983) and Dr. Kenneth Birch (in the mid to late 1990s). 
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member of the denomination who served as the EFC’s vice-president in the late 1980s and its 
president from 1991-1993. Beginning in the late 1960s, Redekop encouraged other EFC leaders to 
move beyond inter-church fellowship and become more involved in the public sphere. For its part, the 
Reformed community contributed its heritage of philosophical and political thought via the Institute 
for Christian Studies, a Reformed graduate school in Toronto. Over the years a number of professors 
at the Institute volunteered on various EFC commissions. In addition, Gerald Vandezande, an active 
member of various Reformed organizations and co-founder of Citizens for Public Justice,66 was a 
long-time member of the EFC’s General Council. Throughout his years of involvement with the EFC, 
Vandezande found his fellow General Council members open to “proposals that might be useful in 
the development of a Christian witness that thinks beyond the immediate demands of the 
constituencies that you speak for, but also meets the needs of people, our neighbours, across the 
country” (2010).  
As the EFC sought to expand its membership and discern its purpose, Canadian society underwent 
fundamental changes. Industrial development brought increased urbanization. Pierre Trudeau, first as 
the Liberal Minister of Justice and later as Prime Minister, introduced new social policies that made 
abortion, contraceptives, and divorce more available, de-criminalized homosexual relations between 
consenting adults, and instituted the policies of bi-lingualism and multiculturalism. When Quebeckers 
voted against sovereignty-association in 1980, Trudeau promised constitutional change and embarked 
on a quest to repatriate the Constitution and write a Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter 
referred to as the Charter).  
Despite these social changes the EFC remained small, underfunded, and largely unnoticed. It had 
no full-time paid staff and relied heavily on volunteers who were already busy in their conference 
offices. It held an annual meeting that brought evangelical leaders together for workshops, speeches, 
and worship, published a magazine named Thrust, and addressed specific social issues such as 
lotteries. In addition, the EFC sponsored biennial seminars for evangelical leaders and administered 
Share, Canada!, a relief and development organization originally managed by the Christian and 
Missionary Alliance Church. Eventually Share became the Canadian branch of World Relief, an 
organization initially established by the American National Association of Evangelicals in 1944 to 
                                                     
66 In 1999, Stiller said that Vandezande taught him “more about political engagement than anyone” 
(Vandezande 1999, viii). A decade later he told a freelance writer that “in time, there was little that I did 
without consulting [Vandezande]” (Volman 2009). Vandezande also had a friendship with John Redekop and 
Mario Di Gangi, a former president of the EFC’s General Council (Vandezande 2010).  
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support European victims of World War II (Stackhouse 1995b, 167). In 1977 the EFC defined its 
purposes in largely pastoral terms: 1) unifying evangelicals; 2) promoting renewal in the whole 
Canadian Church; and 3) affirming the authority of Christ over all aspects of society.  
In 1981 the General Council revised the organization’s constitution and charted a new course. 
While maintaining the mandates of developing evangelical church leadership and fostering unity, the 
new constitution expanded the EFC’s role in public life. More specifically, the organization was to 
defend the rights and freedoms of the Church, Christian institutions, and individual Christians as well 
as “bring moral direction” into governmental decisions (Stackhouse 1995b, 167).67 To meet the 
objective of becoming more involved in politics, the General Council hired Stiller in 1983 to become 
its executive director (the titled changed to “president” shortly before Stiller left the organization in 
1997). Under Stiller, the EFC operated with a reinvigorated General Council and a much more 
politically active evangelical base. More importantly, Stiller had significant access to political power 
during the Progressive Conservative governments from 1984-1993, which meant that the EFC had 
moved from a pastoral fellowship with little political clout to a politically engaged organization that 
wielded some degree of influence in the backrooms of Parliament Hill. Given the importance of 
Stiller’s influence on the EFC, it is worth looking at his career more closely. 
2.2 Brian Stiller: 1983-1997 
Stiller came to the EFC with a desire to understand more about public policy. An ordained 
Pentecostal pastor with a graduate degree from Wycliffe College, the Anglican college at the 
University of Toronto, Stiller worked for Youth for Christ for 16 years prior to his tenure at the 
EFC.68 As he worked with young people he became aware of the degree to which public policy 
impacted people’s lives, but realized that he lacked a theological framework that could connect the 
                                                     
67 In 1987 Faith Today listed the following as components of the EFC’s mandate: “1) Remind the nation of the 
supremacy and reign of Jesus Christ; 2) Encourage government to rule with truth and justice; 3) Publicly 
express biblical convictions; 4) Prepare Christians to be ‘salt’ and ‘light’ – effective ambassadors to their own 
communities; 5) Bring church leaders together in prayer, fellowship and national strategy” (Faith Today 1987b, 
33). 
68 Youth for Christ is an international evangelistic outreach to youth under the age of 25. Founded in the 1940s, 
it hired Billy Graham as its first full time staff person. Over time Youth for Christ spawned other organizations, 
including the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association and World Vision International. Stiller originally joined 
Youth for Christ in Montreal and then moved to Toronto to work with the branch office there. In 1975 he 
became the organization’s national president (Faith Today 1996, 54). 
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social and spiritual needs of people with public policy (Stiller 2008). He brought this concern for a 
holistic view of life to the EFC.  
As early as 1978 Stiller volunteered on the EFC’s Social Action Commission. He later served as 
the organization’s vice-president (Stackhouse 1995b, 167) and became its executive director in 1983 
at the age of 41. At the time the EFC had a budget of approximately $26,000, funds which Stiller had 
to raise, and a tiny, cramped office (Faith Today 1996, 54). Almost immediately Stiller reorganized 
Thrust, renaming it Faith Alive and then Faith Today two years later. While Faith Today was 
published by the EFC, and the EFC’s president was its Editor-in-Chief, Stiller and his successors 
insisted that the news and issues magazine was not the “organ” or mouthpiece of the EFC but a 
“forum for conversation” and “a vehicle for community understanding and exchange” (Walsh 1999a, 
7). However, as Mark Chapman observed, there is considerable overlap between the EFC as the 
public voice of many evangelicals and its publication which elaborates the views of evangelicals 
(1994, 32n2).69 On the 10th anniversary of the magazine, Stiller suggested that Faith Today had 
helped non-evangelicals understand that evangelicals were not “some funny, fundy group in the 
corner” but had a “substantive, legitimate and coherent message to offer the world” (Cambridge 1993, 
33). Under Stiller’s leadership, then, Faith Today not only sought to bring evangelicals together, but 
also to portray evangelicals and their concerns to the general public.70  
Stiller’s skills, temperament, and background contributed to the EFC’s significant growth over the 
next decade. Those who knew Stiller personally often commented on his entrepreneurial spirit and 
zeal for networking (Stackhouse 2008; Redekop 2008; Jantz 1994). Within five years of taking office, 
Stiller was able to increase the EFC’s budget to $1.2 million and by 1990 the budget reached $2 
million (Stackhouse 1995b, 168). In 1996 Faith Today reported that the organization had a budget of 
$3 million, a staff of 30, and represented almost 2 million people, including 14,000 individual 
members, 28 denominations, thousands of churches, and 100 parachurch agencies (54). 
                                                     
69 I do not study the contents of Faith Today in this thesis. I limit my use of the magazine to the columns written 
by the EFC president/Editor-in-Chief, articles written by various authors about the EFC, or columnists who 
quote an EFC president in a story. 
70 At the end of 2008, the average print run of Faith Today was 20,000 copies per issue, with an estimated 
readership of 45,000 to 100,000. The average reader has an individual income of $67,000, a post-secondary 
degree, and is 50 years old. Readers come from the following churches in descending order: Baptist, 
Pentecostal, Christian and Missionary Alliance, non-denominational, Christian Reformed, Mennonite Brethren, 
and Anglican. For more, see http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=467 (accessed 
January 30, 2011). 
 
 55 
Although the EFC expanded and became more politically involved under Stiller’s leadership, 
Stiller’s background as a Pentecostal pastor remained a point of tension in the broader evangelical 
community. On the one hand, Stiller’s oratory gifts developed as a pastor, combined with his 
Saskatchewan roots, allowed him to converse comfortably with both denominational leaders and the 
evangelical base, which at the time was largely located in Western Canada. As Stackhouse noted, 
Stiller understood the concerns of the working class. He spoke their language and channelled their 
concerns into support for political engagement generally and for the EFC specifically. In Stiller the 
EFC found someone “who could and wanted to articulate frankly the fear that evangelicals had that 
their country was running away from them and that they were going to suffer for it as their country 
became much less congenial to them” (Stackhouse 2008). On the other hand, the Baptist Convention 
of Ontario and Quebec and the Convention of Atlantic Baptist Churches delayed their membership 
with the EFC because they feared that the EFC would become a wing of American fundamentalism. 
These Conventions joined the EFC only after Stiller left the organization (Stiller 2008). 
Stiller brought with him a vision for a new age of evangelical political involvement. He believed 
the social changes occurring in Canada and in the mainline churches presented opportunities for 
evangelicals to engage in public debates and exert some political influence. Early advertisements for 
the EFC in Faith Today declared, “It’s time we stood up for what we believe,” and that the “EFC is 
vital to the religious life of Canada … It’s time that we break the silence that has allowed our great 
country to lose its religious mooring and drift into a state of moral chaos” (Faith Today 1986a, 71; 
1987a, 55). There was a sense of urgency as well as possibility in these ads. The sense of urgency was 
rooted in the perception of the loss of a Christian ethos in Canada while the sense of possibility rested 
on the premise that there was still time for Canada to regain its religious foundation. The deciding 
factor was whether evangelicals were ready to act. Indeed, Stiller used this urgency-possibility 
strategy to persuade evangelicals and their leaders to engage in all aspects of Canadian public life, 
including politics. The message was clear: the future of Canadian―not just evangelical―identity 
depended on robust evangelical participation in public life. 
One of Stiller’s major concerns was the lack of home-grown Canadian evangelical leadership. 
Therefore Faith Alive/Today did not feature the leaders of the American Religious Right. Instead, 
throughout his time at the EFC Stiller expressed his concerns about the dominant American TV 
personalities of the time. For example, in the third issue of Faith Alive, which addressed the lack of 
evangelical leaders in Canada, Stiller praised Billy Graham but was silent about Jerry Falwell, the 
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primary voice of the American Moral Majority (Stiller 1983a, 7-9). Three years later when Stiller 
discussed “high-tech evangelism,” he lamented how “religious programs too often seem to assault 
[the unchurched] with manipulative, American-patriotic and narrow fundamentalist presentations. 
And unfortunately, too often viewers perceive TV evangelists as being money gatherers and empire 
builders” (1986a, 24-25). Stiller went on to celebrate the work of Graham and other evangelists such 
as Luis Palau, David Mainse, and Terry Winter (the latter two were Canadian), thereby separating 
them from such televangelists as Falwell, Jim and Tammy Baker, and Jimmy Swaggart. Stiller’s 
silence on these latter television personalities spoke volumes. In addition, Stiller wrote that he found 
the anti-Clinton sentiments uttered by Falwell disturbing (1994a, 70). When Stiller was asked about 
his concerns over imported evangelical leadership during the 1980s, he recalled that Falwell and the 
Moral Majority “may have sounded right in their world but sounded awfully tinny up here” (2008).  
In addition to urging the development of Canadian evangelical leaders, the early Faith Alive issues 
reflected Stiller’s Canadian patriotism, which he made explicit in his book Don’t Let Canada Die by 
Neglect (1994), a compilation of his columns for Faith Alive/Today and other EFC literature as well 
as several of his public speeches. In the book Stiller admitted “to being very much in love with 
Canada” and proud of his Saskatchewan roots. However, he qualified his patriotism by speaking 
about the need “to love God first” and “putting God’s moral law first.” Yet for Stiller the command to 
love God first did not require the retention of the “old order” of Christian dominance but to love one’s 
neighbours (1994b, 22-24). This suggested a rejection of Christendom, in which the Christian faith 
was dominant and granted political and economic privileges. As Stiller worked at the EFC, he became 
convinced of the need for those who follow “‘the Jesus way’ to become more focused in caring for 
our nation” (x). More specifically, he called evangelicals to rebuild the foundation of Canada by 
developing their own spiritual disciplines, contesting individualism, and becoming engaged in the 
public debates about religious broadcasting, politics, the arts, education, and business (3-21).  
If Stiller desired evangelicals to become more engaged in the public sphere, he discovered that he 
first had to re-shape the evangelical conception of “the world” and the necessity of participating in it 
in some manner.71 Part of his education program was an eight hour seminar he created in 1987 
                                                     
71 In typical evangelical parlance, “worldly” is a negative term used to identify “bad” behaviour, including 
smoking and drinking alcohol (Stiller 2003a, 95-96). These behaviours are seen as bad because they do not 
“lead to a witness of Christ’s claims on life” (1994b, 110). Some evangelicals go so far as to define a concern 
about politics and society as worldly (33). In contrast, Stiller advised evangelicals that although sin entered the 
world with the Fall, the earth, its products, the physical body, and living in the world remain important.  Indeed, 
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entitled “Understanding our times,” that encouraged audience members to engage culture. Stiller 
recognized that his proposed vision required evangelicals to shift their thinking away from viewing 
the world as secondary to viewing it as essential and evangelicals as essential to it. Perhaps to 
distinguish himself from fundamentalists, Stiller rejected evangelical separation from culture and 
refused to view “the world” as evil or foreign. In 2008, he told Faith Today that he wanted 
evangelicals to “understand that sectarianism is neither biblical nor helpful” (Faith Today 2008a, 23).  
Stiller also had to educate evangelicals about the processes of politics and law-making as well as 
the philosophies that he believed were harming Canada, especially secularism. An EFC ad in a 1987 
issue of Faith Today defined secularism as “a view that God is irrelevant to life,” a view that EFC 
leaders believed was “quickly replacing Christian faith as the foundation stone of our nation” (Faith 
Today 1987b, 33). To combat secularism, Stiller called evangelicals to participate in the public 
sphere. He advocated a particular type of engagement, one founded upon what he described as 
thoughtful and carefully constructed strategies (Stiller 1988a, 33). He reminded evangelicals that 
many of the freedoms and benefits they and other Canadians enjoy have their origins in the “Judeo-
Christian” faith of the early settlers and politicians (1985, 61).72 This nod to history did not indicate 
that Stiller wanted a return to a Christian establishment. Instead, he urged evangelicals to learn the 
language of the contemporary culture. He taught them that speaking religious truth did not require 
them to use religious-sounding words. If evangelicals wanted to be taken seriously, he advised, they 
had to attend public debates and present ideas rather than moralize (1995a, 78). He reminded them of 
the importance of loving those of other religious traditions (1991a, 78) while at the same time 
remembering that their “duty [is] to persuade all people that what we believe is true” (1987c, 34). In 
addition, Stiller warned against the dangers of materialistic individualism (1991b, 202). It appears 
that the overall purpose of this education was to provide evangelicals with a Christian interpretation 
of society in preparation for increased engagement in the public sphere. This interpretation accepted 
the modern differentiation of society and the separation of the church from such institutions as the 
state and the economy. At the same time, Stiller believed that religious voices had the right and the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
“it is in the world that we encounter the life of Christ. The drama of God’s recreating life is played out on the 
stage of life, in this world” (2003a, 96).  
72 While EFC literature frequently uses the term “Judeo-Christianity,” some sociologist of religion are 
uncomfortable with it. For instance, Lori Beaman writes that the term masks the anti-Semitism that remains 
pervasive. Beaman, “The myth of pluralism, diversity, and vigor: The constitutional privilege of Protestantism 
in the United States and Canada,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42:3 (2003), 322n15. 
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responsibility to be involved in the development of social and economic policy in an effort to protect 
the Christian understanding of the human person as the image of God.  
Stiller cultivated a public voice for evangelicals, largely through his contacts with media 
personalities and his public image. He became a prominent spokesperson for evangelicals on public 
policy matters and heightened his public image by hosting “The Stiller Report,” later re-named 
“Cross Currents,” a weekly half-hour television show on Vision TV that brought together various 
guests to discuss the issues of the day. The program had strong connections with the EFC as frequent 
panel members included Redekop and Vandezande, as well as George Rawlyk, a Baptist historian 
who studied Canadian evangelicalism.73 The show portrayed evangelicals as reasoned contributors to 
public debates.  
While Stiller’s success was due in large part to his own abilities as a fundraiser, organizer, and 
public figure, his tenure as the EFC’s president coincided with at least three external factors that 
significantly impacted the work of the EFC and played to Stiller’s strengths. First, the 1982 
repatriation of the Constitution with its Charter of Rights and Freedoms was just a year old and 
Canadians had not yet fully comprehended its implications. Evangelicals became aware of the 
implications in 1985, when the Supreme Court ruled that the Christian justification of the Lord’s Day 
Act violated the freedom and conscience of Canadians. Much of the EFC’s analysis of the ruling 
viewed it as one of the first indications of a new emphasis on the freedom of Canadians to be free 
from religion and its influence (Epp Buckingham 2002, 29; 2007, 19). As EFC leaders came to 
interpret the Charter as a tool for secular and/or non-Christian advocacy groups to challenge the 
public role of Christianity in Canadian politics and society, they began to intervene in legal cases that 
involved issues of religious freedom. Generally these cases involved the religious freedom of 
Christians, although a few involved the rights of religious adherents of other faiths to publicly express 
and practice their beliefs.  
Second, Canadians elected Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives in the 1984 federal 
election, giving the Party its first majority government since John Diefenbaker’s government from 
1958 to 1962. Mulroney’s first caucus had a number of evangelical MPs, including Mennonites from 
                                                     
73 After Rawlyk’s death, Stiller wrote a column in Faith Today about Raywlyk’s contributions to the study of 
evangelicalism in Canada (1996a, 70).  
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the Western provinces74 who helped Stiller gain political access. These MPs included John Reimer 
from Ontario, Benno Friesen from British Columbia, and Jake Epp from Manitoba. Ramon 
Hnatyshyn, a Ukrainian Orthodox from Saskatchewan, also became an important contact for Stiller.75 
Both Hnatyshyn and Epp served in Mulroney’s Cabinet – Hnatyshyn as House Leader and Justice 
Minister and Epp as Minister of National Health and Welfare and then as Minister of Energy, Mines 
and Resources. Epp worked closely with the EFC during his tenure as Minister of Health (1984-
1989), particularly on the issue of abortion in the wake of the 1988 decision by the Supreme Court to 
strike down the abortion law. To this day Epp and Stiller remain friends.76 In addition to political 
contacts, Stiller established relationships with such media personalities as Barbara Frum, then co-host 
of CBC-TV’s The Journal, and Peter Gzowski, a former host of CBC-Radio’s Morningside, as well 
as with ethicist Margaret Sommerville at McGill University and Don Page, then serving in the 
Department of External Affairs (Stiller 2008). 
Third, Canadian evangelicalism experienced growth in the 1970s and 1980s, an era that saw the 
membership numbers and attendance rates of mainline churches decline. As a result of the growth, the 
number of students attending Canadian evangelical colleges, seminaries, and post-secondary 
theological schools increased. George Egerton and former Liberal MP David Smith subsequently 
claimed that the growth provided the evangelical community with some political clout. For example, 
during the 1980-1981 federal debate about whether to recognize God in the preamble to the 
Constitution, Smith informed Prime Minister Trudeau and the Liberal caucus that the number of 
students in post-secondary theological schools affiliated with the Pentecostal Assembly of Canada 
alone was more than the combined number of students in schools operated by the Anglican, United, 
and Presbyterian denominations. According to Smith, the numbers helped convince Trudeau to 
include the phrase “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God 
                                                     
74 According to Redekop, among the Canadian General Conference and Mennonite Brethren (MB) 
denominations, the Dutch-Russian Mennonites set the tone rather than the more politically aloof Swiss-German 
Mennonites that are dominant in the US (Redekop 1995, 35). Mennonite candidates have contested a number of 
seats in most elections since Confederation, representing a variety of political parties. In some ridings two or 
more parties ran Mennonite candidates (40-46). When an undisclosed national political party approached 
Redekop to become its local candidate in the 1984 election, the MB leadership informed him that if he ran for 
office he would have to give up all of his denominational and local church leadership positions. Redekop chose 
not to run for the nomination (1999, 27). 
75 Hnatyshyn served as Canada’s Governor General from 1990 to 1995. Stiller believes the Western Canadian 
heritage he shared with these MPs partially explains his political access (2008). 
76 Stiller later dedicated two of his books to Epp (1997a and 2003) and in 2005 Epp became the Chancellor of 
Tyndale University College and Seminary in Toronto where Stiller served as president from 1995 until 2009. 
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and the rule of law” in the preamble of the Constitution (Faith Alive 1983b, 45; Egerton 2000, 104-6). 
As Redekop recalled years later, the political significance of the number of students in evangelical 
Bible institutes and colleges helped EFC leaders become aware that they could have as strong a 
public voice as the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Canadian Council of Churches 
(2008). However, it must be kept in mind that despite the fact that there may have been more students 
in evangelical schools than those operated by the mainline churches, the numbers were nevertheless 
relatively few. 
A number of national issues occupied Stiller’s attention during his 14 years of leadership at the 
EFC, with abortion being perhaps the most prominent. Other issues included the funding of 
independent religious schools in Ontario, a campaign against euthanasia, and protesting an 
amendment to the Canadian Human Rights Act that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. These issues heightened the unease with which evangelicals viewed Canadian society and 
are covered in depth in later chapters.  
Given Stiller’s love for Canada, the unity question greatly concerned him, especially after the 
failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, which sought to amend the Constitution Act 1982 in an 
effort to address the concerns of Quebec that prevented the province’s leaders from signing the Act. 
Stiller found the aspirations of Quebeckers as outlined in the Accord to be reasonable (1992a, 70). A 
year after the collapse of Meech Lake, Mulroney initiated a second round of negotiations with the 
provincial premiers that produced the Charlottetown Accord. During this process, the EFC 
established a task force on Canada’s future, chaired by Paul Marshall, who reminded Canadians that 
evangelicals, like other Canadians, accept the Canadian values of “Peace, Order, and Good 
Government.” He wrote about how Christianity was a central element of Canadian identity given the 
religious nature of Canadian society and politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(1992). Don Page, then dean at Trinity Western University and another member of the task force, 
argued that evangelicals could offer a national perspective given their presence in every region in 
Canada and a national reconciliation process based upon the Christian principles of “Confession, 
Forgiveness, Restitution, and Lasting Reconciliation” (1992, 29). Stiller later noted that the high 
regard Canadians have for an activist federal government contributed to the evangelical penchant for 
denominational structures, writing, “this ‘Canadian way’ of being attached to and allowing national 
governmental forms to lead is a powerful cultural instinct that is not lost on the felt need of 
congregations and church leaders who want to be a part of something larger, something national” 
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(1993a, 78). In this manner Stiller emphasized the reciprocal relationship between evangelicalism and 
national political structures. The underlying argument was that evangelicals are a part of Canada and 
value Canadian public institutions just as strongly as other Canadians. 
As policy development and political engagement were extremely important to Stiller, a significant 
personal milestone occurred in 1996 when the EFC opened an office in Ottawa called the Department 
of National Affairs. Its creation enhanced the ability of evangelicals to engage more directly in the 
political process. The EFC appointed Bruce Clemenger, at that time the EFC’s researcher and 
developer of policy, to lead the office. The connection to Ottawa through the Department of National 
Affairs was important to Stiller as it was consistent with his view that evangelicals must be engaged 
in political processes, including the lobbying of policy makers and leaders of the state.77  
At the age of 55 Stiller left the EFC in 1997 to become president of Ontario Bible College/Ontario 
Theological Seminary.78 He is to date the longest-serving EFC president and under his leadership the 
number of EFC affiliates increased, as did its budget. Stiller established contacts with people far 
removed from the evangelical community, thereby modelling for evangelicals the value of the liberal 
principle of the individual freedom of conscience. This principle in turn required that evangelicals 
recognize that they were one voice among many and to work for the religious freedoms of all 
Canadians, not just themselves. 
Studying this history of the EFC under Stiller’s leadership does not by itself further the discussion 
between Stackhouse and Redekop about the degree to which the EFC helped create a Canadian 
evangelical identity. What is required is a study of the philosophical and theological influences upon 
the EFC’s leaders. Stiller’s religious roots are in Pentecostalism, a tradition that historically did not 
engage in Canadian political life (Althouse 2009). Given Stiller’s involvement with a broad spectrum 
of evangelical traditions that he encountered within the EFC, one may surmise that he became 
familiar with a variety of models conceptualizing the relationship between faith and politics. One 
                                                     
77 Stackhouse thinks that most evangelicals continue to see the role of the EFC as monitoring the state, 
particularly the federal government. However, he cautions against an overly deterministic interpretation of the 
scope of the EFC’s work, noting that it also works to deepen congregational life and assists churches in mission 
work and evangelism (2008).  
78 Stiller began to serve as the voluntary interim OBC/OTS president in June of 1995 when it faced bankruptcy. 
The OBC/OTS hired him permanently in 1996 and he served as president of both OBC/OTS and the EFC until 
May 31, 1997. In 1998 the OBC was renamed Tyndale College and when it received university status in 2003 it 
became Tyndale University College. It remained connected with the seminary and in 2006 the college and 
seminary bought the adjoining property of 56.3 acres from the Sisters of St. Joseph for $40 million (Faith Today 
1996, 54; www.tyndale.ca). 
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model prominent among American fundamentalists and some evangelicals was developed by Francis 
Schaeffer, a neo-Calvinist theologian and former fundamentalist whose work Stiller encountered 
while in university (Stiller 1994b, 3-4). Schaeffer rebelled against the humanist worldview that views 
human beings as autonomous, independent, and perfectible (1976, 60, 121). He found this “secular 
humanism” to be dangerous because he believed that it leads to chaos and statism. Humans were 
created to worship something, he preached, and when they reject God they put the state, society, or 
some other idol at the centre of life and worship it.  
In A Christian Manifesto (1982) Schaeffer introduced evangelicals to the concept of cultural 
warfare. He viewed the battle against secular humanism as momentous and total, involving the arts, 
philosophy, religion, architecture, and social policy. In essence, he taught evangelicals that 
worldviews matter, and that abortion, family breakdown, and pornography were the results of the 
humanist worldview. Schaeffer’s notion of cultural warfare was similar to the American culture wars 
of the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, prior to the founding of the Moral Majority in 1979, Schaeffer urged 
Jerry Falwell to use his influence to combat secular humanism (Gilgoff 2007, 82).  
Although Stiller learned a great deal from Schaeffer, he did not ascribe to Schaeffer’s desire to 
return to a golden past when Christianity was the established religion. In fact, Stiller doubted whether 
such a golden age ever existed (1997a, 42-43). For Stiller, the purpose of evangelical political 
engagement was not to re-impose Christendom but to have “the biblical values of truth, integrity, and 
justice pervade the legislative agenda” and “to live out the Gospel in a redemptive way, with an eye to 
Jesus’ return and with a heart of obedience” (179). Furthermore, while Stiller, like Schaeffer, viewed 
with concern the desire of modern humanism “to eliminate Christian influence in our society” (Stiller 
1994b, 24), he did not adopt Schaeffer’s call for a culture war. Instead, Stiller intentionally 
distinguished the EFC from the American Religious Right (1996b, 70). Rather than adopt Schaeffer’s 
model, Stiller’s writings reflected elements of the writings of Redekop and Marshall. Below I 
highlight the work of these two theorists and examine how they influenced Stiller. I begin with 
Redekop, as his involvement with the EFC preceded that of Marshall.  
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2.2.1 John Redekop 
It is significant that Redekop is a member of the Conference of Mennonite Brethren Churches, which 
joined the EFC in 1964.79 According to Bruce Guenther, the Mennonite Brethren are more involved 
in transdenominational evangelicalism than many of the other Mennonite branches, are more 
acculturated, and are less Anabaptist, with only one-half of them supporting the traditional Anabaptist 
peace position (1997, 230, 233). Guenther claims that historically there was some mutual critique 
between evangelicals and Mennonites. Where evangelicals challenged the manner in which 
Mennonites intertwined ethnic distinctions with their doctrines of faith, Mennonites distrusted how 
the theological emphases of evangelicals unwittingly promulgated such cultural values as 
consumerism, individualism, and nationalism (239). Despite these historical differences, Redekop’s 
membership in the Mennonite Brethren predisposed him to welcome such a transdenominational 
evangelical organization as the EFC and to advocate for evangelical involvement in politics. 
In fact, Redekop was a significant force in moving the EFC from an organization that defined its 
purpose as providing mutual support and fellowship to its members to one that was engaged in the 
political life of the nation. Some of Redekop’s motivation lay in his experiences with American 
evangelicalism which he encountered in the early 1960s while doing his doctoral thesis at the 
University of Washington in Seattle. His thesis examined Billy James Hargis, a pastor and 
spokesperson for the American far right in the 1950s and 1960s. Redekop described Hargis and his 
followers as Christian fundamentalists who were virulently anti-communist, opposed to both social 
reform and the United Nations, and desirous of a return to traditional America. Redekop distrusted 
their tendency to conflate liberalism with communism (1968, n.p.80) and their rigid political ideology. 
He found the growth of the far right movement to be disturbing because it thwarted social progress by 
describing most state intervention in social issues as communist subversion. Moreover, Redekop 
disliked how the far right transplanted “final, total answers, from the private, religious sphere to the 
public, political sphere” (1968, 202).  
Upon his return to Canada in 1968 and after accepting a job at Waterloo Lutheran University (now 
Wilfred Laurier University) in Ontario, Redekop became involved with the EFC and served as the 
                                                     
79 In 2001 the Conference had a membership of 34,288 and an attendance of 45,528 people. The combined 
number of members of all the Mennonite denominations that are also members of the EFC is 48,887 (Guenther 
2008, 412-13).  
80 Taken from the preface of Redekop’s American Far Right.  
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first chair of its Social Action Commission.81 His distrust of the American far right’s penchant for 
simplistic religious answers to political issues and its view of America as God’s chosen country, 
coupled with his reservations about the militarism, patriotism, and partisan identification he saw in 
the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), all led him to join other EFC leaders in insisting that 
the organization be non-partisan.82 As he recalled in an interview, the decision not “to become the 
chaplain of the government of the day” was “a direction-setting decision” (2008). As a result, claimed 
Rekeop, the EFC did not feature prominent politicians at its conventions and both Redekop and Stiller 
desired a clear distinction between the EFC on the one hand and the NAE, Jerry Falwell, and the 
Moral Majority on the other hand. In this manner Redekop not only helped lead the EFC to become 
more involved in politics, but he also contributed to the development of a particular type of 
engagement that eschewed political partisanship and strove for the political centre. In 1983 Redekop 
and a few other General Council members challenged Stiller to apply for the position of Executive 
Director (2008). 
Redekop’s two other contributions to the EFC were his dedication to ecumenism and social 
justice.83 These commitments in turn contributed to the manner in which the EFC defined 
evangelicalism. Redekop called for evangelical denominational and parachurch leaders to work 
together, identify issues for which they had something distinctive to say, and then collectively address 
those issues. He especially desired the leaders to address “the social consequences of the gospel” 
(2008). When some leaders reminded him of how the Social Gospel movement split Protestantism in 
the early twentieth century, Redekop responded by referring to Jesus’ parable about the Good 
Samaritan as found in the biblical book of Luke. In the parable a Samaritan, a social outcast, chose to 
aid a wounded man after two Jewish religious leaders passed by without stopping.84 At the time, 
Redekop saw evangelical denominations such as the Christian and Missionary Alliance, the 
Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada, and the Evangelical Free Church contributing to relief and 
development organizations overseas but doing little to address social justice issues in Canada. Soon 
Redekop and other EFC leaders began urging the federal government to support Canadian 
                                                     
81 In 2008 Redekop recalled that when he became involved with the EFC he was the only person in the 
organization with a PhD (2008). 
82 However, the NAE did not become overtly identified with the Republican Party until 1979 (Cizik 2005, 50-
55). 
83 This is not to say that other evangelical leaders involved in the EFC did not have the same commitments to 
ecumenism and social justice. Redekop’s contributions are highlighted here because of his long involvement in 
the EFC, his previous experiences in the US, and his education in political science. 
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aboriginals, provide more relief funding for famine-stricken Ethiopia, and promote refugee 
sponsorship and family reunification programs. Redekop urged other EFC leaders to lobby for the 
protection of all people, not just its members, and to make specific policy recommendations. He 
advised EFC leaders to avoid the language of “thus says the Lord” and instead focus on how the 
EFC’s positions served the common good (2008). In short, Redekop helped guide the EFC to view 
evangelicalism as ecumenical, concerned about social justice, and politically centrist.85 
Specific policy issues for which Redekop provided some leadership included capital punishment 
and the role of religious education in public schools. He wrote an article in Faith Today arguing 
against capital punishment and together with others helped steer the General Council away from 
advocating for the retention of the practice. With regard to religious education in Ontario public 
schools, Redekop advised other leaders not to argue for mandatory religious exercises in public 
schools. Given his previous experience as a high school teacher, he insisted that the requirement to 
read the Bible did not make a school, its staff, or its students Christian. Instead, Redekop called EFC 
leaders to respect the religious freedom of all Canadians and the religious pluralism of Canadian 
society (2008). This did not mean that EFC leaders ignored the issue of religious education. To the 
contrary, they became very involved in the debate but grounded their arguments in religious freedom 
and in the importance of recognizing the role of religion in society rather than demanding mandatory 
Bible readings and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer. As early as 1972 Redekop wrote that in his 
view the mandatory requirements for religious practices in public schools were not moral (1972, 27). 
Redekop’s commitments to ecumenism, protecting the religious freedom of all Canadians, and 
speaking in a publicly-accessible manner were shared by other EFC leaders. They took the values of 
liberal democracy seriously, including the individual freedom of conscience. Redekop and Stiller 
assumed the differentiation of church and state, but neither of them believed that differentiation 
required the separation of faith and politics. This refusal to privatize religion was also present in the 
work of Marshall.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
84 The parable is found in Luke 10: 25-37. Jesus used it to answer the question “Who is my neighbour?” 
85 Although Stiller sometimes linked evangelicals with the Progressive Conservative Party in his early days at 
the EFC, he quickly distanced evangelicals from any particular political party (Stackhouse 2008). 
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2.2.2 Paul Marshall 
Born in Britain, Marshall came to Canada as a graduate student and upon earning his Doctorate he 
taught at the Institute of Christian Studies. During the late 1980s and early 1990s he chaired (or co-
chaired) either the EFC’s Social Action Commission or its Religious Liberties Commission.86 In 1997 
Stiller referred to Marshall as “one of the most important influences” in his study of how the Christian 
faith may influence public policy (Stiller 1997a, 219). In an interview Stiller referred to Marshall as 
his intellectual tutor and claimed that Marshall helped him realize the falseness of the evangelical 
penchant of separating religion from public life (2008). Of particular importance to this chapter is 
Marshall’s influence on Stiller’s conception of the state. 
Marshall brought with him to the EFC a commitment to two political philosophies. First, he had a 
deep respect for Toryism and Canadian philosopher George Grant. Grant critiqued the type of 
English-speaking liberalism developed by John Locke and the American liberal philosopher John 
Rawls.87 Often described as a Red Tory,88 Grant opposed abortion, supported an interventionist state, 
and promoted Canadian economic nationalism. Like Grant, Marshall appreciated the Tory 
conservatism brought to Canada by the early British immigrants. He believed that the presence of the 
Anglican and Catholic traditions in Canada differentiated Canada from the US (1991, 8). Indeed, the 
Tory assumption of a strong central state is congruent with the Kuyperian interpretation of the state, 
the other political philosophy Marshall brought to the EFC. 
Kuyperian thought emerged out of a Calvinist worldview and can be traced back to the former 
Dutch Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper and Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd. These two 
scholars advocated for a positive view of the state and it is this view that distinguished their American 
followers from the organizations of the Religious Right, many of whom advanced a negative view of 
                                                     
86 In 1998 Marshall left the Institute for Christian Studies to work for Freedom House as a senior fellow at the 
Centre for Religious Freedom. In 2006 he moved to the Hudson Institute, where he holds the same title. He 
remained chair of the EFC’s Religious Liberty Commission until at least 2000 (EFC 2000a). 
87 Grant claimed that Rawls’ theory of justice is “the union of equality and liberty” (1985, 39) which requires 
significant cooperation between large private corporations and the state. He questioned whether Rawls’ view of 
the person as a calculator of her own interest is able to provide a concept of the common good capable of 
constraining mammoth corporations or whether it will lead to anything other than consumptive individuals. He 
also criticized Rawls for abstracting his theory from the realities of war and imperialism and separating self-
interest from any knowledge of the state of nature, of “the way things are as a whole” (41-42). 
88 Horowitz defined a Red Tory as “a philosopher who combines elements of socialism and toryism so 
thoroughly in a single integrated Weltanschauung that it is impossible to say that he or she is a proponent of 
either one as against the other. Such a red tory is George Grant, who has associations with both the 
Conservative party and the NDP” (1995, 32). 
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the state. Redekop described an important element of Calvinism when he wrote that Calvin 
emphasized “the Christian role of the state and asserted that its function is to help Christians live the 
Christian life” (2007, 51). This element of Calvinism is evident in various Reformed churches in 
North America founded by Dutch immigrants grounded in the Kuyperian worldview. 
Marshall introduced evangelicals to Kuyperian neo-Calvinism89 in his book Thine is the Kingdom: 
A Biblical Perspective on the Nature of Government and Politics Today (1984), written to help 
evangelicals develop a biblically rooted view of politics and government. Christians engaged in 
politics needed to do more than advance Christian morality or hold good humanitarian intentions, 
Marshall insisted. He wanted them to understand that politics is intrinsically important on its own 
merit and that like all other aspects of life it is under the lordship of Jesus Christ. Marshall attributed 
to the state the positive task of promoting justice, often defined in the classical sense as “‘giving each 
their due’” (52). Individuals are given their due when everyone has “what we need in order to 
discharge our life’s responsibilities … each of us has a right to fulfil the callings that God has given 
us” (55). At its heart justice is concerned with right relationships, especially between God, people, 
and things (55). For Marshall, this Kuyperian neo-Calvinist conception of justice requires that those 
within the state are able to recognize justice and injustice and “rectify what is unjust by restoring 
things to their right relation” (1989, 18). In fact, in an article written for Faith Today Marshall 
identified the promotion of justice as the state’s “ministry.” He stressed that justice must be meted out 
impartially, meaning that governments, especially those that involve Christians, cannot provide 
specific privileges for Christians. Rather, they are to promote justice for all (1987, 38). Marshall 
argued that the principles of justice are found in Scripture and therefore God provides direction for 
Christian engagement in politics. Ultimately, then, Christians do not engage in politics on the basis of 
“common sense” or “neutral reason.”90 He also thought that governments are most able to carry out 
their responsibilities in constitutional democracies.91  
                                                     
89 I take the term “Kuyperian neo-Calvinism” from Jonathan Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd: Christian 
Philosopher of State and Civil Society (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011). 
90 The latter is an implicit rejection of many modern liberal theorists, including John Rawls. 
91 Many elements of Marshall’s conception of the state are echoed by fellow Kuyperian neo-Calvinist 
philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff, who attributes to the state the judicial task of promoting justice and the 
legislative task of making just laws. Wolterstorff follows Calvin when he suggests that good government serves 
the common good, defined as “the shalom, the flourishing, of the people,” although he acknowledged that 
governments wreak injustice when they enforce their view of the common good (2005, 150). Like Marshall, 
Wolterstorff locates government, at least partially, in the “order of creation” (150), meaning that government is 
more than God’s remedy for sin (149); it is also a mediator “of divine authority” (154). Wolterstorff contrasts 
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While Marshall held a positive view of the state and its ability to promote justice, he also portrayed 
government as limited because its authority comes from God, not from itself or the people. Marshall 
further limited the power of the state by reminding his readers of the biblical call for all citizens to 
participate in the search for justice. Justice is the task of all people, he insisted, because “the political 
order is designed by God to be a body of citizens, with diverse offices and responsibilities, called to 
implement justice within their territory” (1984, 61). For Marshall, then, the state is not to overstep its 
boundaries and interfere in, or mange, the offices of other authorities. God-given authority is diffused 
throughout society, with individuals, churches, parents, schools, and the courts all occupying their 
own sphere with their own authority structures. Kuyperians attribute to the state the function of 
ensuring that such institutions do not violate each other’s spheres or areas of authority. If and when 
they do, the state is to restore right relations “by rewarding the just and punishing the unjust” (56).92 
The principle that each interconnected but distinct sphere has its own area of authority that must be 
protected is called “sphere sovereignty.”93  
The Kuyperian worldview differs from classical liberalism in that it does not view individuals as 
autonomous nor understand the state as the institution that most threatens individual liberty and 
against which individuals must be protected. Instead, the state promotes human flourishing by 
ensuring that individuals have what they require to live out their lives. Marshall argued that the state 
has intrinsic value in that it is an institution created by God. It also has instrumental value because it 
provides social order for human flourishing. However, Marshall did not view the state as 
plenipotentiary, as the most important public institution or the final authority. Instead, the state is 
limited by a variety of authorities in the different sovereign spheres of society. At the same time, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
his theology with that of Anabaptist theologian John Howard Yoder. According to Wolterstorff, a key 
difference is that Yoder viewed the “powers,” the political, social, philosophical, religious, and ethical 
structures, as fallen and enslaving humanity. The result, claims Wolterstorff, is that “we are not to obey the state 
because it issues legitimate commands that place us under obligation; we are simply to subject ourselves to it, in 
the way that Russians subjected themselves to Stalin” (154).  
92 In disagreement with John Howard Yoder, Marshall maintains that it is incorrect to oppose Jesus’ ethic of 
love, admonition against revenge, and non-violence as outlined in the Sermon on the Mount with the state, the 
only institution authorized to use force. Marshall understands Jesus as addressing individuals whereas Paul in 
Romans 13 (where he urged his readers to submit to the ruling authorities) argued that God punishes the 
evildoer and rewards the good through the state. For Marshall, interpreters who ignore the “distinction between, 
on the one hand, Christians acting on their own authority and, on the other hand, Christians acting with the God-
given authority of political office,” wrongly conclude, as Yoder does, that Christians are not to be directly 
involved in politics (1984, 46, 155n4). 
93 The notion of sphere sovereignty has some similarities with the conservative valuation of group autonomy 
described by Nisbet (1986, 38). Similarly, the Kuyperian view of the state can be aligned with the conservative 
view as detailed by Nisbet (22, 35). 
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notion of differentiated authority as found in the doctrine of sphere sovereignty was not necessarily 
anti-liberal given that both systems of thought promote the notion of institutional differentiation 
whereby the church is separated from such public institutions as the state and the economy but 
religious adherents have the right (and in Kuyperian terms, the responsibility) to speak on matters of 
public policy.  
In 1992 Stiller referred to Thine is the Kingdom as “the most complete and helpful overview of a 
Christian view of politics” (Stiller 1992b, 82). Kuyperian commitments are visible in Stiller’s 
political understandings in three ways. First, during his tenure the EFC adopted the Kuyperian 
commitment to structural pluralism as a way in which Christians can be transformative agents in 
society. As Marshall noted, most Christians believe that they are engaging in the work of 
transformation but differ in their view of how transformation is to be achieved. Where traditionally 
evangelicals believed it was accomplished through individual action, Anabaptists posited that the 
church as an alternative community would effect change. Mainline churches focused on actions taken 
by the church itself whereas those of the Reformed persuasion sought transformation by creating 
alternative Christian organizations (1991). While schools at all levels of education were the most 
obvious type of alternative Reformed organizations, other Canadian examples included a Christian 
labour union, credit unions, and care facilities for the elderly and those who live with disabilities. In 
Reformed parlance these organizations were examples of structural pluralism, a model of society that 
assumes religion impacts all of life and thus insists that societies must allow for a wide variety of 
faith-based organizations to service various faith or non-faith communities. The EFC advocated for 
structural pluralism in the areas of broadcasting and education, the subjects of chapter 5. A discussion 
paper issued by the Social Action Commission supported structural pluralism as modeled in “the 
Dutch Calvinist idea of ‘pillarization’” as an example of how to address religious pluralism. When 
divergent fundamental beliefs make it extremely difficult or impossible for people to work together 
within one organization, the Commission suggested that “instead of trying to control everybody by 
means of government, it is better to try to exist in communities and organizations alongside one 
another, and to open up society to coexistence. This is a biblical theme” (EFC 1997a, 5). The 
Commission viewed coexistence as a biblical approach because it reflects the belief that God’s grace 
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extends to everyone, not just Christians. It concluded that Christians are called to promote the rights 
of all people, whether they are Christian, secular, or belong to another faith tradition.94 
The second aspect of Stiller’s writings that reflected Kuyperian neo-Calvinist commitments was his 
identification of Christian activity in the political sphere as a ministry because all areas of life are 
affected by sin and require redemption. When Stiller wrote an article for Faith Today about the 
creation of the Christian Heritage Party, a conservative Christian political party, he identified a 
number of guidelines to help Christians think through the issue. His first principle was “‘The earth is 
the Lord’s and the fullness thereof, the world and they that dwell therein’ [Ps. 24:1]. Nothing is 
beyond God’s ownership” (1988b, 77). This is a reiteration of Kuyper’s belief that every inch and 
domain of human life is under the Lordship of Christ (Noll 1996, 46).95 Stiller linked political action 
to ministry even more overtly when he described the EFC’s interventions at the Supreme Court as a 
form of evangelism. He made this remark after the Court ruled against the request of Sue Rodriguez 
to legalize doctor-assisted suicide (1994b, 133-36). In an interview Stiller recalled that the 
“Understanding our times” workshops conducted across the country in the late 1980s were “a way to 
help evangelicals to understand primarily a Reformed vision that all of life is the Lord’s” (2008). 
Essentially, he wanted evangelicals to come out of their sectarian cloisters, become involved in socio-
political issues, and see all areas of life as important because they are important to God. 
A third area of Kuyperian influence on both Stiller and the EFC can be seen in the positive view of 
the state developed in many EFC documents and literature. For instance, in the EFC’s 1983 “Charter 
on human life” EFC leaders stated: “We urge the Government as administrator of public justice: to 
protect human life at all stages of development” (Faith Alive 1983a, 40). This statement attributed to 
the state the task of securing justice and assumed that governments were able to recognize justice and 
injustice and have the requisite tools and skills to rectify unjust situations. In 1987 Stiller claimed that 
evangelicals “must be about reclaiming and redeeming that which our Lord has created to help order 
this part of the universe until he returns in glory and power” (1987a, 59), a task that included seeking 
truth and righteousness for all, not just for evangelicals. For Stiller, the prevailing principalities, such 
as the state, “are not intrinsically evil or demonic. They have been ordered by God for the benefit of 
society” (59). In 2008 Stiller described the state as a human conundrum filled with a variety of 
                                                     
94 For more on the Kuyperian view of pluralism, see Mouw and Griffioen (1993). 
95 This is not to suggest that only Kuyperians believe all of life falls under the Lordship of Christ. In this 
context, however, its adoption, taken in conjunction with the other aspects of Kuyperian thought adopted by 
Stiller, suggests a thorough Kuyperian influence on Stiller and the EFC. 
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people, some of whom love power while others desire to serve. While some are incompetent, others 
are brilliant. Reflecting upon what he had learnt about the state during his time at the EFC, he said 
that he had come to see government as a gift of God, “because if you don’t have government you 
have anarchy. I see that as a constituent of Christ’s concern. Today I say to young people the calling 
for [political involvement] is a great calling” (2008). He went on to suggest that many evangelicals 
unfortunately adopt the antipathy towards public life found in a popular revivalist phrase which Stiller 
paraphrased as: “When God calls you to be a preacher, don’t stoop to be a king” (2008).96 In contrast, 
Stiller grew up in a home in which his father, a Pentecostal preacher, personally knew Tommy 
Douglas. Consequently, “there was an honouring in our community of the role of the public square” 
(2008). Thus prior to his introduction to Kuyperian thought, Stiller already held a positive view of the 
state. One might say that for Stiller the Kuyperian view of the state reinforced the view of the state 
modelled by his father. 
Each of these three elements of Kuyperian thought may be found in an undated two page EFC 
information sheet entitled “Being a faithful Christian, being a good citizen.” Written in response to 
the question “Should Christians participate in politics?” the paper stated, “our task is to work to 
transform [society]” (EFC n.d.a, 1). While the paper acknowledged the importance of calling people 
to repentance, it emphasized the need to reform social structures that cause injustice and limit the 
ability of people to pursue their calling(s). The paper then pointed out that many believers portrayed 
in the Bible held political office in order to fulfill “their desire to be obedient to God in the pursuit of 
justice and care for the vulnerable” (1) It went on to declare that “the governing authorities are God’s 
agent to do good” (1) and that politics often involves choosing between two or more legitimate goals 
(2). The belief that all of life, including politics, is under the lordship of Christ was also stated (1). 
In his research on the EFC during the early 1990s Mark Chapman implicitly confirmed the 
influence of the Kuyperian tradition on both Stiller and the EFC. After interviewing Stiller, Chapman 
concluded that the EFC  
                                                     
96 Stiller attributed the phrase to revivalist preacher Dwight Moodie, a nineteenth century revivalist preacher. I 
could find no reference of this quote to Moodie. However, various present-day evangelical preachers use 
modified versions of the phrase. For example, Charles H. Spurgeon is quoted as saying, “If God calls you to be 
a minister, don’t stoop to be a king” (http://sermonseeker.com/sermons/Special%20Occasions/The%20 
Mission%20of%20a%20Minister%20%28Ordination%20Sermon%29 [accessed January 30, 2011]) and 
American preacher Jordan Grooms said, “If God calls you to be a missionary, don’t stoop to be a king” 
(http://home.snu.edu/~HCULBERT/slogans.htm [accessed January 30, 2011]). 
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believes that it is better to help develop right policy than to wave 
placards criticizing the government. It seeks to work with 
government as an enabler. The EFC’s approach is based on a high 
view of government that believes that good policy enables good 
living and that bad policy does the opposite. Therefore its objective 
is to try to find a way to write good policy. (1994, 82)  
Although Chapman did not link this thinking with the Kuyperian tradition, he recognized that Stiller 
viewed the state as a potentially positive social force.97 
The Kuyperian worldview takes seriously the task of serving all members of society by attributing 
to the state the task of protecting institutions and organizations that represent citizens’ particular 
commitments and beliefs. This is the “public justice” element of Kuyperianism that Jonathan Chaplin 
defines as a “pluralistic social theory which seeks to give priority to a recognition of many different 
kinds of legitimate social relationship, community, and association, and the rights and responsibilities 
attaching to them” (2004, 3, italics in original). Such a view of public justice is antithetical to the 
desire to privatize religion. Although Redekop disagrees with some elements of the Kuyperian 
worldview, he does not dispute these aspects of public justice.  
2.2.3 Redekop’s response to the Kuyperian view of the state 
Redekop questioned the Calvinist view of the state that anchored Kuyperianism and wondered 
whether Christian political engagement could achieve such positive results given that governments 
are “kept busy restraining evil, ‘putting out fires,’ dealing with a vast assortment of crises, and trying 
to control social antagonism and cleavages” (1985, 37). He juxtaposed the Calvinist position that 
views political involvement as a ministry with Anabaptist theologian John Howard Yoder’s claim that 
the church is pre-eminent over the state, (37), and suggested that the work of contemporary neo-
Calvinists calling on governments to act justly blurs “the distinction between a lost world and the 
body of Christ” (2007, 54). In addition, Redekop questioned the degree to which Calvin remained 
rooted in medieval Catholicism, which unified life and society under the cross (51).  
Redekop’s view of the state is grounded in Anabaptist history and theology. Historically 
Anabaptists abstained from political activity because they believed that the political order had a lower 
standard of ethics than the church in that it was not guided by love. Anabaptists further distrusted the 
                                                     
97 The EFC is not the only evangelical group to adopt elements of Calvinism. As Casanova notes, others are 
also drawing from this heritage, including members of the American Religious Right (1997, 158). 
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state because it has the ability to use force to achieve its goals and desires. In his book Politics under 
God (2007), Redekop adjusted this historical position and developed a view of political engagement 
he called “Reformed Anabaptism.”98 He encouraged Christians to engage in politics in order to 
increase civic righteousness. More specifically, he urged them to consider “selective involvement” in 
politics by supporting political policies that reflect such church values as health care, safety, 
education, and care for elderly persons (91). Redekop claimed that God requires Christians to “affirm 
the legitimacy of the state” (99) and advocate for religious freedom for all (101). In addition, he 
advised Christians not to link the gospel with any one political ideology or party as Christians are 
conservative, liberal, or socialist “depending on which part of the gospel is being emphasized” (155). 
Christians are to work with other religious and non-religious people, he argued, because Christians 
cannot claim “a monopoly on compassion” or political insight (153). When engaged in pressure 
politics, they “must be careful to use proper methods,” which includes “reasonable compromises on 
nonessentials” and the willingness to “accept the improvement of society by degree” (154). 
According to Redekop, Christians are able to actively participate in various levels of government 
although he acknowledged that senior positions in government could be out of reach as it might be 
difficult to retain one’s religious ethics at that level. Such participation would be virtually impossible 
if one was a pacifist (201).99 Redekop’s respect for liberal democracy and individual conscience, his 
desire for religious adherents to work together, and his recognition that change often happens 
incrementally are apparent in his work and that of the EFC.  
 Although Redekop argued that Christian action can make a state more just, he warned Christians 
against using the state to promote their own interests. Given the Anabaptist position that the church 
and society operate with different ethical systems, Christians cannot expect governments to evidence 
the love ethic of the church. Instead, Christians can be the conscience of society by promoting justice, 
freedom, and human dignity, examining the basic orientations of government, evaluating specific 
public policies, and focusing on the assumptions that undergird policies. At the same time, Christians 
must keep in mind the potential for states to do both good and evil (1972).  
This is not to say that Redekop held a negative view of the state. Rather, he labelled his conception 
of the church-state relationship as “Anabaptist realism,” a perspective that he described as advancing 
an optimistic view of the state but not seeing it as part of the created order. Although governments 
                                                     
98 Both Stiller and Clemenger wrote an endorsement for Politics under God. 
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can reflect God’s love, Redekop declared, they are nevertheless “God’s Plan B,” introduced after the 
Fall of Adam and Eve into sin as recorded in Genesis 3. In Redekop’s view, God gave Adam and Eve 
the freedom of choice and they chose to reject God’s lordship. However, God continued to love 
humanity and therefore provided them with political structures such as governments to help establish 
and maintain stable and peaceful societies. While the church’s ethic and purpose are far more 
important than those of the state, the state need not be an enemy of the church (2007, 19-21).100 For 
his part, Marshall rejected the notion that because the state came into existence after the Fall, it was 
part of God’s Plan B. Instead, he contended that there were many activities and institutions recorded 
in the Bible that occurred after the Fall, including the construction of bricks and singing of music. He 
insisted that their later introduction did not indicate that they existed because of sin (1984, 42).  
Despite Redekop’s influence on Stiller, the latter appeared to lean more towards the Kuyperian 
view of the state rather than Redekop’s Anabaptist realism. One example occurred in 1989 when 
Stiller wrote a foreword to a book that resulted from a conference held to discuss the task and 
limitations of the state. In the foreword Stiller noted that although Christian interest in the state is at 
times “too self-centred, it also shows there is a need for involvement by those who believe that 
politics is a part of God’s creation.” In the next sentence he claimed “that, while governments do at 
times act tyrannically, they have been created to act as ‘servants of God’” (1989a, viii). With these 
words Stiller depicted the role of the state positively and did not portray it as God’s response to sin or 
God’s “Plan B.” 
The previous paragraphs suggest that there is some evidence for Stackhouse’s claim that the EFC 
interpreted evangelicalism in a particular manner and thereby helped create an evangelical identity. 
This identity viewed the state in positive terms as an institution created by God to promote and 
protect justice. At the same time it is important not to overstate the differences between Marshall and 
Redekop. Both urged EFC leaders not to seek the political establishment of Christianity and to 
promote the religious freedom of all religious groups. Both assumed the importance of Christian 
political engagement, produced arguments that were accessible to the general public rather than 
narrowly focused on a particular religious community, and called evangelicals to be engaged in issues 
of social justice. They were leery of the American Religious Right and worked for distinctly 
Canadian evangelical responses to Canadian issues. Both of them understood the differences between 
                                                                                                                                                                    
99 Some Anabaptists understand the church as an alternative community in which their faith is a way of life. The 
work of Stanley Hauerwas, an Episcopal theologian and ethicist, reflects this approach. 
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Canadian and American political cultures and between Canadian and American evangelicalism as 
described in the previous chapter. Over time Marshall and Redekop became friends and continued to 
provide leadership to the EFC. Ultimately they influenced the EFC to construe Canadian 
evangelicalism as politically engaged in order to promote public justice. For some of the 
denominations affiliated with the EFC, these assumptions were a significant break with previous 
conceptions of political engagement. Thus there is some support for Stackhouse’s charge that the 
manner in which the EFC defined evangelicalism did not reflect the full diversity of political views 
held by evangelicals. 
Under Stiller’s leadership the EFC focused on the institution of the state rather than, say, civil 
society or culture. The organization produced briefs to the government on a host of issues and sought 
to influence MPs and Cabinet Ministers. Towards the end of Stiller’s tenure the organization’s focus 
expanded to include the courts as various groups employed the Charter to challenge the 
constitutionality of some of the Christian assumptions underlying a number of social policies. 
Although the public voice of the EFC diminished after Stiller’s departure as his successor did not 
have the same public persona, the EFC’s participation in parliamentary discussions and legal 
interventions continued. 
2.3 Gary Walsh: 1997-2002 
When Stiller left the EFC it employed 30 people (Faith Today 1997, 10), represented 28 
denominational affiliates, and maintained close relationships with over 100 parachurch agencies 
(Faith Today 1996, 54). As Stiller’s successor the General Council selected Gary Walsh, at that time 
the Bishop of the Free Methodist Church in Canada. A contemporary of Stiller, Walsh assumed the 
Presidency of the EFC in 1997 at the age of 52. At the time the EFC’s mission statement instructed 
the organization “to be a public advocate of the gospel of Jesus Christ, unite Christians of diverse 
backgrounds, express biblical views on public issues, and assist Christians in evangelism” (McIntire 
1998, 34). Whether intentional or not, Walsh paid special attention to the unity element in the EFC 
mission statement. He focused on expanding evangelical partnerships to include the renewal 
movements in mainline churches and sought to have the EFC enrich congregational life. Stackhouse 
characterized Walsh’s role as being a “pastor to pastors” (2008). 
                                                                                                                                                                    
100 Redekop acknowledged that he supports “dualism, a two-kingdom perspective” (2007, 200). 
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During his time at the helm, Walsh continued Stiller’s and Redekop’s commitment to ecumenism 
by emphasizing what the evangelical community held in common rather than what divided it. To that 
end he saw his role as a facilitator rather than a leader and he helped create ministry “roundtables” 
that brought various denominational organizations together to pursue a common purpose.101 In 
addition, he sought to moderate the public perception of evangelicals. He wanted evangelicals to be 
less confrontational for he considered it unfortunate “if the evangelical movement became known for 
half a dozen angry issues” (Faith Today 1997, 10). In Walsh’s view, this could be done if the EFC de-
emphasized issues and crises and instead focused on “the value that the organization adds to 
Christendom’” (Careless 1999, 37). How Walsh understood the term “Christendom” in this context is 
unclear. The writer of the article placed Walsh’s quote within a larger discussion of how the EFC 
might expand its representation to include more elements in the evangelical community. It is probably 
the case that Walsh used the term to refer to the broader Christian community. 
In 1998 Walsh led the EFC’s General Council through a re-visioning process that continued to 
identify the EFC’s public and political role as “job one” but also called for greater unity and a 
renewed commitment to “thinking Christianly” (Walsh 1998a, 10).102 The process led to changes in 
the EFC’s governing structure. Walsh wanted to move the EFC away from a single-cell organization 
that revolved around the president, as it did under Stiller, to a multiple-cell organization (Careless 
1999, 35).103 Governing responsibilities moved from the General Council to a Board104 and as the 
EFC hired more staff to address public policy, including hiring its own lawyers,105 the need for the 
                                                     
101 Under Walsh these “roundtables” addressed higher education, evangelism, Christian media, and global 
mission (Fieguth 2004, 32-33).  
102 When introducing the re-visioning process to Faith Today readers, Walsh echoed Stiller’s desire to develop 
“made in Canada” approaches to Canadian issues when he reminded them that “looking to other countries for 
precedence and guidance may be less helpful” given Canadian multiculturalism and pluralism (Walsh 1999b, 
17).  
103 As a result, Walsh’s role in Faith Today diminished in comparison to Stiller’s role. Where Stiller had a one 
page editorial entitled “Understanding our times” towards the end of each issue, most of Walsh’s editorials were 
on page 7 and entitled “From the publisher.” Towards the end of his tenure the editorial was re-titled “The 
gathering place,” a title Clemenger has maintained. 
104 E-mail from Bruce Clemenger to the author December 23, 2008. 
105 The first lawyer hired was Janet Epp Buckingham, who has a LL. B. from the University of Stellenbosch in 
South Africa, where she wrote a thesis on religious freedom. Prior to working for the EFC, she worked for 
Christian Legal Fellowship while serving as chair of first the Social Action Commission and then the Religious 
Freedom Project. During her tenure at the EFC (2000-2006), she was its Director of Law and Public Policy in 
the Ottawa office. In 2006 she left the EFC to become the director of the Laurentian Leadership Centre in 
Ottawa, where students of Trinity Western University gain experience and knowledge by working for MPs. The 
EFC then hired Don Hutchinson, a former pastor of The Salvation Army Church (Canada) who founded and ran 
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Social Action Commission diminished and eventually it ceased to operate. Walsh reaffirmed his 
desire to reach out to evangelicals in the mainline churches and regional evangelical groups. 
Interestingly, he noted that the “EFC has never developed an organizational life that takes it to the 
grassroots” (Careless 1999, 36), echoing the concerns raised by Stackhouse about representation. 
However, although Walsh may have desired to bring the EFC to the grassroots, the decision-making 
process was staff-driven, especially by the president. While this process enabled decisions to be made 
more quickly, the organization lost an avenue with which to incorporate a variety of voices from its 
member denominations. In effect, the centralization of the decision-making process reduced the 
amount of collaboration among the various elements of its constituency.  
Seeking to serve the church more effectively, Walsh enlarged the EFC’s Centre for Ministry 
Empowerment and more intentionally linked churches with the EFC’s Commissions and Task Forces 
(Careless 1999). He helped establish www.christianity.ca as an online clearing house of information 
and news sources about evangelicals and provided leadership to Vision 2000, an evangelistic outreach 
project initiated by the EFC under Stiller. In an effort to support the EFC’s public and political work, 
Walsh and other EFC leaders changed the name of the Ottawa office from the Department of National 
Affairs to the Centre for Faith and Public Life and expanded its role to include an educational 
component to help evangelicals think through issues. As Walsh became increasingly concerned about 
the lack of religious freedom he saw reflected in court decisions, he extended the EFC’s public and 
political role by creating the Religious Freedom Project to monitor legal decisions and public debates 
concerning religion and religious practice(s). Prior to becoming the EFC’s legal counsel, Janet Epp 
Buckingham supervised the project. The Religious Freedom Project spawned the Religious Liberty 
Commission, originally chaired by Paul Marshall. John Redekop also provided leadership to the 
Commission. 
The first year and a half of Walsh’s presidency were difficult as he adjusted to his role of leading a 
national organization and being a public spokesperson for evangelicals. In his first year a budget 
shortfall forced him to lay off staff temporarily, and his restructuring program caused “some 
trepidation within the organization” (Koop 1998). Moreover, Walsh at times seemed uncertain, if not 
uncomfortable, with the media, who had grown accustomed to Stiller’s public role as a spokesperson 
for Canadian evangelicals. Walsh’s lack of media savvy was demonstrated when, within several 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the legal department of that denomination in Canada. In addition to Hutchinson, Faye Sonier is the EFC’s 
associate legal counsel. 
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months of becoming president, Bill Phipps, then moderator of the United Church, publicly stated that 
he did not believe in the divinity of Christ. When Maclean’s magazine called Walsh looking for a 
response, Walsh chose to speak about Jesus rather than “slamming” Phipps. As a result Maclean’s did 
not include Walsh in the story. Members of several renewal groups in the United Church expressed 
their disappointment, stating they would have appreciated more active support from the EFC. Walsh 
later explained his response as “less reactionary” than others, stating “I don’t have much of a need to 
put down people or organizations with whom I disagree. There is so much good in the United Church; 
I didn’t want to use the moment to slam their leader” (Careless 1999, 36). In theological terms, 
Walsh’s emphasis upon Christ rather than Phipps was consistent with the centrality of Jesus in 
evangelical theology. However, as EFC’s president, Walsh’s task was not to engage in nuanced 
theological discussions, which would be of little interest to mainstream reporters or general readers, 
but to articulate clearly the EFC’s position on central theological issues that defined evangelical faith.    
One year later, the Hamilton Spectator called Walsh just as he was entering a meeting, looking for 
his response to the killing of an abortion provider in Buffalo. When Walsh could not meet the 
Spectator’s 90-minute response deadline, the paper’s religion editor noted the EFC’s silence on the 
issue. Walsh felt the Spectator’s actions were unfair. “We’ve spoken and spoken and spoken. We’re 
decidedly pro-life at every level. Who would expect we would need to make a statement about life? 
We’ve been talking about life for 20 years.” Once again Walsh’s response reflected a lack of media 
savvy. This time, however, Walsh decided a change was in order. As a result of these events, Walsh 
implemented changes so he and the organization would be prepared for such contingencies in the 
future (Careless 1999, 36).106 
During Walsh’s tenure the EFC produced an extraordinary number of briefs, discussion papers, and 
policy positions in response to the issues of the day. Such productivity could occur, at least in part, 
because the Ottawa office hired had hired its own lawyers. Many of the issues addressed during this 
time were the same as those addressed by the EFC under the leadership of Stiller, with the addition of 
the issue of biotechnologies. Based on the EFC’s online resource list, under Walsh’s five-year term 
the organization made at least 23 presentations to various parliamentary bodies and published eight 
position papers or other materials intended to educate evangelicals and engender discussion among 
                                                     
106 Doug Koop, editor of Christian Week, voiced his concern about these incidents when he wrote, “the voice of 
evangelicals in Canada must speak loud enough to be heard and soon enough to be heeded” (1998). 
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them. The paper topics included: Christianity and pluralism; gambling; poverty; religious education in 
public schools; marriage; stem cell research; and child pornography. 
In those same five years the EFC intervened in at least 14 legal cases, most of them at the Supreme 
Court and often in coalition with other groups. The majority of these cases involved the issue of 
homosexuality in some way, whether it was the religious freedom of religious adherents and their 
institutions to express their disagreement with the practice of homosexuality, challenging the 
expansion of social benefits to same-sex couples, or opposing same-sex marriage. The EFC also 
intervened on behalf of Ryan Dobson, a child who sued his mother for harm inflicted while in utero; 
argued against Robert Latimer, accused of the “mercy killing” of his young daughter afflicted by 
cerebral palsy; contended that the protection of children trump the freedom of expression in a case 
involving a man from British Columbia who had written unpublished stories about minors engaging 
in sexual acts; and argued against granting a patent for a genetically modified mouse, known as the 
Harvard Mouse case. Thus although Walsh focused more attention on the institution of the church 
than Stiller, the EFC under his leadership continued to employ significant resources to address and 
interact with the state, especially the courts 
These political and legal interventions reveal that under Walsh the EFC focused attention on 
traditional evangelical concerns. While the EFC under Stiller participated in the national unity 
debates and how national broadcasting rules and Ontario’s public schools mistreated and/or 
misrepresented religion in general, many of the issues which it addressed under Walsh’s leadership 
focused on issues involving sexual morality. Granted, the organization continued to address religious 
education in Ontario’s public schools and cautioned the government that anti-terrorism laws could 
adversely impact Christian humanitarian agencies while its Social Action Commission published a 
background paper entitled “Good news to the poor” which related the Bible to issues of poverty and 
the Canadian government (EFC 1999a).107 Yet the bulk of its work from 1997 to 2002 addressed such 
issues as prostitution, the expansion of conjugal rights to same-sex partners, new reproductive 
technologies, and the freedom of Christians to state their beliefs about homosexual relationships. The 
EFC framed its concerns about sexual morality in terms of the imago Dei, arguing that image bearers 
of God need legal and political protections in order to live with the dignity and respect they deserve.  
                                                     
107 The paper became the most widely circulated document ever produced by the EFC (Walsh 2001b, 7). 
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Although Walsh did not write about the theological and political influences in his life,108 EFC 
documents continued to reflect a Kuyperian influence. For example, in “Good news to the poor” the 
Social Action Commission described society in the Kuyperian language of sphere sovereignty. The 
Commission defined the state’s role as securing “public justice” and the language used to describe 
such justice reflects the notion of sphere sovereignty: 
A central function of government, however, is to set out a public 
legal order that can serve to justly integrate all social institutions 
together into one society according to public justice, that is, in a way 
that respects, enables and enhances their specific callings. 
Sometimes the state sets conditions which shape the future 
integration of society and sometimes the state follows up existing 
integration in order to correct distortions and oppression. Both are 
valid elements of government’s public legal integration of society. 
The state’s task, however, includes more than simply making laws 
and regulations. Governments that legally integrate society may have 
to step in to prevent the oppression of one institution by another, 
intervene to justly reconstitute a distorted societal relationship, act to 
fulfil a particular function or service that is absent or failing, or 
arbitrate in order to restore a person or institution to its proper place 
when another institution unjustly absorbs its callings. (EFC 1999a, 9-
10) 
While Stackhouse wrote his critique of the EFC and NAE in 1995 when Stiller was the EFC’s 
president, he might have made the same observations in 2003 given the EFC’s continuing focus on 
ecumenism and the influence of the Kuyperian view of the state evident in some EFC publications. 
Some of this Kuyperian influence came from Bruce Clemenger, the director of the Ottawa office who 
helped develop many of the papers and submissions developed during Walsh’s tenure. Clemenger 
obtained his Master’s degree at the Institute for Christian Studies where Paul Marshall was one of his 
supervisors. 
Walsh left the EFC in 2002 in order to lead Interdev, an international organization that developed 
global strategic partnerships.109 The EFC leadership engaged in a ten-month search that culminated in 
                                                     
108 In an interview with Christian Week Walsh noted the importance of Dean Merrill’s Sinners in the Hands of 
an Angry Church (Zondervan, 1997) on his thinking (Koop 1998).  
109 Shortly thereafter, Interdev announced that it was shutting down its operations as it no longer had a role to 
play in developing partnerships. Walsh then became president of Just Opportunity International Canada, a 
microcredit financier based in Toronto. Towards the end of 2008 he resigned from Opportunity to take a 
position at Northeastern Seminary and Roberts Wesleyan College in the state of New York. 
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the unanimous decision to hire Bruce Clemenger as its president. A generation younger than Stiller 
and Walsh, Clemenger differs from his predecessors in that he is much more of an academic. 
2.4 Bruce Clemenger: 2003-present 
Clemenger’s journey to political activism reflected some of the same influences evident in Stiller’s 
life. As a high school student Clemenger encountered Francis Shaeffer’s book and film series How 
Should We Then Live? In an interview with Faith Today, Clemenger claimed that Schaeffer inspired 
him to integrate his personal faith with other areas of life (Fieguth 2004, 33). After high school 
Clemenger obtained an undergraduate degree in economics and history, followed by a Master of 
Philosophical Foundations degree in political theory from the Institute of Christian Studies. At the 
time of writing he continues to work on a PhD in political theory.  
Although familiar with the work of the EFC from a young age,110 Clemenger became directly 
involved with the EFC in 1989 when he joined its Social Action Commission. In 1992 Stiller hired 
him to be the organization’s research coordinator and he worked closely with Stiller to open the EFC 
office in Ottawa in 1996. As director of the office, he was the EFC spokesperson for issues 
concerning law and public policy (Fieguth 2004, 33-34). When Faith Today interviewed Clemenger 
in 2003 when he became the EFC’s president, it asked him to identify the future challenges for 
Canadian evangelicals. Clemenger highlighted issues concerning religious freedom because he was 
uncomfortable with the changing definition of tolerance, particularly its move “from a recognition of 
difference to a celebration and affirmation of diverse faiths and lifestyles” (Faith Today 2003, 15).111 
Clemenger worried that this definition would become problematic for evangelism. Other challenges 
he noted include the role of the Church in an increasingly secular country, how to speak in public 
debates in Canadian society, and how to engage young people in church ministry.  
As the EFC’s president Clemenger continued to challenge the secularism which evangelicals 
viewed with increasing concern. Yet the manner in which Clemenger interacted with secularism was 
different from that expressed by Stiller and Walsh, in large part because the context of Canadian 
public life changed in the early 2000s. After some Muslim fundamentalists flew two planes into the 
                                                     
110 Clemenger’s father sat on the EFC’s General Council in the 1970s. Robert Thompson, a federal politician 
and leader of the federal Social Credit Party, was a family friend (Fieguth 2004, 31, 33). Thompson was 
president of the EFC’s General Council in the 1970s. 
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twin towers in New York on September 11, 2001, Canadians became more aware of the public 
consequences of religion. A year later the Supreme Court ruled in Chamberlain v Surrey School 
Board No. 36 that the term “secular” does not mean a-religious. This ruling meant that a secular 
school system does not prohibit the involvement of religious parents and groups who participate in 
education as particular religious voices. The Court recognized that people’s views are often motivated 
by religious beliefs.112 The Chamberlain decision permitted Clemenger to spend less energy on 
educating evangelicals about the dangers of secularism and instead focus on the benefits of 
participating in civil society. As a result, a number of Clemenger’s columns in Faith Today call for a 
public discussion about the content of “Canadian values.” Thus Clemenger interacted with a different 
Canadian ethos that was marked in part by a new openness to religion in the public sphere.  
In addition, Clemenger worked with a different evangelical community than did Stiller. More 
specifically, evangelicals had become more invested in politics and more politically savvy. Where 
Stiller had to convince evangelicals about the importance of participating in politics, Clemenger could 
assume that most evangelicals now agree on the importance of political engagement (Clemenger 
2003, 172). Where Stiller had to teach evangelicals about the dangers and limitations of bifurcation, 
of identifying some tasks as sacred and others as secular, Clemenger claimed that evangelicals 
“believe that life should not be bifurcated or compartmentalized” (2009a, 4). He saw evangelicals as 
integrating their faith with the rest of their life, suggesting that they view such activities as serving the 
poor and others in need as acts of worship as well as of service (4). Furthermore, Clemenger worked 
within an evangelical context shaped by the lessons learned from the abortion debate – that an all-or-
nothing approach to politics is often counter-productive. Institutionally, he benefitted from the 
structural changes established by Walsh as the EFC now has the organizational structures and ability 
to respond quickly to issues. 
Another change in the context in which Clemenger worked was a new alignment between the 
Conservative Party and evangelicals, demonstrated in the 2006 and 2008 elections. When Harper’s 
first Cabinet was sworn in, Clemenger noted that the evangelical faith of some of the Cabinet 
members did not become a public issue, a fact he welcomed, especially when he compared the silence 
                                                                                                                                                                    
111 Six months later Clemenger addressed the issue again in Faith Today. Where toleration once meant 
“Respecting the religious beliefs of another, particularly when you consider those beliefs to be heresy,” he 
believed that it now means affirming all differences (Clemenger 2004b, 14). 
112 See Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, ¶19. Available online 
at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2002/2002scc86/2002scc86.html (accessed February 21, 2011). 
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with the negative reception Preston Mannning and Stockwell Day encountered when they assumed 
the leadership of the Reform and Alliance parties respectively (2006a, 14). 
In the midst of all of these contextual changes, the EFC’s budget and types of activity expanded. In 
2002 its revenue was $2,932,381. Revenue rose to $4,273,895 in 2007, with the largest increase 
coming from program registrations and contributions.113 The EFC declared 2005 a Year of Prayer for 
Canada and instituted a campaign called “Celebration 2005,” aimed at motivating Christians to 
engage in their communities. In 2007 Clemenger established the EFC’s Centre for Research on 
Canadian Evangelicalism which seeks to improve public and scholarly representations of Canadian 
evangelicals, prompt new research, provide information to evangelical ministry leaders, and act as a 
storehouse for research. Its first advisory council was chaired by Stackhouse (Regent College). Other 
members included: Marguerite Van Die (Queen’s University); Bruce Guenther (Mennonite Brethren 
Biblical Seminary/Trinity Western University); Mark Noll (University of Notre Dame); and Samuel 
Reimer (Atlantic Baptist University114). Nine other members represented denominations, a particular 
church, ministry organizations, the EFC, and a public polling company. Another new initiative was 
the Missional Church Project, established to facilitate dialogue between denominations, churches, 
mission agencies, and educational institutions in order to gain greater insight about the great 
commission as found in Matthew 18, 18-20 (Faith Today 2008b, 15). In addition, Clemenger 
followed Walsh in his desire to collaborate with more denominations and ministries and in his focus 
upon the service nature of the EFC for other ministries (Faith Today 2003, 15).  
Clemenger continued the trend of becoming more involved in legal cases, demonstrating how the 
state remained a central institution for the EFC in its political engagement. By the end of 2006 the 
EFC under Clemenger intervened in at least 6 cases, many of them in coalition with other groups. (By 
the end of 2010 the number of cases reached 12.) These coalitions paralleled similar developments in 
the Protestant mainline churches that created inter-church coalitions in the 1970s to address specific 
social justice issues. Seven of the EFC’s interventions under Clemenger may be classified as cases 
concerning religious freedom, of which two involved religious freedom for non-evangelical groups 
                                                     
113 Affiliation fees increased from $252,715 in 2002 to $368,608 in 2007. These fees were dwarfed by 
contributions, which totalled $2,460,123 in 2007, roughly $340,000 more than the contributions received in 
2002. In 2007 the EFC spent $909,496 on its publications, $848,251 on “public witness,” which includes 
conferences, research, and costs involved in legal interventions, and $1,582,131 on “equipping and encouraging 
ministry leaders” via roundtables and partnerships. The budget of 2008 remained roughly the same for these 
budgetary items. To view EFC audited annual financial statements, see http://www.evangelicalfellowship. 
ca/page.aspx?pid=1231 (accessed January 27, 2011). 
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(Jews and Jehovah’s Witnesses) and two addressed religious freedom with regard to how religious 
people opposed to homosexual activity and marriage may publicly express their views.  
Despite these legal interventions in religious freedom, the issue that consumed Clemenger’s time 
until the end of 2006 was the same-sex marriage debate. The EFC spent a great deal of resources 
making parliamentary presentations, intervening in legal cases as a member of the Interfaith Coalition 
on Marriage and Family,115 conducting media interviews, and participating in civil society debates. 
During the debate Clemenger argued that one’s views of same-sex marriage were increasingly “the 
litmus test often used in Canada of late to determine whether someone is tolerant and reasonable, 
compatible with secular society and suitable for public office” (2006b, 14). Given evangelical 
opposition to the expansion of marriage, some within the academy and the media portrayed them as 
un-Canadian, fundamentalist, and trying to impose their socially conservative views on the Canadian 
populace (14). To counter such claims Clemenger advanced three arguments. First, he insisted that all 
legislation reflects a moral position. The question was not whether morality should be imposed, but 
which moral position would legislation enforce. He pointed out that in the marriage debate both the 
political right and left desired to have their moral views ensconced in public policy and ultimately the 
government made a moral choice (2005a, 14). This defence helped the evangelical base put the 
public’s concerns about their political activity in perspective. Clemenger further used the argument to 
expand the definition of morality beyond the traditional issues of abortion, euthanasia, and marriage 
to include how individuals and countries spend their money. Thus for Clemenger national budgets are 
moral documents (2004c, 38-39). Second, Clemenger emphasized how evangelicals participate in all 
professions and walks of life (2005b, 14) and he focused on their contributions to the charitable and 
voluntary sectors of society (2006b, 14). Third, he urged evangelicals to live out their integrated faith, 
to meet the needs of the vulnerable, come alongside the poor, and help the broken (14). These words 
hinted that perhaps Clemenger wanted to spend more EFC resources on the issues of poverty and 
homelessness. Indeed, the EFC-initiated roundtable on poverty and homelessness is increasingly 
involved in proposing policy recommendations and doing advocacy work.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
114 Now Crandall University. 
115 Members of the Interfaith Coalition change depending upon the particular case. The most consistent 
members are the EFC and the Islamic Society of North America. The Catholic Civil Rights League and the 
Ontario Council of Sikhs participated in more than one case with the Coalition. Other associations that appear in 
only one case include the Archdiocese of Vancouver, the BC Council of Sikhs, the BC Muslim Association, the 
Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops, and Focus on the Family. 
 
 85 
Another important element of Clemenger’s agenda was to call for public discussions to provide 
“content,” or meaning, to the Charter principles116 of justice, tolerance, religion, life, and equality, 
Clemenger wanted Canadians to provide the content, not the courts (2006c, 14). Implicit in 
Clemenger’s arguments was the assumption that religious voices were free to express and practice 
their beliefs in civil society and that religious adherents were fully entitled to participate in civil 
society as religious adherents. Clemenger emphasized this public nature of faith. As he noted, “a well 
reasoned dialogue can provide the civil forum for a plurality of perspectives to be heard and perhaps 
result in a substantive conversation about which guiding principles are necessary for a truly just 
society” (14). When Clemenger called evangelicals to participate in these discussions, he urged them 
to do so with the goal of seeking “the good of society” (2005b, 14). He informed evangelicals that 
they promote the good when they advocate for policies “that uphold human dignity, care for the 
vulnerable, promote justice in relationships and protect our freedoms” (2006b, 14).   
When Clemenger identified the significant influences upon his thinking, most of them were in the 
Kuyperian tradition. In addition to Schaeffer117 and Marshall, he listed Bernard Zylstra, a former 
political theorist with the Institute for Christian Studies, and Al Wolters, a philosopher and theologian 
who previously taught at the Institute and Redeemer College, another post-secondary Kuyperian 
educational institution. Clemenger credited Gerald Vandezande for teaching him about public policy 
and Stiller for his leadership in helping the evangelical community engage in public life.118 
Like Marshall, Clemenger employed a classical definition of justice. For example, in a 2007 
column in Faith Today he wrote, “justice is fulfilled when each has their due; that is, what is 
necessary for them to fulfil their calling before God. This includes food and shelter as well as 
community and friends. It also includes authority that is commensurate with our responsibilities” 
(Clemenger 2007a, 14). The last line is typical sphere sovereignty language in that social spheres 
                                                     
116 Clemenger found the Charter’s use of the term “principle” rather than “value” significant. For Clemenger, 
“principle” refers to “that which abides and is grounded” whereas Nietzsche’s term of “value” refers to “that 
which one asserts in the absence of principles” (2006c, 14, italics in original). 
117 Clemenger credited Schaeffer with teaching him “that life need not be bifurcated and that faith should not be 
compartmentalized. Indeed, quite the opposite. … Our faith has implications for all areas of life – the alternative 
is idolatry and living a life [of] unexamined habits” (2006d, 14). Yet he, like Stiller, distanced himself from 
Schaeffer’s desire to return to Christendom or a golden, more Christian past. 
118 E-mail from Bruce Clemenger to author December 23, 2008.  
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have their own sovereignty and authority structures. The state is not to interfere with these authority 
structures unless there is a problem within one of them or between one or more of them.119 
Despite his educational training at Kuyperian institutions, however, Clemenger was careful to note 
that concern for public justice is by no means exclusive to the Reformed or Kuyperian tradition. In an 
interview he took pains to note that those representing the United Church, any of the Reformed 
Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, or a Mennonite Church all believe that they are promoting 
public justice when they engage in the public sphere in that they all believe they are identifying 
biblical principles deemed to be the best for the whole society, not just themselves. Clemenger argued 
that moving beyond such articulation to advising on policy specifics was outside the scope of the 
church (2008a). 
Two consistent themes among these three EFC presidents were their commitment to political 
engagement and their positive view of the state. All of them called evangelicals out of their sectarian 
communities into the public sphere. Their view of the state was in large part influenced by the 
Kuyperian tradition. Other elements adopted from this tradition were its conceptions of sphere 
sovereignty and structural pluralism. To conclude this chapter I return to the debate between 
Stackhouse and Redekop. Both have a deep knowledge of the EFC but they differ on how to define 
the notion of representation. The question is whether the call to public engagement and the manner in 
which that public engagement occurred created or reflected evangelical identity.   
2.5 A return to the Stackhouse/Redekop debate 
Despite all of the work generated by the EFC, George Rawlyk observed in 1996 that Canadian 
evangelicalism appeared leaderless. He pointed to a 1993 Angus Reid poll which revealed that 72 per 
cent of Canadian evangelicals could not identify an evangelical leader. A further 7 per cent said there 
were no such leaders. Another 5 per cent listed American evangelist Billy Graham with an additional 
3 per cent naming Canadian televangelist David Mainse and 2 per cent Brian Stiller.120 Rawlyk 
                                                     
119 In another article Clemenger wrote that “at its core, the State is oriented toward the pursuit of justice in the 
public sphere. It adjudicates between members of society, individual and institutions, and it protects rights and 
holds us to our responsibilities in our common life together. Stated another way, government undertakes a 
specialized activity of individuals and institutions that make and enforce public decisions which are binding on 
the whole community in the pursuit of justice and the good of all” (Clemenger 2006e). 
120 An article in Faith Today reported that Stiller was not surprised at the response, claiming that most Canadian 




attributed the lack of leadership to the populist and local nature of evangelicalism. Canadian 
evangelicals resist being melded into a coherent movement, he thought, because they consider it “a 
frontal challenge to their Canadian Christian identity that owed so much to the way in which localism 
blended into a growing sense of individualism” (1996, 140). Rawlyk also discovered that only 19 per 
cent of conservative Protestants said they had direct contact with the EFC, such as personal contact, 
watching it on television, or reading about it, compared with 4 per cent of the Roman Catholics and 
11 per cent of mainline Protestants (135). In fact, conservative Protestants had more direct contact 
with IVCF, Aglow Canada (formerly Women Aglow), and especially the Bible institutes and 
colleges, than with the EFC (136). Pollster Andrew Grenville found that the EFC had direct contact 
(personal or written) with approximately 500,000 evangelicals, compared with 900,000 evangelicals 
who had such contact with Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship. The total evangelical population at the 
time was 3.4 million (1997, 421, 428).  
Clearly the majority of Canadian evangelicals at the time of Rawlyk’s study did not have 
significant contact with the EFC. In 1995 Stackhouse suggested that some denominations did not join 
the EFC because it pursued agendas and advanced positions that were not shared by all evangelicals, 
thereby defining evangelicalism in a particular manner that alienated some denominations. As he 
noted in his comparison of the EFC and the National Association of Evangelicals, the two 
organizations not only spoke for their constituencies in the public sphere “but they also sought to 
educate and shape their constituencies, to speak to them” (1995b, 177, italics in original). Essentially, 
he argued that the EFC helped create a transdenominational and politically engaged evangelical 
identity with which some evangelicals disagreed (178). Stackhouse pointed to the EFC’s support for 
the compromise abortion Bill of 1990 as an example of the EFC not reflecting an evangelical 
consensus and going beyond the basic evangelical tenets of its statement of faith (176).  
 For Stackhouse, the EFC’s reliance on denominational leaders to determine evangelical views and 
the abstention of a number of denominations raised the question of representation, of how the EFC 
gathered input from evangelicals in the process of discerning and developing distinctly evangelical 
positions. Stackhouse further suggested that the search for a united evangelicalism was fruitless 
because “‘evangelicalism’ per se provided too slender a basis for such involvement in public life” 
(1995b, 178).121 He claimed that even in the golden age of evangelical political action in the 
                                                     
121 Former evangelical and now Catholic political theorist J. Budziszewsky echoed some of the concerns raised 
by Stackhouse on this point. In an observation about American evangelicals Budziszewsky wrote, “the typical 
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nineteenth century, evangelicals established issue-specific organizations rather than umbrella groups. 
There is, he said, no single and simple “evangelical opinion” and thus the EFC and National 
Association of Evangelicals should either: 1) represent a wider diversity of evangelical opinions; 2) 
explicitly state the convictions which determine its particular version of evangelicalism; or 3) limit its 
work to areas in which there is unanimity and leave the more controversial issues to be debated by the 
denominations or new issue-specific organizations (178-79). In 2004 Stackhouse summarized the role 
of the EFC as edifying the church, informing church congregants about public policy, and equipping 
them “to do better in the political sphere” (Fieguth 2004, 34). The implicit suggestion was that the 
EFC should limit its work to equipping congregants to participate in the public sphere rather than 
undertaking such engagement itself on behalf of evangelicals. 
Redekop disagreed, claiming that the EFC operates in the same manner as other umbrella agencies. 
From the United Nations to political parties to very small associations, Redekop claimed, umbrella 
organizations have members who participate conditionally while maintaining their own agendas and 
identities. He insisted that the objective was not to have every person in a local congregation 
understand a particular issue, as each person is interested in a variety of issues and may adhere to 
different positions than others in the congregation. Instead, the process was akin to that of political 
representation where individuals vote for another person to represent him or her in governmental 
debates and decisions. He conceded that the inherent risk in such a structure is differentiated input, 
revealed during the abortion debate during the early 1990s, when the EFC supported a compromise 
Bill because it stated that life beings at conception while many rank and file evangelicals opposed it 
because its definition of the mother’s health allowed many abortions. Yet despite the danger of 
differentiated inputs, Redekop argued that the EFC’s focus on denominational and parachurch leaders 
rather than the base was an authentic and legitimate structure (2008).122 
                                                                                                                                                                    
evangelical is ambivalent. On the one hand, he is convinced that Christ is Lord over every part of life, the public 
square included. This draws him outward. On the other hand, he tends to think of faith in exclusively 
individualistic terms, as a ‘personal’ relationship with Jesus Christ. From this perspective, even the church 
begins to blur; society at large becomes invisible. Although the Great Commission to bring Christ to all people 
pulls him outward again, it does not pull him far enough. He is apt to imagine that if only everyone were 
converted, the public square would take care of itself. Sufficiently provoked, he warmly takes part in public 
affairs, but his participation is impulsive rather than careful and orderly.” Budziszewsky, Evangelicals in the 
Public Square: Four Formative Voices in Political Thought and Action (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006) 
17.  
122 EFC presidents communicate with the base in a variety of ways. Initially Stiller sent out polls about various 
issues that were then synthesized and reported in Faith Alive/Today. Stiller also sent out bulletin inserts entitled 
“Religion watch.” With the move of society towards the web, the EFC created the online site Christianity.ca and 
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The examination of the leadership presented in this chapter supports Stackhouse’s argument that 
the EFC contributed to the creation of a specific evangelical identity, particularly its focus on political 
engagement and ecumenism, the very elements identified by Stackhouse as problematic. However, it 
is difficult to establish the degree to which the EFC was responsible for the adoption of this identity 
by evangelicals. At least two other possible explanatory factors exist. First, the manner in which 
evangelicals participated in the abortion debate may have led many of them to re-examine their 
understanding of politics and their engagement in it. Such a re-evaluation may have led evangelicals 
to support the EFC as they came to understand the manner in which the EFC participated in the 
abortion debate. Second, the public space for religion shifted as the courts grappled with the 
definitions of religion and secularism and as religious groups claimed public space by participating in 
public discussions, running for office, intervening in legal cases, and working with other religious 
groups to develop common causes and positions. These efforts in turn influenced public perception 
and perhaps even legal decisions. Thus there was a dialectical relationship between evangelical 
identity and society that suggests an evangelical identity that is in continual flux. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This overview of the work of the EFC’s three presidents yields four observations. First, the influence 
of Redekop and Marshall upon the EFC was significant. Both encouraged the organization’s leaders 
to engage in the public square and helped move the organization from one that spoke primarily to 
evangelicals to one that had a political voice and identity. In addition, Hoover’s contention that the 
Mennonite and Reformed communities helped moderate Canadian evangelicalism was substantiated 
in this chapter (1997, 208). Stiller blended the Mennonite and Reformed traditions to form a political 
theology that he then employed to define Canadian evangelicalism.  
Second, the Kuyperian view of the state as described by Marshall was operative within many 
aspects of the EFC. As a result, there was congruence between the EFC and two Reformed 
institutions: the Institute for Christian Studies and Citizens for Public Justice, both of which 
contributed a well-developed political theology to the EFC and profoundly influenced Stiller and 
Clemenger. The adoption of a positive view of the state informed by the Kuyperian worldview may 
not be as surprising as it appears at first glance as there was a natural affinity between the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
its “magazine” Church and Faith Trends is now published exclusively on the EFC’s website and thus accessible 
to all. The issue, as stated by Stackhouse, is how to get the “pew sitters” to go onto the site (2008). 
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sphere sovereignty and the evangelical fear of governments overstepping their bounds and interfering 
in non-state institutions such as the family, church, and voluntary associations.123  
Third, the EFC became a leadership-driven rather than a grass roots organization. On this point 
both Stackhouse and Redekop agree. The leadership was primarily from the presidents, but also from 
the staff, especially since the structural reorganization instituted by Walsh. For example, Don 
Hutchinson, the EFC’s vice president, its general legal counsel, and director of the Centre for Faith 
and Public Life, monitors various social issues and together with the president and associate legal 
counsel decides on which legal cases to intervene.124 
Fourth, the issue of religious freedom has been and remains an important aspect of the EFC’s 
political and legal interventions. Increasingly EFC leaders emphasize the public consequences of 
religion and the right of religious practitioners to publicly express and practice their faith. This issue 
is the topic of chapter 4. However, to properly examine how the EFC interacts with the issues of 
religious freedom, I first outline how its leaders interpreted and responded to secularism, the subject 
of chapter 3.   
 
                                                     
123 But as Clemenger reminded the author, although evangelicals in general want limited government, what that 
means differs from evangelical to evangelical (Clemenger 2008a). 
124 E-mail from Don Hutchinson to author, April 30, 2009. Hutchinson noted that the EFC is “in the process of 
structuring a legal advisory panel to further assist in assessment of intervention opportunities and development 




Defining the secular public sphere 
EFC leaders now support a secular state in that they acknowledge the differentiation of such public 
institutions as the state, church, and economy. They do not hearken back to a “golden past” when 
most Canadians self-identified as Christian. Indeed, Stiller urged evangelicals to distinguish between 
cultural dominance and Christ’s rule and avoid “fighting for the old majoritarianism” (1992c, 70).125 
At the same time, EFC leaders challenge evangelicals to be vigilant against secularism, typically 
defined as an anti-religious ideology dedicated to limiting, if not removing, religious reasoning and 
practice from public life. A secular state, EFC leaders argue, does not require the privatization of 
religion in order to protect the civil peace and encourage tolerance. However, the manner in which 
they defined and interacted with secularism put them in opposition with those who claim that 
Christianity continues to be privileged in Canada (Biles and Ibrahim 2005a, 2005b).  
Since concern about secularism motivated much of the political work of the EFC, it is important to 
understand how its leaders defined the term and how their definition accorded with scholarly 
conceptions. In order to evaluate the EFC’s conception of secularism, I compare it with a sociological 
definition that I only briefly describe here as it is discussed in greater detail in section 3.2 below. 
According to Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “secularism refers to a public settlement of the relationship 
between politics and religion” (2008, 12). In Western Europe, this settlement took a specific form, 
born from such experiences as Christendom, the Protestant Reformation, and the religious wars that 
followed. José Casanova traced the etymology of the term “secularism” back to the medieval 
Christian conception of reality as consisting of two realms, the religious and the secular. Properly 
speaking, Casanova claimed, pre-modern thinking consisted of three worlds: the “other” world (or 
heaven) and the two realms of “this” world (i.e., the religious as found in the church and the secular 
as found outside the church). “Secular” priests worked in the world whereas “religious” priests 
withdrew from the world to live in isolated religious communities. The church mediated between the 
secular world and heaven, meaning that it structured reality. Consequently, there was little or no 
                                                     
125 Leslie Tarr, then senior editor of Faith Today, reminded his readers that Christians must distinguish between 
the dismantling of Christendom, which is a good thing, and the destruction of Christianity, which is impossible. 
To lose privileges may be uncomfortable, he acknowledged, but the gospel does not require such privileges and 
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differentiation between morality, sin, and the legal system. Membership in the church was 
compulsory, although there is no firm evidence that members personally lived “Christian” lives 
(1994, 12-16).  
With the advent of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the church lost its central and 
mediating role in society. These events initiated the process of secularization as they differentiated the 
various social spheres from the church and religion. Enlightenment philosophers elevated the secular 
world and insisted that religion find its place within the secular world. Over time, various secular 
states expropriated much of the land and wealth from the church and took over some of the church’s 
public functions, such as education and welfare services. In short, secularization contributed to the de-
sacralization of reality and society (Casanova 1994, 13-16; Heclo 2003, 6).126 Some versions of 
liberalism went further and sought to limit religion to the private world of the home and the 
individual.  
It was this privatization of religion that EFC leaders contested, not secularism per se. Section one 
traces the evolution of their definition of, and interactions with, secularism. In the early 1980s, Stiller 
defined secularism as anti-religious, akin to atheism. While this definition was somewhat dualistic, it 
became increasingly nuanced over time. By the early 1990s Stiller began discussing the role that 
Christians played in the development of secularism in Canada. When he left the EFC in 1997, he 
advised evangelicals to support pluralism in an effort to counteract the privatization of religion. 
Section two locates the EFC’s definition within sociological conceptions of secularism and advances 
the argument that while EFC leaders challenged one type of secularism, they accommodated another 
type. The third section examines the political implications of the EFC’s interactions with various 
types of secularism and the secular Canadian state 
3.1 Developing a definition of secularism 
EFC leaders typically viewed secularism as a worldview that seeks dominance in the public square. 
The concept of “worldview” has both Christian and secular roots. Discussed by church leaders 
Augustine and Aquinas in the fifth and thirteenth centuries respectively, the term entered the common 
                                                                                                                                                                    
their elimination do not impede the gospel. For Tarr, Christians cannot be dependent upon the props provided 
by privilege (1989, 14-15). 
126 Casanova rejects the interpretation of secularism as the emancipation of humankind from superstition, belief, 
and religion and a movement towards reason, unbelief, and science because the secular and the religious are 
bound together (1994, 17; 2006, 21).  
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lexicon when German philosopher Immanuel Kant referred to a Weltanschauung or “sense perception 
of the world” (Naugle 2002, 59). Subsequent German romanticists and idealists used the idea to 
connote “an intellectual conception of the universe from the perspective of a human knower” (59) and 
claimed that one’s Weltanschauung provides meaning to human life.127  
Dutch theologian and politician Abraham Kuyper employed the Dutch equivalent of the term 
worldview (levensen wereldbeschouwing) to refer to a “life system” or “life and world view” (Kuyper 
1931, 11n1, italics in original). In his Stone Lectures of 1898 held at Princeton University, Kuyper 
presented Calvinism as a system of belief that impacts the spheres of religion, politics, science, and 
art (1931)128 and therefore an effective tool “in the spiritual and intellectual warfare being waged for 
cultural dominance” (Naugle 2002, 20). His followers insisted that one of the purposes of their 
political engagement was to transform or redeem culture so that all cultural activities glorify God. 
Another Kuyperian principle required them to seek justice for all. James Skillen of the Centre for 
Public Justice in the US contends that Kuyper modelled the latter principle when he rejected Christian 
imperialism and led the campaign to grant all Dutch citizens equal political, educational, and religious 
rights (1996, 85).129 
Later in the twentieth century Francis Schaeffer popularized the concept of worldview among 
evangelicals when he identified “secular humanism” as a worldview that threatened Christianity. 
Schaeffer warned conservative Protestants that they were losing control of their culture to humanists, 
whom he identified as those who take to themselves that which belongs to God and create “a value 
system rooted in the belief that man is his own measure, that man is autonomous, totally independent” 
(1976, 60). He maintained that the humanist elevation of both human reason and the particular over 
                                                     
127 The terms “weltanschauung” and “worldview” have been used to advance a variety of political goals. For 
instance, Hitler and the Nazis employed it in their propaganda campaigns (see http://www.calvin.edu/academic/ 
cas/gpa/schul01.htm (accessed January 30, 2011). In light of the many secular uses of the term, David K. 
Naugle desires to redirect the concept “along Christian terms” (2002, 259n13). Of specific concern to Naulge is 
what he perceives to be the postmodern relativist reduction of worldviews to personal narratives. For further 
reflections by some Kuyperians about the “dangers” associated with the Christian use of the term “worldview” 
see Marshall, Griffioen, and Mouw (1989).  
128 For Kuyper, Calvinism contained “a given form for political and social life, for the interpretation of the 
moral world-order, for the relation between nature and grace, between Christianity and the world, between 
church and state, and finally for art and science; and amid all these life-utterances it remained always the self-
same Calvinism, in so far as simultaneously and spontaneously all these developments sprang from its deepest 
life-principle” (1931, 17). 
129 James K.A. Smith cautions those who focus on worldviews against reducing people to cognitive beings and 
ignoring the loves and desires of the heart. Smith suggests that a disproportionate emphasis on worldview may 
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the absolute resulted in the death of God movement (175-81). Without a transcendent God, he argued, 
human beings lose their dignity, which he believed was based on being created in the image of God, 
and their sense of meaning (55). In addition, he alleged that in the absence of absolutes, there is no 
basis for morality and laws become arbitrary (55, 128).130 
While categorizing various systems of thought as “worldviews” was not unique to Schaeffer, his 
academic demeanour and trenchant apologetic against a twentieth-century Western culture that had 
rejected human sinfulness in favour of human perfection through scientific reasoning turned 
Schaeffer into one of the most popular evangelicals in the 1970s and 1980s. His warnings against 
secularism resonated with evangelicals in both Canada and the US. For Schaeffer, secular humanism 
was the source for much that was wrong with the world: abortion, the manipulation of society by 
elites or authoritarian governments, genetic engineering, and the loss of morality. Evangelicals 
continue to view Schaeffer, who died in 1984, as a modern day prophet and cultural outsider who saw 
more clearly and deeply into the culture than those immersed in it.  
Despite Schaeffer’s popularity among evangelicals, some within the broader evangelical and 
Reformed communities either nuanced Schaeffer’s analysis or offered an alternative position. For 
example, while Schaeffer focused on secular humanism as a threat to Christianity and called 
evangelicals to reconstruct their Christian past, Paul Marshall followed Kuyper and emphasized the 
religious nature of all worldviews. For Marshall, one’s religion shapes “basic questions about the 
nature of reality―what human nature is, what sin is and how it is manifested, what the nature and 
direction of history is, what law is, what idolatry is, and what the root of meaning of human life is” 
(1991, 5). In short, one’s understanding of the world―one’s worldview―is a religious system that in 
turn impacts other areas of life. This conception of worldview assumed that every person is 
fundamentally religious.131 Marshall communicated his views of religion in a number of EFC 
documents. For instance, in his contribution to the book of essays written by the EFC’s Task Force on 
                                                                                                                                                                    
result in an “insufficiently Augustinian” worldview. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and 
Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009) 43-46. 
130 Ronald Wells defines secular humanism as a worldview informed by scientific rational thought that 
marginalizes revealed truth and promises progress and eventual human perfection. Wells, History through the 
Eyes of Faith (New York: Harper & Row, 1989) 116, 125, 136. 
131 In another context Wolterstorff describes the type of thought developed by Marshall as one that “begins with 
the anthropological claim that an ineradicable feature of human beings is the irresistible impulse to bring unity 
to life by taking something as absolute, by giving ultimate allegiance to something or other – be it the 
transcendent God or something immanent in the created order. If the former, this impulse is faith; if the latter, 
idolatry” (1989, 67). For his disagreement with this interpretation, see pp. 70-71. 
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Canada’s Future, Marshall expanded the definition of religion to include philosophies and ideologies 
that attempt to provide ultimate meaning to their adherents, including fascism, communism,132 and 
conceptions of culture, democracy, and human rights (1992, 5-6).133 In an article published by the 
EFC on its website entitled “A Christian defense of religious freedom,”134 Marshall argued that 
religion was about more than religious creeds and doctrines. Instead, it was “the fundamental shaper 
of human life, sometimes positively so, sometimes not” (1996, 1). In this conception worldviews are 
religious perspectives in that they provide answers to the perennial questions concerning the nature of 
the human person and the meaning of existence.  
All three EFC presidents, but especially Stiller, exhibited the influence of both Schaeffer and 
Marshall. Schaeffer’s influence was evident in Stiller’s portrayal of secular humanism (often 
shortened to the term “secularism”) as a worldview that impacts all areas of life. Throughout his 
tenure at the EFC Stiller presented secularism as a threat to human dignity and morality and insisted 
that the struggle against secularism required evangelicals to participate in public life. Yet Schaeffer’s 
influence was limited as his desire to return to the past meant that he did not provide evangelicals 
with the necessary interpretive framework to constructively engage with the secularism in their 
culture. In search of a model of engagement more applicable to the Canadian context, Stiller and 
other EFC leaders (including Redekop and Marshall) rejected Christian reconstuctionism and 
expanded the EFC’s mandate to seek justice for all, not just evangelicals. The following section traces 
the thought of Stiller who, like Schaeffer, identified secularism as a significant threat for Christianity, 
and how he employed the threat to motivate evangelicals to re-enter the public sphere. 
3.1.1 Stiller’s identification of secularism as a threat 
Many of Stiller’s early columns in Faith Today followed Schaeffer in their portrayal of secularism as 
a singular, monolithic movement that was in opposition to Christianity.135 Stiller called evangelicals 
                                                     
132 Paul Bramadat finds such definitions of religion “too capacious” (2005, 11). 
133 George Grant adopted a similar view of religion. Using the Latin understanding of religion as that which 
binds together, he identified religion as “that system of belief (whether true or false) which binds together the 
life of individuals and gives to those lives whatever consistency of purpose they may have.” Thus he described 
Marxism and liberal humanism as religious systems (1969, 46). He also identified “teaching about the virtues of 
democracy” which students accept on faith as religious in nature (49).  
134 The article was adapted from an “Occasional Paper” that Marshall wrote for the World Evangelical 
Fellowship.  
135 This position reflects the influence of Schaeffer. According to Susan Harding, Schaeffer created a warring 




to resist secularism by engaging in the public square in order to accomplish two tasks: protect the 
vulnerable that are inevitably marginalized by what he perceived to be the narcissistic and 
individualist culture spawned by secularism; and become cultural and political insiders in order to 
bring about spiritual renewal (1983b; 1993b, 70). The second task suggests that an important purpose 
of evangelical political engagement for Stiller was the transformation of culture.  
Stiller’s concern for those who were negatively impacted by secularism was evident in his book A 
Generation under Siege, published in 1983, the same year that he became the executive director of 
the EFC. In this book Stiller lamented how the search for success and personal fulfillment led too 
many Canadian adults to pay insufficient attention to the safety and welfare of their children. One 
explanation Stiller offered for the rise of this desire for self-fulfillment was secularism, which he 
identified as a worldview that refused to acknowledge the transcendent. A secularist “may still accept 
religious worship, culture, symbolism, holidays, artifacts, and even language,” he noted, “but he does 
not have a religious worldview” (1983b, 60). It is important to note that this was the last time that 
Stiller described secularism as a non-religious worldview. As the EFC’s executive director he would 
come to refer to secularism as a religious worldview. 
A year later Stiller followed Schaeffer in linking secularism with humanism and identifying both 
philosophical systems as de-valuing human life and informing the pro-choice movement. After an 
Ontario jury found Dr. Henry Morgentaler not guilty of wilfully procuring a miscarriage in his 
abortion practice in 1984, Stiller described Morgentaler’s underlying philosophy as secularist, that is, 
“a worldview adopted by a person, community or country that assumes there is no outside reference 
point, or in other words, no God. Life is lived with no reference to any source of life … In short, our 
society measures itself within itself. That’s secularism” (1984c, 46-7). Stiller argued that society 
replaced the worship of a transcendent God with the worship of cultural values such as individual 
rights and personal convenience. He defined the worship of cultural values as humanism and claimed 
that it fed the pro-choice movement. The collusion of secularists and humanists, he warned, resulted 
in “a moral bomb” as their devaluation of life lead people to view children as expendable (47). 
Although Stiller did not name the secularists and humanists against whom he spoke, the implicit 
suggestion was that the leaders of the pro-choice movement and those who sought to limit the 
influence of a transcendent God in public life and policy fit within the category. Stiller viewed the 
Supreme Court’s 1985 decision to strike down the Lord’s Day Act as another indication of the 
increasingly secular nature of Canadian society bent on erasing its Christian past (1985a, 61).  
 
 97 
Four years later Stiller’s conception of secularism as a religious worldview became more explicit. 
In 1989, as the lower courts began ruling on the constitutionality of religious (Christian) education in 
Ontario public schools, Stiller urged evangelicals to support organizations that intervened in legal 
cases to defend religious freedom. In Faith Today he wrote that a legal decision to ban religious 
education would “shape the educational curriculum within a secular framework. To remove the 
teaching of religion is to ensure that the educational mindset will be one of secular humanism, which, 
in effect, is itself a religious world view” (1989b, 78). For Stiller, then, the belief that religion was 
irrelevant to public life was as religious a statement as the claim that religion impacted all of life.136  
During his early years at the EFC, Stiller continued to raise the same concerns about the vulnerable 
that he highlighted in A Generation under Siege. After witnessing the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990, he compared the economic and spiritual failures of communism 
with secularism. Just as Marxism advanced an ideology of materialism that views human beings in 
economic (material) terms, he argued, so “secularism pushes out of our economic considerations a 
view of humankind which sees people as spiritual beings” (1990a, 78). While Stiller believed the 
residual elements of the Judeo-Christian faith in the West militated against the abuses and excesses of 
communist materialism, he was worried that “secular democratic materialism … may lead to 
narcissistic anarchism in which self-centredness rules” (78). Stiller’s fear relied on a framework he 
developed in A Generation Under Siege that identified narcissism and secularism as linked 
worldviews opposed to a Christian worldview.137 
Stiller contrasted the harm that he believed secularism posed for the vulnerable with what he 
understood to be the inherent commitment of the Christian faith to protect the dignity of each person, 
including the disenfranchised. In a Faith Today column published in 1992, he rejected the secularist 
appeal to human rights legislation in its attempt to limit the public expression of religion and thereby 
create a “neutral” public square. For Stiller, the term “human rights” was grounded in religious belief 
as it assumed “a universal, moral order from which the right of the individual derives its legitimacy” 
(1992d, 82). He pointed out that Christians believe human beings have significance because they are 
“created out of purpose” rather than “the result of happenstance” and are made in the image of God 
                                                     
136 In summarizing the arguments presented to the Supreme Court in Rodriguez (1994), a case involving doctor-
assisted suicide, Stiller wrote that “all arguments are basically rooted in a religious worldview. The tragedy is 
that religious views dominating our culture have usually been secular and humanistic” (1994c, 78). 
137 In 1994, Stiller identified autonomous individualism as a threat because it elevated individual rights over 
self-restraint (1994b, 13). 
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(82). The term “rights” was an equally religious principle, he claimed, because it originated from the 
“belief that there is a universal body of truth from which our rights are derived” (82). He then posited 
the Judeo-Christian faith as the source of this universal order and body of truth which in turn provided 
the foundation for human dignity. He warned that ignoring the religious root of human dignity could 
result in the reduction of human life to utility, a situation in which “‘rights’ become that which people 
give you and ‘human’ exists only when it serves those in power” (82).138 This fear of reducing human 
life to utility motivated Stiller and other EFC leaders to participate in public debates on the issues of 
pornography, prostitution, abortion, and new reproductive technologies. For the EFC and the 
evangelicals it purportedly represented, the Judeo-Christian faith best protects the vulnerable because 
its principle of the imago Dei supports human flourishing and dignity. In contrast, secularism was 
thought to degrade the human person. 
Stiller’s early definition of secularism contained elements of a dualism that portrayed those who 
were religious and recognized the transcendent as “good” while those who were self-referentially 
secularist were labelled as idolatrous and “bad.” It appears that for Stiller the two worldviews were 
incompatible, with little potential or opportunity for reconciliation. As a result, the term “secularism” 
came to be coded as a “bad” ideology and the source for much of the sin and immorality that 
evangelicals and EFC leaders saw in the culture. This interpretation ignored the instances in which 
Christians supported regimes that violated human rights as well as examples of secular organizations 
challenging both the church and the state in an effort to protect human dignity.139 In addition, the 
dualism led evangelicals to adopt an “us versus them” conception of the public sphere in which they 
were called to pursue truth by resisting a dangerous philosophy and its adherents. The presence of 
such a dualism reflected the influence of Schaeffer, who did not differentiate between secularists who 
were willing to create public space for religion and those who desired to privatize religion. Nor did he 
help evangelicals understand the degree to which they contributed to the development of secularism. 
The resulting “thin” representation of secularism was evident in leading evangelicals in the US, such 
as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell (Jelen 1993, 179; Harding 2000). However, the dualism was less 
                                                     
138 The argument may also suggest that Stiller was wary of granting the state the power to define the terms 
“human,” “rights,” and “human rights.” However, this avenue of thought was not further developed in either 
Stiller’s subsequent writings or in the EFC’s other literature. 
139 For example, Casanova notes that European working classes abandoned their faith and embraced socialism 
in much higher numbers than their American counterparts because the European state churches often supported 
state repression (1994, 244n56).  
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pronounced in Stiller’s writings than those of Schaeffer and leaders of the American Religious Right, 
especially towards the end of Stiller’s tenure at the EFC. 
One of Stiller’s purposes of identifying secularism as a threat to the Christian foundations of 
Canadian society was to mobilize evangelicals to re-engage with politics. He informed evangelicals 
that if they desired to preserve some vestiges of Christian beliefs in Canadian law and public policy, 
they had to participate in the process of creating new legislation. They had to be “at the table” where 
decisions were made. In essence, what Stiller sought was the continuation of what David Martin 
refers to as the “shadow establishment” of Christianity that exists in Canada (2000, 24). The 
following section examines how Stiller used the threat of secularism to gather evangelicals together 
and participate in public life.  
3.1.2 Developing a discourse of resistance to mobilize evangelical political action 
Stiller traced the roots of secularism to the Enlightenment project of freeing people from religion in 
addition to supporting the freedom of religion (1994b, 67).140 He saw the same desire to free people 
from religion in the political and legal changes that de-Christianized Canadian society, such as the 
Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the Lord’s Day Act, the curtailment of the ability of the 
evangelistic organization Gideons International to distribute free Bibles in public schools, and the 
disappearance of Christmas nativity scenes from some government buildings. In the aftermath of the 
decision to ban compulsory prayers in Ontario schools, he wrote, “the force that has blunted the role 
of Christian faith in society is secularism―the idea that God is irrelevant to life, including education” 
(1989c, 78). The result of secularism, Stiller warned, was a society that “refuses to acknowledge any 
practical difference in the life of the nation between worshipping God and watching pornographic 
videos” (1994b, 69). For Stiller, then, the destruction of the Christian foundation of society in favour 
of individual freedom and gratification created a confused people incapable of discerning which 
actions were beneficial and which ones harmed the nation’s moral health. The antidote he proposed 
was evangelical political engagement in order to protect human dignity, the nation’s moral health, and 
religious freedom. Put another way, the resistance discourse employed by Stiller against secularism 
mobilized the base to political engagement, which he believed was essential if the slide into 
narcissistic anarchy was to be halted.  
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Although EFC leaders had emphasized the need for evangelicals to be politically engaged since at 
least 1983, the link between political engagement and secularism was made explicit in 1987. A full-
page ad in the November/December issue of Faith Today that year encouraged readers to join the 
EFC and have their voice count in the struggle against secularism (Faith Today 1987b, 33). This ad 
reflected a turning point in the EFC’s self-definition. In contrast to previous statements of the EFC’s 
purposes, which listed unity and the renewal of the church as the first objective (Thrust 1977, 6), the 
1987 ad identified the tasks of reminding “the nation of the supremacy and reign of Jesus Christ” and 
encouraging “government to rule with truth and justice” as the first and second elements of the EFC’s 
mandate (Faith Today 1987b, 33). Bringing about the unity of the church remained on the list, but 
only as the fifth and last element. The new emphasis on advocating for a nation under the reign of 
Christ was supported by the provocative words, attributed to the German pastor Martin Niemöller, 
which headlined the ad: 
First they arrested the Communists, but I was not a Communist, so I 
did nothing. Then they came for the Social Democrats, but I was not 
a Social Democrat, so I did nothing. They arrested the trade 
unionists, and I did nothing because I was not one. And then they 
came for the Jews, and then the Catholics, but I was neither Jew nor 
Catholic, so I did nothing. At last they came and arrested me, and 
there was no one left to do anything about it. (33)141 
The use of Niemöller’s poem indicated the degree to which Stiller and EFC leaders in the late 1980s 
believed that conservative Protestantism was under attack by a worldview intent on destroying the 
religious heritage of the country and limiting the future participation of religious adherents in public 
debates and the development of public policy. Niemöller’s “they” were Nazis, while the implied 
“they” in the EFC’s usage were secularists who posed a threat to Christians and human dignity.  
Stiller took Niemöller’s implied plea for people to discern the philosophies of the age seriously. He 
argued that one way in which Christians could address harmful philosophies was to “be at the table” 
where decisions were made. As he told one journalist, “we have to be at the table debating with the 
others, to convince them that Christian values can construct laws that are good for them for their own 
reasons” (Graham 1990, 329). An important element of Stiller’s desire to be at the table was to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
140 This is a common understanding among those closely connected with the EFC. For example, see David M. 
Brown (1999-2000). Brown served as legal counsel for the EFC in a number of its court interventions until 
2006, when Prime Minister Harper appointed him to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  
141 The groups addressed in the poem differ in its various versions. 
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persuade others of the benefits of the Christian faith. Indeed, he maintained that the best foundation 
for a society was healthy families, biblical literacy and faith, and strong churches that foster strong 
communities (Stiller 1994b, 14-17). 
In an effort to provide evangelicals with a model of resistance against false ideologies, Stiller 
pointed to the members of the early church who refused to privatize their faith. Instead of turning 
inward, they participated in the public square knowing that they would clash with the Roman 
authorities (1994b, 5-8). Based on this history Stiller called Christians to challenge public beliefs and 
practices that limited the ability of believers to freely engage in their religion. They were to remind 
their leaders that Canada was a nation under God and that God was sovereign over all (2003a, 149). 
Reminiscent of Kuyper’s claim that Calvinism addresses all aspects of life, Stiller advised 
evangelicals to become involved in more than politics. He encouraged them to be engaged in the arts, 
media, law, education, and business, because when Christians abandon these areas of life they fall 
under “the control of darkness” (1993b, 70). In contrast, involvement in politics would enable 
Christians to combat the secularist desire to privatize religion (1995b, 86). To facilitate evangelical 
political engagement, Stiller urged evangelicals to learn the language used in public discourse, to find 
ways to be present in public debates, and to offer ideas rather than moral diatribes. He recognized the 
power of secular discourse in the public square and advised evangelicals to learn its syntax and 
grammar. In Stiller’s words, evangelicals were to speak the truth of Christ into public life by entering 
into public dialogues and appropriating secular discourse when necessary (1995a, 78). As he noted in 
Faith Today, the point was for evangelicals to be cultural and political insiders intent on strategically 
bringing about spiritual renewal (1993b, 70; 1995b, 86). The sub-text was that evangelical political 
engagement could help protect the ongoing influence of Christianity in culture.142  
However, Stiller’s call to appropriate secular language did not indicate that he was yielding ground 
to secularism or that he was advising evangelicals to rid their public speech of all religious language 
and reasoning. Rather, his strategy was pragmatic. If evangelicals wished to persuade others about the 
benefits of the Christian faith, then they must use the language that enabled them to be heard. As 
Stiller noted, “to use [the Bible] with those who do not believe is to invite their scorn and repudiation 
of the Bible. Instead, use biblical ideas expressed in non-biblical language” (2003a, 161). He also 
                                                     
142 Elsewhere Stiller listed the steps evangelicals must take if they wish to sit at the table: get their facts rights; 
avoid being sidetracked from the real issue; digest the views and arguments of others; test one’s approach 
before presenting to politicians or committees; meet the key players; learn the system; be present at the table; 
build coalitions; learn the art of compromise; and do not become weary (2003a, 162-64). 
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advised them to avoid uttering such phrases as “thus says the Lord” and proclaiming judgement. As a 
result of these positions, the EFC’s opposition to secularism was more moderate than that of many 
American Religious Right activists. There was no EFC equivalent to Pat Robertson’s prediction of a 
hurricane striking Orlando, Florida as condemnation for the city’s support of gay and lesbian rights or 
Pat Buchanan’s claim “that the founding fathers would have had one response if they had learned that 
public schools did not teach the Bible but taught about homosexuality: ‘Lock and load’” (Wilcox 
2000, 62, 80). In terms of political mobilization, the EFC did not engage in voter mobilization like the 
Religious Right (82-83) nor raise money for political and school board candidates (83-84). 
In another contrast with various elements of the American Religious Right, Stiller recognized the 
right of citizens to choose secularism as their worldview. For example, when the Supreme Court 
struck down the Lord’s Day Act he reminded evangelicals that although the Court appeared willing to 
erode the Christian view of humankind and society, “as Christians we cannot deny that option or 
attempt to enforce our view.” He went on to emphasize the importance of non-coercion, writing that 
“we have no inclination to call on the government to prescribe religious patterns for the rest of society 
by legislating morality. The nature of Christ’s Kingdom is inherently non-legalistic. Obedience to 
Christ must flow out of a heart that is open to Christ’s call and knows life will be enriched by that 
obedience” (1985a, 61). Stiller’s argument was that traditional Christian morality emerges from a 
converted heart that is attuned to God and therefore cannot be imposed by political authorities. This 
position was easier to make in the context of the Lord’s Day Act than abortion, when EFC leaders 
indeed attempted to have the law reflect a certain view of the human person they believed best 
protected human dignity and flourishing. 
Although Stiller lamented the movement of Canadian society away from its Christian heritage, he 
refused to identify nineteenth-century Canada as a Christian country. In From the Tower of Babel to 
Parliament Hill (1997), published just as he was leaving the EFC, Stiller explained that his focus on 
Canada’s Christian roots was not to seek the return of a supposed by-gone Christian Canada, but to 
note “that the Kingdom of God invades, shapes, and brings health to a nation” (1997a, 22). After 
outlining a history of Christianity in Canada, which drew on many of the sources we discussed in the 
first chapter of this thesis, Stiller concluded that Canada never was a Christian nation.143 He 
                                                     
143 Stiller acknowledged that while early Canada had a Christian framework, it did not treat the Chinese 
immigrants and aboriginal peoples well. He warned Christians against yearning for what was. “The gospel,” he 
wrote, “calls us to engage the world as we find it – not as we wish it were. The kingdom of our Lord is not 
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understood nineteenth-century church culture as similar to the broader social culture and accused 
church leaders of the time of opting “for a cosy relationship with an emerging middle class” (43). 
Furthermore, he noted that “the period was hardly a model of biblical justice in its treatment of non-
Anglo-Saxon immigrants, women, and Native peoples. One could even say that some of Canada’s 
social policies are more biblical today, largely because they have been informed by a biblical vision” 
(43). He then traced a history of secularism in Canada, from the disestablishment of the Anglican 
Church to the need for temperance and Sabbatarian movements, the separation of churches and 
schools, the appeal of Darwinism and higher criticism, and the liberal theology of the Social Gospel 
movement (46-63). Secularism was so successful in imposing its views upon Canadian society, Stiller 
argued, because Christians began abandoning the public square in the twentieth century; that is, when 
Roman Catholics became less engaged with culture after the Quiet Revolution, when mainline 
Protestants lost their spiritual energy, and when many evangelicals withdrew into sectarian 
communities (19-20).144 Essentially, Stiller urged evangelicals to fill the void left by the Catholics, 
liberal Protestants, and an earlier generation of evangelicals. Given the significant cultural and 
political influence held by the Catholics, particularly in Quebec, and liberal Protestants in English-
speaking Canada until the early 1970s, the call for evangelicals to replace these groups suggests an 
aspiration to seek considerable influence. Indeed, in a 2009 interview Stiller claimed that evangelicals 
were “moving from the back of the street to Main Street” (Longhurst 2009).  
The thoroughness with which Stiller explicated the connections between actions taken by 
Christians and the development of secularism that he traced in From the Tower of Babel revealed the 
degree to which he nuanced his earlier conception of secularism as a monolithic, anti-religious 
ideology. Signs of increasing nuance may be seen as early as 1988, when Stiller argued that as 
evangelicals increased their personal wealth in the 1960s and 1970s, they began to emulate the very 
culture they previously preached against (1991c, 198). In addition, he insisted that sectarian 
withdrawal reinforced the belief that faith should be kept out of public life (1991c, 197, 199; 1995a, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
trapped in the past. It is powerful, breaking down the idols of this age and uprooting the violent and untruthful 
ideologies of this culture” (1994d, 70).  
144 Stiller identified a number of explanations for the evangelical withdrawal from public life during this time: 
the fundamentalist controversies; a pre-millenialist theology; fear of the problems evangelicals associate with 
the Social Gospel movement; and lower socio-economic status (1994b, 89; 1997a, 68-70). In addition, he 
charged evangelicals with being so busy preparing themselves for the Lord’s return that they ignored the 
“surrounding moral disintegration” (1991a, 78). In contrast, he urged them to remember that “churches win the 
right to speak as, from community to community, they gently and faithfully assert that this earth is God’s 
creation and this nation is his dominion” (78). 
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78).145 In From the Tower of Babel Stiller developed the argument by paying greater attention to the 
historical interaction of Christians and secularism in Canada. For example, he noted that while 
Egerton Ryerson believed that public education should promote Christian values, his campaign to 
separate education from the control of the dominant churches “set up a dividing line which in the end 
served to support powerful forces already at work in the secularization of the system” (1997a, 52). 
Stiller further asserted that the involvement of Christian churches and individuals in the Sabbatarian 
and temperance movements convinced politicians “that the safest course of action was to stay clear of 
any religious issues” (50). Stiller’s move to locate at least some developments of the secularization 
process within the Christian community indicates a move away from the dualism evident in his earlier 
writings.146 His other move in From the Tower of Babel was to shift his focus away from explicating 
the dangers of secularism to promoting pluralism as a means with which to limit secularism by 
broadening public debate and creating space for religious perspectives.  
3.1.3 Stiller’s turn toward pluralism 
In 1989 Stiller portrayed pluralism as a tool used by secularists to privatize religion (1989c, 78). 
However, it was a certain interpretation of pluralism that Stiller opposed, a type for which Marshall 
provided an analogy: “A principal looks around his school and says, ‘Some like to play hockey, 
others prefer football and still others would rather have soccer. Given the various preferences, I won’t 
allow any sports’” (78). It was this type of pluralism that Stiller opposed as it argued that because 
there were religious differences in the population, all religion had to be privatized. Over time Stiller 
came to promote an alternative conception of pluralism that did not eliminate difference but rather 
enabled all groups to be at the table where public policy decisions were made (1994b, 79-82). In 
From the Tower of Babel Stiller defined this alternative understanding by differentiating between 
religious and cultural pluralism, a distinction he learned from British Presbyterian missionary Lesslie 
Newbigin.147 While rejecting the notion that all religions are equally true, Stiller nevertheless 
                                                     
145 Stiller suggested that secularists, sectarians, religious individualists, narcissists, and pessimists all share the 
humanist worldview that “neuters” God. “While believing [God] has all power, we assume he has no intention 
to intervene. Believing God can but won’t, we replace faith with fatalism” (1991c, 200). 
146 The other EFC leader to discuss the interaction between secularism and Christianity is Clemenger. In a Faith 
Today column he recognized that “liberalism and its secularist expression” is “very much a western ideology 
birthed out of Christendom” (2008b, 14). Unfortunately, there was no further explanation of the comment in the 
article. 
147 See Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989) and Foolishness to 
the Greeks (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986). 
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affirmed cultural pluralism, which he defined as a social arrangement that recognizes diversity. In his 
view, cultural pluralism 
is a basic Christian affirmation that we―as God does―are to give 
space and allowance for people to think, believe, act, and hope with 
different assumptions. It is Jesus, with the unexpected directive to 
love others … who revolutionizes our way of treating others, 
including those who believe and act differently. (1997a, 162)  
Stiller’s point was that belief in Jesus cannot be coerced and that Christians are called to respect 
people of all faiths. In addition, he thought that cultural pluralism could provide a forum for debate in 
which those with divergent commitments “seek a way for coexistence, with neither side giving up 
what it believes to be true” (166). Stiller added that cultural pluralism may be an opportunity because 
a culturally pluralistic state is to protect and promote justice for all and not discriminate on the basis 
of religion. For Stiller, then, “cultural pluralism is a very strong defense against any ideological 
tyranny that might attempt to rule in our public schools and universities” (165-66). Put another way, 
Stiller suggested that cultural pluralism may offer protection against an ideological tyranny of 
secularism. In his mind conservative Protestants could use the fact of cultural pluralism to argue that 
the media, school boards, and government had to recognize the right of all religious people to 
participate in public debates (167). 
The publication of From the Tower of Babel coincided with the release of a discussion paper 
written by the EFC’s Social Action Commission entitled “Being Christian in a pluralist society: A 
discussion paper on pluralism.”148 The paper maintained that the liberal desire to privatize religion as 
a response to pluralism was misguided. Indeed, the desire “points towards the basic defect of 
liberalism―namely that it trivializes differences, especially religious differences” (EFC 1997a, 2). In 
the paper the Commission criticized the liberal advancement of a particular form of pluralism that 
claimed to be a neutral philosophy that promoted individual autonomy and choice within an 
atmosphere of toleration. Such liberal pluralism was an inadequate response to religious diversity, the 
Commission claimed, because it allowed for only one way to manage difference: impose 
individualism on all and ultimately create homogeneous societies (2).149 As an alternative, the 
Commission urged Christians to bring religious differences into the public square so that they may be 
adequately and justly addressed (3). It called Christians to engage pluralism in a number of ways: (a) 
                                                     
148 Clemenger notes that the discussion paper was based on a previous paper written by Marshall (2008a). 
149 Stiller echoed the same concern of homogeneity in From the Tower of Babel (1997a, 63-66). 
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through the organizational structures and models of their particular religious traditions; (b) by 
persuading (as opposed to imposing) others to develop a Christian culture built upon respect, 
tolerance, honesty, and integrity; and (c) by coexisting with others. In those issues where diversity 
and coexistence are not possible (for instance, it is not possible to have a variety of national energy 
programs at the same time), the Commission wrote, “it is our Christian responsibility, politically, to 
seek to win that which is just for everybody and not only that which is good for us” (6). While the 
Commission acknowledged that the EFC had a common responsibility to advocate for the whole, it 
failed to address the issue of what happens when there are multiple conceptions of what is “just for 
everybody.”  
In short, by the time Stiller left the EFC in 1997, the organization had a more nuanced definition of 
secularism than it did in 1983, one that recognized secularism as a complex concept with roots in 
Christianity. Stiller had distanced himself from Schaeffer’s dualistic understanding of culture and 
instead focused on pluralism. The Social Action Commission’s paper on pluralism identified a 
particular type of liberal pluralism that the EFC perceived to be misguided. The paper encouraged the 
development of a more robust pluralism that welcomed religious diversity rather than privatized 
religion. Both Stiller and the discussion paper reminded evangelicals that if they desired to counteract 
secularism, they had to become politically and culturally engaged and protect the rights of all citizens 
to participate in public debate. In this manner the term “secularism” operated as a motivating 
discourse of resistance. Indeed, Stiller was so successful in persuading evangelicals to be politically 
engaged that by the time he left the EFC he could write: “Today most of our church leaders recognize 
the need for Christians to engage our culture” (1997b, 62). Yet he persisted in posing secularism as a 
threat. As we will discover in the following sub-section, although the two presidents who succeeded 
Stiller further refined the EFC’s conception of secularism, they too employed the same discourse of 
resistance: “secularism” was the source for many of society’s problems and it had to be resisted. 
3.1.4 Walsh and Clemenger 
The shift in strategy towards challenging the public sphere to be more pluralist was evident in the 
work of the both Walsh and Clemenger. Shortly after the 2000 federal election in which some media 
ridiculed some of the evangelical beliefs held by Alliance Party leader Stockwell Day, Walsh 
defended evangelicals by stating that they, like Christians generally, welcomed people of all faiths to 
Canada and accepted “comprehensive pluralism.” In a Faith Today editorial on the subject from early 
2001, he wrote, “evangelicals know that a pluralism that does not favour one faith over another 
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actually provides an ideal context for mission and ministry. Nominal Christian structures have never 
satisfied us. Even during the ‘Christendom years,’ we were calling people to personal repentance and 
radical discipleship in obedience to Christ” (2001a, 7). Ultimately, Walsh claimed, it was not 
pluralism per se but “the secularist view of pluralism that we resist, a view that insists that because 
religions are different from each other, then faith must be privatized in the name of tolerance” (7). 
Walsh maintained that when religion was taken out of education, for example, values continued to be 
taught, but they were unidentified. He noted that in a truly pluralist state, such elevation of the 
“secularist faith” should not occur and promised that the EFC “will resist a religionless society and 
we will call public officials to respect people of all faiths and the faith of all people” (7). Examples of 
the presence of this secularist view bent on privatizing faith frequently mentioned in Faith Today 
included former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s prohibition against speaking the name of Jesus Christ 
in a public memorial service after the downing of a Swiss Air flight off Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia, 
and the exclusion of religious leaders from the public memorial to remember the victims of 
September 11, 2001 (Epp Buckingham 2002, 28).  
While Walsh followed Stiller’s move to advocate for pluralism, he also drew from the work of 
Clemenger, at that time the director of the EFC’s Ottawa office. Clemenger distinguished between a 
secular and a secularist state. A secular state, he asserted, is inclusive and allows a variety of religious 
traditions to operate freely. In contrast, a secularist state privatizes religion and removes it from the 
public square. The more secularist the state, the more difficult it is for religious institutions to operate 
in civil society. For Clemenger, a truly secular civil society does not require religious actors to 
advance “de-religious or de-faithed rationale to engage in public life, for example, in the courts” 
(1999, 8). Instead, he called for a pluralist state in which all voices, including religious ones, were 
welcome to participate in public discourse. To combat the secularist creed of privatizing religion, 
Clemenger urged people of faith to engage in the public sphere as individuals as well as members of 
religious organizations, for when they limit their political engagement to working through their 
religious institutions, they unconsciously adopt a secularist position that relegates religious practice to 
private institutions (8). Like Stiller, Clemenger suggested that Christians contributed to the processes 
of secularization and privatization when they unwittingly adopted secular assumptions about the 
nature and role of religion in public life.  
As EFC president, Clemenger continued to define and interact with secularism. His positions were 
clearly outlined in an article he wrote for the Evangelical Review of Theology, which was based on a 
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speech he gave at the Consultation on Globalization and Social Justice held in Kuala Lumpur in early 
2001. In the article Clemenger defined a secular state as one that accommodates religious and cultural 
diversity and is “properly secular” when it does not interfere in matters of authority given to the 
church (for example, the development or enforcement of doctrine).150 However, secular states are 
directed by a worldview or faith perspective, he argued, and for this reasons their interactions with 
different faiths can never be completely free from bias (2003, 160-62). According to Clemenger, then, 
it was impossible for states to be a-religious, even though an a-religious state was the goal of 
secularists. He thought that this mistaken search for an a-religious state often led secularists to 
privatize religion. 
Following in the footsteps of the Social Action Commission’s paper “Being Christian in a pluralist 
society,” Clemenger’s article challenged the liberal assumption that secular, or non-sectarian, public 
discourse is free from any comprehensive doctrine, including conceptions of the good, and that it is 
therefore neutral, reasonable, and accessible to all. The problem with this position, Clemenger argued, 
“is that all citizens are expected to function publicly as liberals” (2003, 160). In contradistinction, he 
desired that all religions have the freedom to present their beliefs publicly and attempt to persuade 
others why their beliefs should undergird public policy.151 When this occurs, the state can be said to 
be properly secular. At this point in his argument Clemenger was rejecting the assumption of some 
secularists that there is only one type of discourse and reasoning that is acceptable in the public 
sphere. For Clemenger there was no such discourse and reasoning as all types of discourse reflect 
views of the human person and society that in turn reveal a comprehensive doctrine (a worldview).  
In a reversal of the dualism found in Stiller’s early definition of secularism, Clemenger accused 
liberalism (as articulated by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas) and secularism of being dualistic. 
According to Clemenger, liberalism operates on the assumption that people are able to, and indeed 
should, separate themselves from their attachments to their family, culture, and religion when they 
participate in the public sphere (2003, 159). This is impossible, he maintained, because faith impacts 
all aspects of life. As he argued in Faith Today, the gospel message of redemption impacts the whole 
                                                     
150 There is a suggestion of the Kuyperian notion of sphere sovereignty in this argument, as the principle 
assumes the state does not generally interfere in the differentiated social spheres. 
151 Clemenger’s strongest statement about evangelical commitment to dialogue and common life rather than 
imposing their values may be found in the March/April 2008 issue of Faith Today in which he wrote: “We may 
also remind ourselves that our ultimate task as Christians is to engage our neighbours in a way that opens up 
conversation rather than closes it down, to listen carefully, to find common ground where we can and to offer 
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person as faith influences both private and public relationships as well as one’s behaviour. One’s 
interactions with others, he insisted, are never religiously neutral, and therefore privatizing religion 
does not yield a naked public square (2004d, 14).152 Clemenger emphasized this public dimension of 
faith. 
Clemenger’s purpose for mobilizing evangelical political engagement was broader than Stiller’s 
desire to be “at the table” as he encouraged evangelicals to participate in civil society. More 
specifically, he called evangelicals to become involved with the process of defining the “Canadian 
values” identified in the Charter. Given that Clemenger considered liberalism a religious worldview 
and that liberalism informs the Charter, Clemenger feared that liberalism was the only worldview 
informing the interpretation of such Charter values as life, liberty, and security (2003, 168).153 He was 
particularly concerned about the definition of tolerance he saw emerging in the Canadian public and 
legal system. He perceived it to be a definition that incorporated not only the recognition of difference 
but also the affirmation and indeed celebration of difference and individual choice (156-57, 167-
168).154 Clemenger linked this notion of tolerance with the “secularist creed” or “secular 
fundamentalism” that labels as intolerant those who do not view choice and individual autonomy as 
the highest public virtues (2005c, 14). By using the term “secular fundamentalist,” Clemenger 
appeared to suggest that the struggle against secularism was not against all secularists, but against the 
fundamentalists who were intent on privatizing religion in the name of tolerance. If this was indeed 
the case, it represented a further refinement of the manner in which the EFC portrayed secularism. At 
the same time, however, the term “secular fundamentalist” was a part of the motivational discourse 
intended to help evangelicals understand their culture and thus focus their involvement in public life. 
If secular fundamentalists have their way, Clemenger warned, they will chip away at religious 
freedom, privatize religion, and ensure that the beliefs and behaviour of all Canadians conform to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
up and live out a way of life that is an authentic expression of the gospel that will be both attractive and 
challenging to our neighbours” (Faith Today 2008b, 14).  
152 At the same time, Clemenger called evangelicals to live consistent and integrated lives in which all aspects 
of life are informed by the same worldview. When faith and values are separated from reason and facts, he 
insisted, the result was idolatry and unexamined habits (2006d, 14).  
153 Clemenger’s concern about the interpretation of Charter values was a frequent theme in his columns for 
Faith Today. See 2005e, 14; 2006c, 14; 2007b, 14; 2009b, 14. 
154 Clemenger equated this view of tolerance with what Charles Taylor identifies as the ‘politics of recognition’ 
(2003, 158). For more on Clemenger’s distinction between tolerance as respect for that which one disagrees and 
tolerance as affirming and celebrating difference, see Clemenger 2004b, 14. 
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secular values (2005d). Therefore the term “secularism” remained coded as a negative worldview that 
threatened the Christian foundation of Canadian society.155  
While the target of the discourse of resistance had been narrowed from secularism generally to 
secular fundamentalists, the need for the discourse remained the same: to counteract the forces that 
seek the privatization of religion. To bolster his position, Clemenger insisted that it was distinctly 
Canadian to recognize that religion deserves public expression and cannot be separated from the rest 
of life. He characterized the privatization of religion as found in France and the American 
compartmentalization of society as un-Canadian attempts to limit religious expression in public life 
(2008c).156 At the same time, Clemenger recognized that politicians work out the relationship 
between their personal convictions and political responsibilities in a variety of ways. Some believe 
that they must reflect the majority of their constituents while others apply the judgement of their party 
to the issues. Some vote their conscience while others are dualists who believe that private 
convictions should not impact political decisions. Clemenger did not advise evangelicals to push their 
MPs towards a particular conception of the relationship. In addition, he insisted that churches should 
not choose one candidate or political party over another.157 It is apparent that Clemenger rejected the 
confrontational strategies adopted by the American Religious Right in the 1980s and 1990s, which 
called on evangelicals to support specific candidates, usually Republican, and pressured politicians to 
vote according to specific religious beliefs.158 In order to understand how EFC leaders balanced their 
discourse of resistance with their nuanced definition of secularism and irenic engagement in Canadian 
public life, it is necessary to locate their work within the historical development of various types of 
secularism in the West.    
                                                     
155 However, a number of Supreme Court decisions in the mid-2000s led EFC leaders to change some of their 
language. For example, after the Court allowed Orthodox Jews to construct succahs on their condominium 
balcony, the sub-title of one of Clemenger’s columns in Faith Today read, “Canadians enjoy considerable 
freedom to practise their faith. Do Christians take full advantage?” (Clemenger 2004e, 14).  
156 In fact, neither the French nor the American states enforce radical separation. The French government funds 
religious schools that teach the national curriculum and employ accredited teachers (Seljak 2005, 194-95) and 
American Presidents regularly discuss how their religious faith impacts their values.  
157 Clemenger discussed the role of churches in the public square in a number of his columns in Faith Today. 
See Clemenger 2005f, 14 and 2005g, 14.  
158 Jonathan Malloy argues that while the Canadian political system does not provide the same opportunities to 
pressure individual MPs, it is important not to reduce the differences between Canadian and American 
evangelical political engagement to issues of institutional and resource mobilization (2009, 356). 
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3.2 Contextualizing the EFC’s definition of secularism 
EFC leaders oppose the privatization of religion because they believe that it narrows the public sphere 
and limits the ability of religious groups to participate in public discourse and the development of 
public policy. They are not alone in re-thinking the role of religion in modern secular democracies. 
For example, Casanova rejects the premise that modernization necessarily leads to the privatization of 
religion. Instead, he finds that “privatization is mandated ideologically by liberal categories of 
thought which permeate modern political and constitutional theories” (1994, 39). The extreme form 
of the desire to privatize religion is often referred to as laïcité. Laicists desire to significantly reduce, 
if not eliminate, religious voices from the public sphere. However, EFC leaders do not use the term 
laicism; indeed, they do not make distinctions between any of the various types of secularism 
operative in the West. Their undifferentiated use of the term “secularism” masks the fact that they 
accommodate certain assumptions of a particular type of secularism that is dominant in the West. 
Before we are able to examine the EFC’s interactions with secularism, we must first identify some of 
the types of secularism prevalent in the West and trace their development.  
3.2.1 The emergence of secularisms in the West 
With the collapse of the medieval dualist conception of “this” world, the social spheres differentiated 
and separated themselves from religion. Religion now had to find its place within a secular reality. 
Casanova identifies four developments that undermined the medieval system and aided in the process 
of secularization. The Protestant Reformation played a significant role by destroying the organic 
system created by the Roman Catholic Church and unwittingly liberated the secular spheres from 
domination by the Church. In addition, it legitimated the new “bourgeois man” and entrepreneurial 
classes while supporting the rise of sovereign states and the new science. The other three carriers of 
secularization identified by Casanova include the emergence of modern secular states, with their 
religious tolerance and concomitant commitment to religious neutrality, the rise of capitalism, which 
made the economy the most secular social sphere, and the differentiation of philosophy, theology, and 
science. Although the early English scientists, including Galileo and Newton, posed nature as a 
“separate but equal” way of knowing God, some of their continental peers radicalized science and 
became “militantly antireligious,” particularly in Lutheran and Catholic countries (21-24). 
The role of the Protestant Reformation in the process of secularization has attracted the attention of 
many scholars. One of the earliest theorists to examine the impact of the Reformation on 
 
 112 
secularization was German sociologist Max Weber, who argued that John Calvin’s doctrine of 
predestination led his followers to seek assurance that they were indeed saved, that they were one of 
the elect. According to Weber, Calvin transformed Luther’s understanding of calling into a “moral 
justification of worldly activity” (81).159 Eventually his followers came to believe that one’s faith was 
evidenced in one’s worldly activity (1958a, 121), and thus good works became the conviction of 
salvation (115). For Weber, this justification of worldly activity, combined with the Calvinist/Puritan 
ascetic lifestyle and rationalization160 of daily life, contributed to the development of capitalism and 
modernization. With regard to secularization, Weber believed that the Calvinist focus on “action in 
this world” devalued magic and the sacraments as means of grace and resulted in “the disenchantment 
of the world” (1958b, 290). For examples he pointed to the manner in which Puritans suppressed both 
rituals (1958a, 105) and the mystical (123)161 and argued that the resulting “ascetic Protestantism” 
helped impel the emerging economic and political processes in a specific direction.  
Weber’s thesis led other scholars to further investigate the origins and development of secularism. 
Given that the four carriers of secularism identified by Casanova impacted countries differently and at 
different times, there were a variety of secularization processes. As a result, European countries and 
their former colonies developed a diverse array of relationships between the church and the state and 
between religion and politics. David Martin categorized the different types of relationships in A 
General Theory of Secularization (1978), basing his categories on whether a country was 
predominantly Catholic or Protestant, whether or not it had a religious monopoly, and whether its 
societal conflict originated from internal or external oppressors (17). For example, Martin claimed 
that in countries with a Catholic monopoly, society tended to split between internal forces who were 
militantly religious and those who were militantly secular. As a result of these struggles a rabid anti-
clericalism developed, the Church moved to the political right, and confessional political parties 
                                                     
159 Marshall studied Weber’s linkage of the notion of calling with the development of the Protestant work ethic 
and capitalism in his PhD dissertation, which he later re-worked into a book. After examining the development 
of Puritan and Anglican views of calling, Marshall concluded that although there was a relationship between the 
Puritan notion of calling and the rise of capitalism, Weber incorrectly attributed Puritan thinking on the subject 
to Calvin’s notion of predestination (1996a, 99-101).  
160 For Weber, the rationalization of the economy and daily life referred to the process of basing social actions 
upon efficiency or calculation. Law and administration are important structures of rationalism and essential for 
capitalism (1958a, 25). 
161 Sociologist Steve Bruce, a proponent of the secularization theory, also argues that Judaism and Christianity 
hastened the rationalization of religion. “By having only one God, they simplified the supernatural and allowed 
the worship of God to be systematized. Pleasing God became less a matter of trying to anticipate the whims of 
an erratic force and more a matter of correct ethical behaviour” (1998, 10).  
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appeared (19, 36-41). However, in countries where Catholicism represented an oppressed culture 
struggling against outside rule, as in Poland under Soviet rule, the Church was more tolerant of 
minorities and anti-clericalism did not emerge (18-19). In these instances the Church tended to the 
political centre or, in some cases, the left (19-20, 44) 
In contrast, Martin found that the Protestant churches in Germany, the Netherlands, and England 
generally accepted the changes wrought by modernity, in large part because they subordinated the 
church to the state and promoted individualism (1978, 37).162 In addition, Protestant societies 
advanced various forms of religious pluralism: “segmented pluralism” where rival established 
churches have their own territorial concentrations; “qualified pluralism,” characterized by a state 
church that is associated with the elite and faces dissent from alternative churches associated with the 
lower classes; and “complete pluralism” as found in the US, where all religions compete with each 
other in the absence of an established church (56-57). According to Martin, Protestant states avoided 
the Enlightenment anti-clericalism found in many of the Catholic-dominated European countries 
because they engaged in political compromises and government by consensus (49).  
Given these historical events and developments, Martin proposed eight patterns of secularization. 
The American pattern has high levels of religious pluralism and low levels of anti-clericalism, a 
stable democracy, a “religiously toned” civil religion, no religious parties, and no established church. 
The English pattern has a medium level of religious pluralism given its established church coupled 
with low levels of anti-clericalism, a stable democracy, a religiously toned civil religion, and the 
absence of religious parties.163 The Scandinavian model has a low level of religious pluralism given 
continued established churches, medium levels of anti-clericalism, a civil religion informed by 
secularism, and minor religious political parties. The Mixed pattern evidences high religious 
pluralism, low levels of anti-clericalism, a stable democracy, a religiously toned civil religion and 
influential religious political parties. The Latin pattern has low religious pluralism, high levels of anti-
clericalism, a less stable democracy, continuing conflicts between church and state, and influential 
religious parties. Other patterns include the Right Statist, Left statist, and Nationalist patterns, all with 
low levels of religious pluralism (1978, 59).  
                                                     
162 Indeed, Martin observes that “the Protestant political pressure is always weaker than the Catholics because 
the Protestants are more coextensive with state-bearing semi-secularist elements and because Protestantism is 
too atomized to achieve disciplined political expression” (1978, 74).  
163 Canada falls between the American and English pattern. Although there is no established church in Canada 
as in England, there is less religious pluralism than in the US. For more, see Martin (2000) and O’Toole (2000). 
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Veit Bader builds on Martin’s patterns when he argues against those who view an American-style 
constitutional separation between the church and the state as an irresistible modern trend. He makes 
four observations about the relationship between the state and religion in modern societies. First, 
differentiation is possible in a variety of legal forms, from constitutional non-establishment clauses to 
the weak establishment of a church. Second, institutional differentiation occurs in degrees and does 
not occur as a package. Third, non-establishment clauses do not indicate a separation between the 
state and religion as there are a number of social and political institutions that interact with religion, 
such as political society, civil society, and culture. In addition, there are different types of 
establishment or disestablishment within a society. For example, in nineteenth-century America, 
Protestantism operated as a civil religion despite the legal separation of church and state. In some 
states where there is no established church, there are religious political parties. This point is related to 
Bader’s final observation that the relationship between states and religions cannot be reduced to 
dualistic schemes. Instead, states interact with religion on a variety of dimensions, including their 
constitutional, legal, and legislative regulations of religion and their administrative interference. 
Bader reminds us that legal recognition is different from political and/or administrative recognition 
and that legal recognition does not necessarily imply actual protection. He points out that states are 
not monolithic and their different branches and departments do not always have the same goals, 
policies, and objectives. In addition, the states’ regulation of religion extends to a variety of spheres, 
such as education, welfare, health care, and employment (2003a, 60-64). 
The overarching conclusion of this sociological work is that the process of secularization can take a 
variety of paths. Indeed, there are many types of relationships between the state and religion, even 
within modern liberal democracies. Some, including Canada, grant religious organizations such legal 
and/or administrative privileges as exemptions from some taxes, military service, and laws while 
others do not. Some provide subsidies to religious organizations for their work in education or 
charitable activities while others draw a stricter line between state and religion. In addition, liberal 
states interpret religious freedoms in different ways. In terms of concrete examples, the situation of 
religion in France and the US is instructive. France is laicist in that it maintains a secular ideology or 
“personality,”164 banning overtly religious symbols from such public institutions as public schools. 
The US Constitution has a non-establishment clause but its public ethos was largely Christian until 
after World War Two. 
                                                     
164 The term “personality” is taken from Asad and its significance is elaborated in the next two sub-sections. 
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In her study of secularism Hurd defines the laicism found in such countries as France as “an 
authoritative public morality based in a singular conception of reason” (2008, 26). Laicists view 
public references to theology or ecclesiastical involvement in the public square as dangerous, and 
therefore they attempt to exclude religion from power and authority (26, 29). Writing in the American 
context, Wilfred McClay describes this type of secularism as “positive” secularism, which establishes 
unbelief and restricts religion to the private sphere.165 In their embrace of self-mastery, positive 
secularists feel obliged to dispel what they perceive to be damaging misperceptions among the public, 
particularly religious misperceptions, and thereby free people from the grip of priests and 
televangelists. Such liberation, they believe, enables people “to discover their ‘true selves,’ and help 
them along in the direction of greater and greater ‘autonomy’” (2000, 67). McClay alternatively 
defines this type of secularism as militant or establishmentarian secularism (65). It is this type of 
secularism that the EFC rejects. 
In contrast, those whom McClay identifies as promoters of “negative” secularism desire an anti-
theocratic secular state that is nevertheless compatible with religious freedom. Such a state is not anti-
religious, and “the secular idiom is merely a provisional lingua franca that serves to facilitate 
commerce among different kinds of belief” (2000, 63). In this view of secularism religion is not 
privatized. Instead, it is seen as a social institution, meaning that the freedom to associate and form 
moral communities is of critical importance. As McClay observes, “pluralism is a necessary 
concomitant of liberalism, precisely because we are social creatures, whose social existence is a prior 
condition to all else that we value” (64). Within such a pluralist state, religions that wish to operate in 
the public sphere must respect those outside of their particular tradition as well as accommodate “the 
world.” For Christians, such accommodation is not a compromise of faith, McClay contends, because 
their faith affirms the world. For example, they believe that God created the world and despite sin, it 
remains endowed with beauty and intelligence. Since all people are created in the imago Dei, they 
benefit from common grace and deserve respect (68-69). McClay argues that negative secularism 
recognizes the need to protect the individual person against a view of liberty that includes “the 
sovereign right to do whatever one wants with the human body and mind, including the 
comprehensive genetic or pharmacological refashioning of both” (70). Such limits can be found, he 
maintains, in the Judeo-Christian principle of the imago Dei. 
                                                     
165 McClay draws his labels from Isaiah Berlin’s identification of positive and negative freedoms. 
 
 116 
Given the wide array of types of secularism, it is necessary to evaluate more closely the EFC’s 
definitions of, and interactions with, secularism. It is especially important to examine its 
undifferentiated use of the term “secular.” That is the subject to which we now turn. 
3.2.2 Analyzing the EFC’s interactions with secularism 
Clearly EFC leaders rejected laicism, interpreted as the privatization of religion, although they never 
actually used the term. Instead, they employed the term “secularism” in an undifferentiated manner to 
denote the desire to privatize religion. One explanation is that they simply did not make the 
intellectual distinction between different types of secularism.166 If this was the case, they were not 
unique. As Casanova observed in 1994, classical forms of the secularization theory conflated the 
differentiation of the social spheres with the premise that religion inevitably declines in modern 
countries and the liberal desire to private religion.  
Another explanation may be found in McClay’s suggestion that there can be no evangelical 
counterculture without a secularist enemy. For McClay, the identification of secularism as the enemy 
provides the glue that holds socially conservative ecumenical coalitions together (2000, 59). This 
identification can be seen in the work of the EFC; indeed, the organization’s opposition to secularism-
as-laicism was part of its raison d’être. Its leaders defined secularism in laicist terms and charged that 
laicism must be rejected because it limited religious associations from having a voice at the table and 
influencing public policy. Their identification of secularism as a key cause for the societal drift away 
from traditional Christian values was an instrumental factor in their efforts to politically mobilize 
evangelicals. In this manner it was beneficial for EFC leaders to use the term “secularism” in an 
undifferentiated manner.  
Yet at the same time as EFC leaders decried laicism, they accommodated the type of secularism 
McClay calls “negative” secularism. They supported a non-theocratic and differentiated state that was 
to protect religious freedom and enable greater pluralism. Indeed, the Kuyperian neo-Calvinism so 
                                                     
166 Clemenger recognizes that there are various accounts of secularism. In 2009 he advised his readers who want 
to know more about secularism to consult specific works by Charles Taylor and David Martin. See Clemenger’s 
article in Church and Faith Trends entitled “Evangelicalism and the advancement of religion,” January 2009, 
available online at http://files.efc-canada.net/min/rc/cft/V02I02/Evangelicalism_Advancement_of_ Religion.pdf 
(accessed January 1, 2011). Occasionally writers in Faith Today referred to secularism in a more differentiated 
manner. For example, Stackhouse noted that there is no “great divide” between religious believers and the 
secularists who oppose them. Rather, there are many divides as those who self-identify as secular are an 
internally diverse group and some of them actively support religious freedom on some issues (2010, 54). 
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influential among various EFC leaders assumes differentiation.167 As a result, EFC leaders spent 
significant resources on issues of religious freedom. They sought to expand the public sphere so that a 
variety of groups, including secular ones, could participate. In addition, they lobbied for increased 
public space for religious associations and individuals to practice and express their beliefs as well as 
their right to be “at the table.”  
In their public writings EFC leaders typically struck a balance between resisting the privatization of 
religion, advocating for pluralism, and accommodating a version of secularism that acknowledged the 
differentiation of the church and state. However, the balance was sometimes lost in their fundraising 
letters. Stackhouse observed this tension and in 1995 he wrote: 
   The Evangelical Fellowship of Canada … bemoaned the erosion of 
the marks of Christianity on society. The EFC, however, did not 
reflect the ‘insider-become-outsider’ ambivalence of American 
evangelicalism. In its more reflective and detailed publications, it 
generally refused to sound proprietorial about Canadian society, 
eschewing a parallel rhetoric of a ‘Christian Canada’ in favor of an 
explicit acceptance of a pluralized culture. … Its fundraising 
literature, however, frequently flirted with this theme, especially in 
terms of the ‘erosion’ of the ‘presence’ of Christianity in the culture, 
and it was clear that by the early 1990s, at least, the EFC had not 
fully resolved this tension in its identity. (1995b, 176)168 
The fact that its fundraising appeals did not lend themselves to nuanced analysis should come as no 
surprise since the purpose of the letters was to raise money, not educate the membership. 
Furthermore, the EFC’s use of a “discourse of loss” was not unusual for a Christian group struggling 
to address and come to terms with the de-Christianization of Canadian society.169 Stackhouse’s 
observations are important for other reasons. First, he distinguished EFC leaders from their American 
counterparts by noting their acceptance of religious diversity and pluralism. Second, the last sentence 
                                                     
167 As Chaplin writes, Kuyper and Dooyeweerd viewed differentiation “as an expression of the historical 
unfolding of our many-sided divine callings” (2004, 3). He acknowledges that such a view reads the biblical 
story through a modern, Western interpretation of history. In addition, he highlights some problems that result 
from differentiation, such as the social inequality that arises from the concentration of economics in the market. 
168 Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox note the same phenomena in the American Christian Right. “Although 
conservative Christian leaders emphasize the importance of appealing politically to the mainstream, these 
leaders communicate in a different language when talking to each other or to activists. To mobilize the 
grassroots activists requires pushing their hot buttons.” See their article entitled “Second coming: The strategies 
of the New Christian Right,” Political Science Quarterly (111 [2], 1996) 290. 
169 Bramadat and Seljak use the term “discourse of loss” to refer to the manner in which some Christians and 
denominations view the loss of power historically enjoyed by Christians in Canada (2008, 15).  
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reflects an earlier conclusion drawn by Stackhouse that evangelicals were undecided about whether to 
work to make Canada as Christian as possible or create a more open pluralism. Despite this 
indecision, however, Stackhouse portrayed EFC leaders as playing “by the rules of Canadian public 
discourse” by being civil and presenting their arguments cogently (1993b, 171). Third, the theme of 
loss of Christian cultural dominance was common among American evangelicals (Jelen 1993, 179) 
and may have influenced EFC leaders. 
In the 15 years following Stackhouse’s observations, the language of loss and fear continued in 
various fundraising appeals. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, EFC leaders became increasingly 
concerned with the public portrayal of faith as intolerant and with some Supreme Court decisions 
that, in their view, limited the freedom of religious adherents to publicly practice their beliefs (EFC 
2003a, 3). Some of the fundraising letters included Niemöller’s poem that warns against the dangers 
of silence in the face of oppression and injustice. For Stiller, the significance of the poem was that it 
cautions those living in countries with a Christian heritage against complacency (Stiller 2003, 35). As 
with so much that Stiller did when he was the EFC’s president, he used the poem to mobilize the base 
to political action against secularism. 
Clemenger used Niemöller’s poem in his appeal to raise funds for the EFC’s involvement in the 
Hutterian Brethren case. When the Alberta government required photo identification on all provincial 
driver’s licenses in an effort to protect Albertans against identity theft, members of the Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony refused to comply because they believe having their picture taken violates 
the second of God’s commandments, which prohibits the making of “graven images.”170 EFC leaders 
decided to intervene in the case because it raised the possibility of governments ordering religious 
communities to change their articles of faith that do not comply with governmental regulations. As 
Clemenger wrote in his fundraising letter, “if we cannot accommodate religious communities that 
pose no threat, break no law and which seek to live out their faith in peace and integrity, then our 
religious freedoms are fleeting indeed” (2008d). Clemenger titled his appeal “Religious freedom 
under attack again” and included Niemöller’s poem. While the comparison of secularists with Nazis 
was not very nuanced, it was an element of the discourse of resistance used to mobilize the base. 
However, in coding everything secular as bad, Clemenger did not acknowledge the fact that the EFC 
accepts a type of secularism that acknowledges the state as differentiated and adopts such elements of 
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liberalism as pluralism and religious tolerance. In a sense, the need to raise money reduced the ability 
of EFC leaders to delineate the different types of secularism with which they interacted. 
The last task in this chapter is to evaluate the political implications of the EFC’s accommodation of 
negative secularism and its positive conception of the state. As EFC leaders seek a place “at the 
table,” they are challenging the liberal secular desire to privatize religion. For Talal Asad, however, 
there are political implications to being at the table, not least of all the encounter of participants with 
the power of the state to structure social spaces in an effort to create certain types of citizens. While 
not everyone may agree with Asad’s interpretation of the state, his concern about the degree to which 
secular liberal states require political subjects to subordinate their religious beliefs and practices to 
political ends is relevant for EFC leaders.   
3.3 Political implications of being “at the table” in a secular liberal state 
When the EFC enters the public square, it does so as a Protestant organization. For Asad, the 
Christian religion is part of the landscape of power in the West. As he observes, “Christianity is 
regarded as a central tradition in ‘the West,’ even for atheists, and the constant reinterpretation of its 
history is part of what ‘the modern West’ is about” (Scott 2006, 282). In this context the term 
“power” does not denote the ability to use force in order to impose one’s views on others. Rather, 
power for Asad is “a kind of fit between the individual’s ability and all the practical conditions that 
have helped shape her desire and exercised it in a particular way” (Asad 2006, 213). Power is having 
the ability to determine what is and is not knowledge and, in Hurd’s words, to pre-structure public 
discourse and practice about both religion and politics (2008, 24). It is the ability to establish the 
“normal” against which other religions are measured. Hurd believes that both laicists and what she 
terms “Judeo-Christian” secularists (similar to the “negative” secularism described by McClay) have 
this power in Western societies in that their conceptions of religion and its role in society are 
considered normative.171 She claims that laicism and Judeo-Christian secularism are historically 
contingent and “forms of authorized knowledge that emerged out of the contested theopolitics of 
Latin Christendom and rely upon particular assumptions about the secular and the religious” (33). 
                                                                                                                                                                    
170 The majority of the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the province. See Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567. Available online at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/ 
2009/2009scc37/ 2009scc37.html (accessed February 21, 2011). 
171 Hurd contends that as Judeo-Christian secularism continues to portray Islam as a threat to the religious, 
moral, and cultural foundations of the Western world, it is involved with power. Therefore religion is by no 
means personal and private (2008, 47). 
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Any Christian organization, then, that participates in the public sphere in a Western country engages 
with power. This is particularly true of Christian organizations that interact with secularism and 
mobilize around the legal and political protection of religious freedom.   
 During Stiller’s early years at the EFC, the desire for access to the “table” was at times overtly 
linked with political power, as seen in some early advertisements in Faith Today that urged 
evangelicals to join the EFC and publicly voice their response to Canada’s “moral and social 
climate,” a climate presumably understood to be lacking in virtue. One ad featured a picture of Stiller 
with then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. The words under the picture read, “Brian Stiller, Executive 
Director of EFC, represents the concerns of its members to the highest level of government” (Faith 
Today 1986a, 71).172 The message was that Stiller had access to political power and could get the job 
done. Such ads quickly disappeared as the EFC intentionally became more non-partisan and over time 
the discourse centred on asking the state to be properly pluralist by protecting religious freedom and 
enabling groups to live according to their beliefs. 
The stance taken by EFC leaders to “be at the table” accords well with the liberal elevation of the 
state as well as the Kuyperian neo-Calvinist desire to reform the state but less so with the historic 
Anabaptist distrust of the state. In Kuyperian thought the state is viewed as the institution that, among 
other things, promotes public justice, meaning that it protects the sovereignty of each social sphere to 
operate according to its own inner authority without oppression from other spheres. Another factor 
that pushes EFC leaders to hold a high view of the state is the influence of Canadian political culture, 
which views the state in generally positive terms and is more open to an interventionist state than 
American political culture. Yet another possible explanation is the increased role of the courts since 
the introduction of the Charter in 1982. Indeed, the courts now adjudicate between the different 
factions of religious associations and institutions fractured by disagreements about same-sex marriage 
(Stackhouse 2010, 54). 
The high level of engagement that EFC leaders have with the state begs the question of what they 
view as the purpose of gaining a seat at the table. They must answer the same question José Casanova 
                                                     
172 Also in 1986, the EFC printed a picture of Stiller and Paul Marshall with MP Benno Friesen and Prime 
Minister Mulroney. According to the account in Faith Today, “Stiller was invited to meet with Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney” to share the EFC’s concerns about government proposals to include the issue of “sexual 
orientation” in the federal government’s Human Rights Act (Faith Today 1986b, 52). The magazine recorded 
another meeting between Stiller and the Prime Minister in 1992 during the unity debate when EFC leaders 
helped write a preamble to the proposed new Constitution (Faith Today 1992, 30). 
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posed for the US Religious Right. Writing in 1994 when the Religious Right enjoyed significant 
influence in the Republican Party, Casanova remarked that “if all they wanted was inclusion and 
recognition, they have earned it.” However, for Casanova the greater issue was “now that they have a 
seat in the republican banquet on equal terms with all the other guests, what are they going to do with 
their voice” (1994, 165). Indeed, EFC leaders want more than inclusion. They work to deprivatize 
religion, protect religious freedom, and have public policy reflect the Christian principles that they 
believe best protects human dignity. The last point suggests a desire for some degree of Christian 
cultural establishment. To develop this idea, we need to return to the work of Asad. 
Having grown up in the Middle East and possessing detailed knowledge of Muslim conceptions of 
the relationship between the church and the state, Asad challenges the liberal relegation of religion to 
the private sphere, albeit from a different perspective than the EFC. The key issue for Asad is “what 
conception of religion makes our secular moral and political practices possible?” (1999, 192-93). In 
response to the question, he outlines the Christian influence on Western secularism, especially its 
conception of secularism as the separation between church and state. In his opinion, Christianity 
shapes modern Western conceptions of secularism that portrays the state rather benignly and hides its 
power and willingness to use that power to enforce particular conceptions of the human person, 
religion, the state, and secularism. For Asad, then, power is inherent in definitions as they impact not 
only public policy but the “personality” of a state and its citizens. 
Therefore Asad does not interpret secularism as the separation of church and state, or religion and 
politics, nor as a religiously neutral state (Asia Society 2002, 2).173 Instead, he defines secularism as 
“an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends 
particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, gender, and 
religion” (Asad 2003, 5, italics in original). For Asad, then, secularism is revealed in a particular type 
of state that defines the nature of its citizens by the degree to which they agree with the fundamental 
values that the state identifies (2006, 219). Difference, including religious difference, is taken out of 
the public or political sphere and shunted into the private sphere. The state is then positioned as the 
institution that transcends difference and provides identity to those within its borders. A type of 
homogeneity is enforced as the state regulates “normality” (2003, 5, 123) and calls for religious 
                                                     
173 If this was an accurate description of secularism, Asad contends, then secular states would accord religion 
more or less the same amount and type of space. However, this is not the case as France and the US, both 
secular states, define religion differently and provide different types of political space for religious adherents 
(Asia Source 2002, 2). 
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toleration. Ultimately, the concept of religious tolerance is a political tool used by the state to increase 
its power and remove morality from the political realm. The result is the subordination of religion to 
the state (1993, 206). Asad believes that Western governments are secular in this fashion and 
therefore he identifies the state as a significant threat to the freedom of religious expression and 
practice. 
Asad’s basic argument is two-fold. First, secularism is a political project whereby the state defines 
and regulates religion, promotes a way of life, and forges a national personality. Second, this political 
project is undergirded by the dominant religion. When EFC leaders interpret secularism as laicism, 
they do not acknowledge the degree to which Christianity remains a part of the Canadian personality 
and is the foundation for much of Canada’s legal code, political structure, and culture. As Bramadat 
and Seljak note, there are “subtle networks of power in which Canadian Christianity is embedded,” 
such as various legal guarantees of funding for Roman Catholic schools (2008a, 29, 43n44). The 
interpretation of secularism as laicism, then, masks the continuation of Christian privilege in 
Canadian law, politics, and culture.174 Clemenger is somewhat aware of the issue as he wrote in 2003 
that Christians are grappling with “the appropriate place and influence of a dominant religion in a 
pluralist society” (2003, 172). However, there is no significant attempt in subsequent EFC literature 
to help evangelicals think through the issue.  
As described in chapter 1, there has indeed been a close relationship between the state and the 
Christian church in Canadian history. One implication of this relationship is that some Christian 
groups, including many evangelicals, have not critically engaged the state and its power.175 Yet it is 
precisely the state’s vast array of powers that makes Asad uncomfortable with religious groups using 
the state to advance an agenda, moral or otherwise. He believes that it is difficult for religious groups 
operating in modern liberal states to do little else but reinforce the state because the latter legislates 
every aspect of both public and private life. Especially worrisome for Asad is the degree to which the 
state controls most, if not all, interpersonal relations. Such “juridification” of life, he claims, 
“constrains the scope for moral suasion in public culture” (1999, 181), including the ability of 
religious organizations to persuade fellow citizens of the superiority of their values and beliefs. Asad 
suggests that when religious movements encounter the reality of moral heterogeneity and discover 
                                                     
174 For a summary of how Christianity remains privileged in Canadian society, see Bramadat and Seljak (2008, 
13). 
175 One group that resisted the state and did not champion a close church-state relationship in early Canadian 
history was the Mennonites (Bramadat and Seljak 2008, 38n5). 
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that they are unable to persuade others, they are easily reduced to emulating secular politicians who 
manipulate citizens by propaganda or mobilize them on the basis of their desires or fears (2003, 187; 
Chatterjee 2006, 59). In essence, deprivatized religious actors who desire a public presence must “act 
as secular practitioners do in liberal democracies” (Asad 2003, 187). This includes developing public 
liberal discourse and playing “by the rules” created by secular liberals. As Stanley Fish observes: “If 
you persuade liberalism that its dismissive marginalizing of religious discourse is a violation of its 
own chief principle [of toleration], all you will gain is the right to sit down at liberalism’s table where 
before you were denied an invitation; but it will still be liberalism’s table that you are sitting at, and 
the etiquette of the conversation will still be hers” (1996, 6, italics in original).176 While the EFC 
desires to change the composition of the guests at the table by insisting that religious voices must be 
present, it does not significantly question the power of those who set the table and decide the menu.  
In his study of Christianity and American Democracy, Hugh Heclo reflects the same concerns 
about the engagement of Christians in the American public sphere. He observes that thoughtful 
Christians who engage in politics in order to derive “a reasoned public ethic” (2007, 135) face 
“insuperable” barriers as they come to realize “that engagement in the ‘public square’ must invariably 
take place on the terms set by America’s modern political arena for a so-called democratic discourse. 
This arena and its rules are not designed to search for truth or to compare rational ‘deliberative 
justifications.’ It is a sophisticated, cynical game designed to manipulate imagery and opinion” (136). 
Heclo concludes that while American Christianity contributed positively to the development of 
American democracy, American democracy negatively influenced Christianity (79). This American 
experience suggests that engagement in the public square runs the risk of secular politicians 
manipulating religious groups and adherents. 
Another implication of the EFC’s interpretation of secularism as laicism is that the organization’s 
leaders do not focus on the most secular of all spheres, the economy. The emphasis on politics and 
securing the rights of religious freedom means that EFC leaders do not critically engage the norms 
operative in the market. While Clemenger suggests that the lack of an evangelical political strategy to 
address poverty is due to the different conceptions of the role of the state held by evangelicals (2003, 
172) (the EFC did create a roundtable of poverty and homelessness in 2003), it is equally possible 
                                                     
176 As Heclo puts it, “the by-product of this equal-seat-at-the-table doctrine has been to confirm religion’s place 
as simply another set of private personal preferences” (2007, 91). 
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that evangelicals disagree about the degree to which they are willing to critique the market.177  All 
social groups run the risk of being manipulated by specific political and economic interests. The issue 
for evangelicals who hold socially conservative views but do not critique the market is that political 
and economic actors who desire a more unregulated market may use socially conservative language 
in an attempt to solicit evangelical political support. For instance, research suggests that there is a 
new alignment between evangelicals and the Conservative Party. Now that the Party has a majority 
government, it remains to be seen whether those in the Party who desire a freer market are willing to 
enact the type of social policy wanted by evangelicals.178  
The point of this section is not to argue that the EFC should not be engaged in the public sphere or 
that the EFC must adopt Asad’s conception of the state. Rather, it is to suggest that the EFC engages 
in a public sphere that is formed by power, and some of that power is undergirded by Christianity. If 
Asad is correct, organizations that participate in the public sphere participate in, perpetuate, contest, 
or reconfigure power. Like any politically engaged organization, then, the EFC interacts with the state 
and is in turn impacted by the state. The following chapters explore how the EFC navigated through 
this challenge as its leaders engaged in specific issues. Chapter 4 studies how they developed a model 
of political engagement in the “life” issues of abortion, euthanasia, and reproductive technologies. 
Chapter 5 examines their efforts to protect religious freedom while chapter 6 traces how they 
participated in the public debates about the definitions of marriage and the family. The point of such 
studies is to investigate the manner in which the EFC interacted with the power of the modern secular 
liberal state and whether these interactions in turn impacted the manner in which its leaders 
participated in the public sphere.  
3.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter I outlined the development of the EFC’s definition of secularism. Initially Stiller 
adopted the dualistic conceptualization of secularism propounded by Schaeffer, but by the early 
                                                     
177 It is instructive to compare the EFC on this point with Citizens for Public Justice (CPJ), another organization 
with deep roots in Kuyperian neo-Calvinism. CPJ links human dignity with economic equity and critiques the 
infatuation with growth that underlines the market economy. In one of its publications Gerald Vandezande 
discusses the “idols” of the marketplace and argues that when Christians submit “to the dominant ideology of 
the marketplace,” justice and faithfulness are squeezed out of the political dialogue. See Vandezande, 
“Challenges: Political action in an era of budget cuts, what faith communities can do about poverty” 
(Vandezande, 1996), 4. 
178 This will be a difficult issue for the Conservative Party given the differences of social and economic policies 
present in its two founding parties, the Progressive Conservatives and the Alliance. 
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1990s he employed the concept of pluralism to advocate for a public role for religion. Nevertheless, 
the term “secularism” remained coded in negative terms and functioned as a tool to mobilize 
evangelicals to political engagement. Clemenger further refined the definition by distinguishing 
between a secular and a secularist state. He contended that while evangelicals were comfortable with 
the separation of church and state, they could not abide the secularist argument that religion must be 
privatized in order to protect public peace. Even so, he and other EFC leaders continued to use the 
term “secular” in an undifferentiated manner in order to rally the base, especially in their fundraising 
letters. Coding secularism as bad masked the EFC’s accommodation of a type of secularism that 
differentiated the church and the state but assumed that the state would promote religious pluralism.  
One of the ways that the EFC contested secularism-as-laicism was to reject the privatization of 
religion. Rather than privatize religion, it insisted that religious voices should be present at the table 
where decisions about public policy are made. However, Asad argues that being at the table has 
political and perhaps religious implications as the table is dominated by liberal principles and state 
power. The state may, and for Asad often does, use its power to control public discourse and social 
space in an effort to create a national personality and a type of citizen. Asad is concerned that 
politically engaged “public” religions may have to participate in the public sphere in a manner that 








Developing a model for political engagement 
When Henry Morgentaler received the order of Canada in 2008, many evangelicals and Roman 
Catholics voiced their disapproval. Morgentaler had spent much of his career as a medical doctor 
challenging the 1969 abortion law that considered abortions to be medical procedures under the 
control of doctors and hospital boards. In violation of the law, Morgentaler opened abortion clinics, 
first in Montreal in 1969 and then in other cities outside Quebec. After a series of arrests and trials in 
Quebec and Ontario, he eventually appeared before the Supreme Court of Canada. On January 28, 
1988, the Court struck down the section of the Criminal Code limiting access to abortion because it 
infringed on Charter rights and was unequally applied throughout the country.179 Nevertheless, the 
Court recognized that the state had an interest in protecting the fetus, prompting the federal 
government to draft new legislation. The subsequent public debate propelled evangelicals into politics 
with a fervour not exhibited since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when they lobbied 
for temperance and Sabbath day observance. Many evangelical and Catholic organizations, including 
the EFC, framed the issue of abortion within the contexts of the common good and the imago Dei. 
To provide a context and interpretive framework for understanding the nature of the EFC’s political 
engagement in the secular public sphere, I employ the work of José Casanova, who studied the re-
emergence of religious voices in the public square of various Western countries during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. In his book Public Religions in the Modern World (1994), Casanova disagreed with 
those social scientists who argued that the differentiation of society, the modern process by which the 
“secular” spheres of the state and the economy become separated from religion, necessarily leads to 
the decline and the privatization of religion (19-20). Instead, Casanova posited that the process of 
secularization is neither linear nor irreversible, as seen in the renewed political activism of the Roman 
Catholic Church since Vatican II. He lauded Catholic leaders for assuming “the vacant role of 
spokesperson for humanity, for the sacred dignity of the human person, for world peace, and for a 
more fair division of labor and power in the world system” (1997, 133) and coined the term 
“deprivatization” to refer to those religious traditions that refuse to be relegated to the private and 
                                                     
179 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988], 1 S.C.R. 30. Available online at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1988/ 
1988canlii90/1988canlii90.html (accessed February 19, 2011). 
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individual spheres of life as mandated by liberalism and theories of modernism.180 It is my argument 
that the EFC participated in the public sphere in a similar manner as the deprivatized religions 
described by Casanova.   
This chapter explores how the EFC advanced a model of political engagement in its interventions 
in the “life” issues of abortion, euthanasia, and reproductive technologies. Although its emphasis on 
the moral aspects of these issues reflects the concerns of many evangelicals around the world, the 
approach tends to ignore the manner in which the market may also harm human life and dignity. 
Nevertheless, the EFC developed its model of political engagement as it interacted with these issues, 
especially during the abortion debate. While the imago Dei principle provided the theological 
foundation for this model, the development of a pragmatic approach to politics that stressed 
incremental change, the common good,181 ecumenism,182 pluralism, and persuasion was equally 
important. The model was a crucial element of the evangelical identity to which the EFC contributed 
as described in chapter 2 and it helped EFC leaders gain access to the public sphere and a place at 
“the table.” As we will discover in this chapter, the EFC used the same model of mixing the 
theological principle of the imago Dei with pragmatic politics and conceptions of the common good 
in its responses to the issues of doctor-assisted suicide and reproductive technologies. To conclude 
this chapter I draw on the work of Casanova to explain the significance of the EFC’s participation in 
these issues.  
4.1 Abortion 
Although American and Canadian evangelicals became involved in the abortion debate at 
approximately the same time, they were responding to different legal and cultural contexts. In the US, 
the American Supreme Court recognized women’s right to abortion in its landmark 1973 decision in 
                                                     
180 In applying Casanova’s theory to Canada, Stackhouse argues that the term “deprivatization” does not fully 
capture the Canadian reality as the Canadian public sphere was never completely privatized (2000, 123-25). 
181 In 2005 Noll identified the Canadian commitment to “a Catholic-rooted concern for the ‘common good’” as 
an important element of Canadian politics and one of the religious differences that separate Americans and 
Canadians. Quoted in Douglas Todd, “U.S. Religious Right pushing into Canada” in the Vancouver Sun 
(Saturday, July 30, 2005). Available online at http://communities.canada.com/vancouversun/ 
blogs/thesearch/pages/u-s-religious-right-pushing-into-canada.aspx (accessed December 30, 2009). 
182 When Noll participated in an EFC event in 1994, he was struck by the casual treatment of ecclesiastical and 
theological boundaries and the ability of people from different religious traditions, or no tradition, to discuss 
issues in a reasonable manner. In addition, he identified the ability of such different traditions as the Reformed 
and Pentecostals to work together to be quite distinctive in Canada (although it is now also occurring in the US) 
(1997, 12).  
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Roe v. Wade. However, American evangelicals did not mobilize against abortion until the late 1970s, 
when Francis Schaeffer and Dr. C. Everett Koop, who later became Surgeon General in the Reagan 
administration, urgently called them to political engagement in order to defend human life. Schaeffer 
and Koop portrayed abortion in dualistic terms as a struggle between those who viewed human life as 
worthwhile and those who saw it as “expendable raw material.” The latter group, Schaeffer and Koop 
claimed, operated from a “humanist base,” meaning that they derived standards from themselves and 
therefore had “no fixed standards of behaviour, no standards that cannot be eroded or replaced by 
what seems necessary, expedient, or even fashionable” (1979, 16-17). As George Marsden puts it, 
Schaeffer portrayed abortion as an example of “the secular takeover of government to promote an 
anti-Christian or licentious agenda” (2006, 245). Schaeffer counselled evangelicals to get involved in 
politics if they wished to resist such secularism. Although the evangelical community historically 
held a variety of views about abortion, Schaeffer was so successful in constructing what Susan 
Harding calls a “pro-life gospel” that by the end of the 1980s almost all alternative evangelical 
positions were either squashed or had silently disappeared from evangelical discourse (2000, 191).183 
While the Canadian Supreme Court decision on abortion came over a decade after Roe v. Wade, 
Canadian evangelicals began joining the pro-life movement at approximately the same time as their 
American counterparts. While some Canadian Christians had mobilized against access to abortion 
throughout the early twentieth century, the issue became politically charged in the late 1960s when 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau liberalized the abortion law by medicalizing it (O’Leary 1988). In 
response, some Roman Catholics created the pro-life movement in Canada.184 By the late 1970s, 
evangelicals had joined the Catholics, perhaps, as Michael Cuneo suggests, because they were 
                                                     
183 One of the few remaining alternative voices was ethicist Stanley Hauerwas, who challenged the secular 
presuppositions he saw in both the pro-choice and pro-life movements. He dismissed the view that abortion was 
an issue of laws or rights. Christians, he stated, “do not believe that life is a right or that we have inherent 
dignity. Instead, we believe that life is the gift of a gracious God” (1993, 58). Instead of becoming involved in 
debates about when human life starts, he called on Christians to contemplate “what kind of people we are to be 
as the Church and as Christians” (50). The church, he insisted, is to practice hospitality, to be a people and a 
place that welcomes new life, including those born with disabilities. In this manner “the church does not 
translate its message directly into the language of the wider society. Instead, the Church witnesses in its own 
language” (Stallsworth 1993, 118), which is the language of faith, hope, and love, not that of individual rights 
and the sanctity of life. 
184 Michael Cuneo suggests that elements within the laity opposed abortion more strongly than the Catholic 
hierarchy (1989, 35).  
 
 129 
inspired by the political engagement on the issue by their American counterparts (1989, 13).185 
Another possible explanation was the influence of Schaeffer on Canadian evangelical leaders.  
Although the Canadian pro-life movement initially based its arguments on the liberal principle of 
human rights and on scientific data about the development of the fetus, by the early 1980s its 
discourse was more theological (41-42). Cuneo posits the arrival of conservative Protestants as one 
reason for this change in strategy and discourse. Although conservative Protestants at first viewed 
Catholic pro-lifers as co-belligerents of necessity in the struggle to protect the unborn, upon entering 
the pro-life movement they discovered that they shared the same “religious world” as pro-life 
Catholics; that is, they shared conservative doctrine and had similar experiences of estrangement from 
the secular culture. As Cuneo notes, “though they cringed at the ardent Marian piety and 
ultramontanism of grass roots Catholics, conservative Protestants were willing to tolerate certain 
excesses when so much else seemed right” (42). Evangelicals, who comprised the majority of 
conservative Protestants in the movement, discovered that they had more in common with pro-life 
Catholics than Protestants in the mainline churches, although it must be remembered that the mainline 
churches did not have a unified position. For example, the United Church supported women’s right to 
control reproduction while the Presbyterian Church in Canada opposed abortion on demand.186 
Catholic-evangelical cooperation on the issue of abortion led to many other instances of later 
collaboration among some Catholic and evangelical leaders, including opposition to the expansion of 
spousal benefits to homosexual couples and the recognition of same-sex marriage. 
When Stiller assumed the leadership of the EFC in 1983, the organization was already firmly 
ensconced in the pro-life movement, with its emphasis on the sanctity of life. In late 1983, the EFC’s 
General Council adopted an “EFC charter on human life” that affirmed the high value of life, 
recognized that life begins at conception, and acknowledged “the special relationship of all humans to 
God as His image-bearers” (Faith Alive 1983a, 40). In the December 1985/January 1986 issue of 
Faith Today, the EFC published a 14-page exposé about abortion in Canada in which the authors 
noted that abortion profoundly challenged evangelical faith and that “God will judge this present 
generation on how we handle this and other social issues” (O’Leary and Mitchener 1985/1986, 16-
                                                     
185 In 1985, Ken Campbell, an evangelical pastor and founder of Renaissance Canada, launched Choose Life 
Canada for the purpose of bringing more evangelicals into the pro-life movement (Cuneo 1989, 13). A Faith 
Today article noted that a jury acquittal of Morgentaler in Ontario in November, 1984 politicized Campbell 
(O’Leary and Mitchener 1985/1986, 28).   
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17).187 Following Malcolm Muggeridge, the British reporter turned Christian, the authors charged that 
legalized abortion leads the public to devalue human life and view killing as “a private privilege,” 
resulting in euthanasia and genetic engineering on human embryos (25-26). The unstated argument 
was that limits on abortion would protect the common good by defending the rights of the disabled 
and elderly.  
The language of the imago Dei was central in the position paper on abortion adopted by the EFC in 
1987. In the paper the EFC declared that it based its opposition to abortion on the biblical view that 
human beings are created in the image of God. The biblical call to love one’s neighbours and seek 
justice, the paper claimed, required Christians to alleviate human suffering, address exploitation, 
unemployment, pornography, and family breakdown, and protect the security of the unborn and the 
disabled against “social dehumanization” (Faith Today 1988, 38). 
Although EFC leaders firmly believed that the imago Dei principle required them to oppose 
abortion (along with euthanasia, pornography, and prostitution), they also wanted to participate in the 
public sphere in order to influence policy makers. This desire required them to state their opposition 
to abortion in ways that were publicly accessible. Developing this strategy was central to Stiller’s 
work, as he sought a distinctly Canadian response that was more moderate than those espoused by 
many leaders of the American Religious Right at the time.188 For example, in its “Charter on human 
life,” the EFC called on the government to “restrict unnecessary abortions” rather than an outright ban 
on all abortions. The “Charter” also called on the Christian community to extend grace and 
reconciliation to those who suffered from the effects of abortion and those who were pregnant and 
unwed (Faith Alive 1983a, 40). 
Further evidence of the EFC’s moderate position can be found in its refusal to support capital 
punishment. Although the federal government formally abolished capital punishment in 1976, some 
evangelicals lobbied for its return until the late 1980s. While the EFC acknowledged the diversity of 
evangelical opinions on the matter, it did not publicly take a position. In 1986 Faith Today published 
the views of Clark Pinnock, a theologian who favoured capital punishment, and John Redekop, who 
                                                                                                                                                                    
186 For the Presbyterian Church in Canada statement, see http://www.presbyterian.ca/webfm_send/5604 
(accessed September 28, 2010). 
187 According to Statistics Canada, doctors in hospitals and clinics performed 66, 446 abortions in Canada in 
1985. The number of abortions peaked in 1997 at 111,526 and fell to 97,254 in 2005. See http://cansim2. 
statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.pgm (accessed January 30, 2011). 
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opposed it. After examining the only direct reference to capital punishment in the New Testament, the 
story of the woman caught in adultery and brought before Jesus (John 9: 1-11), Redekop concluded 
that the first spiritual principle of the story was that people are created in God’s image. He affirmed 
“that death is not God’s highest will for mankind. The theme of God’s overall dealing with man is 
life, not death. This affirmation means that in grey areas Christians lean towards life” (Redekop 1986, 
34). In a 2008 interview, Redekop recalled that there were many conversations about the death 
penalty among members of the EFC’s General Council throughout the 1970s and 1980s. When a 
Council member called for a vote on the issue to determine whether there was consensus among the 
group, those opposed to capital punishment carried the vote. “The old establishment” Redekop 
claimed, “was quite surprised that the combination of Reformed and Mennonite and a few others 
carried the day” (2008). In contrast, many American evangelicals continued to promote capital 
punishment throughout the 2000s.189 
Another indication of its moderate position may be seen in the EFC’s critique of what it saw as the 
excesses of the pro-life movement. Shortly after the Supreme Court struck down the abortion law in 
1988, Faith Today published an article by Denyse O’Leary, who identified five mistakes made by the 
Canadian pro-life movement in its campaign to reduce access to abortion. First, O’Leary claimed that 
in its effort to repeal Section 251 of Trudeau’s 1969 Omnibus legislation liberalizing social policy, 
the movement ignored how the pre-1969 era marginalized and disempowered unmarried pregnant 
women. Second, the movement viewed differences regarding legal and political strategies as 
theological differences, creating internal divisions and eliminating political options. Third, the 
movement’s constant reactions against the pro-choice movement robbed pro-lifers of creativity and 
opportunities for education. Fourth, the alignment of the pro-life movement with the political right, 
and thus with the latter’s opposition to day care and public financing of affordable housing, made it 
difficult for pro-lifers to claim that they really were pro-life. Finally, continually seeking publicity for 
its cause signalled the movement’s exclusion from the centers of power where the decisions are made. 
O’Leary concluded the article by urging the movement to become more strategically political (1988). 
Instead, the movement fractured when the Progressive Conservative (PC) government of Brian 
Mulroney attempted to create new legislation limiting access to abortion. In the ensuing debate the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
188 Gilgoff portrays James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, as a purist regarding abortion, unable to 
compromise and unwilling to expand his interest to include non-life issues (2007, 109-10). 
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EFC took a more moderate position than some other evangelical and Catholic organizations such as 
REAL Women and Campaign Life. 
It is important to remember that the Supreme Court did not recognize a woman’s right to an 
abortion. Rather, it acknowledged that the state had an interest in protecting the fetus and that new 
legislation could restrict some access to abortion and still be constitutional. The Court favoured a 
gestational approach that would limit access during the third trimester of pregnancy. However, the 
pro-life element of the Conservative Caucus did not support such an approach and the government 
struck a committee to propose new legislation. 
Benno Friesen, an evangelical PC Member of Parliament from British Columbia, and Lisa 
Bourgault co-chaired the caucus committee that drafted Bill C-43 while John Reimer, another 
evangelical PC Member of Parliament, was a committee member. Introduced into the House of 
Commons in November, 1989, the committee’s proposed Bill kept abortion in the Criminal Code but 
reduced the limitations for procuring an abortion by requiring only one doctor to determine whether 
having a child would harm the woman’s “health,” including her psychological health. By using the 
deliberately vague term “health,” the committee hoped to appease pro-choice activists, pointing out 
that the Bill created a standard of entitlement, did away with hospital boards, and allowed for the 
establishment of abortion clinics (Brodie 1992, 106). At the same time the committee attempted to 
appease the pro-life lobby by rejecting a gestational approach in favour of the principle that life 
begins at conception (Reimer 2008). 
When the EFC appeared before the Legislative Committee studying the Bill in early 1990, it based 
its opposition to abortion on the biblical call to seek justice, with its conception that all people have 
dignity because they “bear the divine image” (EFC 1990, 1). In its submission to the Committee, the 
EFC linked negative social consequences with abortion, including forms of individualism that 
threatened social survival. For the EFC, all people, including the unborn, are interconnected. 
Likewise, it portrayed social policy as interconnected. As the submission stated: “If we devalue the 
life of the unborn, we will be less motivated to do much for those who are marginalized by poverty or 
other disabilities” (2). The idea here was that abortion served as a bellwether for a good deal of social 
policy. Consequently, EFC leaders argued that support for abortion indicated a slippery slope towards 
                                                                                                                                                                    
189 As late as March 2008, Christianity Today reported that evangelicals were the strongest supporters of the 
death penalty in the US. See Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra’s “Capital doubts,” available online at http://www. 
christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/march/6.20.html (accessed August 18, 2010). 
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neglecting such vulnerable populations as the disabled. Given Canada’s declining birth rate since 
1960,190 the EFC urged policy-makers to link the issue of abortion with “the long-term building of our 
nation” (2). In effect, the argument was that abortion did not serve the common good because it 
harmed the long-term health of the nation and jeopardized the lives of the marginalized.191 The 
organization grounded its conception of the common good in the biblical call to practice justice and 
mercy (1). Indeed, caring for the weak and oppressed was a significant element of how the EFC 
defined the common good. Other social considerations mentioned in the brief included the possibility 
that the logic supporting abortion might one day be used to legitimate fetal farming and abortion 
based upon gender.192  
Bill C-43 created significant controversy within the evangelical community. While most pro-life 
groups expressed their disappointment with the lack of interest exhibited by the Legislative 
Committee to amend the Bill, evangelical organizations could not agree on a common strategy to 
secure changes, much less a common response to the Bill. On the one hand, Citizens for Public 
Justice (CPJ) supported the Bill with the hope of eventually improving it. In an interview with Faith 
Today in the spring of 1990, Gerald Vandezande, then CPJ Director of Public Affairs, said, “simply 
saying how bad the bill is plays into the pro-abortion forces that want to defeat the bill. We don’t 
want it defeated; we want it improved” (Faith Today 1990, 60). On the other hand, a REAL Women 
spokeswoman explained that, “we would prefer it not be passed than have it enshrined into law that 
you can kill a human being” (60). For its part, the EFC adopted a similar position to CPJ. While its 
leaders continued to decry abortion and the Bill’s overbroad conception of the mother’s “health,” they 
nevertheless supported the Bill because it acknowledged that life begins at conception.193 Stiller 
thought that over time more restrictions could be placed on abortion as Canadians came to see that the 
issue was about the right to life rather than the right of choice (Stiller 1991d, 78). In addition, 
                                                     
190 For more on Canada’s declining birth rate, see Statistics Canada at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/kits-
trousses/issues-enjeux/c-g/c-g1-eng.htm (accessed August 9, 2010). 
191 In 2008, on the 20th anniversary of the Supreme Court ruling squashing the abortion law, the EFC’s Don 
Hutchinson posited abortion in common good language. As Canada’s population ages, he wrote, “we find 
ourselves wondering where the next generation of workers will come from. They’ll have to come from 
somewhere else because Canada has buried the generations that should have been born to us.” See Hutchinson’s 
webitorial “20 years since Morgentaler – Nothing to celebrate” at http://www.christianity.ca/NetCommunity/ 
Page.aspx?pid=5407 (accessed January 30, 2011). 
192 During the process of creating legislation to regulate new reproductive technologies, the federal government 
sought to prohibit gender selection practices (EFC 2001a, 5).  
193 Jonathan Malloy interprets the EFC’s support for the Bill as indicative of its moderate position on the issue 
(2009, 356). Stiller recalls that EFC members generally agreed with the decision to support the Bill (2008).  
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knowledge of the political and legal processes involved in developing and amending legislation 
contributed to the EFC’s position. Through his relationships with John Reimer and Health Minister 
Jake Epp, Stiller witnessed first hand the process by which public policy is developed and how 
change often occurs slowly and incrementally. With this bit of sober political pragmatism in mind, 
Stiller pleaded with pro-lifers engaged in civil disobedience (i.e., blocking entrances to abortion 
clinics) “to be tolerant of the long-term strategy,” which for Stiller was convincing the majority of 
Canadians who were undecided on the issue to support the pro-life cause.194  
However, the long-term approach did not appeal to all pro-lifers. While Stiller and Reimer together 
lobbied MPs to support the Bill (Reimer 2008), those who opposed it lobbied with equal dedication. 
The net result was that the conservative Protestant community sent mixed messages to 
parliamentarians.195  
Despite the divisions in the pro-life camp, the House of Commons passed the Bill in May, 1990.196 
As a result, many doctors across the country stopped performing abortions for fear of litigation by the 
pro-life movement (Brodie 1992, 112). Forces on both sides of the debate then turned their attention 
to the Senate. According to Janine Brodie in her study of the abortion debate, although the 
Progressive Conservatives held a majority in the Senate,197  
                                                     
194 While Stiller focused his attention on the creation of a new law, he acknowledged that civil disobedience 
might push the federal government to write new legislation (1989e, 78; 1991d, 78).  
195 According to Janine Brodie, feminists understood the central issue of the abortion debate to be “about the 
social construction of women” (1992, 71) while the pro-life movement interpreted the central debate to be one 
of competing rights between the mother and the fetus (similar to the position taken by the pro-life movement in 
the US). In response, Jane Jenson claims, the pro-choice lobby also turned to rights discourse and as a 
consequence dropped many of its social policy arguments (1992, 55). Soon the debate centered on the nature of 
personhood, with the pro-life members turning to science in an attempt to prove that life begins at conception 
and the pro-choice camp linking personhood with viability (79). Some pro-choice advocates labelled the pro-
life understanding of personhood at conception as the “social construction of the foetus” (80) and understood 
the movement in general as “expropriating the female body and disenfranchising the female subject” by 
privileging society over women (81). Feminists found such privileging of society to be contradictory because 
pro-life advocates also asserted the absolute right of the fetus to life “irrespective of the values of the 
collectivity” (85). 
196 When the Bill passed the House, Stiller wrote that although it was unknown how many abortions the Bill 
would prevent, he added that “we expect that hospitals and doctors will be reluctant to perform abortions for 
fear of legal action” (1991b, 120).  
197 In order to pass the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in the Senate, passed just prior to the vote held on the 
abortion Bill, the Progressive Conservative government used an obscure constitutional provision to appoint new 
Senators, meaning that the Conservatives had a majority in the Senate at the time of the free vote on abortion 
(Brodie 1992, 169n111). 
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On the eve of the vote in the Senate, parliamentary insiders began to 
suspect that the federal government was ambivalent about the bill’s 
passage. There had been very little pressure exerted on Conservative 
Senators to toe the party line and the Justice Minister had indicated 
that, even if passed, the bill might not be implemented, at least 
initially. (1992, 115)  
Such political indifference, coupled with the objections of the doctors and the protests of those who 
believed the Bill did not adequately protect the fetus, contributed to a tie vote in the Senate in January 
1991, almost three years to the day after the Supreme Court struck down the abortion law in 1988 
(114).198 Under Canadian law, a tie vote in the Senate means a Bill is defeated.  
In his analysis of the defeat Stiller focused on the role played by those Christians who rejected the 
Bill because it did not do enough to protect the unborn. While Stiller recognized that the Bill was 
imperfect and did not in his opinion go far enough to protect and respect human life (1991b, 118-23), 
he nevertheless took umbrage with those whom he labelled “religious fundamentalists,” defined as 
those who advocated for legal sanctions as a means to enforce a certain moral position. For Stiller, 
these fundamentalists were more comfortable with arbitrary restrictions than trusting “God to bring 
about transformation by his grace” (1991d, 78).199 He particularly objected to their legalism. 
“Legalism,” he wrote, “says that the way to transform is to superimpose a code of laws on people. But 
that denies grace. Jesus saw it differently. The letter kills but the Spirit gives life. Grace is essential 
for transformation” (1991c, 199). With these words Stiller called Christians to practice grace when 
engaging in the public square and rely on persuasion rather than using the law to impose a particular 
moral view on other Canadians.200 Reflecting on the issue in 1994 he wrote, “Grace is essential for 
transformation. Or, to put it in terms of the abortion issue, a society must first be led to care about the 
unborn children before laws to protect them will be accepted and before other ways of dealing with 
problem pregnancies will be sought” (1994b, 209). This emphasis on grace allowed the EFC to think 
about change in incremental terms, work with politicians who were not Christian, and adopt a type of 
political pragmatism that acknowledged all people are sinful creatures who make mistakes and need 
forgiveness. People of faith who adopted a legalistic approach to politics, Stiller claimed, were co-
                                                     
198 Each side received 43 votes (Brodie 1992, 115).  
199 Stiller also noted the role of secular fundamentalism in the defeat of Bill C-43. Secular fundamentalists, he 
claimed, resist laws that limit personal choice and permit moral anarchy (1991d, 78).  
200 In a 2008 interview Stiller singled out the Catholic organization Campaign Life as an example of a religious 
fundamentalist group. He ascribed his distrust of fundamentalists to their reductionism, as they take the big 
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opted by the culture in that they desired “to benefit by the application of the gospel rather than to give 
because of the gospel” (1989d, 78).  
The model in turn contributed to the creation of a Canadian evangelical identity. EFC leaders 
desired that evangelicals participate in a particular manner that accommodated political processes and 
the slow pace of political change, especially in a pluralist country. In contrast, organizations such as 
the Catholic Campaign Life and REAL Women shunned accommodation and viewed compromise as 
a “sell out.” Instead of accepting incremental change, these organizations adopted an “all or nothing” 
approach. Stiller rejected such an approach. Instead, he believed that the Bill “provided pro-lifers with 
an opportunity to shift the debate in the direction of forcing society to talk about the essence of the 
unborn. It would have robbed the pro-choice movement of their inherent argument, which insisted the 
issue was one of choice” (1991d, 78). Stiller’s strategy was to advance persuasive arguments, get the 
ear of the authorities, and convince the public rather than impose legal sanctions (78). The model was 
pragmatic in that it worked for what was possible at the time, although Stiller’s ultimate goal was to 
limit the number of abortions performed in Canada. 
At first glance it appears that the EFC’s model of moderation, incremental change, and persuasion 
failed to attract the support of significant numbers of evangelicals. Although the EFC continued to 
lament unlimited access to abortion in Canada and called for the protection of human life at all stages 
of development, including prior to birth,201 there was no political will among any of the political 
parties to develop another law. Canada became the only industrialized country with no limitations on 
the procurement of abortion.202 Furthermore, evangelical political engagement largely dissipated, with 
the evangelical community fractured over the degree to which evangelicals should accommodate and 
compromise when involved in politics. As Stackhouse noted in 1995, not all evangelicals agreed with 
evangelical political engagement, let alone the EFC’s support for a partial solution to the abortion 
issue (1995b, 176).  
Yet the abortion debate did not create permanent fissures within the evangelical community, in 
large part because most evangelicals continued to oppose abortion on the basis of the beliefs that life 
                                                                                                                                                                    
issues and create “a legalism around them, [so] that if you’re not on the right side, not only are you wrong on 
the issue, but you are somehow morally or spiritually depraved” (2008). 
201 See the EFC’s website at http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=462 (accessed 
January 30, 2011). 
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begins at conception and that all human life reflects the image of God. By 1994 so many Canadian 
evangelicals supported the pro-life movement that commentators claimed membership in an 
evangelical church was “related to a conservative abortion attitude” and “a powerful source of 
political socialization” (Chandler et al. 1994, 137, 142). Put another way, the disagreement between 
evangelicals during the abortion debate was political, a difference of strategy, rather than 
theological.203 
Despite the failure of the EFC to achieve consensus with regard to how evangelicals would 
participate in the public sphere, evangelicals learned from their experiences in the abortion debate. In 
subsequent debates they accommodated a greater variety of political strategies. Not all issues required 
such accommodation however. For example, in the early 1990s they presented a unified public front 
as they supported an existing law that criminalized doctor-assisted suicide. In their political and legal 
interventions in the issue, EFC leaders continued to develop their model of political engagement, with 
its emphasis on the imago Dei, the common good, and ecumenism. 
4.2 Euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide 
In the early 1990s, Sue Rodriguez, who suffered from Lou Gehrig’s disease, challenged the law that 
criminalized doctor-assisted suicide. Because she did not want to burden her family with her care 
when she became incapacitated, she petitioned the court to allow her doctor to assist her in the act of 
suicide when she could no longer carry out the act by herself. The EFC, together with the Canadian 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (CCCB), intervened in the case when it reached the Supreme Court 
in 1993. In describing its organizational objectives at the beginning of the joint legal argument, or 
factum, the EFC described its objectives as being “a public advocate of its members’ values and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
202 An Environics poll conducted in 2007 revealed that 6 out of 10 Canadians desired some sort of protection for 
the unborn. See http://www.lifecanada.org/html/resources/polling/2007PollReport.pdf (accessed January 30, 
2011). 
203 The EFC continued to be involved in legal cases that involved the unborn. In 1997 it intervened with The 
Christian Medical and Dental Society in a case in which a pregnant woman addicted to solvents was mandated 
by Winnipeg Child and Family Services to undergo treatment in order to protect her fetus. The interveners 
supported Child and Family Services on the basis that pregnant women have a duty of care for the unborn. A 
year later the EFC supported a young boy who sued his mother for reckless driving after he sustained injuries in 
utero, resulting in a caesarean section and the boy being born with cerebral palsy. In this case the EFC again 
argued for legal recognition of a duty of care and insisted that the law should treat the mother and the fetus as 
distinct and separate from each other. Then in 2007 it participated in a BC case as a member of the Canadian 
Religious Freedom Alliance in order to support two abortion protestors who were arrested because they 
contravened the bubble zone around an abortion clinic. In all three cases the courts ruled against the positions 
taken by the EFC and its co-interveners. 
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beliefs to government, courts and other public institutions and [promoting] a life affirming ethic 
within contemporary culture” (CCCB and EFC 1993, ¶3). The factum began with the argument that 
since “the Charter is an expression of the basic rights and values held in common by our society,” 
(¶6), it must be interpreted within the framework of its Preamble, which recognizes the rule of law 
and the supremacy of God. Or put another way, the values of the Charter are not self-defining. 
Instead, they must be interpreted, and the interveners wanted the Court to interpret the right to life and 
security within the framework of the sanctity of life.204 A life-affirming ethic, they claimed, was 
integral to Canadian law, pointing to a 1982 report by the Law Reform Commission of Canada which 
recognized the “sanctity of human life” and recommended against de-criminalizing doctor-assisted 
suicide (¶16-17).205 Legalizing doctor-assisted suicide, the interveners stated, would erode the trust 
necessary to live in community, undermine patients’ trust in their doctor, and pressure the elderly and 
infirm to end their life rather than burden others for their care (¶31-33). In contrast, they insisted that 
the law, which they understood as a moral system, should advance the common good by upholding 
trust and protecting human life. The legalization of doctor-assisted suicide, they argued, implicates all 
of society and therefore is a matter of public policy rather than an individual decision (¶29-31). 
According to Bruce Clemenger, who, at the time of the Rodriguez case was the director of the EFC’s 
Centre for Faith and Public Life, only the EFC and CCCB promoted “the sanctity of human life” 
argument in front of the Court (2003, 171). By a margin of 5 to 4, the court agreed with their position, 
citing the consensus among Canadians for the principle of the sanctity of life.206 Clearly EFC leaders 
viewed the decision as a victory. 
The EFC’s involvement in the Rodriguez case furthered its model for political engagement in two 
ways. First, it maintained the ecumenical collaboration seen in the abortion debate. Intervening in the 
case with the Bishops made sense given the Christian valuation of the theological principle of the 
imago Dei that both Catholics and evangelicals share. Second, the interveners made extensive use of 
papers produced by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in their argument that a legal code can 
                                                     
204 The EFC developed this point more fully in a submission to the Senate Special Committee on Euthanasia 
and Assisted Suicide in 1994. In the paper the EFC stated that “the identification and interpretation of [the 
principles of fundamental justice as found in the Charter] is a task in which all Canadians can participate. 
Various communities in our society will bring their own perspective to bear in this discussion. In this, religious 
communities have a unique contribution to make” (1994a, 2). Clemenger has continued to make this argument. 
205 The factum quoted from The Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working paper no. 28, “Euthanasia, 
aiding suicide and cessation of treatment,” 1982, pp. 3 and 7.  
206 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519. Available online at http://scc.lexum.org/ 
en/1993/1993scr3-519/1993scr3-519.html (accessed March 9, 2011). 
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never be morally neutral. Although life-affirming legislation has a Christian pedigree, the interveners 
insisted that one does not need to be religious in order to support it because such legislation protects 
the weak, particularly the physically and mentally challenged, the elderly, and the terminally ill. The 
interveners combined theological principles with practical politics and contributed to the Court’s 
decision that recognized a shared Canadian affirmation for the sanctity of human life.    
Subsequent events kept the issue of euthanasia in the spotlight. Within one month of the Rodriguez 
decision, Robert Latimer killed his daughter Tracy, who suffered from cerebral palsy. Approximately 
one year later Sue Rodriguez ended her life with the help of an unknown person. These actions by 
Latimer and Rodriguez placed the complex questions of euthanasia and assisted suicide squarely in 
the public sphere. To help evangelicals think though the issues, the EFC’s Social Action Commission 
released a discussion paper in which it attributed the general acceptance of euthanasia to “the rise of 
individualism and personal autonomy” (EFC 1994b, 1). Advocates of euthanasia, the Commission 
claimed, presented the issue as a personal matter and a compassionate response to suffering. While 
the Commission rejected such arguments, it recognized the complexity of the matter, noting that the 
professionalization of health care has led to depersonalized care and that technological advancements 
prolong life but are expensive. It differentiated the refusal of treatment from involuntary euthanasia 
and assisted suicide. In a section labelled “A Christian response,” the Commission noted the need “to 
develop our Christian understanding of suffering” and urged its readers to support palliative care 
options and protect the vulnerable (6). In addition, it called for compassion and stated the need to 
bring the Christian message of hope to those who believe that their lives are useless (7). 
Despite the recognition of the complexities of the issue, however, the Commission ended its paper 
by portraying the issue in dualistic terms similar to those advanced by Schaeffer and Koop. It stated, 
The presence of a movement to legalize euthanasia in Canada is 
symptomatic of the general tendency in our society to devalue 
human life. When God is no longer recognized as the source of life, 
then the measure of a life’s worth will be narrowed down to 
uncertain, utilitarian terms. When God is no longer recognized as 
sovereign in the course of our living and dying, human beings are 
likely to claim their “right” to die. 
On the other hand, when God is acknowledged as Life-giver, then all 
human life is recognized to have inherent worth and dignity. When 
God is acknowledged as sovereign in all matters of life and death, 
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then life and death will be treated with great care and humility. 
(1994b, 7) 
There is little complexity in this statement; those who do not believe in God are portrayed as holding 
utilitarian views of life and are willing to kill human beings for the sake of convenience, while 
Christians are portrayed as those who believe in the dignity of the human person. As a simplistic 
reduction of a complex issue, this statement ignores the historical fact that many non-Christians are 
also committed to human dignity and that Christians have not always treated human life “with great 
care and humility.” While the actions of adherents cannot refute the legitimacy of a religious belief, 
meaning that actions taken by Christians that ultimately de-value life cannot invalidate the sanctity of 
life argument, neither can Christians gloss over such actions and assume that a belief in God 
necessarily leads all believers to protect and promote human dignity for all. For whatever reason, 
subsequent EFC papers and interventions did not repeat the Social Action Commission’s dualistic 
argument. Regardless, its leaders continued to maintain the position that the Christian faith offers the 
best protection for human dignity.  
EFC leaders clearly outlined their theological assumptions in a submission to the Senate Special 
Committee established in 1994 to study the issues of euthanasia and assisted suicide. The submission, 
entitled “Walking together in the shadow of death,” began with a quote from Dr. Margaret 
Somerville, an ethicist who argued in a 1994 EFC-produced video that euthanasia was “the vehicle 
through which we are fighting about which world view will govern our society in the future” (EFC 
1994a, 1). Somerville’s statement helps explain the fervour with which evangelicals participated in 
both the abortion and euthanasia debates. What was at stake for them was whether the worldview that 
defined Canadian society would be Christian, meaning that it adopted the sanctity of life argument, or 
if it would be influenced by another worldview that might not value human life to the same extent or 
in the same manner that Christianity did. The submission softened the dualism that could emerge 
from such a conception of the issue by quoting the Law Reform Commission’s support of the sanctity 
of life argument. Such use of the Commission’s work suggested that EFC leaders recognized that not 
all non-Christians necessarily reduce human life to utility and convenience. The submission went on 
to argue that all Canadians must have the opportunity to participate in identifying and interpreting the 
Charter principles of life, liberty, and security of the person. It posited the contribution of religious 
communities as a unique but by no means exclusive voice in the discussion. The unstated assumption 
was that religious communities should have the same public space as any other group to persuade 
others that their position was beneficial for society (2). The paper noted that Canadians who ascribed 
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to the liberal conception of the human person could support the EFC’s desire to affirm the “inherent 
dignity” (3) of each person. This promotion of pluralism was an essential element of the EFC’s model 
of political engagement. 
The submission identified four principles that the EFC believed should guide Canadian society on 
the issue of euthanasia: a) “The sanctity of life;” b) “The stewardship of life,” which required that 
human life must be nurtured, in part by creating laws that discourage destructive behaviour; c) 
“Compassion for life;” and d) “Communal responsibility for life” (1994a, 2-3). These principles, the 
EFC noted, were “widely shared” (4) and provided the foundation for the “life-affirming ethos” of the 
legal system. The organization rejected euthanasia as ungovernable and raised the spectre that one 
day patients, the elderly, and other vulnerable people might have to justify their existence. Instead of 
permitting euthanasia and assisted suicide as a means to address suffering, the EFC called on the 
government to support palliative care. It also noted that society must find better ways of incorporating 
and valuing the elderly and disabled (5).207  
Although the language of the common good was not used in the EFC’s submission to the Senate, 
the concept was the foundation for the organization’s position. EFC leaders assumed that palliative 
care promoted the common good in a way that assisted suicide could not, because it protected the 
lives of those generally considered weak and oppressed. For these leaders, the degree to which 
societies follow the biblical injunction to care for the marginalized indicates the degree to which they 
are good. For instance, if the terminally ill or disabled fear that their doctors may over-prescribe 
mediation in order to hasten their death, the common good is harmed because trust is broken and the 
helping professions betray their oaths to care for others. Given that human beings live out their lives 
                                                     
207 As a result of its hearings, the Senate committee wrote a report entitled Of Life and Death (1995). The report 
called for a clarification of law on withholding/withdrawing treatment and more emphasis on palliative care. It 
recommended that assisted suicide as well as non-voluntary and voluntary euthanasia remain criminal offenses, 
although it suggested lesser sentences for cases involving compassion, with the parameters and sentence to be 
established by Parliament. The report is available online at http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/1/parlbus/commbus/ 
senate/Com-e/euth-e/rep-e/LAD-TC-E.HTM (accessed January 30, 2011). Another Senate committee updated 
the report in 2000, choosing to focus on the need for a national strategy to provide end-of-life care. In this 
second round of hearings the EFC made a submission as part of the Care-in-Dying Coalition, an organization 
dedicated to advocating for more palliative and home care for the terminally ill. The Coalition lamented the 
absence of palliative care in provincial health care systems and supported the recommendation of the 1995 
committee that the Criminal Code be clarified to distinguish euthanasia from withholding or withdrawing 
treatment in particular circumstances and the administration of drugs that dull pain but as a side effect hasten 
death. However, it opposed the Senate’s 1995 recommendation that mercy killing on the basis of compassion 
carry less severe penalties. See the Coalition’s 2000 paper entitled “Five years later, where is the care in 
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in communities and are involved in a variety of relationships, what happens to the weak impacts the 
entire society. If the lives of the disabled are de-valued, the EFC submission argued, then all human 
life is eventually de-valued (1994a). The concept is closely linked to the principle of the imago Dei; it 
is precisely because each person, regardless of their abilities or health, is made in the image of God 
that it is in the best interest of society to protect human life and dignity.  
The issue of euthanasia came to the public’s attention again in the late 1990s with new 
developments in the Latimer case. After a complex series of trials, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
held that Latimer had to serve a minimum of 10 years of his life sentence in jail before he would be 
eligible for parole. When Latimer appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court in 1999, the EFC 
intervened, together with the Christian Medical and Dental Society (CMDS) and Physicians for Life. 
In their factum these interveners argued that Tracy must be seen as a person entitled to the same 
dignity and protection as every other Canadian. Her personhood could not depend on her physical and 
mental abilities or her freedom from pain. Perhaps the strongest statement in the factum occurred 
when the interveners discussed the significance of allowing Latimer’s argument that he felt 
“compelled” to kill Tracy. “To grant this appeal” they stated, “will harden the Canadian soul, will 
foster and encourage a culture of death in our country, and will say to the disabled that they are lesser 
beings who do not enjoy the full protection of Canadian law” (EFC, CMDS, and Physicians n.d. 
[2000], ¶5). They noted that the Charter’s guarantee of such universal freedoms as one’s right to life 
are informed by theological and philosophical sources that are beyond positive law. They identified 
two such theological sources as Judaism and Christianity, both of which base personhood and dignity 
on the principle that human beings are created in the image of God. The imago Dei principle, they 
claimed, yields two legal principles: a) that all people enjoy equal dignity; and b) that no one may 
take another’s life (¶12). The interveners maintained that according to the international rule of law as 
found in the United Nations Charter, Tracey’s personhood was grounded in her inalienable human 
rights and inherent human dignity, the same sources that grounded these protections in the Canadian 
Charter and provincial Human Rights Codes (¶14-17). In 2001, the Supreme Court upheld Latimer’s 
10 year minimum sentence.208 
                                                                                                                                                                    
dying?” available online at http://files.efc-canada.net/si/Euthanasia/EuthanasiaSenateBrief2000/pdf (accessed 
February 20, 2011). 
208 R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2001 SCC 1. Available online at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2001/2001scc1/ 
2001scc1.html (accessed March 9, 2011). 
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Throughout the 2000s the issue of euthanasia remained alive as several backbench Members of 
Parliament introduced private members’ bills into Parliament, all of them unsuccessful.209 In 2005, 
Clemenger wrote in Faith Today that those seeking the legalization of euthanasia, like the advocates 
for same-sex marriage, had a flawed understanding of the origin of human dignity in that they 
conferred human dignity dialogically rather than deriving it from the principle of the imago Dei. By 
dialogical dignity Clemenger was referring to the notion that “you have dignity only if others affirm 
you in your choices and the identity you have constructed for yourself.” Clemenger suggested that 
evangelicals combat this flawed understanding of personhood by persuading others in word and deed 
about the benefits of the biblical conception of human dignity as based on the principle of the imago 
Dei (2005a, 14).  
The EFC’s model of political engagement that was grounded on the imago Dei and emphasized 
moderation and pluralism was apparent in its participation in the euthanasia debate. By calling 
attention to the issues of palliative care, EFC leaders attempted to move the discussion beyond a for 
or against dualism, or a liberal/conservative dichotomy, to include such issues as how society values 
the elderly and cares for the ill. By focusing on the universality of the sanctity of life argument and 
the need to protect the weak and vulnerable in society, EFC leaders sought to persuade others, 
including non-Christians, about the benefits of the imago Dei principle for society. Indeed, the EFC 
often pointed to the affirmation of the sanctity of life in documents by the Law Reform Commission 
to argue that one does not have to adhere to a specific religious doctrine in order to support human 
life. As Clemenger wrote in an article in Faith Today:  
We will not seek to impose―that is not our task nor our calling. We 
will seek to persuade and give faithful witness to the wisdom 
entrusted to us as witnesses to the gospel of grace. We are loved by 
God and bear His image. Life is something that we should cherish 
and care for. We should love others as we love ourselves, in word 
and deed. (2005a, 14)  
Here Clemenger argued the same position as Stiller; namely, if evangelicals use the law to impose 
their views of life, they are not modeling the grace of God. Instead, they are to cherish life and care 
for others in practical ways. One of the ways to do so was to persuade others about the sanctity of life, 
using both religious and non-religious sources and arguments. The same commitments may be 
                                                     




discerned in the EFC’s attempts to have legislation concerning reproductive technologies 
acknowledge the sanctity of life. In many of their papers on the issue, EFC leaders pointed to the 
Rodriguez decision as evidence of a common Canadian support of the sanctity of life.   
4.3 Reproductive technologies 
Scientific advancements such as “test tube babies” and cloning animals led many countries, including 
Canada, to create legislation to regulate new (or “assisted”) reproductive technologies. To study the 
issue, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney appointed a Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies in 1989. In its 1993 report entitled Proceed with Care, the Commission offered almost 
300 recommendations, including the prohibition of selling eggs, sperm and embryos as well as paying 
surrogate mothers. It also called for a regulatory body to oversee genetic technologies. When 
Parliament began the process of drafting legislation and holding hearings, the EFC participated in 
every step of the process. Its leaders worried that the new technology would change social 
conceptions of the family, because “biological ties and parenthood would become unrelated. At 
worst, parenthood would be reduced to a transaction, depending solely on the will of the adult parties 
to a contract” (1996a, 2).210 EFC leaders urged Parliament to de-commercialize reproductive 
technologies by banning experimentation on embryos at all stages of development either within or 
outside the human body;211 the creation of embryos for the purpose of research; the destruction of 
embryos; selling or buying eggs, sperm, zygotes, embryos and fetuses; patenting cells; cloning;212 
genetic alteration, and paying surrogate mothers (1996a; 1997b; 1999c). In many of its interventions 
the EFC called for public funds to support research intent on curing infertility rather than introducing 
third (or more) parties into the process of creating a child (1996a, 4-5). Especially troubling for EFC 
leaders was the use of anonymous egg or sperm donors, which made it difficult for the resulting 
children to discover their biological identity (1998a). In addition, they disputed the term “donor” 
                                                     
210 This argument is similar to the one advanced by EFC leaders in the same-sex marriage debate. See chapter 6. 
211 A report issued by the Standing Committee on Health in response to draft legislation introduced by then 
Minister of Health Alan Rock allowed research on excess embryos from in vitro treatments. While pleased with 
many other aspects of the report, the EFC issued a press release saying it was “truly disheartened at the lack of 
protection for the human embryo.” In March 2002, the Canadian Institute for Health Research decided to fund 
research on embryonic stem cells. The EFC issued another press release indicating its deep disappointment with 
the decision, given that such research results in the death of the embryo. See http://www.evangelicalfellowship. 
ca/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=1087 (accessed January 30, 2011). 
212 This prohibition would include therapeutic or non-reproductive cloning, even for the most altruistic or 
compassionate reasons, as the immediate and long-term effects were unknown. The EFC viewed the process as 
objectifying people and disregarding the best interest of children (1999c). 
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because it devalued children and reduced reproduction to a transaction (1997b). They found the terms 
“human organism” and “human reproductive material” equally problematic, preferring the terms 
“human being” and “embryo” respectively (1996a; 2001a, 4). 
In all of its submissions, the EFC urged caution and elaborated a number of principles to help guide 
the decisions of law-makers. It insisted that the nature of the law is important because its underlying 
principles reflect “the moral framework that underlies the interactions of the individuals within a 
society” and it acts “as a teacher, shaping and influencing how individuals view a specific legal or 
moral problem” (1995, 9). Identifying principles, then, was not an abstract and philosophical activity, 
but an essential aspect of how citizens live and reason together and necessary to determine the 
common good. 
The EFC’s Social Action Commission formed a Biogenetics Committee, which published a paper 
entitled “Changing genes: A Christian approach to human genetic testing and therapy” that defined 
the relevant terms and helped evangelicals think through the issues related to genetic testing. First 
published in 1995 (and amended in 1998), the paper identified what the Committee considered to be 
the central principles involved in the issues, principles which were consistent with those articulated in 
the EFC’s submissions regarding euthanasia, such as the sovereignty of God, the sanctity and dignity 
of life, an emphasis on the community, living in hope, “and resisting the temptation to usurp God’s 
place” by gaining power to reengineer life (EFC 1995, 2). Furthermore, the Committee claimed that it 
was not the responsibility of human beings to eliminate suffering from the world. At the same time, it 
recognized the positive elements of genetic testing. 
Our generation may have the unique opportunity to use genetic 
research, testing and therapy as new avenues by which Christians can 
demonstrate compassion and love. However, as Christians, we also 
have a responsibility to be vigilant in protecting humanity from the 
possibility of being abused by this technology. We must ensure that 
people with genetic disorders are neither exploited for scientific or 
commercial advantage, nor discriminated against on the grounds of 
their differences or “abnormalities.” (2-3) 
For instance, the Committee noted that prenatal testing for such genetic mutations as cystic fibrosis 
could lead to increased abortions. While the Committee acknowledged that most Canadians believed 
that abortion for the purposes of convenience or on the basis of gender was unacceptable, it worried 
about the increasing tolerance of abortion on the basis of genetic abnormalities. Yet it recognized that 
the discovery of genetic abnormalities via genetic testing could help parents prepare for the child and 
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celebrate his or her birth. It counselled evangelicals to show compassion to parents caught in difficult 
situations regardless of whether the parents chose to keep or abort the fetus (6). Other fears arising 
from genetic testing involved eugenics and cloning. However, the Committee recognized that most 
scientists were concerned about curing old genetic diseases and that most Canadians found human 
cloning repulsive. Such repulsion, the Committee claimed, rested on biblical principles. “In this 
manner, the Christian is fully equipped to offer witness in the public sphere to God as a God of hope, 
who uses but is not dependent on our technologies” (7). To protect against the negative elements of 
genetic testing, the Committee urged the government to create legislation guided by the principle of 
the sanctity of life. Such a position would not rule out genetic technology but would prohibit such 
applications as human cloning, creating human-animal hybrids, and genetic testing for the purposes of 
eugenics (9).  
To help Canadian MPs and the public think through the issues of biotechnologies, the federal 
government created the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee in 1999 (the mandate for the 
Committee expired in 2007). The EFC urged the Committee to probe more deeply its underlying 
principles by studying such things “as the nature of life, the ownership of life, and the effects of these 
new technologies” (2001b, 2). It claimed that biotechnologies should be assessed by their impact on 
principles that shape common life and interpreted within the Charter’s dual commitments of the 
supremacy of God and rule of law. In addition, EFC leaders argued that the intent behind the 
development and use of biotechnologies was as important to discern as how they should be done (2) 
and principles should not be developed as simply compromises between divergent positions (2001c, 
2). 
The various discussion papers and proposed legislation issued by the federal government on the 
issue of reproductive and genetic technologies were largely consistent with the EFC’s position 
(1996a; 1997b, 1). In 2000 an EFC submission noted that the latest version of the legislation at the 
time included amendments formerly introduced by the EFC (2000b, 3). The proposed legislation 
criminalized human cloning, the development of human-animal hybrids, experimentation on human 
embryos beyond their first 14 days of existence, and the selling and buying of eggs, sperm, and 
embryos. 
In 2004 the federal government passed legislation regulating biotechnologies that prohibited many 
of the activities the EFC found objectionable, with the exception that the legislation allowed for the 
destruction of human embryos for the purposes of research. Human cloning remains illegal in 
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Canada, as is the creation of embryos for the purpose of research, using technology to select gender, 
altering a cell genome that will be transmitted to future generations, creating hybrids, selling or 
buying eggs, sperm, and embryos, and paying for surrogacy. Contrary to the EFC’s request, however, 
the terms “donor” and “human reproductive material” remain in the legislation.213 In 2006 the 
government created the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada, a regulatory body to 
regulate human reproduction. From the mid-1990s onward, the EFC had supported the creation of 
such a regulatory body but urged the government to ensure that the agency would not become “a 
vehicle of social engineering” and that is members include ethicists, representatives from religious 
communities, and people with disabilities as well as scientists (1996a, 3).   
In the midst of all this Parliamentary action, a legal case over the ability of companies to patent life 
forms ensued. The case began in 1985 when the president and fellows of Harvard College sought 
patents in Canada, the US, the UK, Europe, and Japan for a mouse with a genetically modified 
genome. In an effort to help cancer research, Harvard scientists injected a cancer-promoting gene (an 
oncogene) into fertilized mouse eggs and then transplanted the eggs into a female mouse host. The 
resulting baby mouse had the altered gene in every one of its cells. When the Harvard fellows sought 
the patent however, they desired a patent not only for the process but also for the product and its 
offspring. The Commissioner of Patents and the Patent Appeal Board allowed for patents on the 
methods and somatic cell cultures but not for the mouse itself. Upon appeal, the Federal Court Trial 
Division upheld the decision against patenting the mouse but the Federal Court of Appeal reversed 
the decision and allowed it. In 2001, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal, granting the EFC 
and Canadian Council of Churches intervener status.214  
In their factum, the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) and EFC noted the concern expressed by 
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health about the lack of a specific disallowance of 
patenting human genes, their DNA sequences, and human cell lines within Canada’s Patent Act. They 
also noted the distinction in Canadian law between lower and higher forms of life. Lower forms of 
life include bacteria and moulds and can be patented. Higher forms of life are more complex and 
                                                     
213 Further information on the Assisted Human Reproduction Act can be found at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ 
ShowTdm/cs/A-13.4///en (accessed February 19, 2011).  
214 Background information taken from the website of The Canadian Bar Association, “The Harvard mouse 
case: Developments in the patentability of life forms” by Angela Furlanetto and Dimock Stratton Clarizio LLP. 
Available online at http://www.cba.org/cba/newsletters/ip-2003/ip2.aspx (accessed January 30, 2011). 
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because they are produced by the laws of nature, they cannot be patented.215 The arguments of the 
interveners were different from those generally advanced by the EFC. Indeed, it was an unusual case 
for the EFC in that it did not pertain directly to human beings and was the first and only time that it 
intervened in a case with the CCC. Of particular concern to the interveners were the moral issues 
arising from the patenting of higher life forms. If crop and/or livestock patents were granted, 
economic power would be concentrated in the agri-food industry, resulting in multinational 
corporations controlling prices. Environmental risks include genetically modified animals escaping 
into the wild and upsetting “the natural balance within a species which could have an unpredictable 
domino effect” (CCC and EFC 2002, ¶46). Another concern was the negative impact upon research if 
patents for higher life forms were allowed as scientists would be in danger of infringing patent rights 
and therapeutic applications could become too costly. A final concern addressed the animals involved 
in the experiments. Given the absence of Canadian regulations protecting genetically altered animals, 
the interveners were concerned about animal suffering due to experimentation. They argued that 
human beings are to practice stewardship, “to care for all that God has entrusted to them.” Ownership 
of higher life forms was “objectionable” because it granted rights without responsibilities for the care 
of animals involved, resulting to their objectification (¶50). “The notion that a part of a species of 
complex animal life should be viewed as an invention of an actual person or corporation is based on 
the metaphysical position which holds implicitly that nature and/or the environment is simply 
composed of manipulable data - a ‘standing reserve’ of calculable forces, completely subject to 
human manipulation” (¶51). Ultimately all life forms found in the natural world would be objectified 
and reduced to their biological and chemical components, including human beings.  
The Supreme Court found that the “Harvard” mouse did not qualify as an invention and therefore 
could not be patented under Canadian patent law.216 Canada became the only industrialized country to 
refuse the patent, although the European countries granted a patent with amendments. The ruling 
stated that changes to the Patent Act must come from Parliament, not the judiciary. 
With the exception of the Harvard Mouse case, EFC leaders grounded their positions regarding 
reproductive technologies on the common good and the imago Dei principle. Using similar arguments 
                                                     
215 According to the Canadian Patent Act, patents are granted for inventions, defined as “‘any new and useful 
art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, 
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter’” (section 2 of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 and 
quoted by the CCC and EFC in their factum 2002, 4n2). 
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to the ones it developed for the euthanasia debate, the EFC insisted that reproductive technologies and 
experimentation on human embryos were not personal decisions or a-moral acts. Instead, decisions 
pertaining to these issues would impact the meaning and value of human life and dignity within 
society. Given that the various drafts of the legislation limiting reproductive technologies and its final 
form contained many of the prohibitions promoted by the EFC, it appears that the EFC’s concerns 
and perhaps some elements of its conceptions of human life found some resonance outside the 
evangelical community.  
Collaboration with the Canadian Council of Churches indicated the degree to which the EFC was 
willing to work ecumenically and to focus on common concerns rather than theological or doctrinal 
differences. Over time the EFC collaborated with various Catholic organizations and participated in a 
variety of inter-faith coalitions in the issues of religious education, religious freedom, and same sex 
marriage. Such collaboration generally occurred in legal interventions, but it brought EFC leaders into 
regular contact with leaders from a variety of religious traditions. Ecumenism came to be a key 
element of the EFC’s model of political engagement and was a natural outcome of its emphasis on 
pluralism.  
The elements of the EFC’s model of political engagement reveal the political moderation of the 
organization. While EFC leaders occasionally employed dualistic rhetoric, they attempted to persuade 
by advancing reasoned arguments they believed could be accepted by evangelicals and Canadians of 
other faiths or no faith. Their accommodation of political processes and adoption of pluralism and 
ecumenism granted the EFC more political authority in the public sphere than other organizations 
perceived to be extreme and their refusal to advocate for capital punishment gave credence to their 
pro-life position. The moderation and political pragmatism of their model, its political pragmatism, 
and their commitment to defend the vulnerable, particularly those with disabilities, all helped EFC 
leaders gain access to “the table” and participate in decision-making. The last section of this chapter 
examines their contributions to the public sphere.  
4.4 EFC contributions to the public sphere 
At the heart of the EFC’s interventions in the moral issues discussed in this chapter was a desire to 
shape legislation and influence the law in order to contribute to what it perceived to be the common 
                                                                                                                                                                    
216 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45. Available online 
at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2002/2002scc76/2002scc76.html (accessed March 9, 2011). 
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good by protecting the weak and vulnerable. In many instances the EFC was competing with socially 
progressive groups to define the Canadian moral character. This is a historical role for evangelicals 
(Malloy 2004, 5) and is reflected in evangelical associations around the world. As David Martin 
notes, “in all Protestant cultures the emphasis on conscience in politics tends to produce associations 
concerned to promote this or that moral issue” (1978, 74). Such concerns are often prompted by 
progressive social legislation.217  
The socially conservative positions advanced by the EFC concerned liberals and social 
progressives. According to Saba Mahmood, social conservatism alarms liberals because it defies such 
normative liberal assumptions “as the belief that all human beings have an innate desire for freedom, 
that we all somehow seek to assert our autonomy when allowed to do so, that human agency 
primarily consists of acts that challenge social norms and not those that uphold them, and so on” 
(2005, 5).218 Indeed, throughout the debates discussed here EFC leaders emphasized the common 
good rather than championing individual autonomy.  
Another cause of concern for some social progressives was the intensity with which evangelicals 
held their views. As Clemenger suggested, some commentators assume that because evangelicals are 
committed to their beliefs, they are therefore “not willing to be reasonable or to seek to accommodate 
or respect the views of others. [Such commentators] assume that believers are unimaginative, 
unforgiving, intolerant and close-minded. In other words, not only are believers unwilling, but they 
are unable to participate in public discourse” (2005b, 14). Clemenger reminded his readers that the 
biblical call to care for the vulnerable is “a positive, life-affirming message … of faith, hope, and 
love” (2005, 14). For Clemenger, then, theology grounds evangelical participation in public life and 
the principle of the imago Dei may be employed to counteract secular views of evangelicals as 
doctrinaire and fundamentalist.  
Easy dismissals of evangelicals as fundamentalist, un-Canadian, and anti-intellectual do not take 
seriously the political and social impacts of the EFC’s promotion of the imago Dei principle. As 
Casanova argues, the principle can be interpreted and practiced in such a manner that it challenges 
and mitigates “the inflexible, inhuman logic” of modernity and may “unintentionally help modernity 
save itself” (1994, 234). It is his belief that “religion has often served and continues to serve as a 
                                                     
217 Marsden identifies the changing sexual mores of the 1960s and 1970s as a key catalyst for the political 
mobilization of American fundamentalists (2006, 240-42). 
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bulwark against ‘the dialectics of enlightenment’ and as a protector of human rights and humanist 
values against the secular spheres and their absolute claims to internal functional autonomy” (39). 
Religious groups do this by insisting that the economic, political, and philosophical spheres are 
subject to external norms (5-6) and offering “counterfactual normative critiques of dominant 
historical trends” (43). They offer such critiques by questioning the established boundaries between 
the public and the private spheres and call for the (re)introduction of morality, that is, discourse about 
the common good, into the affairs of the state and economy (217).219 According to Casanova, the 
public impact of such critiques cannot be measured by their ability to persuade the state and 
autonomous spheres to adopt and enforce their agendas. Instead, their impact can be measured by 
their contributions to public debates about the importance of extraneous morals for the autonomous 
spheres and the location of boundaries between the public and private spheres (43).  
In this chapter we saw that the EFC called for the reintroduction not only of the principle of the 
common good into social policy but also of the imago Dei, to which it linked the sanctity of human 
life argument. For EFC leaders these matters were related as they believed that the sanctity of life 
argument serves the interests of the common good. The implicit belief was that the Christian (and 
Judaic) view of the human person as created in the image of God establishes the best ethos for human 
flourishing and the best protection for human dignity. As Clemenger argued in a letter to a newspaper 
editor, Christianity “provided the very foundation for the affirmation of the equal dignity of all 
persons upon which freedom of religion, expression and conscience are rooted” (2006f). In Canada 
Watch, the EFC’s quarterly update to its members, he wrote: “the EFC plays an essential role 
reminding the courts and governments of Canada that there are Biblical principles that profoundly 
impact the decisions they make (2006g, 2). It was the role of the EFC, he noted, to equip legislators 
and EFC members about those principles. He summarized the EFC’s role by stating that the 
organization helps governments be “truly good” and citizens to be “truly responsible.” Therefore all 
of the EFC’s briefs and position papers outlined the Christian principles its leaders believed were the 
best guides for the development of policy.  
The EFC shared its desire to protect human dignity with the post-Vatican II Roman Catholic 
Church described by Casanova. Indeed, Catholic and evangelical leaders collaborated in their 
                                                                                                                                                                    
218 In contrast, Mahmood believes that the desire for freedom is “profoundly mediated by cultural and historical 
conditions” (2005, 14) as “all forms of desire are discursively organized” (15). 
219 Casanova later suggested that “without normative traditions neither rational public debate nor discourse 
ethics is likely to take place” (1997, 205).  
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responses to abortion and euthanasia. For EFC and Catholic leaders, the principle of the imago Dei 
led them to recognize the importance of social policy. Unlike various leaders of the American 
Religious Right, they did not argue for a limited state that leaves charity in the hands of churches and 
other voluntary organizations.  
There is another aspect of the EFC’s work that may be desirable in a secular society and again, it 
shares this aspect with the Roman Catholic Church. Casanova suggests that the Church after the 
Second Vatican Council could be deemed a desirable public religion because “it criticizes the radical 
individualism that accompanies privatization and stresses the collective and communal―the 
ecclesial―character of the proclamation of faith and of religious practices, while simultaneously 
upholding the absolute rights of the individual conscience” (2006b, 27). The EFC served a similar 
function in Canadian society. During the abortion and euthanasia debates the EFC critiqued what they 
saw as radical individualism, insisting that human life is lived in community and that communities are 
impacted by individual actions. However, it must be stated that the EFC did not promote a collectivist 
school of thought that elevates the state as the most significant social institution.    
The manner in which EFC leaders participated in the public square was consistent with Casanova’s 
model for public religions. Although they called for the introduction of ethics into the public spheres, 
they did not question the differentiation of such social institutions as the state, economy, and legal 
system from the church or religion. At the same time, however, they refused to separate religion from 
politics and public life. For EFC leaders, religion can never be privatized as it is comprehensive and 
impacts all aspects of a believer’s life, including their political and economic choices. The support of 
EFC leaders for social differentiation reflected their acceptance of modernism. They did not question 
the freedom of individual conscience nor seek a theocratic state. Instead, they presented arguments 
that they believed people of all faiths and those with no faith were able to adopt without 
compromising their particular doctrines or beliefs.  
Casanova insists that the acceptance and accommodation of modernity by public religions does not 
indicate increasing secularization as the religions involved do not accept the private role assigned to 
them by liberalism (1994, 163). The move into politics, then, cannot be interpreted as an indication of 
increasing secularization. As Mahmood observes, since the secular liberalism of modern states 
operates as “something like a form of life,” all groups must necessarily engage with its agency (2005, 
191). She argues that because the state regulates almost every aspect of life, the entry of conservative 
religious groups into the public sphere does not politicize the spiritual domain. Instead, the 
 
 153 
“conditions of secular-liberal modernity are such that for any world-making project (spiritual or 
otherwise) to succeed and be effective, it must engage with the all-encompassing institutions and 
structures of modern governance, whether it aspires to state power or not” (193-94). For Mahmood, 
then, conservative religious groups wishing to preserve their way of life or protect their doctrines are 
inevitably drawn into the political sphere of the state as it operates with a significant degree of power 
in society. The following two chapters investigate more thoroughly the EFC’s interactions with 
secularism and the modern secular liberal state in order to discover how these interactions influence 
the manner in which the EFC participates in the public sphere.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I continued the argument first developed in chapter 2 that the EFC helped create a 
particular type of evangelical identity that operated ecumenically and was politically engaged. The 
subject of this chapter was the model of political engagement promoted by EFC leaders, a model 
based on arguments promoting the common good and the principle of the imago Dei. The model 
accommodated the processes of creating legislation, accepted incremental change, assumed pluralism 
and ecumenism, and sought to persuade rather than impose. It helped EFC leaders interpret and 
respond to Canadian society and shape Canadian evangelical identity. In short, the EFC operated in 
the public sphere within the model developed by Casanova as acceptable public religions in the 
modern world.  
EFC leaders continue to monitor the issues discussed in this chapter. Indeed, the issues remain 
politically volatile. For instance, in 2010 Prime Minister Harper informed Canadians that foreign aid 
for maternal health would not include funding for abortions. In May of that year, 15,000 pro-lifers 
gathered in Ottawa for a March for Life rally. The EFC’s Don Hutchinson addressed the crowd, 
which included approximately 20 Conservative and Liberal MPs and hundreds of students (Delacourt 
2010). Clearly, abortion remains a salient issue for evangelicals.220  
The continuing importance with which evangelicals view the life issues discussed in this chapter 
suggests that evangelicals will remain active in politics for the foreseeable future. In fact, many of 
them are gearing up for a debate on euthanasia, which Clemenger suggests will be the next significant 
                                                     
220 A 2008 study of young American evangelicals under the age of 30 indicated that while younger evangelicals 
are more supportive of homosexual rights and same-sex marriage than their parents, they are as opposed to 
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and potentially divisive public debate (2005a, 14). In 2009 he dedicated two columns in Faith Today 
to the issue, telling evangelicals that “commitment to human dignity … is a principle that lies at the 
core of our understanding of self and other” (2009c, 14) and reiterating the necessity of protecting 
vulnerable Canadians (2009d, 14). 
                                                                                                                                                                    
abortion.  See a poll conducted by Religion & Ethics News Weekly in September, 2008, available online at 




Protecting religious freedom  
EFC leaders are so concerned about secularism because they believe that the privatization of religion 
negatively impacts religious freedoms, particularly the right of religious adherents to publicly practice 
their faith and the right of religious communities to live in a manner consistent with their beliefs. This 
focus on the communal aspect of religion challenges the general trend in Canadian constitutional law, 
which, according to legal scholar Benjamin Berger, conceptualizes religion as individual, private, and 
“an expression of human autonomy and choice” (2007, 283, 295). Between 1987 and 2009, 
approximately one-third of the EFC’s approximately 40 legal interventions involved issues of 
religious freedom in some manner. In most of these cases the EFC appeared with a fellow intervener 
or as a member of a coalition.  
In this chapter I examine the EFC’s promotion of religious freedom within the context of Talal 
Asad’s observation that when religious organizations enter the public sphere in Western, secular 
liberal states, they must contend with the state’s power. According to Asad, definitions of religion in 
Western democracies often reflect Christian conceptions and are an element of state power. Elizabeth 
Shakman Hurd elaborates by suggesting that such definitions pre-structure public discourse. 
In its engagement with the issues of religious freedom covered in this chapter, the EFC defined 
religion broadly as a belief system that helps people understand the nature and meaning of human life 
and society. This definition enabled EFC leaders to argue that secularism was as religious a belief 
system as organized religion, which in turn permitted its leaders to insist that there was no such thing 
as religiously neutral broadcasting and education and that it was impossible to privatize religion. The 
specific issues covered in this chapter include: 1) religious broadcasting; 2) religious education in 
Ontario’s public day schools; 3) sexual orientation and educational institutions; and 4) the right of 
minority religious groups to practice their beliefs.221 The EFC’s interventions in these issues stressed 
the need for governments to protect religious freedom, pluralism, and identity. Before commencing a 
more in-depth investigation of the issues, I provide an overview of how the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms defines and protects religious freedoms.  
                                                     
221 Via the Religious Liberties Commission the EFC monitors the religious freedoms of Christians around the 
world. Such work is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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5.1 The legal protection of religious freedom in Canada 
Canada differs from the US in that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter referred 
to as the Charter) does not require the separation of church and state. In fact, the Preamble to the 
Charter states that “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the 
rule of law.”222 While a number of the legal submissions produced by the EFC ask the Supreme Court 
to interpret the Charter in light of the Preamble, many legal scholars believe that the Justices view the 
statement as symbolic and consequently ignore it (Barnett 2008; Brown 1999-2000).  
The Charter explicitly protects the freedom of religion in Section 2(a), which recognizes the 
fundamental “freedom of conscience and religion,” and in the guarantee of 2(b) to protect the 
“freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression” of Canadians. In addition, Section 15(1) protects 
the right to equality without discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, sex, age, race, or 
disability, and is employed in some freedom of religion cases. According to Benjamin Berger, the 
intention of these Sections is to protect the rights of the individual (2002, 53n43). Some religious 
freedom cases invoke Section 27 of the Charter, which preserves Canada’s multicultural heritage, 
thereby suggesting that religion is a cultural matter (Barnett 2008). The ability of the state to curtail 
religious freedom is limited by Section 1, which “guarantees the rights of freedoms set out in [the 
Charter] subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.” According to this section, if the government restrains the freedom of 
religion in order to achieve a social objective, the onus is on the government to prove that the 
restriction is justified as an appropriate compromise.223 Section 1 tends to be invoked in cases 
involving a conflict of competing rights, such as the freedom from discrimination based upon sexual 
orientation and the freedom of religious expression. 
Many legal cases concerning religious freedom originate from one of two motivations. In the first 
instance religious individuals or groups seek an exemption from secular laws that contravene a 
particular religious obligation, as in the case of the Hutterian Brethren in Alberta who protested 
against the mandatory picture identification on driver’s licenses. Such requests are an example of 
                                                     
222 The Charter is Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, available online on the Department of Justice’s website, 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/1.html (accessed February 21, 2011). 
223 In R. v. Oakes (1986) the Supreme Court devised four criteria to help determine whether state violations of 
Charter rights are reasonable. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, ¶70 and 71, available online at 
http://scc.lexum.org/en/1986/1986scr1-103/1986scr1-103.html (accessed March 9, 2011). For a summary of 
how the criteria may be applied to education, see Dickinson and Dolmage 1996, 369.  
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religious adherents seeking freedom for religion and are often argued on the basis of cultural and 
group identity using the language of equality. In the second instance, individuals or groups attempt to 
persuade the court to strike down a law that they believe is based on a religious belief or promotes 
one particular religion, as in the cases involving religious education in Ontario public schools. These 
cases reflect a desire to be free from religion (Brown 1999-2000).  
The first freedom of religion case to come before the Supreme Court after the introduction of the 
Charter in 1982 was R v. Big M Drug Mart in 1985. In this case the Court found the Lord’s Day Act 
as unconstitutional because it imposed a Christian view of the Sabbath on non-Christian citizens. In 
his reasons for the Court’s ruling, Justice Dickson, later Chief Justice Dickson, defined religious 
freedom in the following manner: 
A truly free society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of 
beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of 
conduct. A free society is one which aims at equality with respect to 
the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and I say this without any 
reliance upon s. 15 of the Charter. Freedom must surely be founded 
in respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the 
human person. The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is 
the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the 
right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance 
or reprisal, and the right to manifest belief by worship and practice or 
by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than 
that.  
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion 
or constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the will of 
another to a course of action or inaction which he would not 
otherwise have chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he 
cannot be said to be truly free. … 
What may appear good and true to a majoritarian religious group, or 
to the state acting at their behest, may not, for religious reasons, be 
imposed upon citizens who take a contrary view. The Charter 
safeguards religious minorities from the threat of “the tyranny of the 
majority.”224  
Both positive and negative dimensions of religious freedom arise from Justice Dickson’s definition. 
The positive dimension enables religious adherents to practice their beliefs while the negative 
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dimension ensures that no person is directly or indirectly forced to follow a particular religious belief 
or act against their beliefs (Barnett 2008).225 Those seeking positive freedoms generally assume a 
more interventionist government whereas those desiring negative freedoms call for the state to stay 
out of the private lives of its citizens. Many EFC submissions to Parliamentary Committees and legal 
factums about issues pertaining to religious freedom refer to Justice Dickson’s definition of religion. 
Depending on the issue, they advocate for either positive or negative religious freedom.  
5.2 The EFC’s involvement in issues of religious freedom 
Already in 1981 EFC leaders identified the protection of religious freedom as central to their work 
(Stackhouse 1995b, 167). In 1999 they named religious freedom as a critical issue facing Christians in 
Canada (EFC 2003a, 3) and the headline of a 2003 issue of Canada Watch read, “Our freedoms 
threatened: If you don’t act to protect your religious freedom, who will?” (1). The issue of religious 
freedom, then, has long been an integral part of the EFC’s discourse of resistance against secularism. 
For example, in the booklet Withering Rights: Religious Freedom in Canada, published by the EFC 
in 2004, Janet Epp Buckingham surveyed a number of legal cases of religious freedom in the areas of 
education, work, family life, churches, and religious expression.226 She concluded that Christians 
continued to experience discrimination and that the Charter “has been used to restrict rather than 
enhance religion in public life” (EFC 2004a, 17). Epp Buckingham argued that secularism was not 
value neutral and that it threatened religious freedom, particularly in the realm of public education 
(10, 25, 31-32, 53).227 Typical of EFC literature, she did not delineate with which type of secularism 
                                                                                                                                                                    
224 R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.R.C. 295, ¶94-96. Available online at http://scc.lexum.org/en/1985/ 
1985scr1-295/1985scr1-295.html (accessed March 9, 2011). 
225 According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the distinction between positive and negative 
freedom is common in political and legal philosophy, available online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-
positive-negative/ (accessed December 23, 2010). Although the conceptions of these two freedoms can be 
traced back to such philosophers as Kant, they were thoroughly developed by Isaiah Berlin in Two Concepts of 
Liberty. For an abridged version of the essay, see Berlin, Political Philosophy, edited by A. Quinton (Oxford 
University Press, 1967) 141-52, available online at http://jmaggio.typepad.com/no_call_me_jay/files/ 
two_concepts_of_liberty. pdf (accessed December 23, 2010). 
226 At a Christian Leaders Connection conference held in Edmonton on January 19, 2010, Hutchinson said that 
when the EFC reprints the booklet in the future, it will change its title to reflect some of the more positive 
rulings in the 2000s, such as Chamberlain and TWU, which are discussed below. 
227 In Withering Rights, Epp Buckingham mourned the loss of a Christian Canada more strongly than Stiller 
ever did, writing, “Some people would like to regain the Canada that seems to have been lost since 1982. But it 
is not likely that we will see the Christian character of Canadian society restored through legal or political 
action. The reality is that Canada is now a secular, pluralistic country where no one religion will be permitted to 
dominate. It is only through the regeneration of Christians and the advancement of the gospel that Canada could 
become in any sense a ‘Christian country’” (EFC 2004a, 11).  
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she was engaging. In the same year she wrote an article for The Voice of the Martyrs Newsletter under 
the headline “Religious liberty under stress,” in which she acknowledged that Canadian jurisprudence 
both protected and restricted the freedom of religion. However, she noted that those seeking social 
change and the privatization of religion―in other words, secularists―were able to make good use of 
the Charter (Epp Buckingham 2004a). 
In the context of same-sex marriage, Clemenger emphasized the importance of religious freedom in 
the following manner: 
The freedom of religion is the first freedom. It is the foundation of 
all other expressive freedoms. When it is proscribed, all other 
expressive freedoms are threatened. Religious freedom entails the 
pursuit of truth: the enquiry into the nature of reality, openness to 
transcendence, and the affirmation of sovereignty and authority 
beyond the temporal powers and institutions. Though not boundless, 
it must be given broad scope or the pursuit of truth will be 
compromised. (2005h, 1)  
For Clemenger, the freedom of religion was central to the protection of other freedoms, especially 
that of expression. However, Clemenger’s definition of religion was distinctly theistic in its emphasis 
on transcendence and allusion to a God beyond the temporal world. This theistic conception of 
religion was narrower than the definition promoted by the EFC in its support of religious 
broadcasting. 
5.2.1 The CRTC and religious broadcasting 
A critical juncture in the history of religious broadcasting in Canada occurred in 1928 when the 
federal government revoked the licenses of all religious broadcasters after one group in Quebec used 
its air time to denigrate the federal government and the Roman Catholic Church.228 The prohibition of 
single-faith broadcasters forced religious groups to find existing “secular” stations that were willing 
                                                     
228 The group in question was the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In response, the Liberal government established the 
Aird Commission to suggest how the federal government might best manage and regulate Canada’s airwaves. In 
1929 the Commission recommended, among other things, the establishment of a publicly owned radio 
broadcaster, but with the Depression, Prime Minister Mackenzie King did not act upon the recommendations. 
Conservative Prime Minister Bennett created the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, later the CBC, in 
1932. For more information see “The birth and death of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (1932-
1936)” at http://www.broadcasting-history.ca/index3.html?url=http%3A//www.broadcasting-history.ca/ 
networks/networks_CRBC.html (accessed January 30, 2011). The relationship between the Jehovah’s 




to air their programs. One of the earliest religious television programs in Canada began in 1962 when 
David Mainse, a Pentecostal pastor, broadcasted a weekly 15 minute segment on a local television 
station in Ontario. Mainse called the show “Crossroads,” and by 1976 over 150 stations carried the 
show. By then Mainse had a vision for a daily show featuring in-studio guests and live telephone call-
ins. Toronto’s Global Television Network agreed to air the show but could not provide studio time, so 
Mainse leased premises at 100 Huntley Street where he could produce his show. Mainse named the 
show “100 Huntley Street,” which was under the domain of Crossroads Christian Communications, 
Inc. (Mainse 1979). By 1985 Crossroads Christian Communications had a budget of $17 million and 
raised another $2.5 million for relief projects in Africa (Stiller, Mitchener, and Dorsch 1985, 13).  
Despite the presence of Mainse and other Canadian evangelists such as Terry Winters in British 
Columbia, Canadian evangelicals continued to support American televangelists. In 1985 Faith Alive 
reported that Canadian evangelicals donated $18 million to American televangelists, including Billy 
Graham and Jimmy Swaggart, in addition to the $21 million they gave to Canadian television 
ministries (Stiller, Mitchener, and Dorsch 1985, 12). Given the visibility and influence television 
provided American evangelists, some Canadian religious adherents began lobbying for a religious 
television station in Canada, but they quickly encountered an obstacle in the Canadian Radio-
television Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), a regulatory body created to control the 
Canadian air waves. The CRTC refused to grant licenses to religious broadcasters until 1987, when 
VISION TV, an interfaith station, became the first licensed religious broadcaster since 1928.229 
To meet CRTC requirements, VISION had to provide a balance of religious viewpoints. A year 
later the CRTC clarified its rules, stating that only issues of public concern and controversial issues 
had to be balanced, and then not in every program but in the general programming. As this balance 
requirement applied only to religious broadcasters, EFC leaders maintained that it was a 
discriminatory requirement. In a submission to the CRTC, the EFC’s Social Action Commission 
noted how MTV was not required to supply a diverse range of music and sports channels did not have 
to address religious faith. Instead of placing the burden of balance upon individual broadcasters, the 
EFC argued for proportional balance, in which the broadcasting system as a whole offered balance. 
For instance, the CRTC could license different broadcasters that reflected different views present in 
the broadcasting region. This solution, claimed EFC leaders, avoided such difficult issues as the 
                                                     
229 The CRTC further stipulated that VISION had to be owned and operated by members who represented a 
variety of faiths (EFC 1992, 6).  
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(impossible) search for objectivity, who decided when balance was achieved, and how to ensure that 
the decision was free from bias. EFC leaders claimed that they did not oppose balanced coverage of 
controversial issues. Rather, they argued that when the requirement of balance was limited to 
religious broadcasters, the implicit assumption was that only religion was controversial (EFC 1992).  
At its most fundamental level, the EFC’s main argument was with the CRTC’s definition of 
religion. The Social Action Commission claimed that the CRTC defined religion as involving a 
relationship with a divinity. Such a conception, the Commission argued, excluded non-theistic faiths, 
such as Buddhism, and non-theological faiths. The Commission maintained that political movements 
such as communism and fascism resemble traditional religion in that they “articulate an ordered 
understanding of the whole world” (EFC 1992, 2). Given that the ideas of democracy, freedom, and 
rights are premised on particular understandings of human nature, the Commission considered them 
religious as well. For the EFC, religion had to be more broadly defined as that which instructs one’s 
understandings of “the meaning of life, of the nature of society, of what human beings really are, of 
their essential responsibilities, whether to self, society or another source” (2-3). This broad definition 
of religion permitted EFC leaders to assert that all programming revealed some type of religious 
commitment, meaning that “religious broadcasting” could not be limited to specifically 
denominational or church programming and that religion could not be privatized.230 
When the CRTC permitted single faith broadcasters in 1993, with the proviso that they provide 
some programming for other religions, a minority of CRTC directors disagreed with the decision 
because they believed that racial and cultural intolerance “‘is often rooted in religious 
intolerance.’”231 EFC leaders disagreed with these directors’ conception of religion as inherently 
intolerant, arguing that different religious traditions in Canada regularly collaborate on such issues as 
funding for religious education and protecting a traditional definition of marriage. As one EFC 
submission to the CRTC stated, “it is possible to co-exist and to work together on common goals 
while living according to different religious beliefs. EFC’s experiences serve as examples that 
religion does not breed conflict or destruction. We support the access of these religious groups to the 
public airwaves” (1998b, 2). In response to the concern that religion was controversial and divisive 
because it addressed ethical matters, the EFC submitted that many existent and supposedly non-
                                                     
230 This expansive definition of religion mirrored the definition advanced by Paul Marshall in 1991and 1992 
(see section 3.1 above). 
231 Public Notice CRTC 1993-78 section V. 18 as quoted by the EFC (1998b, 2). 
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religious programs already tackled controversial issues, such as Black Harbour and Star Trek: The 
Next Generation (2-4). 
By 2002 the CRTC had granted licenses to 22 single faith radio broadcasters.232 The EFC noted the 
significant benefits of these broadcasters, especially their contributions to “Canadian Christian 
identity.” According to an EFC submission to the House of Commons in 2002, fewer Canadians than 
previously listened to Christian radio stations produced in the US. The submission further contended 
that Canadian Christian stations contributed to national unity as they crossed theological and ethnic 
lines, provided Christian music artists with a venue to launch their careers, and helped advertise 
Christian music (2002). The EFC remained concerned, however, about the unfair burdens placed on 
religious broadcasters in the name of balance. To meet this requirement, the EFC claimed, some 
single faith religious broadcasters were compelled to offer free air time in order to attract the 
participation of other faiths. Five years later the EFC argued that with the addition of multi-cultural 
and multi-lingual stations, balance was already present in many markets and thus the balance 
requirement should be dropped for single-faith broadcasters (2007). However, at the time of writing 
the CRTC has neither redefined religion nor modified its requirements for religious broadcasters.   
To summarize, the EFC identified the worldview expressed by the CRTC as secularist, intent on 
limiting public discord by muzzling religious voices and limiting their access to the air waves. The 
EFC’s expansive definition of religion permitted the organization’s leaders to argue that it was 
impossible to privatize religion as some type of faith perspective animated all programming. If all 
programming was religious, they maintained, then it was unfair to restrict the public expression of 
some religious adherents, in this case Christian broadcasters. This argument appealed to the liberal 
tenet of equality rather than a theological principle. The organization relied on the argument of 
pluralism in its interventions in the issues of religious education in public schools and public funding 
for religious schools in Ontario. 
5.2.2 Religious education in public schools 
Much of the early evangelical engagement in education involved the creation of post secondary 
theological schools, which were largely focused on preparing men and women for Christian lay 
ministry. Over time some of these theological schools became degree-granting colleges. By the 1980s 
evangelicals were increasingly interested in religious education for their younger children in day 
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schools.233 In his comments celebrating the tenth anniversary of Faith Today, John Stackhouse noted 
that “no evangelical interest has surfaced as often in [Faith Today] as education” (1993b, 43). Some 
of this interest originated in the conservative Protestant struggle against the secularization of public 
day schools. Nowhere was this struggle more evident than in Ontario during the 1980s and early 
1990s. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, public day schools in Ontario became secularized as some parents 
took umbrage with the Christian nature of the province’s public education system. The first court 
ruling to find the Christian nature of Ontario’s public schools discriminatory occurred in 1988 when 
the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled against the use of the Lord’s Prayer in opening school exercises 
because it violated the Charter by compelling students to participate in a Christian religious practice 
(Zylberberg 1988).234 Two years later another Ontario Court of Appeal decision found the mandatory 
weekly periods of religious instruction in public schools and the religious education curriculum then 
used by the Elgin County Board of Education to be indoctrination, and hence a violation of the 
Charter (Elgin 1990).235 When Epp Buckingham summarized the ruling, she noted that while the 
Court permitted schools to teach about religion, it prohibited the imposition of a particular religious 
view, indoctrination, attempts to convert, and a devotional approach (2005a, 13). Despite having the 
freedom to provide instruction about religion, the Ontario Ministry of Education largely excised 
religion from public schools and their curriculum. Some parents who wanted their children educated 
in a Christian worldview withdrew their children from the public system and enrolled them in 
independent religious schools, but as these schools received no public funding, the financial burden 
on parents was often onerous. A number of parental groups and various religious coalitions went to 
the courts in an attempt to force the Ontario government to extend public funding for religious 
schools beyond the Roman Catholic “separate” schools. Both the Ontario courts and the Supreme 
Court of Canada preserved the unique status of Roman Catholic schools in Ontario as mandated in the 
British North America Act (1867)236 and did not find the limitation of funding to Catholic schools to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
232 The CRTC approved Crossroads Television System’s application for a broadcasting license in 1998. 
233 When Stiller became the EFC’s executive director in 1983, one of the 3 Commissions existent at the time 
studied issues related to education. The other 2 were the Social Action and Worldwide Missions Commissions 
(EFC, Together we can, Faith Alive 1 [1], 1983, 21). 
234 Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education, 1988 CanLII 189 (ON C.A.), available online at 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1988/1988canlii189/1988canlii189.pdf (accessed February 21, 2011). 
235 Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Ontario (Minister of Education) (1990) 71 O.R. (2d) 341 (CA) 
(accessed February 21, 2011). 
236 Also known as the Constitution Act, 1867. 
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be discriminatory against other religions (Adler 1996 and Bal 1997).237 A Jewish parent then took the 
issue to the United Nations Human Rights Committee,238 which ruled in 1999 that the funding of day 
schools of one religious group but not others was discriminatory.239 The EFC intervened in the Elgin 
County case and supported the religious parents in Adler and Bal through its involvement in the 
Ontario Multi-faith Coalition for Equity in Education and the Coalition for Religious Freedom in 
Education respectively (Fledderus 1997, 20; EFC 2001d, 1).  
The EFC’s intervention in the Elgin County case marked its first foray into the legal system. In 
order to gain support for the intervention, Stiller had to shift evangelical thinking, which historically 
frowned on evangelical involvement in the courts. He refashioned evangelical conceptions of the 
courts by persuading them that they had a role to play in helping the courts interpret the meaning of 
such lofty Charter phrases as the “freedom of religion.” He portrayed the opponents of religious 
education, particularly the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, as seeking the “total secularization 
of our public schools and, indeed, a total separation of church and state in all aspects of Canadian 
society” (1989b, 78). If evangelicals desired to contest such secularization, Stiller claimed, they had 
to promote “the Judeo-Christian values and heritage” of Canada (78). In essence, Stiller was 
reminding evangelicals that religion had a public role. This position required him to challenge 
evangelicals who preferred to withdraw from public life and preserve the integrity of their churches 
against “the world.” By asking evangelicals to support the EFC’s forays into the legal sphere, Stiller 
was rejecting evangelical isolationism and sectarianism and redefining the term “evangelical” to 
include public engagement. Clearly he had to explain the nature and purpose of the EFC to 
Parliamentarians and evangelicals alike. 
Three principles informed the EFC’s position on religious education. The first located the primary 
responsibility for educating children with parents, which in turn required a sufficient number of 
choices of publicly funded schools to enable parents to find at least one that taught the desired values. 
                                                     
237 According to Dickinson and Dolmage, in Adler and Bal the Ontario courts ruled that Ontario schools were 
secular, interpreted as religiously neutral, not as humanist (Dickinson and Dolmage 1996, 373, 375). The legal 
citations for Adler at the Supreme Court is Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 and for Bal at the Ontario 
Court of Appeal is Bal v. Ontario (1997) 34 O.R. (3d) 484. 
238 The legal citation for the case is Canada [1999] UNHRC 45; CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996 (5 November 1999). 
For the committee’s ruling, see http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/UNHRC/1999/45.html (accessed January 30, 
2011). The Ontario government claimed that it did not have the money to change the funding structure for 
religious day schools. 
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The second principle challenged the supposed neutrality of public schools by stating that all education 
was shaped by a worldview, “a particular value system, based in ultimate beliefs.” Indeed, it 
considered “the denial of the supernatural [as] no less a statement of faith than the affirmation of a 
Creator God” (EFC 2000c, 2). According to Epp Buckingham, secular public schools espoused a 
value framework that defined religion as unimportant to, or separate from, public life. She charged 
them with promoting “ideological pluralism,” a term she employed to refer to the belief that all 
religions are equal and all lead to God. The result of such ideological pluralism, she claimed, was the 
elimination of distinctive doctrines and religious differences, the reduction of religious beliefs to 
points of view, and the privatization of religion (2005a, 7).240 The third principle confirmed the role 
of the government in providing education and then called on the government to work with parents and 
provide the type of education desired by parents if it could be provided responsibly (EFC 1999b;241 
2001d).  
The perception of an increasingly secular nature of public day schools prompted the EFC’s 
Education Commission to ask in 2000: “How then can we properly recognize diverse religious and 
cultural values in education? How can we give shape to a public education culture that neither 
excludes nor discriminates, but engenders respect and opens space for the study and celebration of the 
plurality of religions?” (EFC 2000c, 1). For its part, the Commission rejected what it perceived to be 
Enlightenment assumptions about religion, tolerance, and values. Rather than equating religion with 
intolerance, the Commission stated that despite some abuses, “religion gives birth to strong 
commitments that define the limits of tolerance” (3).242 It contested Enlightenment rationalism, with 
its elevation of scientific knowledge and conception of religious truth as irrational, and stated its 
preference for the post-modern understanding that “facts” cannot be separated from the situation of 
the knower, including her values and worldview. The Commission challenged schools and teachers to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
239 In 2001 the Conservative government introduced a tax credit to provide some tax relief for parents paying 
tuition for religious schools and as a means with which to respond to the 1999 UN decision, but in 2003 the 
newly elected Liberal government under Dalton McGuinty repealed the legislation. 
240 In his study of religion and education in Canada, David Seljak notes that the various religious education 
coalitions portrayed the secular nature of public schools as a quasi-philosophy or religion that is imposed upon 
all and thereby violates the right to freedoms of religion and conscience (2005, 187). This is an apt description 
of the view held by the EFC. 
241 The EFC presented this document together with The Ontario Multi-Faith Coalition of Equity in Education. 
242 The Commission provided a number of examples, including the ancient Hebrews who abhorred human 
sacrifice and did not tolerate the practice of abandoning children and the British Puritans who led a campaign to 
end the sale of children and, two centuries later, ended slavery. For examples beyond Christianity, the 
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provide the space for students to critically explore their own worldview and that of others (5-6). In the 
words of Epp Buckingham: “By engaging in dialogue with others with different points of view, we 
hope to develop attitudes and mentalities within the common public culture that welcome the various 
cultures and lifestyles within a society” (2005a, 7). This was especially important for the Commission 
as it believed that religion is a foundational element of students’ identity (EFC 2000c, 5). Like many 
other EFC documents on education, the Commission quoted the Ontario Royal Commission on 
Learning, which stated that “there is no such thing as value-free education.”243 The ultimate issue for 
the Commission was not whether religious views should be taught, but which ones (2).244 In general, 
EFC leaders did not advocate for the continuation of Christian dominance in the form of specifically 
Christian prayers and religious instruction. Rather, on the basis of religious diversity, they argued that 
public school students should learn about religion, appreciate how religious beliefs influence 
individual and collective identities, and identify how the various religions answer the ultimate 
questions of life (5).   
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Adler and Bal ended the struggle for public funding of religious 
schools in Ontario. In their promotion of such funding, EFC leaders endorsed the notion of structural 
pluralism, which encourages the creation of single faith institutions such as schools, credit unions, 
labour unions, and radio programs in order to strengthen and support particular religious 
communities. However, the request for the public funding of religious schools revealed a particular 
view of the state that held it at least partially responsible for protecting, if not enhancing, the ability of 
religious individuals and communities to live in a manner consistent with their beliefs. Epp 
Buckingham stated in her study of religious freedom and education that “the government must protect 
the ability of different groups to live in conformity with their convictions” (2005a, 8). This appeal to 
positive rights was a common approach in various EFC interventions and is discussed in more detail 
in the last section of this chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission pointed out that the Hindu faith inspired Ghandi’s campaign against British rule in India and 
inspired Martin Luther King’s struggle to obtain civil rights for African-Americans (EFC 2000c, 3). 
243 Quoted from the Ontario Royal Commission on Learning entitled “For the love of learning,” (Toronto: 
1994), I, 60. 
244 David Seljak raises two additional concerns arising from the same issue. First, he argues that the absence of 
religious education produces “religiously illiterate students” unprepared to interact with the religious diversity 
of fellow Canadians and unable to adequately understand world events inspired by religion such as the events of 
September 11, 2001.244 Second, the lack of “positive support for minorities to socialize their children into their 
unique religious identities” is problematic. Seljak suggests that religious groups may find secular schools to be 
as inhospitable as their Christian predecessors (2005, 179). 
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After the Adler and Bal judgements, other educational issues drew the attention of EFC leaders. 
More specifically, they became concerned about how school curriculums and policies were promoting 
homosexual rights and how those policies impacted religious adherents. Increasingly, evangelical 
educational institutions faced criticism about their opposition to homosexual practice. As a number of 
cases pitting religious freedom against the right of homosexuals to be free from discrimination slowly 
made their way through the courts, EFC leaders prepared to intervene. 
5.2.3 Sexual orientation and educational institutions 
In 1996 the British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) initiated the first of the two cases 
examined here when it refused to accredit a teacher preparation program at Trinity Western 
University, an evangelical liberal arts university that first opened its doors to students in 1962.245 The 
BCCT refused accreditation because the University required its students to sign a code of conduct that 
was rooted in Christian values and prohibited students from, among other things, engaging in 
homosexual activity while attending the school. The BCCT argued that such opposition to 
homosexuality inevitably produced teachers who would discriminate against gay and lesbian students.  
EFC leaders viewed the case as important because it was the first time that the Court had to rule on 
a conflict between the right of gays and lesbians to equal treatment and the right of religious freedom 
(Epp Buckingham 2005a, 4). In its factum the EFC identified the central issue of the case as whether 
religious institutions can be denied benefits and licenses if their views of sexual morality differ from 
the majority.246 It advanced three arguments in support of its position. First, the freedom of religion 
guaranteed by the Charter cannot be limited to what occurs within the confines of religious 
institutions. Instead, the EFC maintained that religious freedom includes “the public expression and 
practice of religious belief” (EFC n.d.d [2001], ¶6). Second, the Charter cannot be used to identify 
“Canadian values” and “public interest.” The EFC held that the Charter and human rights codes 
address conduct and do not establish moral beliefs because moral choices reside with individuals and 
their consciences (¶21-22). It further argued that the Charter does not attribute more weight to some 
freedoms than to others. In other words, gay equality rights do not trump religious freedom, and 
therefore religious adherents have the right to believe in the traditional Christian view of 
                                                     
245 The denomination which founded the University (at that time Trinity Junior College) was the Evangelical 
Free Churches of Canada and America. 
246 Trinity was one of only a few cases in which the EFC intervened by itself.  
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“homosexual conduct as sinful” (¶24, 27).247 Third, the BCCT could not grant or withhold public 
privileges on the basis of conscience because such actions would be akin to a “religion test” (¶35). 
When the Supreme Court ruled in favour of Trinity,248 citing a lack of evidence that Trinity students 
discriminated against gay and lesbian students in the classroom, Epp Buckingham noted with 
approval that the ruling supported the claim that one Charter right cannot be privileged over another 
(2001). The Court also permitted codes of conduct such as that required by Trinity.249 
The second case, cited as Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 3, pitted some religious 
parents on the School Board in Surrey, British Columbia, against supporters of gay and lesbian 
equality rights. In 1997 the Surrey School Board refused to approve three books for use in 
kindergarten and grade one. As the books presented families led by lesbian or gay parents as morally 
equal to families led by heterosexual couples, the Board found the books too controversial and not 
age-appropriate for use in primary classrooms. The fact that some of the Board members opposed the 
books on religious grounds created controversy because the province’s School Act mandated that all 
public schools in the province be secular. When the British Columbia Supreme Court quashed the 
Board’s decision, the School Board appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeal, at which time the 
EFC, together with the Archdiocese of Vancouver, intervened. Their factum focused on how the Act 
interpreted the term “secular.” According to the two interveners, the Act intended the term “secular” 
to mean non-denominational or non-sectarian and therefore it could not be used to exclude moral 
views that flow from religious beliefs (EFC and Archdiocese 2000, ¶10, 17). Moreover, the 
etymology of the term indicated that it was used as a jurisdictional term to separate the religious from 
the public sphere (¶14). In their factum the EFC and Archdiocese insisted that the Act’s mandate 
ordering schools to teach the “’highest morality’” in an effort to promote civil society had its roots in 
religious traditions. They further argued that just because “a moral concern stems from and may have 
                                                     
247 This statement ignored the diversity of views about homosexuality within Christianity at the time. 
248 Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 
available online at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2001/2001scc31/2001scc31.html (accessed March 9, 2011). 
249
 Some of the issues in the case are similar to those in Vriend (1998), in which Delwin Vriend, a laboratory 
instructor, lost his job at The King’s College because he acted in an inconsistent manner with the College’s 
statement prohibiting homosexual practice. Vriend then sought to have protection against discrimination on the 
basis of “sexual orientation” read into Alberta’s Individual Rights Protection Act. The EFC’s legal factum in the 
case noted that the College’s policy forbade homosexual practice, not orientation. It argued that “the ability of 
religious institutions to adopt and maintain codes of conduct for their communities is fundamental to the 
exercise of their freedoms of conscience, religion and association” (EFC n.d.b [1997], ¶21). If the Supreme 
Court was going to read “sexual orientation” into the Act, then the EFC asked that there be an exemption for 
“those whose religious beliefs require that certain sexual behaviours not be condoned” (¶52).  
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its origin in religious faith in no way disentitles advocates of that moral concern from advancing this 
as a social good deserving of acceptance of Canadians generally” (¶20). For the EFC and the 
Archdiocese, if an issue is able to be debated on its own merits without recourse to its religious 
origins, it meets the “secular” standard. A moral principle is religious only when it requires faith in a 
particular religion in order to be accepted (¶21). In addition, they insisted that a morally neutral 
education system was inconceivable. Therefore it would be unfair to allow those with no faith to 
dictate what was taught in public schools while disallowing those with religious faith to contribute to 
educational content. If religious voices were silenced, and in this case they involved members of the 
evangelical, Roman Catholic, Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim communities, then only one type of moral 
consideration could be advanced, to the detriment of democracy and open debate (¶23, 27- 29).  
The EFC/Archdiocese factum in Chamberlain drew from the EFC’s argument in Trinity when it 
stated that the Charter could not be used as “a national statement of virtues.” Therefore it rejected the 
lower court’s reading of equality rights for gay and lesbian persons into the School Act’s mandate to 
teach the “highest morality.” Instead, the interveners interpreted the purpose of the Charter in 
classically liberal terms as the protection of individuals and groups against illegal governmental 
infringements (EFC and Archdiocese 2000, ¶35).  
When the BC Supreme Court ruled in favour of the School Board in 2000, the case went to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, where the EFC once again intervened, this time in a broader coalition with 
the Archdiocese of Vancouver, the Catholic Civil Rights League, and the Canadian Alliance for 
Social Justice and Family Values Association. The Court agreed with the coalition’s arguments that 
religious views could not be eliminated from public debate and that the term “secular” did not 
indicate non-religion.250 Nevertheless, in a 7 to 2 decision the Court ordered the school board to 
review its decision, stating that although religious parents have the right to express their concerns, 
they and the Board could not exclude other legally recognized groups such as gays and lesbians.251 In 
                                                     
250 The EFC used this decision to support its argument that prayer should continue to be used in the Ontario 
Legislature. Hutchinson reminded the committee studying the issue that in Chamberlain “the Supreme Court of 
Canada identified the need to allow inclusion of the religiously informed mind in the Canadian ‘public square’” 
(EFC 2008, 3). 
251 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4  S.C.R. 710, ¶19, 25, 59, and 72. The 
decision is available online at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2002/2002scc86/2002scc86.html (accessed March 9, 
2011). Clemenger found the Court’s definition of toleration and respect concerning because “In choosing sides, 
the Court did not make the public system more inclusive but less public―in the sense that many parents will be 
compelled to find alternatives to the public system.” See “The EFC responds after Supreme Court overturns 
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short, the Court mandated the School Board to base its decision on toleration and non-sectarianism.252 
EFC leaders focused on the dissenting opinion, which emphasized that all people, including 
agnostics, atheists, and religious adherents, believe in something.253 Essentially the two dissenting 
Judges adopted the same expansive definition of religion as the one promoted by EFC leaders and 
therefore they declared that it was impossible to privatize religion.   
The EFC considered the judgements in both Trinity and Chamberlain as partial victories.254 It 
celebrated the fact that in Trinity the Supreme Court protected the right of a religious institution to 
promote a broadly held evangelical conception of sexuality and to have a “discriminatory” code of 
conduct. EFC leaders welcomed the Court’s recognition in Chamberlain that the term “secular” in 
public policy does not mean a-religious. They continued to employ their broad conception of religion 
in their interventions in cases involving the religious freedom of minority religious groups.  
5.2.4 Protecting the religious freedom of minority groups 
The EFC initially supported religious minorities from the sidelines. For instance, Stiller told reporters 
that he supported the decision that permitted Sikh RCMP officers to wear their turban rather than the 
traditional Stetson hat (Stiller 2008). In 2006 the EFC’s legal counsel celebrated the ruling of the 
Supreme Court in Multani v. Commission Scholaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys that permitted a Sikh 
student to wear his kirpan to school.255 In the 2000s the EFC took a more activist approach by 
intervening in legal cases.  
The first case began after members of the Orthodox Jewish community in Montreal constructed 
succah huts on the balconies of their condominium in contravention of the condominium rules. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Surrey School Board Decision,” press release dated 12/20/02, available online at http://www. 
evangelicalfellowship.ca/ NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=1623 (accessed January 30, 2011). 
252 In June 2003 the School Board again rejected the three books, citing their poor grammar and intolerance of 
different views on same-sex marriage. The following month it approved two other books depicting same-sex 
parents for use in the classroom. 
253 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4  S.C.R. 710, ¶137. 
254 Epp Buckingham headlined her summary of the Trinity decision with the words “A strong decision for 
religious freedom in Canada: The Supreme Court of Canada rules in favour of Trinity Western University.” 
Issued in May 2001, the summary is available online at http:/files.efc-canada.net/si/Education/ 
TWUdecisionsummary.pdf (accessed February 20, 2011). In the EFC’s response to the Chamberlain decision, 
Clemenger celebrated the Court’s ruling that secularism did not preclude decisions made on the basis of 
religious considerations and that secular institutions were not required to ignore religion.  
255 See the analysis of Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguierite-Bourgeoys written for the EFC by its legal 
advisor at the time, Rickcola Slawter Available online at http://files.efc-canada.net/si/Religious%20% 
Freedom%20in%20Canada/EFC/Multani.pdf (accessed April 28, 2008). 
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Succahs remain in place for eight days and are part of the Sukkot celebration that is similar to 
Thanksgiving celebrations in North America. The festival reminds Jews of the 40 years they spent in 
the desert after fleeing Egypt and before entering Canaan as documented in the second book of the 
Bible. When the case arrived at the Quebec Superior Court, the judge heard from both Orthodox and 
non-Orthodox Jewish rabbis on the issue of whether succahs were required by the Jewish faith. The 
judge sided with the liberal interpretation and ruled against the Orthodox believers. In doing so the 
judge interpreted doctrine, an action the EFC found distressing. When the case reached the Supreme 
Court in 2004, the EFC and Seventh-day Adventist Church submitted a joint factum in which they 
argued that courts could not rule on matters of religious doctrine and how belief is publicly 
manifested. As their factum noted, in matters of faith there are typically contrary views and the courts 
may not rule on the validity of those views. Instead, they should be limited to ruling on the sincerity 
with which beliefs are held. In addition, the interveners insisted that case law and the Québec Charter 
of Individual Rights and Liberties protected the freedom of religious expression and did not 
distinguish between obligatory and voluntary religious expressions and/or practices. The two 
interveners also identified the freedom of religious expression as a fundamental aspect of human 
dignity (EFC and The Seventh Day Adventist Church in Canada 2003a). In a 5 to 4 split the Supreme 
Court found in favour of the Orthodox believers, recognized the comprehensive nature of religion, 
and ruling that the state cannot adjudicate between contesting interpretations of religious dogma. This 
case is cited as Amselem.256 
The EFC’s press release about the decision observed that the judgement accommodated individual 
beliefs and practices.257 Benjamin Berger viewed the decision as “telling because the Court reject[ed] 
the notion that, for the purposes of law, religious freedom depends in any way on collective 
conceptions of religious precept” (2007, 286). Berger did not claim that courts “erred” when they 
conceived of religion in individual terms; rather, his point was simply that the law’s understanding of 
religion was ideologically informed by liberalism (291). It was this liberal individualism that the EFC 
challenged in a case involving a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Quebec. 
                                                     
256 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, available online at http://files.efc-
canada.net/si/Religious%20Freedom%20in%20Canada/EFC/Multani.pdf (accessed February 20, 2011). 
257 See the EFC’s press release, “The EFC applauds Supreme Court of Canada decision to protect religious 
freedom” dated 6/30/04 and available online at http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/NetCommunity/ 
Page.aspx?pid=1554 (accessed January 30, 2011). 
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In the early 1990s, the village of Lafontaine, Quebec, refused to grant a congregation of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses a permit to construct a house of worship. Initially the congregation discussed with the 
village the possibility of building a church in a residential neighbourhood but the village claimed the 
church would adversely affect tax revenue as houses of worship are tax free. The village then directed 
the community to look for land in areas already zoned for such construction, but the community could 
find no such land available. In 1992 the community purchased land in a commercial zone, very close 
to another house of worship, but the village refused to re-zone the land and offered no explanation for 
its refusal. When the case came before the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Court found no limitation of 
religious freedom in the village’s actions as the village had other lands zoned for houses of worship. 
The congregation then appealed to the Supreme Court. The factum of the EFC and the Seventh Day 
Adventist Church focused on the necessity of religious communities meeting together if they are to 
enjoy the freedoms outlined by Justice Dickson in the 1985 judgement on Sunday shopping. Given 
that the interveners viewed religion as having both individual and communal aspects, they considered 
the village’s refusal to grant the construction permit an infringement of the congregation’s right to 
worship collectively. They argued that the village’s actions amounted to a state-imposed burden, and, 
referring to the Court ruled in the Trinity case, insisted that the state may not limit or burden the 
freedom of religious expression (EFC and The Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Canada 2003b). 
However, the interveners did not acknowledge the fact that churches do not have an unlimited right to 
construct houses of worship where they will, a fact that the Court’s majority decision noted. The 
Court side-stepped the issue of the congregants’ right to worship publicly and based its decision on a 
technicality, finding that the village did not properly and fairly exercise its duties. Consequently, the 
Justices sent the matter back to the village for consideration and ordered it to address the request in a 
proper and fair manner.258 
The EFC further developed its conception of the communal aspect of religion in its legal 
documents supporting the members of the Wilson Colony of the Hutterian Brethren in Alberta who 
opposed the photo identification requirement for driver’s licenses. The EFC, together with the 
Christian Legal Fellowship (CLF), intervened in the case when it reached the Supreme Court. Their 
factum argued that “religion, is by definition, and in practice a personal commitment manifest in and 
through community” (EFC and CLF 2008, ¶16). This definition of religion expanded the protection of 
                                                     
258 Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48, 
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 650, available online at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2004/2004scc48/2004scc48.html (accessed 
March 9, 2011). 
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religious freedoms guaranteed in the Charter to include group rights. Indeed, the factum noted that 
there would be no individual Wilson members without the existence of the Colony. “Therefore, in 
order for the Wilson Members to exercise their freedom of religion, they must do it in community, 
because the community is the means by which they can exercise their s. 2a) rights” (¶24). As Wilson 
members believed that the Bible required them to live communally in rural areas, not having access to 
driver’s licenses would impair their ability to live on their rural colonies. Although the Supreme 
Court unanimously agreed that religion has collective aspects, the majority nevertheless found that 
the desire of the Alberta government to maintain the integrity of its driver’s licenses and protect its 
citizens against fraud justified the infringement of the Brethrens’ religious freedom.259 Despite the 
negative decision against the Wilson members, Hutchinson celebrated the Court’s recognition of the 
collective aspects of religion (Hutchinson 2009b).  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Trinity, Chamberlain, Amselem, and the Hutterian Brethren 
were all significant cases that clarified the legal protection of religious freedom in Canada. In many 
ways the judgements supported the desires of the EFC to a) expand the conception of religious 
freedom to include the rights of religious communities; b) have the courts protect the right of 
religious adherents to express publicly their religious convictions; and c) persuade Parliament and the 
courts to protect religious pluralism. However, EFC involvement in these cases involved more than 
winning the freedom for religious adherents. Participation involved the EFC in the power dynamics of 
the public sphere. The last section of this chapter identifies four challenges facing the EFC as it 
interacts with these dynamics. 
5.3 Challenges associated with the EFC’s legal work 
The introduction of the Charter provided a new avenue for evangelicals to clarify and extend the legal 
protection of religious freedom, given that other Canadian political institutions such as legislatures, 
executives, and bureaucracies are fairly closed to external influences (Malloy 2004, 9-13).260 Dennis 
Hoover and Kevin den Dulk offer further reasons for why the EFC began to intervene in legal cases. 
They trace evangelical and Catholic involvement in cases involving abortion, euthanasia, and 
religious education and conclude that the liberalization of the judiciary and cognizance of the 
                                                     
259 See Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, available online at 
http://scc.lexum.org/en/2009/2009scc37/2009scc37.html (accessed March 9, 2011). 
260 Malloy suggests that municipal and school board politics are more open to influence than the other levels of 
government (2004, 12).  
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importance of legal decisions motivated conservative Christian associations to litigate. Hoover and 
den Dulk reject the argument that evangelicals entered the legal system because they did not 
experience success in the political realm. Instead, they contend that evangelicals perceived the justice 
system to be adverse to their worldviews but nevertheless recognized the saliency of the issues before 
the courts. As a result, they participated in both legal and political interventions simultaneously 
(2004, 18).  
Hoover and den Dulk identify Brian Stiller as one of the most important Canadian leaders in the 
evangelical turn towards mobilization in the legal sphere. They note that by the early 1990s, the EFC 
was “one of the most frequent evangelical filers at the Canadian Supreme Court” (2004, 26). In fact, 
the EFC’s involvement in the Hutterian Brethren case in April 2009 marked its 20th appearance 
before the Supreme Court.261 However, there are a number of challenges associated with such 
involvement in the legal system. 
The first challenge concerns the tension between positive and negative rights and how the 
advocacy for positive rights reflects a power position. In many of its interventions the EFC used the 
Charter to protect and advance its causes, including the cause of religious freedom. On the one hand, 
it adopted what Thomas Bateman identifies as a liberal constitutionalist view of the Charter when it 
insisted in Trinity and Chamberlain that the primary function of the Charter is to protect the freedom 
of individuals from illegal state intrusions in their private lives (1998, 7-8). On the other hand, in the 
Hutterian Brethren case the EFC asked the government to protect not only religious freedom but also 
the ability of religious groups to live differently from the broader society without undue economic 
hardship.262 In addition, in Vriend the EFC requested the Supreme Court to exempt religious 
adherents and their associations from anti-discriminatory laws if such laws contradicted specific 
religious beliefs (EFC n.d.b).  
Although the definition of religion given by Justice Dickson in 1985 allowed for both negative and 
positive religious freedoms, there is a tension between the two types of freedoms, particularly in the 
role that each of them ascribes to the state. The EFC’s participation in issues of religious freedom 
                                                     
261 Hutchinson noted this milestone at a Christian Leaders Connection conference hosted by the EFC in 
Edmonton on January 19, 2010 at The King’s University College. In Hutchinson’s estimation, no other religious 
group has this track record. 
262 The Charter does protect some group rights, including the freedom of association, the rights of minority 
language education (Section 23), Aboriginal rights (Section 25) and preservation of Canada’s multicultural 
heritage (Section 27).   
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reflected this tension. For example, in 2003 Clemenger acknowledged that the EFC’s focus on issues 
of religious freedom was to protect religious life from incursions by the state (Clemenger 2003, 170). 
The statement reflected a classic liberal conception of jurisprudence that assumed a non-
interventionist state except in the event that it needs to intervene in order to protect the freedom of 
particular individuals or a group. As Clemenger noted in Faith Today, the Charter is to check both 
majoritarianism (by protecting minorities) and “the interests of the powerful” (Clemenger 2005e, 14). 
In these instances the state intervenes in order to protect the rights of those not strong enough to 
defend themselves. However, when the EFC called on governments to create the political and legal 
space for the public expression and exercise of faith, fund religious schools that met certain legal 
requirements, exempt religious adherents from certain laws, and recognize the public benefits of 
religion, it was asking the state to actively support religion, or more specifically, religious pluralism. 
In the areas of religious broadcasting and religious education, it asked the government to protect, if 
not enable, religious pluralism in the name of choice. In these instances it appeared that the EFC 
preferred an activist government that directly or indirectly promoted religion rather than one that 
adopted a “hands off” approach. 
In many of the cases discussed in this chapter, the Canadian courts were willing to protect both 
negative and positive rights arising from the Charter. This willingness was in contrast with the 
situation in the US where, according to Ted Jelen, judges are increasingly unwilling to exempt 
religious adherents from laws that infringe on their religious freedom unless the corresponding 
legislation specifically grants the exemption (Jelen 1999, 351). In addition, the American 
constitutional prohibition against the creation of an established church and the general acceptance of 
the separation between church and state limits the ability of the courts and governments to grant such 
positive rights as funding religious schools. In the Canadian context, with its different political and 
legal structures, judges may rule on both the negative and positive dimensions of religious freedom. 
As we have seen, the EFC contributed to the protection of both dimensions. 
However, Nancy Rosenblum is troubled by religious adherents who ask the state to actively 
promote religion. In her study of how pluralist democracies accommodate religion, she makes two 
observations that are pertinent to this chapter. First, she notes that the designation of what constitutes 
religion is important because once activities or beliefs are deemed to be religious, it is easier to claim 
that they are “deserving of democratic deference to the laws of the ‘religious polity’” (2000, 6). For 
Rosenblum, then, defining religion is a political act as it makes demands of the state and influences 
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public policy, such as funding religious schools. Indeed, the very act of a religious association 
appealing to the state to protect its religious freedom may indicate its desire to institutionalize its 
political involvement with the intention of gaining lasting influence (Jelen 1999, 350). Defining 
religion is also an act of power, as definitions typically create standards against which other religions 
are measured. For example, the EFC’s definition of secular philosophies as religious perspectives 
enabled it to call for religious access to the benefits distributed by the various levels of government. 
In many of their documents EFC leaders defined religion as comprehensive and communal. Yet not 
all religious people define their religion in this manner. However, it must be remembered that with 
regard to education, the EFC did not ask the state to protect the Christian nature of public schools, but 
only to encourage the study of religion in public schools and the public funding of a variety of 
religious schools in the name of confessional and institutional pluralism. 
Second, Rosenblum is concerned about what she terms the “integralist” approach of many religious 
associations who struggle for the right to participate in the public square as unified (religious) 
identities. In advancing their positive religious rights, these associations demand that the state ensures 
the necessary conditions for their flourishing, not only by granting them exemptions from some laws, 
but also recognizing the contributions of faith to the moral and civil life of the nation and actively 
promoting religious pluralism (2000, 16-17). One of the dangers of tying religious flourishing so 
closely with the state, Rosenblum warns, is that the religious associations eventually adopt the same 
techniques and methods of participation as secular groups, creating their own media or using public 
media to their advantage, supporting political parties and/or candidates, and forging ecumenical and 
inter-faith coalitions to intervene in political and legal processes (19). While Rosenblum is writing 
about the American context here, her larger point is that when religious associations depend on, and 
cooperate with, the state, they easily become “deformed” (182).  
This potential to be “deformed” by political interventions is the second challenge facing the EFC. 
While the organization does not support specific political parties and candidates, it uses liberal and 
secular modes of reasoning when it enters the legal system. For instance, in many of the EFC 
arguments studied in this chapter that were used to advance positive religious freedoms appealed to 
the same liberal principle of equality used by other groups seeking protection of their rights, including 
homosexuals. Although Rosenblum’s term of “deformity” may be too strong in the case of the EFC, 
the organization accommodated secular public discourse and at times subsumed particular theological 
belief to political engagement. In addition, the EFC’s involvement in broad inter-faith coalitions 
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provided greater access in that such a group was more likely to gain access to governmental benefits 
and the media than single associations representing narrow interests. However, the strategy required 
that distinctive and particular theological arguments were minimized or ignored in favour of the 
promotion of broader interests. In broad coalitions less emphasis was placed on distinctive arguments 
in the name of relevance and raising legal arguments that would be appreciated by a secular audience. 
The distinctly evangelical element of the EFC’s identity was then, at least at times, subsumed by 
political and social conservative values. 
The third challenge involves the EFC’s strategy of investing so many of its resources in the legal 
system. In his book Two Faces of Liberalism (2000), John Gray argues that liberal legal systems view 
disagreements as conflicts of fundamental rights that must be adjudicated by the courts. The problem, 
Gray contends, is that the adversarial nature of the legal system politicizes the law and reduces the 
possibility of compromise. Rather than focus on the legal system, Gray calls for a return to the arts of 
compromise and political negotiation. Unlike legal decisions, “political settlements are local, variable 
and renegotiable” (117). They may change over time and respond to specific circumstances, meaning 
that they cannot be universalized.  
Gray’s observation that adversarial liberal legal systems politicize the law and make compromises 
more difficult to achieve suggests that there are political implications to focusing so much energy on 
protecting religious freedom via the courts. EFC leaders are clear in their preference for the political 
rather than legal creation of social policy. However, Hugh Heclo views such popular arguments as 
deceptive. As he notes:  
With natural-law jurisprudence a relic of the past, politically engaged 
Christians easily succumb to viewing the essence of law as the will 
of the political sovereign, namely the people. The problem is that if 
Christians really do believe what they say, it has to follow that 
immoral policies on abortion, eugenics, euthanasia, gay marriage, 
genetic engineering, and so on are just as wrong if passed by fifty 
state legislatures as they are if decided by a handful of Supreme 
Court justices. (2007, 137) 
Heclo’s concern here is that religious groups too easily substitute process for principle. In addition, 
there is no indication that Parliamentary decisions would provide different policies than those 
mandated by the courts. While blaming the courts for liberal social policy may be a popular theme 
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with the evangelical base,263 it does not address the fact that Canadian society is largely driven by 
liberal values.  
Given the propensity of Parliament to avoid deciding on contentious issues by referring them to the 
courts, EFC leaders may justly claim that they have few options but to engage in the legal system if 
they wish to defend religious freedom. However, to do so they must play by the rules created by the 
justice system. Moreover, the EFC’s agenda comes to be determined by what is in front of the courts 
rather than developing a position on a particular issue and then negotiating with the various 
stakeholders for its adoption (as EFC leaders did in the abortion debate). The organization’s legal 
interventions may then be perceived as reactive. For example, the EFC became involved in 
broadcasting and educational issues only after the government, and especially the courts, moved to 
de-Christianize some public policy and public institutions. 
A final challenge concerns the extent to which the EFC is a “top-down” rather than a grassroots 
organization, meaning that it is not able to engage in acts of solidarity with religious minorities at the 
local level. For instance, at approximately the same time as the EFC was supporting the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Quebec in their quest to construct a house of worship, Laotian Buddhists in Toronto 
attempted to build a temple in Caledon, just north of Toronto. Once the Buddhists obtained a 
development permit some local citizens began a series of legal challenges to hinder the construction 
of the temple. As a result, the Laotian community had to undertake an environmental assessment 
study and faced land use limitations not imposed on other religious buildings in the same area 
(McLellan and White 2005). Given the EFC’s argument about the importance of houses of worship 
for religious communities, the issues facing the Laotian Buddhists provided its leaders with an 
opportunity to support a religious minority at the local level of politics. Publicly at least they did not 
comment on the case. A related issue is that some minority religions, especially those among the 
poorer immigrant and refugee groups, may require an extra measure of support for two reasons. First, 
they may conceptualize religion differently than Christianity, which some believe continues to 
undergird Western definitions of religion, and second, economic inequities impede the ability of 
minority religions to participate in the public sphere and influence public policy. The legal protection 
of religious freedom, therefore, is not sufficient to actually promote equal participation.  
                                                     
263 Some members of the American Religious Right decry activist judges. See Richard John Neuhaus, The 
Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 
1984) and Muncy, Mitchell S., Richard J. Neuhaus, William Bennett, and Robert Bork (eds.), The End of 
Democracy?: The Judicial Usurpation of Politics (Spence Publishing Co., 1997). 
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Veit Bader develops these points. Writing about the American context, he argues that constitutional 
guarantees of the free exercise of religion does not result in actual protection of all religious groups as 
it ignores cultural and political inequalities among religions. Furthermore, Bader claims, the liberal 
principle of a neutral state masks the influence of the dominant majorities and ignores the fact that 
states have a variety of means at their disposal to either hinder or support religions. Therefore legal 
recognition does not guarantee “actual” recognition (1999, 601-04, 2003a, 62-63).  
The larger issue behind these challenges is that the legal system wields power. Organizations with 
the requisite resources are able to engage with the system and employ its power in order to protect 
and advance their causes. Indeed, legal interventions require that the participants know “the rules of 
the game,” have the resources to hire lawyers, and are able to speak before the courts. According to 
Asad, the law wields power in that it prescribes certain types of living and certain types of political 
subjects. As he reminds us, “the function of law is not merely to reflect social life but also to 
reconstruct it―if necessary by force and against all opposition” (2003, 215). Nation-states do not 
employ persuasion, he argues. Instead, they employ the law, which always operates through power 
(256). For Asad, the state creates a particular type of political subject by its laws, advancement of 
particular values, and the type of arguments permitted in the public sphere. For example, those who 
desire to participate in the public sphere must use rational argumentation, which is a particular 
“liberal moral and political discourse” (1999, 180). This requirement excludes those who cannot 
create such arguments and “become particular speaking and listening subjects” (181). When the EFC 
intervenes in the legal system, it is interacting with the power of the state to create political subjects, 
define citizens, and protect religious freedom.  
The fact that power resides in the law does not suggest that legal interventions are somehow 
dishonourable or that the main objective of the EFC is to “gain power” in order to marginalize other 
groups. Instead, the point is that the EFC is comfortable acting within the structures of a secular 
liberal state and does not examine the means by which that state privileges some religions in the 
state’s “personality.” In its desire to participate, the organization adopts many of the same democratic 
liberal values that animate other actors in the public sphere, such as a high regard for the state and 
equal access to state resources. Rather than detail what a truly evangelical life might look like, the 
EFC typically seeks to reform the state so that it is more accommodating of religious belief and 
practice in order that religious adherents may have their place at the table and acquire influence. 
However, EFC literature does not address the power that resides with the guests at the table as they 
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define the nature and scope of religion and thereby constitute the “normal” against which others are 
measured.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The EFC’s emphasis on religious freedom originated from its interpretation of secularism as a threat, 
its rejection of the privatization of religion, and its conception of religion as comprehensive in nature 
and scope. From these conceptions flowed the conviction that religion was practiced both privately 
and publicly. Increasingly the EFC focused on what it perceived to be the collective aspect of 
religion. This chapter examined its arguments for religious freedom in the contexts of religious 
broadcasting, religious education in public schools, sexual orientation and educational institutions, 
and the religious freedom of minority religious groups. The study revealed that the manner in which 
the EFC defined religion and secularism had political implications. For instance, its leaders spent 
significant resources intervening in legal cases defending religious freedom. As a result, its agenda 
came to be formed, at least in part, by what cases were before the courts. In addition, some of its 
arguments were based on the liberal argument of equal access rather than theological principles. It 
was comfortable acting within the parameters created by the state and did not actively contest the 
power of the state to create those parameters.  
In the next chapter I study the EFC’s promotion of the traditional family and opposition to same-
sex marriage. More specifically, I examine the nature of the religious-political subject developed by 
the EFC as it intervened in public policy debates about marriage and the family. Of particular interest 
is how the EFC crafted its arguments and whether it grounded these arguments in religious reasoning, 




Advocating for the traditional family and heterosexual marriage 
In 2008 the EFC published an interview with Douglas Todd, the religion reporter at the Vancouver 
Sun. Todd identified three recurring news stories about evangelicals: 1) their political involvement; 2) 
their engagement in issues concerning homosexuality; and 3) their claim of persecution at the hands 
of the broader culture.264 When asked what advice he would offer evangelicals, Todd suggested that 
they de-emphasize the sex-related issues and work more closely with other faith and non-faith groups 
on issues such as the environment. In Todd’s view, the emphasis on sex-related issues drove a wedge 
between conservative Christians and almost everyone else (Church and Faith Trends 2008).265 While 
Todd’s advice may appear reasonable from a media perspective or from the point of view of a public 
relations consultant, it fails to recognize how important the issue of sexual morality is to the identity 
of evangelical individuals and groups. 
One need only examine the involvement of evangelicals in the same-sex marriage debate to get a 
sense of how significant the issues of sexual morality are to their identity. Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien’s announcement in 2003 that his government would introduce legislation to permit same-sex 
couples to marry prompted evangelicals to mobilize in numbers and with a passion not seen since the 
abortion debate in the early 1990s. Approximately 15,000 supporters of traditional marriage gathered 
on Parliament Hill in April 2005 and evangelicals created a myriad of new organizations to protect 
heterosexual marriage. The Western Standard magazine identified the emergence of a number of 
evangelical leaders in this movement, including the EFC’s Bruce Clemenger (Johnson 2005). Despite 
this activism, the Liberal dominated Parliament expanded the definition of marriage to include same-
sex unions in the summer of 2005. As the opposition, most Conservative MPs opposed the expansion. 
When the Conservatives came to power six months later, several commentators thought evangelicals 
and other members of the Canadian Religious Right would force Stephen Harper to re-open the 
debate (e.g., McDonald 2006). 
                                                     
264 For a description of how evangelicals feel persecuted by the dominant culture, see Jenny Jackson, “The fear 
of God: The religious right is afraid to speak and the left is afraid to listen” in The Ottawa Citizen (March 18, 
2006), available online at http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=7454b9e4-2bd5-4d46-
bd30-26fa7be875a0 (accessed December 27, 2010). 
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 This fear of a rising Canadian Religious Right was fuelled, at least in part, by events in the US, 
particularly the manner in which leading American social conservatives, including some evangelicals, 
opposed equality rights for gays and lesbians. For example, the Family Research Council (previously 
a division of Focus on the Family266) insisted that “sexual orientation” was not immutable or inborn 
and therefore gays and lesbians could not seek civil rights legislation to protect themselves against 
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In fact, argued the Council, 
homosexuals have not been denied civil rights as they enjoy the same freedoms of religion and speech 
and the same due process of law granted to every other American citizen (Sprigg 2007, 2-5). In 
addition, these opponents of same-sex equality rights typically portrayed homosexuals as potential 
criminals engaged in deviant and immoral behaviour (Miceli 2005, 601; Smith 2005, 226-27), linking 
homosexual behaviour with child sexual abuse, promiscuity, mental illness, domestic violence, and 
sexually transmitted diseases (Sprigg 2007, 12). Indeed, opposition to homosexual equality rights 
became an important symbol of what Wilcox, Chaves, and Franz call the “familistic ideology” of 
conservative Protestantism that advanced “traditional family values” in order to resist “modernity and 
the forces of secular liberalism it sees implicated in family change” (2004, 493). In this manner 
sexual orientation and same-sex marriage became highly polarized culture war issues, pitting gay 
rights lobby groups against, among others, the Religious Right. Member organizations of the latter 
claimed that practising homosexuals posed a threat to children and therefore should not be allowed to 
teach in public schools (Wilcox 2000, 122).  
Religious Right activists in the US advanced two additional arguments against gay rights: first, that 
gays and lesbians were wealthy members of society; and second, that they held significant political 
power. As a result, went the argument, any civil rights legislation protecting gays and lesbians against 
discrimination would further entrench their privileges (Herman 1996, 349). “No special rights” for 
homosexuals became the rallying cry as these activists insisted that gays and lesbians were not “truly 
disadvantaged” because their lifestyle was a choice (352, 356). In addition, they claimed that anti-
discrimination legislation would force them to employ homosexuals and thereby violate their 
religious beliefs (Wilcox 2000, 121). As a result, they mobilized to support state constitutional 
amendments, known as propositions, banning same-sex marriage. For example, prior to the 2008 
                                                                                                                                                                    
265 Todd lists the most influential Canadian evangelicals as: Preston Manning, David Mainse, Brian Stiller, and 
John Stackhouse (whom Todd describes as an atypical evangelical because of his intellectualism) (Church and 
Faith Trends 2008, 4).  
 
 183 
American election Focus on the Family donated $727,250 in support of Proposition 8 in California 
that recognized only heterosexual marriage (Luning 2009). 
As we will see in this chapter, the EFC did not employ the same antagonistic and inflammatory 
rhetoric as the American Religious Right, despite the fact that Canadian evangelicals generally held 
the same attitudes about same-sex marriage as the American Religious Right (Bean, Gonzalez, and 
Kaufman 2008, 902). Yet there were some similarities in strategy. While EFC leaders did not 
explicitly engage in the argument about whether or not homosexuality is a choice, its opposition 
reflected elements of the “familistic ideology” described by Wilcox, Chaves, and Franz. In addition, 
EFC leaders argued that legislation protecting gays and lesbians against discrimination could 
negatively impact religious freedom in that evangelicals and their institutions could be forced to hire 
or rent facilities to homosexuals and gay rights groups. Like the American Religious Right, the EFC 
decried activist judges, insisting that Parliament, not the courts, should make social policy. Despite 
these similarities, however, there were differences in the manner that the EFC and the Religious Right 
engaged with the issues surrounding sexual orientation. First, the EFC refused to align itself with a 
political party, unlike the move of the Religious Right into the Republican Party. Second, over time 
the EFC accepted public opinion on a number of issues, agreeing that gays and lesbians were indeed 
discriminated against in society and that the state should recognize same-sex unions in some 
manner.267 
This chapter traces the EFC’s involvement in two equality rights debates: the expansion of spousal 
benefits to same-sex couples and the redefinition of marriage to include homosexual unions. For EFC 
leaders, these issues challenged the evangelical view of “spouse” and “family” as heterosexual in 
nature. As columnist Bob Harvey wrote in Faith Today,268 evangelicals view (heterosexual) marriage 
as “a higher calling, one that benefits not only the spouses but also their children and society itself. It 
has an other-directed dimension that is not necessarily present in common-law relationships … It is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
266 Examples of how the Council interpreted and engaged with sexuality issues can be found at http://www.frc. 
org/issues (accessed December 30, 2010). 
267 The EFC was also more moderate than some other Canadian evangelical leaders such as Reverend Tristan 
Emmanuel, who believes homosexuality is a bad choice. For more on Emmanuel, see Keith Boag’s story on 
evangelicalism for the CBC, entitled “Canada’s evangelical movement: Political awakening,” and aired on June 
13, 2005. Available online at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/evangelical/ (accessed July 15, 2010). For 
examples of how these Canadian evangelicals employed some the same types of political strategies as the 
American Religious Right, see Christopher Dreher’s story in the Globe and Mail on September 23, 2006 
entitled “In Ottawa, faith makes a leap to the Right.” Available online at http://www.citizenimpact.ca/ 
leap_to_the_right.html (accessed June 23, 2010). 
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for the common good of everyone that we preserve our traditional understanding of spouse and 
family” (2000, 29). Harvey’s reference to the common good revealed the continuing presence of the 
EFC’s political model as outlined in chapter 4. In that chapter we saw that during the abortion, 
euthanasia, and reproductive technology debates, the EFC advanced a model of political engagement 
that stressed the imago Dei, the common good, ecumenism, pluralism, persuasion, and a pragmatic 
approach to politics that recognized the incremental nature of political and social change. Throughout 
the public debates about the expansion of spousal benefits and marriage to include same-sex couples, 
the same model was often evident in the EFC’s arguments.  
In their efforts to support heterosexual marriage, EFC leaders typically advanced four arguments 
against same-sex marriage. First, they insisted that they did not support discrimination against any 
group, including gays and lesbians. However, they argued that social policies enabling governments 
to treat various groups in different ways were not necessarily discriminatory. Second, they claimed 
that heterosexual marriage contributed to social stability and was the best social structure in which to 
raise children. Third, they maintained that Parliament as an elected body has the task of creating 
social policy, not the courts. Finally, they framed the issue as one of religious freedom by arguing that 
religious adherents and their organizations had the freedom to state publicly their disagreement with 
homosexual marriage without being marginalized for their views or denied public benefits. In these 
instances, EFC leaders asked the courts to balance competing equality rights with religious freedom 
and defer to the right of legislatures to create social policy. After tracing how the EFC employed 
these arguments in their opposition to the expansion of spousal benefits and marriage, I conclude the 
chapter by examining the degree to which the EFC adopted secular and liberal reasoning in its 
engagement with these issues in the public sphere.   
6.1 Opposing the expansion of gay and lesbian equality rights 
From the mid 1980s through the 1990s, Parliament and the Canadian legal system conferred an 
increasing number of social benefits on homosexual relationships. Much of the impetus for change 
came from legal rulings. The EFC viewed the extension of spousal benefits to gays and lesbians as a 
threat to heterosexual marriage and the family. The traditional family deserved protection, Stiller 
argued, because it was the institution in which members “learn about self, responsibility and others” 
                                                                                                                                                                    
268 Harvey was the religion reporter at the Ottawa Citizen until 2005. 
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(Stiller 1994b, 14). In these types of arguments the EFC emphasized the socialization aspects of 
family.  
Despite their strong support for families, EFC leaders typically did not romanticize the traditional 
conception of the institution. For instance, Stiller advised men to break the stereotypes of what it 
meant to be a father and not be threatened by their wives’ ambitions and economic independence 
(1988c, 24). For Stiller, “whenever a father succumbs to the macho model imposed on males he cuts 
himself off from the joy and fulfillment in caring for the emotional needs of the child” (23). In 
addition, the EFC recognized that abuse occurs in some families. As the EFC’s Social Action 
Commission acknowledged in a paper entitled “Abuse in homes and church communities,” too often 
the church denied abuse, whether in families or among church workers. The Commission identified 
the sins of abuse as violating the integrity of relationships, misusing power, disregarding personal 
dignity, and betraying trust (EFC 1996b, 3-4).269  
Documents produced by the EFC during the debates surrounding homosexual rights and benefits 
defined marriage as religious in its origin and nature and social in its purpose. In terms of its religious 
elements, the EFC conceptualized marriage as part of the created order as recorded in the biblical 
account of Genesis 1 and 2 in which Adam and Eve were created in God’s image to provide 
companionship to, and assume responsibility for, each other. As an EFC position paper claimed, 
marriage “is symbolic of God’s relationship to his people and Jesus Christ’s relationship to his 
church” (1996c, 2). Elsewhere the EFC described marriage as covenantal in that it binds a man and a 
woman together to become “one flesh” (2003b, 2-3).270 Since God is the author of marriage, the EFC 
understood its heterosexual nature as normative and universal. The role of the state was to recognize 
and support it. As for the social role of marriage, the EFC viewed it as “the relationship upon which 
human society is founded” (1996c, 2), meaning that its leaders viewed marriage as the foundation of 
the social order. 
Marriage is unique among all relationships, the EFC claimed, because it alone has the task of 
procreation and the socialization of children. Its leaders often reminded the courts that gay and 
lesbian relationships are incapable of having children without involving a third party. It was the 
biological role of procreation, with its concomitant responsibilities and obligations, which made 
                                                     
269 In 1986 Stiller called pastors to be vigilant against incest, which he identified as a greater evil than the sin of 
homosexuality. He asked pastors to “take a look at what we’re saying to our men” (1986b, 51). 
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heterosexual marriage a distinct relationship that required specific social policies not available to 
other types of relationships. In addition, EFC leaders petitioned the government to create tax policies 
that supported families by recognizing the cost of raising children (EFC 1999d).  
The EFC summarized the benefits of a traditionally structured family in the following manner: 
A family … is a community uniquely suited to teach and transmit 
cultural, ethical, social, spiritual and religious values essential for the 
development and well-being of its own members and society as a 
whole. The family is also a binding permanent commitment to past, 
present and future generations and as such is the cement that holds 
society together. In addition, the family is the source for the 
relationships that provide health, education and welfare benefits that 
meet the needs of individuals without cost to the taxpayer. The 
family has been the foundation social structure from time 
immemorial in all societies. Although not perfect, no better system 
has ever been devised in which to raise children and to care for the 
disabled and the aged. (1999e, 1)271 
In short, the EFC conceptualized the family as an institution serving the needs of children and 
supporting the aged, disabled, and ill. Due to these multiple functions, the EFC refused to reduce the 
family to a legal agreement. 
While evangelicals have a long history of promoting and protecting the traditional family, much of 
their political involvement began in 1969 when Trudeau liberalized social policy. At the time, easier 
access to divorce attracted far greater attention than the de-criminalization of homosexuality (Smith 
2005, 226). However, as more evangelicals engaged in the practice of divorce, fewer evangelical 
leaders spoke against it. This phenomenon also occurred in the US. As Nathaniel Klemp and Stephen 
Macedo note in their study of the American Christian Right, same-sex marriage became a pivotal 
issue among evangelicals because “the gay and lesbian lifestyle is alien to many Americans” and 
therefore a more powerful “tool of mobilization” than divorce (2009, 237). 
In Canada the issue of gay equality rights first drew the attention of social conservatives shortly 
after Trudeau repatriated the Constitution with its new Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. 
Three years later the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights, commissioned with the task of 
ensuring that all legislation conformed to the equality rights stipulated in section 15 of the Charter, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
270 This statement does not reflect the fact that the structure of marriage and families has changed significantly 
over time. 
271 This statement ignores how family structures are constituted differently in various cultures around the world.  
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recommended that the Human Rights Act be amended to include “sexual orientation” as one of the 
grounds on which it would be illegal to discriminate. When the federal government said it intended to 
introduce legislation to amend the Act, the EFC’s Social Action Commission submitted a brief to the 
government in which it agreed that “homosexuals should have the same rights as everyone else in 
Canada” (EFC 1986, 1) but objected to the amendment for three reasons.272 First, the Commission 
argued that the amendment was not needed because homosexual relationships were legal as long as 
they were between consenting adults and because homosexuals already enjoyed protection against 
discrimination and inequality in that they had the same rights and protections as other Canadians.273 
Moreover, it claimed that Parliament intentionally excluded sexual orientation in the list of 
characteristics for which it was illegal to discriminate when it created the Charter. Second, the 
Commission worried that the lack of definition of the term “sexual orientation” could unintentionally 
create protection for various “sexual aberrations” (3). Third, it insisted that the proposed legislation 
made “government more intrusive than is justifiable in a free and democratic society” (1). More 
specifically, the Commission feared that the amendment would limit the ability of religious volunteer 
agencies to “set their own standards” regarding volunteers, of landlords to refuse to rent space to 
homosexuals, and of religious schools to teach “biblical doctrines of sexuality.”274 It wondered what 
type of pressure would be placed on public schools to present homosexuality as normative and 
morally equivalent to heterosexuality, and about the eventual possibility of same-sex marriage (2-
3).275 When Stiller summarized the EFC’s position on the amendment in Faith Today, he titled his 
article “Rights or special protection?” and claimed that the amendment not only protected a certain 
lifestyle but required the public to support that lifestyle, thereby making the legislation quite 
intrusive. He differentiated between the responsibility of human rights codes to “protect people from 
discrimination based on unchangeable, morally neutral characteristics such as race, color, nationality 
or sex” and the desire of some to protect particular life-styles (Stiller 1987d, 55, 70). While the EFC 
did not overtly say that homosexuality was a choice rather than an aspect of some people’s identity or 
a genetic disposition, Stiller’s differentiation between unchangeable characteristics and lifestyles 
                                                     
272 The EFC presented this brief directly to Prime Minister Mulroney (Faith Today 1986a, 71). 
273 No subsequent EFC document argued that homosexuals did not suffer discrimination in Canadian society. 
274 As one EFC online document stated, “Discussing and developing norms for sexual behaviour is one of the 
central social roles of religion. All religions do this, whatever their particular views on homosexual behaviour” 
(n.d. “Hate propaganda: Talking points on Bill C-250.” Available online at http://files.efc-canada.net/si/ 
Religious%20Freedom%20in%20Canada/EFC/Bill%20C-250%20Talking%20Points.pdf (accessed February 
21, 2011).  
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suggests that the latter is a choice and that choices are not protected by the Charter. However, this 
was a specious argument as the Charter does indeed protect choices, including the choices individuals 
make about what religious beliefs they will follow.  
When Parliament did not pass the amendment, equality rights activists changed their strategy and 
employed the Charter in their quest to change social policy, meaning that they sought change through 
the courts. The first case began in 1985 when Brian Mossop, an employee of the federal government, 
applied for bereavement leave in order to attend the funeral of the father of his gay partner. When the 
government refused, Mossop sued, arguing that the federal government’s heterosexual definition of 
“family” was discriminatory. In his comments on the case in Faith Today, Paul Marshall sympathized 
with Mossop’s situation and agreed that Mossop should have been given time off to attend the 
funeral. But Marshall disagreed with Mossop’s attempt to redefine the family and thereby eliminate 
privileges granted to heterosexual married couples. He believed that the policy changes sought by 
Mossop would grant couples the benefits of marriage without any of its liabilities and duties, resulting 
in the further erosion of the institution of marriage. Marshall insisted that although the government 
may not enforce a Christian view of marriage, it does have the responsibility to “protect the 
institutions of marriage and family” by ensuring that federal policies do not undercut marriage (1990, 
12). In 1993 the Supreme Court narrowly ruled against Mossop.276  
In the early 1990s a second case in Ontario challenged heterosexual marriage. In Layland v. 
Ontario (1993), two gay men sued the province of Ontario after a city clerk in Ottawa refused their 
application for a marriage license. The majority of the Ontario Divisional Court did not find the 
common law definition of marriage discriminatory.277 When the appellants appealed the decision, the 
EFC sought and received intervener status, although the appeal was abandoned before it reached the 
Court.278 However, the EFC had already prepared its factum, which argued on the basis of common 
law that marriage was heterosexual and had as one of its principle functions the creation and 
maintenance of families. In its factum the EFC denied that the common law definition of marriage as 
heterosexual was discriminatory against homosexual couples because the exclusion of homosexual 
                                                                                                                                                                    
275 The Commission noted with concern the implicit assumption in the government’s amendment that religious 
objections to homosexuality were “arbitrary or irrelevant” (EFC 1986, 4). 
276 Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554. Available online at http://scc.lexum.org/en/ 
1993/1993scr1-554/1993scr1-554.html (accessed March 9, 2011). 
277 Layland v. Ontario (1993), 104 DLR (4th) 214.  
278 The two original applicants ended their relationship before the Divisional Court released its ruling. Two 
other men became the applicants for the purpose of appeal but later abandoned it.  
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relationships was based on the common law interpretation of marriage, not on the personal 
characteristics of the applicants (n.d.c ¶41). In what became a common EFC argument, the 
organization insisted that distinctions between individuals and groups were not inherently 
discriminatory (¶45). A second argument was that common law should be reformed only by 
Parliament, as “the court may not be in a position to appreciate fully the economic and policy issues 
underlying the choice it is asked to make” (¶27). An ancillary argument noted that all of the world’s 
major religions view marriage as heterosexual (¶67). 
The first indication of change occurred two years later in 1995. In Egan v. Canada the Supreme 
Court ruled against the claim that same-sex couples should receive the spousal pension distributed by 
the Old Age Security Act. Although the Court upheld the heterosexual definition of marriage it 
nevertheless recognized for the first time that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
violated the equality rights of gays and lesbians.279 After a number of other legal cases expanded 
homosexual equality rights (including an Ontario case where the judge ruled that gay couples have 
the right to adopt children), the federal government introduced legislation (Bill C-33) to amend the 
Human Rights Act and protect gays and lesbians from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation with regard to employment and access to goods and services. In its 1996 submission to the 
Parliamentary committee studying the amendment, the EFC summarized its opposition in the 
following manner: 
The EFC believes that it is not the role of the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission, nor human rights legislation in general, to 
determine what is or is not a family, who is or is not a spouse and to 
sanction particular lifestyle choices or relationships within society 
where those choices are not morally neutral and where the labels 
placed on such relationships would not accord with a broad 
consensus. A formal amendment to the CHRA would do more than 
simply confirm that which has already been judicially determined. A 
formal amendment would serve as public sanction of homosexual 
relationships and would significantly challenge long held institutions 
of marriage and family. (1996d, 7)  
The last sentence reveals the crux of the matter for EFC leaders, who did not want homosexual 
relationships to have the same public and moral standing as heterosexual marriages. They worried 
                                                     
279 Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. Available online at http://scc.lexum.org/en/1995/1995scr2-513/ 
1995scr2-513.html (accessed March 9, 2011). As the nine judges released four separate reasons, the issue 
remained open to debate. 
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that the amendment could lead to the expansion of spousal benefits to same-sex couples (as had 
already occurred in Ontario) and eventually the redefinition of the terms “spouse” and “marriage” (3, 
5). Equally concerning for EFC leaders was the lack of definition for the term “sexual orientation” 
which for them revealed a lack of clarity about the protections guaranteed in the amendment. They 
asked whether the protection of sexual orientation would extend to “all forms of expression,” 
including behaviour and lifestyle (7). The Charter and original human rights legislation, they argued, 
protect citizens against unequal treatment based on who they are, not what they do (8).280 Despite 
these arguments, Parliament passed the legislation.  
In the same year as the government debated Bill C-33, the EFC released its position paper on 
marriage entitled “Marriage and family status in Canada.” In it the EFC insisted that spousal benefits 
should be limited to heterosexual marriage given that women who leave the workforce to have and 
raise children are economically dependent on their husbands. In the case of marriage breakdown, 
spousal benefits ensure that women and their children do not live in poverty. For the EFC, then, 
spousal benefits applied only to heterosexual marriage (with some also applicable to opposite sex 
common-law partners). However, this position ignored the fact that a homosexual parent may also be 
dependent on their partner. While EFC leaders recognized that there may be inequities in other 
relationships of dependency, they insisted that the inequities be addressed in a manner that protected 
heterosexual marriage, perhaps by creating a new category of relationships such as “households,” in 
which partners would receive benefits on the basis of dependency, not conjugality (EFC 1996c, 4, 7).  
EFC leaders employed many of the same arguments developed in the position paper two years later 
when they intervened in M v. H (1998), a case involving a lesbian couple in Ontario that split up. 
After the separation M. sued H. for spousal support payments. At the time the province’s Family Law 
Act disallowed same-sex couples from applying for spousal benefits upon the dissolution of a 
relationship because it defined “spouse” in heterosexual terms. The EFC intervened as a member of 
The Interfaith Coalition (the other Coalition members included the Ontario Council of Sikhs, Focus 
on the Family, and the Islamic Society of North America). The Coalition’s factum advanced four 
                                                     
280 CPJ, virtually alone among evangelical groups to support the Bill, urged the government to establish a 
category called “registered domestic partnerships,” which would include all types of committed relationships 
such as siblings, friends sharing accommodations, and homosexual couples. CPJ suggested two benefits to 
using this approach. First, the government would not legislate on the basis of sexual activity but commitment; 
and second, it did not threaten the definition and understanding of marriage. Clemenger, at that time the EFC’s 
director of national affairs in the EFC’s Ottawa office, expressed some reservations about CPJ’s proposal, 
suggesting that the registered domestic partnerships sounded too much like marriage (Harvey 1996, 14).  
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basic arguments. First, it argued for continued legislative support for heterosexual spouses given their 
unique role in bearing and raising children (Interfaith Coalition n.d. [1998?], ¶2). Second, it insisted 
that the intent of spousal benefits was to protect dependent women and children and thus was not 
applicable to same-sex couples (¶3-4). Third, it interpreted the complainant’s intent as desiring to 
change the definition of “spouse,” which should be the prerogative of Parliament, not the courts (¶5-
7). Finally, it pointed out that the courts rejected “formal equality,” thereby recognizing that the 
different treatment of individuals or groups did not in and of itself result in inequality, especially 
when the intent of the distinction was to protect vulnerable groups. In the case of spousal benefits, the 
Coalition observed, the distinction centred on the basis of “spousal status” and not sexual orientation. 
As other relationships of economic dependency and emotional support were also treated distinctly 
from heterosexual couples, the distinction in and of itself was not discriminatory (¶20-26). Even if 
spousal benefits were to include same-sex couples, the Coalition argued, they would still be under-
inclusive as a variety of other types of “economically inter-dependent domestic partnerships” would 
then be discriminated against. Therefore it urged the Court to consider the implications of such an 
expansion of the benefits. Not only would there be less money for heterosexual spouses, but the 
expansion would re-write legislation and dramatically alter the family and social structures (¶46, 48, 
51).  
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and ruled that the law must treat same-sex couples in 
the same manner as heterosexual common-law partners. However, the Court limited its ruling on the 
use of the term “spouse” to the section of the Act that addressed spousal support, a section in which 
the Act defined “spouse” more broadly than in the other sections in order to include heterosexual 
common-law couples.281 In response, the Ontario government created a new category of “same-sex 
partner” to address the necessary legislative changes and the Liberal government under Prime 
Minister Chrétien introduced Bill C-23 to amend the federal law regarding the disbursement of 
spousal benefits. Like the Supreme Court ruling, the federal government reserved the term “marriage” 
for heterosexual couples but expanded the definition of common-law relationships to include same-
sex relationships.282  
The Eagan and M v. H cases represented significant turning points for those seeking equality rights 
for homosexuals. They also reflected a change in strategy for the EFC as they marked the first time 
                                                     
281 M. v. H. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. Available online at http://scc.lexum.org/en/1999/1999scr2-3/1999scr2-3.html 
(accessed March 9, 2011). 
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that the organization argued for the expansion of spousal benefits to include other types of 
economically dependent relationships. Many subsequent EFC legal and political interventions 
repeated the argument (e.g., 1999e, 1), especially during the same-sex marriage debate. EFC leaders 
objected to the use of conjugality to define common-law relationships, including same-sex 
relationships, for two reasons: 1) it required the government to inquire into one’s sexual activity and 
thus made the government too intrusive; and 2) it discriminated against those who live together but 
are not sexually intimate, such as two sisters, a parent and unmarried adult child, or two friends (EFC 
2000d).  
Three trends are evident from this overview of the EFC’s interventions against the expansion of 
social programs to include same-sex relationships. First, EFC leaders consistently argued that a 
traditional family provided the best structure in which to raise children and therefore they continued 
to identify procreation as a fundamental aspect of marriage and family. In this matter they reflected a 
muted form of the “familistic ideology” developed by American Religious Right activists. Second, 
they were increasingly willing to differentiate the term “spouse” from “marriage” and accept the 
state’s authority to define “spouse.” In addition, EFC leaders acknowledged that same-sex 
relationships must be recognized in some manner in the law and accorded some social benefits. These 
changes of position suggest that the broader social culture influenced the organization. Its leaders 
accepted the decisions of legislatures and the courts, even when the decisions differed from accepted 
evangelical principles. This occurrence reflected the process Casanova described in his study of 
public religions. Building on the analysis of feminists, he noted that deprivatization “introduces 
publicity, that is, intersubjective norms into the private sphere” as well as morality into the public 
spheres of the state and the economy (1994, 217). In comparison, many organizations within the 
American Religious Right continued to “oppose any public legitimation of gays and lesbians” and 
“condemn any national, state, or local laws that prohibit discrimination against gays and lesbians in 
housing and employment” (Wilcox 2000, 121). Third, in their arguments to protect traditional 
conceptions of marriage and family, EFC leaders rarely used specifically religious language in their 
interventions, with at least two exceptions: they based their conception of marriage on Genesis 1 and 
2 (EFC 1996c); and they insisted that marriage mirrors “the intimate relationship which God desires 
to have with His people” (2000d, 3). Some activists in the American Religious Right adopted a 
similar strategy when they employed the secularized discourse of rights in their portrayal of gays and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
282 On June 9, 1999, Parliament passed a motion defining marriage in heterosexual terms for the first time. 
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lesbians as undeserving of minority rights (Herman 1996). These three trends continued in EFC 
arguments against same-sex marriage, which, from the evangelical point of view, fulfilled the 
“slippery slope” argument that the expansion of spousal benefits to include same-sex couples would 
be the first step towards the redefinition of marriage.  
6.2 The same-sex marriage debate 
Shortly after the M v. H ruling and the resulting federal legislation expanding spousal benefits, those 
involved in the struggle to gain equality rights for non-heterosexual couples perceived a “lack of 
political will to enact legislation reform” and decided to launch a series of Charter challenges against 
the heterosexual definition of marriage (MacEachern and Knapp 2004, 3-4). Beginning in 2000, three 
gay couples applied for marriage licenses in BC (Egale Canada Inc. v. Canada [AG]), Quebec 
(Hendricks c. Québec), and Ontario (Halpern v. Canada [AG]). The first court to rule in their favour 
and find the heterosexual definition of marriage unconstitutional was the Ontario Divisional Court.283 
The EFC participated in all three of these cases: as a member of the Interfaith Coalition for Marriage 
(IFCM), alternatively known as the Interfaith Coalition for Marriage and Family (ICMF), in the Egale 
and Halpern cases284 and with The Catholic Civil Rights League in the appeal of Hendricks to 
Québec’s Court of Appeal. As one factum explained, same-sex marriage was not a peripheral issue 
for the Coalition members because it violated the “foundational anthropology of the person” as 
posited by some faith traditions (IFCM 2002, ¶10). Furthermore, the Coalition insisted that cultural 
changes permeate religious as well as secular communities, impacting “the identity and practices of 
religious communities” (ICMF 2003, 11).285  
                                                     
283 Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 95 C.R.R. (2d) 1. See “Synopsis of Halpern et al v. Attorney 
General of Canada et al,” online at http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2003/june/halpernsynopsis.htm. 
The BC case is referenced as EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2001), 88 C.R.R. (2d) 322, 
2001 BCSC 1365; and EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 38 R.F.L. (5th) 32, 2003 
BCCA 251, while the Quebec case is referenced as 36 R.F.L. (5th) 127; and Hendricks v. Québec (Procureur 
général), [2002] R.J.Q. 2506. 
284 The Coalition partners varied with each case. Coalition members in the BC case at the Supreme Court 
included the Archdiocese of Vancouver, BC Council of Sikhs, BC Muslim Association, the EFC, Islamic 
Society of North America, Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ontario Council of Sikhs, and The Catholic 
Civil Rights League.  According to Pamela Dickey Young, the EFC was one of the key members in the various 
Interfaith Coalitions (2006, 21n3). The willingness of EFC leaders to work with a variety of faith groups to 
achieve a common goal reflected Stiller’s distrust of sectarianism.  
285 Intervening in the legal cases about the redefinition of marriage cost the EFC over $250,000. Affiliate fees 
covered less than 10 percent of this cost (Faith Today 2005a, 15). The Australian Evangelical Alliance used 
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The three Coalition factums were similar to each other. For instance, in each case the Coalition 
argued that the world’s major religions interpret marriage as between one woman and one man.286 
They specifically focused on the Roman Catholic, Protestant evangelical, Islamic, and Jewish 
conceptions of marriage. Three other common arguments included the belief that the same-sex 
marriage issue was one of social policy rather than human rights, that pluralism provided political and 
civil space for dissent, and that the expansion of marriage to include same-sex couples threatened 
religious freedom. We look at each of these arguments in turn. 
6.2.1 Marriage as a social policy issue 
In all of their arguments against same-sex marriage, EFC leaders argued that heterosexual marriage 
focused on children while same-sex marriage focused on the adults in the relationship. The 
implication was that homosexual relationships provided a less desirable environment for children. As 
the EFC noted on its website:   
The interest of the state is for children and should not have as its 
primary interest, the romantic relationships of adults. Same-sex 
marriage really means accepting that marriage is intended primarily 
for the benefit of adults, and children are given only a second 
consideration. This viewpoint undermines the preservation of the 
state, because out society’s survival is dependent on our children 
who will form the next generation. We already know that the 
institutional, historical and universal view of marriage provides the 
best environment in which to raise our children. (n.d.e) 
This statement reflected the EFC’s interpretation of the same-sex marriage issue as a social rather 
than a rights issue. It was indicative of the fear of EFC leaders that the expansion of the terms 
“spouse,” “marriage,” and “family” would result in less legislation that supported “stable families and 
acknowledge their important contribution to the common good” (Harvey 2000, 29). In other words, 
they thought that same-sex marriage would jeopardize the special status that heterosexual marriage 
had in the law. Social policy that treated heterosexual marriage differently than other types of 
relationships was not discriminatory, they argued, because the distinction was based on the unique 
                                                                                                                                                                    
materials produced by the EFC in its support of heterosexual marriage. Australian political leaders chose to 
continue defining marriage as a heterosexual union (15). 
286 However, the factums did not fully acknowledge the internal divisions that existed among adherents of the 
world’s largest faith traditions with regard to same-sex unions. For example, the factums described “The Roman 
Catholic Conception of Marriage” without recognizing the internal diversity among Catholics. In the Coalition’s 
defence, opposition to same-sex marriage was and remains the position of the Vatican. 
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procreational aspect of marriage and family. Even though same-sex couples were able to use a variety 
of reproductive technologies to have children, the begetting of children still required a male and a 
female.287 Of particular importance to EFC leaders was the fact that no jurisprudence outside Canada 
had found the heterosexual nature of marriage to be in violation of a group’s human rights. Where 
same-sex marriage was recognized – at the time in Belgium and the Netherlands – the decision was 
made on the basis of politics, not rights. They pointed out that in countries that recognized domestic 
partnerships, heterosexual marriage continued to be treated distinctively as domestic partnerships did 
not receive all of the benefits given to married heterosexual couples (EFC 2003b, 10). 
The EFC’s link between marriage and procreation comes from Roman Catholic thought and is not 
without its difficulties for Protestants. The Catholic Church hierarchy conflates sexual intercourse, 
marriage, and reproduction, viewing all three as complementary and part of the natural law. In 
contrast, while Protestants also view sexual intercourse as limited to marriage, they do not require that 
it be for the purpose of reproduction. Hence they permit the use of artificial birth control and even in 
vitro reproduction. However, these differences were subsumed to allow Catholics and Protestants to 
join forces to protect the traditional family.  
Given that EFC leaders deemed same-sex marriage to be an issue of social policy and not human 
rights, they urged the courts to defer to Parliament to create social policy. As Doug Cryer, the EFC’s 
former social policy director, explained, courts examine particular cases “rather than considering the 
broader social ramifications, which is something governments have the ability to do” (Faith Today 
2007, 15). Similarly the Interfaith Coalition insisted that changing the definition of marriage as found 
in the common law was “a matter of judgment informed by moral and political philosophy, religious 
insight, anthropology, sociology, and many other disciplines.” Since judges had “no special insight 
into these matters” they should not change the common law (ICMF 2003, 14). The coalition sought 
legislative deference in Egale because the case involved colliding rights (IFCM 2002, ¶45) and 
because the coalition believed that significant social change requires “incremental legislative 
                                                     
287 The courts rejected these arguments because opposite-sex partners were able to marry but same-sex ones 
were not. In response to the emphasis of procreation in heterosexual marriage, the courts stated that same-sex 
couples also have children and that marriage has more purposes than that of procreation (MacEachern and 
Knapp 2004, 5). 
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initiatives” (¶48), not judicial fiat.288 Yet at the same time the Coalition argued in Halpern that since 
marriage predated the state, the state had little jurisdiction to change it (¶2-4).  
In their various publications the EFC and its Coalition partners separated the extension of spousal 
benefits from homosexual marriage. They did not contest the expansion of benefits but stated that 
such expansion did not require the redefinition of marriage (ICMF 2003, 1-2; EFC 2003b, 13). 
However, they did not identify how the social impacts of homosexual marriage differed from those 
derived from the expansion of benefits. 
6.2.2 The pluralism argument 
In Halpern the Coalition argued that if the Court changed the definition of marriage, it “would, in 
effect, be stating what beliefs should operate in the public sphere on a matter of fundamental 
importance where the claims of one group involve widespread philosophical rejection of the very 
social foundations upheld by other groups” (IFCM 2002, ¶55). Essentially, what was at stake, the 
Coalition claimed, was whether tolerance and pluralism actually existed in Canada, as “freedom 
requires a respect for diverse beliefs” (¶60). Instead of judicial fiat, the coalition advocated for the 
allowance of disagreement over the issue and the recognition that such disagreement was an 
expression of pluralism protected by the Charter. If the Court ruled against the freedom of 
disagreement, then the coalition asked for guaranteed exemptions for religion and conscience (ICMF 
2003, 26; 2002, ¶59). 
Despite the Coalition’s dedication to heterosexual marriage, it acknowledged that same-sex 
couples’ rights were violated when their unions were not institutionally recognized in some manner 
(ICMF 2003, 16). Elsewhere the EFC argued that if inequality existed between same-sex unions and 
heterosexual marriage, the government must address the existent inequality, not eliminate difference. 
For example, it argued that “inequality on the basis of sex or race is not addressed by redefining sex 
or race to eliminate difference, but by treating different sexes and different races equally” (2003b, 
13). The EFC further argued that definitions by their nature make distinctions in order to preserve the 
essence of the thing being defined. According to its leaders, tolerance and pluralism are eroded when 
differences and distinctions are legislated away (2003b, 13-14). 
                                                     
288 The EFC and its Coalition partners note that the Supreme Court has ruled that changes to the common law 




6.2.3 Same-sex marriage as a threat to religious freedom 
The Coalitions linked the argument that pluralism created considerable space for dissent and opposing 
viewpoints with the belief that religious freedom was threatened by same-sex marriage. In Egale, the 
Coalition argued that the use of such terms as “heterosexism” or “homophobia” was an attempt “to 
turn the respectful disagreement with homosexual conduct into an ‘ism’ akin to racism.” For the 
Coalition members, such stereotyping “stigmatizes religious traditions, threatens those who oppose 
[gay marriage] and fractures civil discourse” (IFCM 2002, ¶10).  
At the same time, the Coalition argued that the religious freedom of the liberal Jewish Rabbis who 
supported the appellants was not limited by the heterosexual definition of marriage, as the Rabbis 
were free to solemnize same-sex relationships as marriages. As its factum stated, “there is no coercion 
to follow the religious beliefs of the majority” (IFCM 2002, ¶37). Drawing from the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Adler (1996), the Coalition argued “that the failure of the state to legislate support for 
particular religious practices did not violate those beliefs” (¶40). Its Halpern factum reminded the 
Court that at issue was “the demand for social recognition … a demand from those who do not accept 
same-sex relationships as marriages” (ICMF 2003, 18). For Coalition members, then, the case was 
not about making unconstitutional legislation more constitutional or aligning common law with 
Charter rights. Instead, it was about social recognition and “complete legislative prescription.” It was 
about social policy and determining what beliefs may operate in the public sphere (ICMF 2002, ¶55). 
Consequently, the Coalition factums urged the Court to interpret any calls for changes to social policy 
within the context of other Charter rights and freedoms, such as multiculturalism and religious 
freedom (¶46 and ICMF 2003, 19). As there were competing rights, any changes were the 
responsibility of the legislatures, not the courts. Furthermore, it was not discriminatory for a 
legislature to distinguish between different types of relationships in order to support social stability.  
As these cases appeared before the courts, the Liberal government created a committee to hold 
hearings across the country and consider the different options available to address the rulings of the 
lower courts with regard to same-sex marriage. Given this legislative process, the Coalition in 
Halpern argued that a redefinition of marriage was not necessary. When the Ontario Court of Appeal 
ruled in 2003 to redefine marriage to include homosexual couples effective immediately, the 
legislative committee advised the federal government to abandon its appeals of all three cases. 
According to Clemenger, the committee was divided on the recommendation with the Chair breaking 
the tie vote “prior to the arrival of a Committee member known to oppose the redefinition of 
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marriage. The Committee remained deeply divided and no official report was forthcoming” (2006i). It 
was at this time that Clemenger assumed the EFC presidency. He spent much of his time during his 
first year addressing the federal government’s draft legislation that redefined marriage as “the lawful 
union of two persons to the exclusion of all others” (Department of Justice 2004). 
The federal government sent its draft legislation and three reference questions to the Supreme 
Court to ensure the constitutionality of the proposed legislation.289 Yet the Interfaith Coalition 
continued its interventions in the courts, attempting to appeal the Halpern decision to the Supreme 
Court and the Hendricks case to the Quebec Court of Appeal. The federal government, the Halpern 
appellants, and the Metropolitan Community Church moved to quash the first appeal, which the 
Supreme Court did, citing that concerned parties could present their arguments during the hearing on 
the reference questions. In a letter to the Justice Minister, Epp Buckingham stated that the Coalition 
wanted to appeal the decision because the reference questions did not ask whether heterosexual 
marriage violated the equality section of the Charter, or whether there were options other than 
redefining marriage that would satisfy Charter equality rights (2003). Subsequently the Justice 
Minister added a fourth reference question that asked the Supreme Court whether heterosexual 
marriage violated Charter principles. The Quebec Court of Appeal refused to hear the Hendricks case 
for similar reasons as those cited by the Supreme Court in its refusal to hear the Halpern appeal; 
namely, that the federal government had already submitted reference questions to the Supreme 
Court.290 
The Interfaith Coalition intervened in the Supreme Court’s deliberations about the reference 
questions.291 Its factum focused on the lack of protection the proposed legislation offered religious 
institutions and clergy (question 3) and insisted that the Charter did not require a redefinition of 
marriage (question 4). The issues raised with regard to question 4 were similar to those raised by the 
Coalition in the Egale and Halpern cases: that equality must be considered in light of their contexts, 
including the religious context, and that marriage predates the law. Unlike the term “spouse,” 
legislation does not create or define “marriage.” The Coalition argued that the government’s 
                                                     
289 The three questions asked whether Parliament had the authority to define marriage, whether the expansion of 
marriage to include same-sex relationships was consistent with Charter principles, and whether the protection of 
religious freedom guaranteed in the Charter protected religious officials from being forced to perform same-sex 
marriages if they consider such marriage to be contrary to their religious beliefs (Department of Justice 2004). 
290 To view the EFC’s press release on the matter, see http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/Page.aspx?pid=1018 
(accessed February 21, 2011). 
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recognition of the institution of marriage as heterosexual was not discriminatory as the government 
had a mandate to “promote social stability” and that heterosexual marriage contributes to social 
stability. The discriminatory element, the Coalition conceded, was the omission of recognizing non-
heterosexual relationships. It urged the courts to employ another remedy rather than redefining 
marriage (ICMF 2004). In addition, the Coalition pointed out to the Court that support for same-sex 
marriage was being used as a litmus test for participation in public life (¶33).  
In an effort to protect religious freedom, the legislation included a clause stating: “Nothing in this 
Act affects the freedom of officials of religious groups to refuse to perform marriages that are not in 
accordance with their religious beliefs.” However, the Coalition found such protection hollow 
because the solemnization of marriage is within provincial jurisdiction and therefore only provinces 
are able to provide real protection. Moreover, it argued, the legislation did not protect lay persons, 
provincial marriage commissioners, and the charitable status of organizations committed to 
heterosexual marriage (ICMF 2004, ¶27-31).  
Two months after hearing the arguments about the reference questions the Supreme Court released 
its decision in December 2004,292 ruling that the federal government had the exclusive jurisdiction to 
define marriage, that the proposed legislation concurred with the Charter, and that religious officials 
cannot be forced to perform same-sex marriages if doing so violates their beliefs (see also Clemenger 
2005i). However, the Court did not rule on the fourth question about whether the Charter required a 
change as the federal government had already abandoned its legal appeals to keep the heterosexual 
definition and drafted new legislation. 
The Supreme Court ruling paved the way for the government to table Bill C-38, The Civil 
Marriage Act, which defined marriage as the exclusive union of two people. In the subsequent debate, 
EFC leaders called on the provinces to safeguard religious freedom (Epp Buckingham 2005b, 3). 
Given that the Court did not rule on the question of whether the government had to redefine marriage, 
the EFC stated that the federal government’s argument “that the Charter requires the redefinition of 
marriage uses the Charter as a sword to refashion society rather than as the shield it was intended to 
be to protect society from unwarranted government intrusion” (2005, 5, italics in original). In the 
EFC’s submission to the legislative committee studying the Bill, Epp Buckingham argued that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
291 In this case the Coalition consisted of the Islamic Society of North America, the Catholic Civil Rights 
League, and the EFC. 
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“equality allows separate treatment. What it prohibits is treatment that is unequal. If gays and lesbians 
have equal benefit of the law, it meets the requirements of the Charter. The Charter was enacted to 
support human rights in Canada, not social engineering” (EFC 2005, 5, italics in original). In 
addition, she called on the federal government to study the social implications of redefining marriage 
before changing legislation (6). 
Despite its opposition to Bill C-38, the EFC worked with a number of MPs from the different 
political parties to support a number of amendments that would protect religious freedom, three of 
which the House of Commons adopted in its final version of the Bill. As a result, the preamble to the 
final version of the Bill included a clause stating that those who maintain the heterosexual definition 
of religion do not operate against the “public interest.” The second amendment promised that no one 
can be denied benefits or suffer burdens because they oppose same-sex marriage293 while the third 
amendment protected charitable organizations from having their charitable status challenged if they 
oppose same-sex marriage (Epp Buckingham 2005c, 3). Bill C-38 passed the House on June 28, 2005 
and the Senate shortly thereafter. At that time Canada joined the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain as 
the only four countries recognizing same-sex marriage.  
In their response to the legalization of homosexual marriage, EFC leaders promised to continue 
seeking the protection of religious freedom and to work to reinstate a heterosexual definition of 
marriage (Canada Watch 2005, 2). They worried that those who serve the marriage industry, such as 
photographers, florists, and facility owners, and oppose same-sex marriage may face legal challenges 
(Faith Today 2005b, 15). Consequently, they worked with the Ontario provincial government to 
amend that province’s legislation in order to protect the religious freedom of clergy and they 
anticipated developing a strategy to help evangelicals discuss with their local school board how same-
sex relationships would be taught in public schools. Clemenger assessed the passage of Bill C-38 as 
“symbolic of an ongoing shift in Canadian’s understanding of the place and role of the church and, 
more generally, of religion in Canada” (2005i). While he did not clarify the statement, the 
marginalization evangelicals felt during the same-sex marriage debate suggested that Clemenger 
believed the Bill was another indication that the church and religion were increasingly being 
prevented from participating in public life and public discourse. He then discussed how the Bill 
                                                                                                                                                                    
292 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, December 9, 2004. Available online at http://scc.lexum.org/ 
en/2004/2004scc79/2004scc79.html (accessed March 9, 2011). 
293 This amendment originated with David Brown, a lawyer who had previously argued a number of court cases 
for the EFC (Clemenger 2005i ).  
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provided “an opportunity to consider yet again how it is we wish to be present and engage in a society 
that is increasingly constructivist in its understanding of the meaning and value of life, and in the 
nature of institutions” (2005i).  
Those opposed to same-sex marriage made one more attempt to influence the law. After the 2006 
election of the Conservative Party as a minority government, Prime Minister Harper asked Parliament 
whether it should re-open the issue. In preparation for the December 7, 2006 vote, the EFC brought 
together various religious leaders who issued a “Declaration on marriage” that reaffirmed the 
heterosexual nature of marriage and its connection to procreation. The Declaration linked 
heterosexual marriage with the common good rather than individual rights and pressed the need for 
religious communities to have the public space needed to present and live by their beliefs. Over 50 
leaders signed the Declaration, ranging from the EFC and various evangelical denominations to the 
Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, a variety of Orthodox denominations and Islamic 
Councils.294 However, Parliament rejected the motion to re-open the debate by a vote of 175 to 123, 
with 12 Conservative MPs voting against the motion and 13 Liberals supporting it (CBC News 2006). 
Such collaboration with a variety of socially conservative religious groups occurred throughout the 
EFC’s political and legal interventions to oppose same-sex marriage. As with the EFC, many of these 
religious organizations worried about the impact of same-sex marriage on their religious freedom and 
the family. Some of these religious leaders viewed a court case that saw the courts grant a child three 
parents to be an indication of how the new definition of marriage would influence the nature and 
structure of families. 
6.2.4 Social issues arising from the redefinition of marriage  
Throughout the marriage debate EFC leaders argued that changing the definition of marriage and 
separating it from procreation would make it difficult for Parliament and the courts to prohibit other 
forms of domestic relationships, such as polygamy (EFC 2003b, 14). Although a judge in British 
Columbia dismissed the case against a polygamous sect in that province on a technicality before it 
reached the courts, EFC leaders intervened in another case that troubled them as much as polygamy. 
The co-called Three Parents case (2007)295 asked how many parents a child may have. In the case 
                                                     
294 The Declaration is available on the EFC’s website at http://files.efc-canada.net/si/Marriage%20and%20 
Family/DoM_English_Legal_Dec11.pdf (accessed July 16, 2010). 
295 A.A. v. B.B., 2007 ONCA 2 (CanLII). Available online at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2007/  
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two lesbians decided to have a child, and with the aid of a male friend one of them became pregnant 
via artificial insemination. Upon the birth of the child, the lesbian partner of the biological mother 
applied to have her name on the child’s birth certificate as a third parent. By not adopting the child, 
the lesbian partner ensured that the child’s father would remain on the birth certificate. When the case 
reached the Court of Appeal in Ontario, the EFC intervened via the Alliance for Marriage and Family 
(AMF) and supported the Children’s Law Reform Act’s understanding of a child as having only two 
parents – one father and one mother – based on biological origins. The Alliance factum raised the 
spectre of a person seeking to be declared a child’s parent against the wishes of the biological parents 
(AMF 2006, ¶102-3). It rejected the claim that the law was discriminatory because it reserved the 
term of “mother” for a child’s biological mother. Instead, the Alliance pointed out that the law did not 
prevent any woman from having or adopting a child (¶125-132, 149). In 2007 the Court of Appeal 
granted the lesbian partner the right to be the child’s second mother although it did not allow the case 
to be a Charter challenge. The EFC’s Doug Cryer criticized the government for developing social 
policy in a piecemeal fashion and leaving the difficult decisions for the courts to decide (Faith Today 
2007, 15). The Alliance attempted to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court but the Court refused 
to grant an appeal because the Alliance was an intervener rather than a party in the case at the Court 
of Appeal. 
The decision in the Three Parents case, coupled with the expansion of marriage to include same-
sex couples indicated that the EFC’s interventions to protect the traditional structures of marriage and 
the family were by and large unsuccessful, despite having secured the three amendments to Bill C-38. 
Throughout their interventions EFC leaders attempted to distinguish themselves from religious 
participants who were more confrontational and used religious rhetoric to create divisions among the 
populace. They did not, for example, follow James Dobson of Focus on the Family who compared the 
battle against same-sex marriage to D-Day (Crowley 2004). Instead, they recognized that same-sex 
unions required some type of recognition and protection but argued that if Parliament wished to 
recognize other partnerships when distributing benefits, it should do so on the basis of dependency, 
not sexual intimacy (EFC 2003b, 16). 
Yet a type of culture war nevertheless existed as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered 
individuals and communities often experienced religion and religious scriptures as harmful. As 
EGALE argued in a legal factum, Christian doctrine undergirds numerous aspects of Canadian 




society and such doctrine is often used to legitimize homophobia. It described the Bible verses often 
quoted by supporters of heterosexual marriage as heterosexist and intolerant and found the description 
of homosexuality as a sin to be dehumanizing (EGALE 2005 ¶19, 43-44). During the marriage 
debate, then, there was a fundamental difference between how proponents of homosexual equality 
rights and the EFC viewed the family, sexuality, and society. As a result, religion became a 
contentious issue.   
The issue facing EFC leaders after the legalization of same-sex marriage was how to sustain the 
momentum of evangelical political engagement and avoid the scenario that occurred in the aftermath 
of the abortion debate when evangelical political engagement dissipated and many evangelicals once 
again abandoned the public sphere. As Jonathan Malloy told a reporter of the New York Times after 
the marriage debate, evangelicals developed “a base here but they need something to organize and 
keep the funds going.” The reporter noted that while evangelical leaders recognized that the single 
issue of same-sex marriage was insufficient to sustain the movement, they disagreed on how to build 
on the momentum in order to address other socially conservative issues such as polygamy and 
euthanasia (Mason 2006). One factor sustaining the momentum was the evangelical concern about 
religious freedom with respect to marriage commissioners and those involved in the marriage 
industry.  
To assist the continued political engagement of evangelicals, Clemenger defined “success” in a 
manner that did not require positive legal and political results. After the legalization of same-sex 
marriage, he noted that “success” meant being faithful rather than winning (2005e, 14). “Our task,” he 
wrote, “is to bear witness to the truth and, in this instance, about the nature and purpose of marriage” 
(2005f, 14). However, there is a significant tension in Clemenger’s statements. Given the liberal 
nature of Canadian society, participation in the public sphere often requires a certain type of political 
subject that communicates in an “a-religious” manner. Explicitly Christian arguments must be made 
palatable to the liberal public, meaning that they are to some degree rinsed of their religious language. 
This process of rinsing can be the opposite of being faithful and bearing witness. The following 
section examines the degree to which the EFC was able to retain its evangelical identity during its 
engagement with the issues surrounding sexual orientation.  
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6.3 The impact of liberalism on the EFC’s religious-political subject 
The same-sex marriage issue brought together various evangelical factions, from those who organized 
noisy public rallies to those who presented moderate arguments in the courts. Evangelicals could 
cooperate on the issue on a scale rarely seen before because the vast majority of them opposed same-
sex marriage. During the debate they ignored other Protestant (or those few evangelical) voices in 
favour of homosexual equality rights and same-sex marriage.296 Beyond the issue of marriage, 
however, evangelical opinion remained fractured on other subjects such as poverty, the environment, 
anti-discrimination laws, and multiculturalism (Malloy 2009b, 11). Nevertheless, for a moment in 
time Canadian evangelicals banded together with Roman Catholics and some other religious groups 
to defend heterosexual marriage. It was a moment when Canadians became more aware of the extent 
to which sexual morality informs evangelical identity.  
Writing in 2000, John Simpson observed that Canadian Protestant sectarian leaders were more 
reserved than their American counterparts in their disapproval of the somatic culture that emphasizes 
the body and body politics. He contended that Canadian Protestant sectarian leaders viewed 
“individual responsibility and personal purity” as private affairs (275). However, the muted Canadian 
sectarian response to the somatic culture that Simpson observed changed with the same-sex marriage 
debate. Although issues of marriage and family have always been politicized, the issue of same-sex 
marriage sparked an especially contentious debate because heterosexuality was socially hegemonic, 
which meant that the political and legal validation of homosexuality unsettled existing social 
structures.297 
In accordance with Simpson’s observation, the EFC generally conceptualized the family as private 
and therefore sought to have less rather than more state interference in family-related issues.298 It was 
the perceived intrusion of the state into the family that prompted evangelicals, in many cases via the 
EFC, to participate in the public sphere in order to protect their traditional life-world. According to 
Casanova, this type of deprivatization may be justified in modern societies because it does not dispute 
                                                     
296 The Prairie Centre for Ecumenism made this observation. Its critique is available online at http://ecumenism. 
net/news/marriage.htm (accessed June 10, 2009). 
297 And hegemonic understandings of social relations are generally sites of struggle (Brodie, Gavigan, Jenson 
1992, 7). 
298 However, evangelicals have often moved the family into the public arena, as evidenced in the temperance 
and anti-smoking movements. For more on the role of religious women and the anti-tobacco campaign, see 
Sharon Cook’s “Evangelical moral reform: Women and the war against tobacco, 1874-1900” in Religion and 
Public Life in Canada, ed. Marguerite Van Die (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 177-95. 
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the modern principles of privacy and the freedom of conscience (1994, 57) while questioning the 
“‘limits’ of the liberal political and social order” (58). The EFC indeed questioned the limits of 
liberalism when it contested state incursions in the family. At the height of the gay marriage debate, 
Epp Buckingham expressed frustration over the scope of the Supreme Court’s reach into daily life. 
She wrote that “nothing is beyond the purview of the courts. They can decide how you parent and the 
meaning of your marriage. And they have agendas. And they impose them” (2004b). Her 
apprehensions about the Court were similar to Asad’s concern over the power of the state to intervene 
in every aspect of life. 
Yet for Asad, families have power and therefore they draw the attention of the state. As he 
observes, “the experience of religion in the ‘private’ spaces of home and school is crucial to the 
formation of subjects who will eventually endorse a particular public culture” (1999, 181, italics in 
original). Families are political, Asad contends, because experiences in the home contribute to the 
type of citizen one becomes and how one responds to religion in general and to those who hold 
different religious convictions than one’s own.299 
Despite the general desire of EFC leaders to keep the state out of the private lives of families, their 
interactions in the various debates about same-sex relationships contributed to the politicization of the 
family. To engage the public debates over the nature and scope of family, they had to move the 
family into the public arena. They did so by focusing on the social policy aspects of same-sex 
relationships, particularly as they impacted children. This move was similar to the one taken by the 
American Religious Right when it developed its “family values” campaign. According to Jelen, the 
focus of the Religious Right on family values was “an attempt to provide a rationale for restricting the 
self-regarding behavior of autonomous adults, by pointing out the consequences of such behaviour for 
people (children) who are presumed incapable of engaging in moral reasoning” (Jelen 1999, 349). 
Although the term “family values” has not been politicized to the same extent in Canada, Jelen’s 
point is relevant to the Canadian context as the EFC’s emphasis on the consequences of behaviour on 
children assisted the process of moving the family into the public sphere. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
299 Craig Martin offers a similar argument, claiming that families, religious communities, and other so-called 
private institutions in liberal democracies are part of a “circulation of power” because they socialize their 
members into particular conceptions of the world and produce both “conditions of persuasions” and types of 
discourse (2010, 8). For Martin, then, the privatization of religion and the liberal principle of the freedom of 
religion mask the power of private institutions to impact public policy (30-31).  
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The EFC then had to develop a strategy of participation. It is important to remember the context in 
which the EFC viewed the legal system. As Hoover and Den Dulk discovered in their research of 
conservative Christian litigation, evangelical groups understood the judiciary as liberal and generally 
supportive of progressive social policy. From their informants Hoover and Den Dulk learned that “a 
group’s perception of judicial ideology influenced how they wrote their briefs, not whether their 
groups got involved” (2004, 18, italics in original). In order to participate in the public arena, then, 
EFC leaders needed to craft arguments that would resonate with liberal judges and other liberal 
associations involved in the debate. In this manner they created a religious-political subject who was 
constrained by the assumptions and language used in the public sphere. Given that the language of the 
public sphere is generally liberal and secular, the religious element of the political subject had to be 
dampened. This dampening was reinforced by the political strategies adopted by the EFC during the 
debate. Participating in ecumenical or inter-faith coalitions allowed EFC leaders to de-emphasize 
differences while enabling cooperation and a certain amount of influence. Focusing on the impact of 
social policy on children meant that they could avoid identifying specific sexual behaviours as 
immoral or contra religious norms. 
As a result of de-emphasizing specific religious beliefs, many of the EFC’s arguments were not 
distinctly religious or evangelical. When the EFC did address religion, it was often in terms of 
grounding marriage and the family on the creation account in Genesis and outlining the heterosexual 
nature of marriage as found in the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths. As a result, many religious 
briefs were not readily discernible from the arguments of other secular participants in the debate, 
most notably, the federal government.  
For instance, one of the earliest legal cases involving same-sex rights in which the EFC participated 
was Mossop (1993), the case that originated with an employee of the federal government was not 
permitted time off to attend the funeral of the father of his gay partner. The EFC was part of a 
coalition that included Focus on the Family (Canada), the Salvation Army, REAL Women, and the 
Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada.300 In her analysis of the coalition’s factum, Didi Herman 
expressed surprise at the “paucity of argument and contribution to debate” by the coalition despite its 
members’ expertise and knowledge on the subject (1994, 114). She concluded that,  
                                                     
300 Herman acknowledged that the Salvation Army, Focus, and REAL Women were the leaders of the coalition. 
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legal precedent has replaced God’s word as Truth, the dictionary 
supplanting the authority of the Scriptures. What the coalition had to 
offer was their Christianity, their world-view as to the imminent and 
serious threat posed by the conspiracy to further the ‘homosexual 
agenda.’ Instead, the legal process appears to have subverted these 
beliefs, rendering them invisible. (114)  
Herman was interested in “the specific ways in which legal discourse compels the adoption of a 
particular pragmatic politics (liberal legalism)” (115). When asked about this “process of 
legalization,” leaders of Focus on the Family (Canada), the Salvation Army, and REAL Women all 
replied that in an “anti-Christian” society such as Canada, religious groups cannot use religious 
sources and remain publicly credible (115).301 Herman concluded that although these Christians 
employed publicly credible language and were forced to accept the public support for homosexual 
rights, they continued to believe that homosexuality was sinful but chose not to include such beliefs in 
their public literature (118). Instead, they focused on child welfare and family principles (126). 
Herman’s observations raise the question of whether the EFC and its fellow Coalition members 
contributed a uniquely religious position to the debate. As Herman noted, the coalition’s factum in 
Mossop was similar to the one filed by the Attorney General (115). 
The Mossop case was one of the earlier post-Charter cases in which the EFC intervened and 
therefore it was a learning experience. However, over twenty years later, Pamela Dickey Young 
observed the same lack of theological statements in the arguments of conservative Christian churches 
and associations opposed to same-sex marriage. Young’s study included the EFC. She concluded that 
although churches and religious organizations had theological views about homosexuality (that it is a 
sin), they recognized that theological arguments were not persuasive in the public square (2006, 19-
20). In this manner politically engaged religious subjects dampened the expression of their beliefs in 
order to produce rational arguments accessible to all within the public square.  
The lack of theological statements in its public arguments is consistent with the EFC’s desire to be 
politically engaged and “at the table.” Yet when EFC leaders are at the table they must engage with 
the liberal arguments posed by other groups involved in the debate. While EFC leaders argued against 
the existence of a so-called secular, or non-sectarian, public discourse free from comprehensive 
                                                     
301 John Biles and Humera Ibrahim tell the story of a researcher attending a conference on religion who 
identified “Canada as a ‘post-Christian country.’” The audience expressed surprise at the statement and one 
attendee noted that “only a Christian” was able to make such a comment (2005a, 167). 
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beliefs, they nevertheless participated in such discourse, thereby accommodating “the world” in its 
arguments. 
The degree to which the EFC accommodated “the world” can be seen in its acceptance of some 
homosexual equality rights. It dropped the argument that homosexuals were not discriminated against 
in Canadian society and increasingly differentiated between the conceptions of spouse and marriage, 
defaulting to the government’s authority to define the former. By the time the Liberals introduced 
legislation to redefine marriage EFC leaders acknowledged that same sex relationships required some 
type of legal recognition. Such changes shifts suggest that over time EFC leaders moved towards the 
societal consensus and identified the omission of legal recognition of same-sex relationships as 
discriminatory. 
Engaging with and using liberal arguments is consistent with what McClay calls negative 
secularism. For adherents of this type of secularism, the state is not anti-religious and “the secular 
idiom is merely a provisional lingua franca that serves to facilitate commerce among different kinds 
of belief” (2000, 63). The state protects religion and recognizes, if not enables, religious pluralism. In 
its arguments the EFC reflected this type of secularism, which accords well with the liberal state and 
liberal democratic values such as the freedoms of association, expression, and conscience as well as 
political equality. Therefore the media portrayal of the EFC’s political and legal interventions in 
favour of heterosexual marriage as un-Canadian was incorrect. Instead, the organization was 
eminently Canadian in its adoption of liberal conceptions of the state and many individual freedoms. 
The area in which it did not conform to Canadian liberal values was the manner in which its leaders 
rejected individual autonomy in favour of some limits on human behaviour when they deemed the 
behaviour negatively impacted children.   
It is important to keep in mind that the EFC’s use of liberal arguments in a liberally-minded society 
does not suggest increasing secularization. As Veit Bader notes, when religious associations prioritize 
liberal democracy “over denominational truths when it comes to political decision-making” (2003b, 
10), they are not secularizing religion. Instead, they are liberalizing religion and playing by “the rules 
of the game.” Viewing the acceptance of the rules as evidence of internal secularization, Bader 
argues, allows religion only two options: to secularize or become sectarian. He rejects the creation of 
such a binary of choices as an element of secular logic (10-11). Bader also rejects the notion that 
public reasoning needs to result in agreement. There is significant moral diversity in a society, he 
maintains, and therefore he focuses on the need for the development of civil and democratic practices 
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such as explaining positions in a manner that is understandable by a wide range of people, listening to 
others, being fair-minded, and willing to accommodate others’ views while avoiding the elevation of 
rational arguments as the only acceptable public reasoning (1999, 614, 617). Generally the EFC 
participated in the manner outlined by Bader. It provided arguments that did not rely on a particular 
religious tradition and served what it believed to be the common good rather than the narrow interests 
of a particular group. Furthermore, it did not belittle those who supported homosexual marriage. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I outlined the major arguments EFC leaders employed in their efforts to protect 
traditional marriage and family. A key element in their definition of marriage revolved around 
procreation. Heterosexual marriages are unique in their ability to have children, they argued, and thus 
require public support not given to other types of relationships. In addition, EFC leaders insisted that 
the freedom of religion should include the right of those opposed to same-sex marriage for religious 
reasons to publicly state their disagreement without losing public benefits. Most of the arguments 
were not specifically religious, suggesting that the type of religious-political subject created by the 
EFC subsumed religious identity to liberal reasoning and public engagement.  
At the same time, however, Asad’s concern that politically engaged, or deprivatized, religion has 
few alternatives but to emulate the same strategies, methods, and reasoning as secular associations is 
troubling for religious organizations as these strategies and methods subsume religious identity to 
political engagement. To combat this power of modern secular liberalism, Asad suggests that religion 
“may have to disrupt” pre-existing assumptions that structure public debates (2003, 185, italics in 
original) by creating new discursive spaces that allow for different types of knowledge, desire, and 







The EFC is asking some difficult questions, such as how Canadians might live together across their 
religious differences, the nature of shared societal norms, the limitations of both liberalism and the 
modern state, and how religions may participate in the public sphere. These questions are relevant in 
modern societies grappling with increasing religious diversity. For their part, EFC leaders reject the 
secular liberal desire to privatize and depoliticize religion and contest liberal theories of public 
dialogue that require people to abstract themselves from their religious particularities when entering 
the public sphere and engaging in public debates. They interpret secularism as a religious perspective 
in that it is a comprehensive doctrine that helps people interpret the world around them. This 
conception enables them to argue that secular broadcasting and education can never be religiously 
neutral and to argue for institutional pluralism which, in the case of education, means that the state 
funds a variety of confessional schools that meet certain standards. However, EFC leaders do not 
typically critique the economy, the most secular sphere. 
EFC leaders are not alone in asking questions about the relationship between religion and the state, 
as Casanova, Asad, and Bader also raise them. A significant difference between the EFC and these 
theorists is that the latter note the on-going privileges that Christianity enjoys in the legal and political 
spheres. The lack of such an acknowledgment means that EFC leaders do not consistently educate the 
evangelical base about the types of political, legal, political, and economic support some religious 
minorities might require if they are to truly enjoy religious freedom and fully participate in public life 
as religious adherents. 
When the EFC engages in the public sphere it attempts to be politically moderate and to avoid 
using religion in a divisive manner. Its leaders recognize that there are significant differences among 
the population and argue that differences, including religious differences, must be brought into the 
public sphere and debated. To be sure, those seeking equality rights for gays and lesbians oppose EFC 
positions about sexuality, feeling that they reflect the ongoing cultural hegemony of Christianity. Yet 
EFC leaders desire ongoing public dialogues about relevant and important issues. They consistently 
separate the organization from the more reactionary elements of the evangelical community, such as 
evangelist Charles McVety. When McVety claimed some responsibility for the Conservatives’ 
attempt to limit public funding for the production of movies that violate conservative sexual mores, 
the EFC’s Don Hutchinson told the Ottawa Citizen that neither McVety nor the Canada Christian 
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College that he leads were members of the EFC (Ottawa Citizen 2008). As the previous chapters 
attempt to demonstrate, the EFC makes contributions to the public sphere. At times they endeavour to 
move public debates beyond the conservative/liberal dichotomy and introduce new categories into the 
discussion. For example, during the debate about doctor-assisted suicide, they expanded the 
discussion to include the importance of hospice and how society values the elderly, ill, and disabled.  
Revisiting the chapters 
Chapter 1 traced the history of Canadian evangelical political engagement and argued that 
evangelicals tended to avoid political extremes. In the nineteenth century most English-speaking 
Protestants shared a common vision of “Christianizing” the country. This Protestant consensus 
continued after the disestablishment of the Church of England in 1841, as nineteenth century 
evangelicals converged towards the political centre, with almost all Protestants involved in the 
Anglican, Baptist, Methodist or Presbyterian churches. Gauvreau joins others in suggesting that 
Canadian evangelical antipathy for polarization and its political moderation contributed to the 
political ethos of accommodation needed to achieve Confederation (1990, 65, 90-91).  
The Protestant consensus came to an end with the emergence of the Social Gospel movement and 
the fracturing of Protestantism into the theologically and socially liberal mainline denominations and 
the conservative evangelicals, who came to be known for their moral conservatism. Yet according to 
Bruce Guenther, the latter group did not flock to the fundamentalism of Aberhart. At the same time, 
however, they did not develop specifically evangelical conceptions of the state, poverty, or the 
relationship between church and state. As the state gradually took over more of the social services 
historically administered by the churches, evangelicals did not protest, perhaps content with the fact 
that the political and economic institutions in Canada at the time generally advanced Christian values. 
While evangelicals were concerned about the 1969 legislation that liberalized divorce and access to 
abortion, they did not mobilize themselves politically, with a few exceptions, such as some  
Mennonite denominations. Instead, the majority of evangelicals focused on creating new institutions 
and building the necessary infrastructure to protect their orthodoxy, including such 
interdenominational organizations as IVCF and the EFC. In sociological terms, evangelicals were 
becoming denominations and increasingly institutionalized. Their new institutions pulled them to the 
theological centre as they focused on the commonalities among evangelical denominations rather than 
doctrinal differences. In addition, their need to raise money also moved them to the “broad middle” 
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(Stackhouse 1993a, 201-02). In contrast to the American Religious Right, Canadian evangelical 
leaders did not rally around the call to take back the nation for God nor fight for the continued use of 
Christian prayers in public schools. They did not reject feminism nor align the organization with a 
political party. Indeed, research clearly demonstrates that the majority of evangelicals did not support 
the Reform Party, despite the fears of some commentators that Reform contained a significant 
element of Christian fundamentalism. However, in 2006 many evangelicals broke with this tradition 
of political diversity when a significant number of them in English-speaking Canada supported 
Stephen Harper’s Conservatives. The strength of this new alignment remains unclear, although it has 
survived Harper’s refusal to re-visit the issue of abortion and his lack of commitment to re-open the 
same-sex marriage debate in Parliament. 
EFC leaders continued to seek political moderation. As outlined in chapter 2, they helped 
evangelicals redefine their understanding of the role of Christianity in public life. For example, Stiller 
taught them that they needed to address contemporary issues and not romanticize the past. He sought 
to make evangelicalism intelligible to other Canadians by becoming a significant evangelical voice in 
the public sphere, speaking to the media, interacting with federal Cabinet ministers, and launching a 
television show that featured evangelicals engaging seriously with issues. He portrayed the EFC as 
“an idea, a voice, a pen, a forum for evangelicals to come together and, in a spirit of cooperation and 
fellowship … develop strategies for a more effective national witness” (Faith Alive 1983b, 38, italics 
in original). The desire to be a national witness prompted EFC leaders, including those on the Social 
Action Commission, to develop reasoned arguments, craft politically astute strategies, and nurture 
denominational, and eventually inter-faith, cooperation.  
The vision for political engagement required the support of the evangelical base. However, prior to 
the early 1980s, not all evangelicals understood the need for political engagement and there was no 
broadly affirmed model of engagement. To partially address this need, Stiller created a series of 
workshops entitled “Understanding our times,” “designed to acquaint evangelicals with the trends of 
the times and to offer direction for Christian involvement in contemporary life” (Faith Today 1987c, 
40). By interpreting the times and offering strategies of how to become involved, the EFC contributed 
to the development of a Canadian evangelical identity that assumed political engagement. Over time 
that identity included legal interventions as Stiller urged evangelicals to overcome their long-standing 
distrust of the court system. He argued that with advent of the Charter courts were addressing salient 
issues and becoming an important element in the creation of public policy. Stiller’s successor, Gary 
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Walsh, focused on supporting unity among evangelicals and expanding evangelical partnerships. 
However the EFC’s Ottawa office under the leadership of Bruce Clemenger and the Social Action 
Commission continued to publish parliamentary submissions, policy and discussion papers, and legal 
interventions in numerous cases. When Clemenger became the EFC’s president in 2003, he continued 
the legal and political interventions. He called for more public dialogue about how to define such 
Charter values as tolerance, freedom, justice, and religion and for the expansion of civil society to 
include more religious groups. 
Throughout these political and legal interventions EFC leaders reflected a fairly positive view of 
government. There are many reasons for this positive view, not least of which is Canadian political 
culture, which some theorists believe has a “Tory touch” that emphasizes the communal aspect of 
society and an economically nationalist state. A second explanation may be found in the Kuyperian 
neo-Calvinism that influenced both Stiller and Clemenger. Brought to Canada by Dutch immigrants 
in the 1950s and 1960s, Kuyperianism holds a high view of the state in that it has a significant role to 
play in promoting justice. This role periodically requires the state to intervene in society in order to 
provide services that other social spheres cannot offer, protect social spheres from incursions by other 
spheres, and coordinate national strategies. 
An important element of the EFC’s interpretation of the times was how it politicized secularism, 
the subject of chapter 3. EFC leaders defined secularism as an anti-religious worldview dedicated to 
restricting religious voices in the public sphere. This conception of secularism mobilized the 
evangelical base to engage in politics and support the EFC.  Many evangelicals feared that “secular 
humanism” would devalue human life and a number of rulings by the Supreme Court after the 
creation of the Charter exacerbated those fears. Between 1985 and 1992 the Court struck down the 
Lord’s Day Act, ruled that the restrictions on abortion and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in 
Ontario’s public schools were unconstitutional, and “read in” the protection of sexual orientation into 
human rights codes. In light of these rulings and the increasing secularization of Canadian society, the 
EFC defined secularism as a worldview intent on privatizing religion in order to significantly reduce 
the public voice and influence of religion.  
The organization’s early descriptions of secularism tended towards dualism, portraying those who 
were religious and recognized the transcendent as “good” while labelling those who were self-
referentially secularist as idolatrous and “bad.” However, this dualism was less pronounced in the 
EFC than among various American Religious Right activists because it was tempered by pluralism. 
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While Stiller opposed a type of pluralism that sought to privatize religion, he argued for a robust type 
of pluralism that enabled all groups, including religious ones, to be “at the table” where social policy 
and other important decisions are made. Such pluralism, he maintained, could be used as a tool 
against the tyranny of ideological secularism that sought to banish religion to private life. Clemenger 
refined the distinction by distinguishing between a secular and a secularist state. The former 
accommodates religious diversity and permits religious groups to advance religious arguments when 
participating in the public sphere and civil society whereas the latter enforces the privatization of 
religion and requires all participants in civil society to use neutral arguments rinsed of any specific 
conception of the good. Yet according to Clemenger even secular states hold or advance their own 
worldview and therefore cannot be completely “a-religious.” Because religion impacts all of life, EFC 
leaders insisted that no person or institution can be free of religious commitments. In short, they 
argued against a type of secularism known as laïcité, which zealously seeks to privatize religion. 
However, it was not against secularism per se, as it accommodated “negative” secularism which 
assumes a secular state and the differentiation of the social spheres. 
The struggle against secularism drew many evangelicals into the political sphere, and for some 
evangelical denominations the EFC was their vehicle of participation. When the EFC intervened in 
political and legal issues, its leaders generally began their briefs and presentations by identifying the 
biblical principles that they believed best supported human dignity and flourishing. They insisted that 
the law was important because it reflected the moral framework of a society and influenced how 
individuals view issues and problems (EFC 1995, 9). For EFC leaders, then, identifying principles 
was not an abstract and philosophical activity but an essential aspect of how citizens live and reason 
together. They proposed biblical principles for three broad areas of social policy. 
The first such area was the “life” issues of abortion, euthanasia, and reproductive technologies as 
outlined in chapter 4. As EFC leaders addressed with these issues they developed a model of political 
engagement that focused on the imago Dei and the common good, was politically pragmatic and 
ecumenical, and emphasized persuasion rather than imposition. With regard to the latter, Stiller 
thought that those who resorted to using the law to force people to act in a certain way were co-opted 
by power and the desire to benefit from the gospel (1989d). In addition, he charged that their legalism 
lacked grace (1991c, 199). To address the “life” issues of abortion, euthanasia, and reproductive 
technologies, EFC leaders attempted to craft positions that they believed did not require others to 
believe in a specific theological doctrine in order to support them.  
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Chapter five documented the second area: religious freedom, the issue that first brought the 
organization into the courts. When contesting the privatization of religion, EFC leaders defined 
religion as comprehensive in scope and therefore applicable to all areas of life. All belief systems that 
address the meaning of life and the nature of society, they claimed, were religious perspectives or 
worldviews. As a result, they argued that secularism was not an “a-religious” worldview and 
educational policy and broadcasting content could never be religiously neutral. In terms of education 
in Ontario, the EFC did not argue for the continued hegemony of Christianity in public schools but 
for the inclusion of religion in the curriculum so that students could understand their religiously 
diverse neighbours and seriously examine their own beliefs and the beliefs of others. In addition, EFC 
leaders insisted that religion was practiced both individually and corporately as well as privately and 
publicly. Therefore they called on the state to protect the freedom of expression of religious adherents 
and their right to practice their faith publicly.  
The third area of engagement involved the issues of sexual orientation and the definition of 
marriage and chapter 6 detailed the manner in which EFC leaders participated in these debates. When 
the introduction of the Charter led to increased protection against discrimination for gays and lesbians 
and the eventual expansion of marriage to include same-sex unions, the EFC intervened in a number 
of cases. Here the EFC posed marriage as religious in nature and social in function. Marriage was 
ordained by God, they insisted, for the purposes of intimacy, support, and procreation. According to 
the EFC, since same-sex unions cannot produce a child without the involvement of a third party, they 
cannot have the same purpose as heterosexual marriage. EFC leaders further insisted that 
heterosexual marriage serves the interests of children while same-sex marriage serves the interests of 
the adults involved. Over time they accommodated court rulings and public opinion by 
acknowledging that homosexuals were in need of protection against discrimination and that the state 
had an interest in defining the term “spouse.” They remained adamant, however, that since the state 
did not create marriage, it did not have the right to redefine the institution and further argued that if 
marriage was deemed to be under-inclusive, it should be expanded to include all economically 
dependent relationships rather than just those based on conjugality. Another concern was the 
repercussions of same-sex marriage on the religious freedom of marriage commissioners and others 
employed in the wedding industry who opposed same-sex marriage on religious grounds but would 
be forced by their provincial employers or by law to participate in same-sex marriage ceremonies. 
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Over the years the EFC influenced some pieces of legislation, contributing to various pieces of 
social policy and legal rulings, such as the Supreme Court’s 1993 ruling barring doctor-assisted 
suicide on the basis that a majority of Canadians supported the sanctity of life. The federal 
government’s legislation prohibiting a variety of reproductive technologies echoed many of the 
restrictions suggested by the EFC. Indeed, the EFC supported the right of the federal government to 
impose national restrictions on the use of reproductive technologies against the claim of the Quebec 
government that the restrictions invaded provincial jurisdiction over health care. When the case 
reached the Supreme Court of Canada in 2009, the EFC intervened, together with the Canadian 
Conference of Catholic Bishops. In an article written during the hearing, EFC lawyer Don Hutchinson 
noted that one of the judges asked the lawyers for the Quebec government a number of questions 
based on issues raised by the EFC in its arguments (2009a). 
The various types of EFC interventions documented in chapters 4 through 6 may be evaluated by 
exploring the degree to which EFC leaders participated in Canadian public life in a manner that was 
consistent with the modern and liberal valuation of individual conscience and the separation of church 
and state. Casanova’s work is instrumental in this regard as he developed some criteria that enable 
such evaluation. To investigate the political implications of such political engagement I turn to the 
work of Asad, who conceives of secularism in different terms than Casanova.  
The EFC as a public religion and the challenges associated with political 
engagement 
Casanova argues that religions may participate in modern secular liberal states in a manner that is 
both viable and desirable as long as they accept the individual right to privacy and the freedom of 
conscience. These conditions can be met when religions protect the rights and freedoms of all people, 
insist that the secular spheres are subject to extraneous moral considerations, and defend a traditional 
life-world from state incursion (1994, 58). As religions enter the public sphere, they provide 
“counterfactual normative critiques of dominant historical trends” by contesting assumed boundaries 
between the public and the private and initiate discussion about the type of morality that should 
govern secular spheres (43). According to Casanova, their involvement in public debates about the 
common good contribute to the development of civil society (230-31) and their critical engagement 
with modernity may protect modernity from its own “inflexible, inhuman logic” (234).  
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In a manner similar to the religions described by Casanova, EFC leaders refused to accept the 
privatization of religion desired by some secular liberals. They insisted that religion is comprehensive 
and impacts all of life, including how religious adherents participate in the public sphere. They 
contested the established boundaries between the private and public spheres by arguing that religion 
is expressed and practiced publicly as well as privately. Therefore they called on the state to protect 
the right of religious adherents to use religious arguments in the public sphere (Chamberlain) and live 
according to their doctrines without undue hardship (Amselem and Hutterian Brethren). In essence, 
they challenged specialists who claim the right to operate according to the logic of their differentiated 
spheres. 
As the EFC participated in the public sphere and asked the state to protect religious freedom, it 
revealed its acceptance of the modern commitment to the freedom of conscience. EFC leaders 
believed that given equal space in the public sphere and at the table, they could persuade others about 
the superiority of developing public policy according to their interpretations of the imago Dei and the 
common good. They accepted the fact of religious pluralism and argued that the public sphere must 
be open to participants of all religions and no religion. All of these accommodations and types of 
interventions suggest that the EFC participated in the public sphere in a manner that was conducive 
with what Casanova calls a modern public religion.  
Yet some commentators are disturbed by the spectre of religious organizations cooperating too 
closely with the state. Casanova acknowledges that when public religions participate in the public 
sphere, they are often changed in the process. However, he sees the change as positive. As he 
observes, “in the very process of entering the modern public sphere, religions and normative 
traditions are also forced to confront and possibly come to terms with modern normative structures. 
Such a public encounter may permit the reflexive rationalization of the lifeworld and may open the 
way for the institutionalization of processes of practical rationalization” (1994, 228). Asad views the 
exchange in more negative terms as he conceptualizes the state in very different terms than Casanova. 
Asad warns that modern secular states are not above using violence to coerce their own subjects 
and foreign countries to adopt specific values and views of religion, secularism, and the state. For 
Asad, these views are largely influenced by Christianity and are inhospitable to other religious 
traditions that do not separate the public and the private and church and state in the same manner. In 
short, he believes that western conceptions of secularism portray the state rather benignly and hide its 
power and willingness to use that power to enforce particular conceptions of the human person, 
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religion, the state, and secularism. In particular, it is the ability of states to use their power to define 
the personality of the nation that worries Asad, because those who do not fit the mould are 
marginalized. For an example he points to the British government’s narrow conception of the term 
“British” in response to the rage of some Muslim leaders against Salmon Rushdie’s Satanic Verses 
(1993, 239-306). 
Asad’s interpretation of secularism as a political project focuses on the state as the sole institution 
providing identity, enforcing a type of homogeneity that defines and regulates “normality.” In this 
conception of the state, religious toleration is a political tool used to remove morality from the 
political realm and subordinate religion to the state. It is the state, and not progressive social groups 
and secularists, who Asad identifies as the biggest threat to religious freedom. In addition, he argues 
that the state creates a particular type of political subject by its laws, advancement of particular 
values, and the type of arguments it permits in the public sphere. For example, those who desire to 
participate in the public sphere must use rational argumentation, which is a particular “liberal moral 
and political discourse” (1999, 180). This requirement reflects the power of the public sphere and 
excludes those who cannot create such arguments and “become particular speaking and listening 
subjects” (181). When the EFC intervenes in the legal system in order to be at the table, it is 
interacting with the power of the state to create political subjects, define religion, and set the terms for 
political discourse. Its refusal to privatize religion goes some way to interrogating the state’s power to 
define and marginalize religion. Yet it does not acknowledge how Christianity continues to have 
cultural influence.  
EFC leaders encountered some of these tensions in liberal democratic discourse highlighted by 
Asad when they participated in the public sphere. For example, although Clemenger called for secular 
states to protect the right of religious groups to participate in the public sphere without having to 
ignore their faith or find secular rationale, EFC leaders did not, or could not, consistently participate 
in such a manner. They supported the right of religious parents to use religious arguments and make 
evaluative judgments on potential school books based on their religious beliefs but many of their 
arguments in the same-sex marriage debate were similar to those advanced by secular participants. 
Put another way, there was a tension between how the EFC wanted to participate and how it actually 
did, or could, participate. 
In issues concerning religious freedom EFC leaders were able to articulate more clearly their views 
about religion. Yet even in those debates some of their key arguments were based on equal access, 
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pluralism, and freedom rather than religious norms. The appropriation of such liberal arguments 
appears to support Asad’s contention that deprivatized religious actors who desire to engage in the 
public sphere must often “act as secular practitioners do in liberal democracies” (2003, 187). 
Rosenblum articulates the threat in terms of religious organizations becoming “deformed” when they 
participate too closely in the affairs of the state.  
Despite these tensions and difficulties, however, the engagement of EFC leaders in public life 
contributed to the public sphere. Their accommodations of the “world” and secular liberal discourse 
indicated the degree to which they were committed to civil society. At times they spent scarce 
economic resources protecting those deemed to be the most vulnerable in society even though 
historically evangelicals viewed the courts as unfriendly. In the process they refrained from culture 
war language and tried to avoid using religion in a divisive manner, although this was more difficult 
to maintain in the debates about the expansion of spousal benefits and marriage to include same-sex 
couples. The appropriation of liberal discourse, then, was not necessarily a negative development. As 
Bader reminds us, given the moral diversity in many societies, there is a need for the development of 
civil and democratic practices such as explaining positions in a manner that is understandable by a 
wide range of people, listening to others, being fair-minded, and willing to accommodate others’ 
views (1999, 614, 617). While EFC leaders have not overtly questioned publicly sanctioned types of 
knowledge, they have to some extent disrupted pre-existing assumptions structuring public debate 
that assumed the privatization of religion. Their call for the expansion of the public sphere to include 
a variety of religious voices is a democratic practice that contributes to a stronger public sphere. Their 
willingness to work with a variety of religious groups suggests that religion is not necessarily or 
always divisive. Indeed, the ability to find common cause despite doctrinal and religious differences 
contributes to public discourse and civil society.  
Bader further argues that the ability of religious groups to accommodate the world and secular 
liberal discourse does not suggest increasing secularization. In his view, religious participants in the 
public sphere who employ arguments readily understood by all are liberalizing religion and playing 
by “the rules of the game.” Commentators who view the acceptance of the rules as evidence of 
internal secularization, he contends, allow religion only two options: to secularize or become 
sectarian. Bader rejects the creation of such a binary of choices as an element of secular logic and 
reminds his readers that such Christian groups as the Baptists and Quakers contributed to the 
“‘foundations’ of liberal democracy” by emphasizing liberal democracy over denominational truths 
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(2003b, 10-12). Evaluated from within this conception of religious engagement in politics, it appears 
that EFC leaders are forging a path that is neither secular nor sectarian. They adopt the rules of 
engagement that are dominant in the public sphere and do not hearken back to a golden past when 
Christianity was the unofficial established religion. Despite their (selectively) socially conservative 
views, they reflect strong commitments to both modernism and liberalism.  
Future Areas of Study 
While this study examined the EFC from within the discipline of religious studies, the work of 
scholars from other disciplines such as political science, legal studies, and critical theory will help 
create a “thicker” picture of the EFC specifically, and evangelical political engagement in general. 
For example, more research needs to be done on the implications of the recent alignment between 
evangelicals and the Conservative Party, especially on public policy. In light of the new Conservative 
majority government after the May, 2011 election, it will be important to note the type of direction 
and leadership that the EFC will provide evangelicals.  
An element of this “thicker” picture is a comparison of the EFC’s interpretations of the imago Dei 
and the common good with other Protestant and Christian groups. These principles guide many of the 
EFC’s political and legal interventions. Yet they are particular interpretations that lead the EFC to 
choose specific issues and engage them in a particular manner. Other Christian groups employ the 
principles to advocate for the rights of women, children, prisoners, and homosexuals, among others. 
A comparative study of how various Christian groups and denominations define the imago Dei 
principle and then apply it to contemporary issues enables us to more fully engage with the work of 
the EFC. 
The question of leadership is central as this thesis studied the attitudes and work of evangelical 
elites. The degree to which evangelicals in the pew are aware and supportive of EFC positions and 
approaches requires further study. As Rawlyk pointed out in 1996, few evangelicals were able to 
identify an evangelical leader or had contact with the EFC (135, 140). More research needs to be done 
to discern whether the situation has changed.  
A central issue, then, is the degree to which the EFC represents its base, the same issue Stackhouse 
raised in 1995. The issue is complicated by the fact that the base is becoming increasingly multi-
ethnic (Guenther 2008, 379-93). While many recent non-European Christian immigrants to Canada 
are socially conservative (Bramadat and Seljak 2008b, 423-26), meaning that recent evangelical 
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immigrants may share the same positions advanced by the EFC, there has been little EFC reflection in 
its literature about how new ethnic groups are impacting and influencing its positions and approaches. 
The role that new ethnic communities will play in the EFC requires further study.   
One area in which the EFC is showing new leadership pertains to the issues of poverty and 
homelessness. Prior to 2003 the EFC did not engage in a campaign to address poverty at the policy 
level, although in 1999 its Social Action Commission published a background paper on poverty 
entitled “Good news to the poor” in which it defined poverty as the situation “when persons, 
associations or institutions lack the resources and space they need to fulfil their God-given 
responsibilities and callings” (EFC 1999a, 2). For the EFC, then, it is not only those with little access 
to money who are poor; rather, people can be friend-poor, land-poor, or even culture-poor.  
In 2003 the EFC created the Roundtable on Poverty and Homelessness. A partnership of front line 
organizations involved with issues of homelessness,302 the Roundtable organizes bi-annual “Street 
Level” conferences that bring together frontline workers and Christian groups dedicated to addressing 
the needs of the homeless. The first such conference occurred in 2006, after which the conference 
participants issued a manifesto that called on the Canadian government and churches to address the 
issues of homelessness. With regard to the role of government, the manifesto declared, “we expect 
good government to formulate policy that not only works toward a level playing field, but offers 
‘second chances’ to people who have failed or done wrong. We believe that justice ought to be 
primarily restorative rather than punitive. We recognize that both social policies and budgets are 
declarations of a government’s moral intent” (Roundtable 2006). The manifesto suggested that the 
presence of homelessness was a moral issue for all Canadians. In 2009, the EFC and the Roundtable 
supported Bill C-304, proposed legislation created by NDP MP Libby Davis that called for a national 
housing strategy for Canada’s homeless. The issue appears to be a significant area of interest and 
advocacy for the EFC leadership. It remains to be seen whether the evangelical base will follow the 
leadership and assume that the state has a significant role to play in succouring the poor. If such 
mobilization were to occur, it would be another example of EFC leaders contributing to the creation 
of a Canadian evangelical identity. 
                                                     
302 In 2006 there were 13 organizations represented in the Roundtable. Combined, they had 437 full-time staff 
supplemented by 310 others who worked part time and 35,000 volunteers who provide 337,000 volunteer hours 
(Clemenger 2006h, 14). 
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Of course the EFC is only one entry point into the world of evangelical politics. Much more work 
needs to done to determine the nature of evangelical engagement, its motivating factors, and long-
term goals. As this study argues, such study must focus on Canadian evangelicals as they are and how 
they act without the assumption that they are simply northern versions of the American Religious 




A list of the EFC affiliates 
Affiliate Denominations: Grace Communion International Church 
Anglican Network in Canada Independent Assemblies of God Int. (Canada) 
Apostolic Church of Pentecost of Canada Inc. Mennonite Church Canada 
Associated Gospel Churches of Canada North American Baptist Conference 
Baptist General Conference of Canada Pentecostal Assemblies of Newfoundland & 
Labrador 
Canadian Baptists of Ontario & Quebec Regional Synod of Canada Inc. 
Canadian Baptists of Western Canada The Christian & Missionary Alliance in Canada 
Canadian Conference of Mennonite Brethren 
Churches 
The Evangelical Christian Church in Canada 
Canadian Conference of the Brethren in Christ 
Church 
The Free Methodist Church in Canada 
Canadian Fellowship of Churches & Ministers The General Assembly of the Church of God in 
Western Canada 
Canadian National Baptist Convention The Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada 
Christian Reformed Church in North America The Salvation Army Canada/Bermuda Territory 
Church of the Nazarene Canada The Wesleyan Church of Canada 
Congregational Christian Churches in Canada United Brethren Church in Canada 
Convention of Atlantic Baptist Churches Vineyard Resources Canada 
Evangelical Covenant Church of Canada Vision Ministries Canada 
Evangelical Free Church of Canada  
Evangelical Mennonite Conference Observers: 
Evangelical Mennonite Mission Conference Canadian Baptist Ministries 
Evangelical Missionary Church of Canada Lutheran Church – Canada 
Fellowship of Christian Assemblies of Canada The Anglican Church of Canada 
Fellowship of Evangelical Baptist Churches in 
Canada 
The Canadian Council of Churches 
Fellowship of Evangelical Bible Churches The Presbyterian Church in Canada 





Ministry Organizations: International Christian Embassy Jerusalem, 
Canada 
A Rocha Canada – Christians in Conversation International Christian Response 
African Enterprise Canada International Justice Mission Canada 
Aglow International Canada International Teams of Canada 
Arab World Ministries Canada Interserve Canada 
Arrow Leadership Ministries Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship 
Association Chretienne Pour La Francophonie Jews for Jesus Canada 
Back to the Bible Canada Medicine Hat Evangelical Association 
Billy Graham Evangelistic Association of 
Canada 
Mission Aviation Fellowship of Canada 
Bridgeway Foundation Missionfest Toronto 
Bus Stop Bible Studies National Alliance of Convenanting 
Congregations 
Canadian Association of Pregnancy Support 
Services 
National Association of Marriage Enhancement 
Canada 
Canadian Bible Society – National Office National House of Prayer 
Canadian Council of Christian Charities New Directions Ministries of Canada 
Canadian National Christian Foundation OM Canada 
Christar OMF International, Canada 
Christian Horizons One Way Ministries 
Christian Info Society Open Bible Faith Fellowship of Canada 
Christian Medical and Dental Society Open Doors with Brother Andrew Canada 
Christian Studies International Ottawa Innercity Ministries 
Community Christian Fellowship Church of 
Canada 
Outreach Canada 
Compassion Canada Partners International, Canada 
CrossWorld Pioneers Canada 
Every Home for Christ International Power to Change 
Focus on the Family (Canada) Association Promise Keepers Canada 
Frontiers Renewal Fellowship within the Presbyterian 
Church in Canada 
Greater Europe Mission reSource Leadership International Inc.  
Home School Legal Defence Association Samaritan’s Purse, Canada 
In Touch Ministries of Canada Sanctuary Ministries of Toronto 





Plus: almost 1,000 individual congregations in the provinces and territories. For a complete list of 
these congregations, see the EFC’s website at http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/netcommunity/ 
page.aspx?pid=384 (accessed March 15, 2011). All information for Appendix A is taken from this 
site. 
Ministry Organizations continued: Columbia Bible College 
Siloam Mission Church of the Nazarene Crandall University 
SIM Canada Eston College 
The Mustard Seed Society Heritage Baptist College and Heritage 
Theological Seminary 
The Navigators of Canada – National Office Horizon College & Seminary 
The Salvation Army Ethics Centre Institute for Christian Studies 
The Scott Mission Living Faith Bible College 
The Voice of the Martyrs Inc. Master’s College & Seminary 
Threshold Ministries McMaster Divinity College 
Toronto Church Planting Nipawin Bible Institute 
Toronto City Mission Pacific Life Bible College 
VisionLedd Ministries Peace River Bible Institute 
WEC International Prairie Bible Institute 
World Relief Canada Providence College & Seminary 
World Vision Canada Redeemer University College 
Wycliffe Bible Translators of Canada, Inc. Regent College 
Yonge Street Mission Rocky Mountain College 
Youth for Christ Canada St. Stephen’s University 
 Steinbach Bible College 
Educational Institutions: Summit Pacific College 
ACTS Seminaries Taylor College and Seminary 
Alberta Bible College The King’s University College 
Ambrose University College Trinity Western University 
Bethany Bible College Tyndale University College & Seminary 
Bethany College Vanguard College 
Booth University College  
Briercrest College and Seminary  
Canadian Mennonite University  
Canadian Southern Baptist University  




Statement of Faith of the World Evangelical Alliance 
“We believe 
...in the Holy Scriptures as originally given by God, divinely inspired, infallible, entirely 
trustworthy; and the supreme authority in all matters of faith and conduct...  
One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit...  
Our Lord Jesus Christ, God manifest in the flesh, His virgin birth, His sinless human life, 
His divine miracles, His vicarious and atoning death, His bodily resurrection, His ascension, 
His mediatorial work, and His Personal return in power and glory...  
The Salvation of lost and sinful man through the shed blood of the Lord Jesus Christ by faith 
apart from works, and regeneration by the Holy Spirit...  
The Holy Spirit, by whose indwelling the believer is enabled to live a holy life, to witness 
and work for the Lord Jesus Christ...  
The Unity of the Spirit of all true believers, the Church, the Body of Christ...  
The Resurrection of both the saved and the lost; they that are saved unto the resurrection of 
life, they that are lost unto the resurrection of damnation.” 
 
As found at http://www.worldevangelicals.org/aboutwea/statementoffaith.htm (accessed 
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